ML20091Q627

Proposed Tech Specs Revising Bases for Supplemental Leak Collection & Release Sys

ML20091Q627
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	06/01/1984
From:	DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20091Q612	List: ML20091Q610 ML20091Q622 ML20091Q627
References
NUDOCS 8406140113
Download: ML20091Q627 (5)

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ATDCIDENT A -

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Remme pages: ' $/3/4.[7-5,;-B.3/4 9-1,

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PIANT SYSTDE BASEE 3/4.7.7 OCNTROL RON DERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the control rom ventilation system ensures that

1) the ambient air t-W.;. tare does not exceed the allowable tenperature-

. for contirur== duty rating ~ for the equipnent and instrumentation cooled by n

this system and 2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.

The

@ERABILITY of this system in conjunction with cmtrol rom design pro-visions ~is based an~ limiting the radiation expcsure to personnel occupying the control rom to 5 rem or less whole body,.or its equivalent. This

. limitation is ' consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 19 ef Al;==rv14v "A", 10 CFR 50.

3/4.7.8 SUPPLBE!NmL LEAK mrmTIm Ale RELEASE SYSTEM (SICRS)

'!he' OPERABILITY of-the SIERS provides for the filtering of postulated radWetive effluents resulting. frm a Fuel Handling Accident (MIA) and fra-leakage.of IOSS of-COO [ ANT ACCIDENE (IOCA) activity frm systems

-cutside of the Reactor Containment.bs41 ding, such as Ehgineered Safeguards Featares ~ (EEF) 'equipnent, prior to their release to the environment. This system also collects potet.ial 3makage of. IOCA activity frm the Reactor

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d.' bi41 ding pd. Lations into the contiguous areas ventilated by the SECRS except' fcr the Main Steam Valve Bom and hpy Air Iock. The operation of this system was====ad in <-=1r'i1= ting the postulated offsite doses in. the. analysis for r. PHA.

System operation was also assuned in that_ portion of. the 'Dengn Basis Accident -(DBA) IDCA analysis which addressed. ESF leakage ;ollowing the IOCA, however, no credit for' SICRS operation was taken in the DBA IOCA analysis for collection ni filtration of Reactor Containment bi41 ding leakage even though ' an unquantifiable anount of contiguous aret pw L. Lien 1==k=<= _ would in fact be collected and filtered.- Based on the results of. the analyses,. the SICRS must -be CPERABIJi: to ensure that ESP laak=<= following the postulated DBA IOCA and, o

l leakage resulting from a MIA will not exceed 10 CFR 100 limits..

~3/4.7.9. SEALED SOURCE JNTAMINATION Thei limitations en aanlad source removable cxmtamination ensure that the. total body or individual organ'irradiaticn does not exceed alloweble -

limits in the event of ingestion or inhalation of the source naterial.Ihe limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is haaad on 10 CFR 79.39(c) ~ limits for plutonium.

T==k=<= of sources excluded frm the requirenents of this specification

. represent less than one maximum permissible body burden for total body

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irradiatim if the source material is inhaled or ingested.

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3/4.7.10 and 3/4.7.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMNAL SYSTEM (RHR)

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Deleted BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-5 l

PROPOSED WORDING p

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on minimum boron concentration (2000 ppa) ensure that:

1) the reactor will remain suberitical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2), a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. The limitation on K of no greater than 0.95 which includes a conservative allowance for uIb$rtanties, is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during refueling operations.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of. the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in

.the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to move-ment of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed;to allow the radioactive decay of the short

~ lived fission products. This decay ~ time is consistent with the assump-tions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment penetration closure and operability.

of the containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment or filtered through

the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to.the atmosphere within 10'CFR 100 limits.- The OPERABILITY and closure l'

- restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release

from a fuel: element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressur-ization potential while in the REFUELING MODE. Operations of :he con-tainment purge and exhaust system'HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and the resulting iodine. removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions-of the accident analysis.

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. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-1 Proposed Wording

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ATI%CHMENT B Safety Evaluation Proposed 01ange Bequest No. 81 amends the beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.1 Technical Specifications, Appendix A concerning the Bases of the Supplementary Ieak Collection and Belease Syste (SIERS) and the Cona4==nt Purge and Exhaust System to reflect the existing Fuel Handling Accident analysis and.the new IOCA offsite dose analysis recently irm;cipcaated into the UFSAR.

Description and Purpose of Change The Bases-for the SICRS have been revised to more explicitly define the conditions and leakage -pathways for which operation of the system is assumed in the analysis. 'Ihe SICRS Bases will then be consistent with the

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existing Fuel Handling AMdent analysis ana the new IOCA offsite dose analysis.

'1he Bases for the Contalment Purge and Exhaust System have been revised to include a requirment to restrict the resultant. radioactive discharge to the abuvsphere to within 10CFR100 limits follcwing a fuel elemnt rupture during refueling operatims when discharging frm '

contalment through the SICRS.

. Basis i

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Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equignent in w 1. Lust to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR increased? _No

_Reasm:

The changes are administrative in nature and do not require physical change to the SIERS or the Containment Purge and Exhaust system.

The changes reflect the. accident analysis and do not affect the system descriptions of Section 6.6.

Therefore, the probability 'of an occurrence or. the l'

consequence of an accident or malfunction of this equipnent will not be increased.

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Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipnent not previously evaluated in the UFSAR created? @

Beason:

Changing the Bases to be consistent with the new analysis does not affect the operation of the system.

Therefore, since this change is adminictrative in nature, it will not create the possibility for a new type of accident or malfunction of equignent as described in Section 14.3 of the l

UFSAR.

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-Attachment B-Safety Evaluation

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Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification -twhvw1? g.

Reason:

The Bases have been revised to be consistent with the new analysis of offsite doses resulting frun a IOCA.

The new analysis is more conservative since no credit is taken for SICRS' oollection of containment leakage, and ESF v4==nt leakage is now considered as a pui.=nt.ial source for rariinetive release. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for these specifications will be increased since radinetive relaaaaa nust be-controlled to limit offsite doses to within 10CFR100 limits.

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namad on the above, is an unreviewed safety question involved? 3 5

Conclusim The~ gw_i chanr=a are =tainiatrative in nature and do.not involve

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physical change to plant safety-related systems, cmponents or structures, will not increase the lika14hnnd' of a malfunction of safety-related y.

equiptent, increase the consequences of an accident previously analyzed, nor create the possibility of a malfunctim different than previously.

evaluated in the UFSAR. The changes reflect accident analysis described in the UFSAR and do not affect the existing systen or. its limiting conditions for ' operation.

The OSC and -ORC have reviewed the proposed change and deramine that-the changes are safe and do not involve an unreviewed safety question.-

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