ML20092G503
| ML20092G503 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/1995 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20092G495 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9509190335 | |
| Download: ML20092G503 (5) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES y'
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2066&4001
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1 SAr'ETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.113 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-38 ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC.
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION. UNIT 3 DOCKET NO. 50-382
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By applications dated June 22, and December 9, 1994, Entergy Operations, Inc.
(the licensee), requested changes to the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, (Waterford 3), Technical Specifications (TSs).
The requested changes would revise plant protection system trip setpoints and allowable values such that they will be consistent with the current setpoint/ uncertainty methodology being implemented at Waterford 3.
The proposed changes are based on recalculated uncertainties resulting from an improved setpoint uncertainty calculation and the installation of upgraded transmitters that provide input to the protection system.
The changes account for additional uncertainties and do not affect the original safety analysis 4
values (analytical limits).
The proposed changes affect TS Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-4 and associated Bases 2.2.1, 3/4.3.1, and 3/4.3.2 as follows:
1.
Table 2.2-1 Item 2) Linear Power Level - High: The trip setpoint of s110.1% of Rated Thermal Power (RTP) and the allowable value of s110.7%
RTP would be changed to $108% and $108.76% respectively.
2.
Table 2.2-1 Item 3) Logarithmic Power Level - High:
The allowable value of s0.275% of RTP would be changed to 50.280%.
3.
Table 2.2-1 Item 4) Pressurizer Pressure - High:
The trip setpoint of
$2365 psia and allowable value of $2372 psia would be changed to reflect s2350 and s2359 respectively.
4.
Table 2.2-1 Item 5) Pressurizer Pressure - Low: The allowable value of 21644 psia would be changed to 21649.7.
5.
Table 2.2-1 Item 6) Containment Pressure - High:
The allowable value of
$17.3 psia would be changed to sl7.4.
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Table 2.2-1 Item 7) Steam Generator Pressure - Low:
The allowable value of 2748 psia would be changed to 2 M 9.9.
7.
Table 2.2-1 Item 8) Steam Generator Level - Low:
The allowable value of 226.7% would be changed to 226.48%.
8.
Table 2.2-1 Item 11) Steam Generator Level - High:
The allowable value of $88.4% would be changed to 588.62%.
9.
Table 2.2-1 Item 16) Reactor Coolant Flow - Low:
The trip setpoint of 223.8 psid and the allowable value of 223.6 psid would be changed to j
219.00 and 218.47 respectively.
l
- 10. Table 3.3-4 Item Sb) Refueling Water Storage Pool - Low:
The allowable value of 29.3% would be changed to 29.08%.
- 11. Table 3.3-4 Items 7c & d) Emergency Feedwater, Steam Generator AP - High: The trip setpoint of $127.6 psid and allowable value of sl36.6 psid would be changed to s123 psid and $134 respectively.
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2.0 EVALUATION I
The proposed changes are based on recalculated uncertainties resulting from an improved plant protection system trip setpoint uncertainty calculation and the installation of several upgraded transmitters.
1 Each protective function effected by the proposed changes is discussed below:
Linear Power Level - Hiah: This signal initiates a reactor trip on high linear neutron flux and provides protection against core damage during uncontrolled Control Element Assembly (CEA) withdrawal from low power; uncontrolled CEA withdrawal at power; and CEA ejection.
The proposed changes would revise the Linear Power Level - High setpoint, in TS Table 2.2-1 from i
s110.1% of RTP to s108% and the allowable value from s110.7% RTP to s108.76%
to ensure the analytical limit of 115% is met with excess margin.
Loaarithmic Power level - Hiah: This signal assures the integrity of the fuel cladding and reactor coolant system boundary in the event of an unplanned criticality during a shutdown condition, resulting from either dilution of the i
soluble boron concentration or withdrawal of CEAs and provides protection during CEA withdrawal. The proposed changes would revise the Logarithmic Power Level - High allowable value, in TS Table 2.2-1 from so.275% RTP to
$0.280% to ensure the analytical limit of 2.6% is met with excess margin.
Pressurizer Pressure - Hioh: This signal initiates a reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure.
It provides protection against high reactor coolant system pressure. And in conjunction with pressurizer safety valves and main steam safety valves, it provides protection against overpressurization of the reactor coolant pressure boundary during loss of electrical load without reactor trip from turbine trip, loss of condenser vacuum, CEA withdrawal from low power conditions, chemical and volume control system malfunction, or main 4
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a feedwater system pipe break events. The proposed changes would revise the Pressurizer Pressure - High setpoint, in TS Table 2.2-1 from s2365 psia to
$2350 and the allowable value from s2372 psia to $2359 to ensure the analytical limit of 2422 is met with excess margin.
l Pressurizer Pressure - Low: This signal limits core damage during postulated loss of coolant accident and CEA ejection events. The proposed changes would 4
revise the Pressurizer Pressure - Low allowable value, in TS Table 2.2-1 from 21644 psia to 21649 to ensure the analytical limit of 1560 is met with excess margin.
Containment Pressure - Hiah:
This signal protects the containment vessel integrity and minimizes radioactive releases during a postulated main steam i
i line beak event. The proposed changes would revise the Containment Pressure -
i High allowable value, in TS Table 2.2-1 from s17.3 psia to $17.4 to ensure the analytical limit of 19.7 is met with excess margin.
Steam Generator Pressure - Low: This signal provides a reactor trip to assist l
the engineered safety features system during a main steam line break or l
feedwater line break event. The proposed changes would revise the Steam Generator Pressure - Low allowable value, in TS Table 2.2-1 from 2748 psia to 2749.9 to ensure the analytical limit of 678 psia is met with excess margin.
Steam Generator Level - Low:
This signal assures that there is sufficient time for actuating the emergency feedwater pumps to remove decay heat from the reactor during a main steam line break event.
The proposed changes would revise the Steam Generator Level - Low allowable value, in TS Table 2.2-1, from 226.7% to 226.48% to ensure the analytical limit of 5% is met with l
excess margin.
Steam Generator Level - Hiah: This signal prevents moisture carryover from the steam generators which could result in damage to the turbines.
The i
proposed changes would revise the Steam Generator Level - High allowable i
value, in TS Table 2.2-1 from s88.4% to s88.62% to ensure the analytical limit of 90% is met with excess margin.
Reactor Coolant Flow - Low: This signal provides protection for loss of reactor coolant flow during a sheared shaft event and steam line break with a loss of offsite power event. The proposed changes would revise the Reactor Coolant Flow - Low trip setpoint, in TS Table 2.2-1, from 223.8 psid to 219.00 i
and allowable value from 223.6 psid to 218.47 to ensure the analytical limit i
of 15.68 is met with excess margin.
Refuelina Water Storaae Pool - Low: This signal allows long term cooling of i
the reactor core during a loss of coolant accident. The proposed changes would revise the Refueling Water Storage Pool - Low allowable value, in TS l
Table 3.3-4, from 29.3% to 29.08% to ensure the analytical limit of 7.43% is met with excess margin.
i Steam Generator Differential Pressure - Hiah: This signal enables emergency i
feedwater only to the intact steam generator during a steam line break event.
3
The proposed changes would revise the Steam Generator Differential Pressure -
High setpoint, in TS Table 3.3-4 from s127.6 psid to s123 and the allowable i
value from s136.6 psid to s134 to ensure the analytical limit of 230 psid is met with excess margin.
The proposed changes to Bases 2.2.1, 3/4.3.1, and 3/4.3.2 would revise the Bases to include a brief description of how the trip setpoints and allowable values are determined.
We have reviewed the proposed TS changes and conclude that these changes have no effect on the original safety analysis values (analytical limits). Also these changes meet the intent of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.105, Revision 2,
" Instrumentation Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation" because its guidelines were used as a guide for establishing the Waterford 3 setpoint program. This program was used to establish the proposed new setpoints and allowable values for trip parameters.
4 Based on the above, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station TS Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-4 and Bases 2.2.1,
~
3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 are consistent with the criteria of RG 1.105, and are therefore, acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official i
had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a pro-posed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 39586 and 60 FR 6300). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR i
51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors:
B. Marcus H. Balukjian Date: September 5, 1995 t
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