ML20090H712

Control of Heavy Loads,Brunswick Units 1 & 2, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20090H712
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	04/23/1984
From:	Bomberger C FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Singh A NRC
Shared Package
ML20090H713	List: ML20090H712
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07976, TAC-7976, TER-C5506-340-3, TER-C5506-340-341, NUDOCS 8404250179
Download: ML20090H712 (28)

Text

-

f.-

Ei .:

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT

.s i CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS "i CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-324, 50-325 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRC TAC NO. 07976, 07977 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-130 FRC TASKS 340, 341 t?.:

9.

W W

rI Prepared by Franklin Research Center Author: C. Bomberger 4 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A. Singh _

April 23, 1984 This report was prepared as an account of work sponw.ed by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their amployees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

\

S yA i

gy0Y ^00. Franklin Research Cent A Division of The Franklin Institute The Benprnin Frankhn Parm.ey. PMa.. Pe 19103 (2151 d48 100o

~

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-324, 50-325 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRC TAC NO. 07976, 07977 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 N RC CONTRACT NO. N RC43-81-130 FRC TASKS 340, 341 Prepared by Franklin Research Center Author: C. Bomberger 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A. Singh April 23, 1984 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa.

ratus, product Or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would nct infringe privately owned rights.

Prepared by: Review by: Approved by:

Ab u/run C / $1 A vW Principal Auth6r 'Gy6upfLeader Department Dfected Date: N Date: 4IM I4 Date: 4. f 4

-b

00. Franklir. Research Center A Division of The Franklin Institute The Ben,arrun Frankkn Parm.ey. PM4.. Pa 19103 (2 t h 448 1000 i

TER-C5506-340/341 4

CONTENTS Section Title Page 1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ,

1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . . . . . . . . . 2 2 EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 18 '

3 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling . . . . . . 21 3.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 21 4 REFERENCES ., . . . . ., . . . . . . . . 23 O

3 l

I

• l I

i l

l 111 s

t 0N kNn Res_earch Center

t .

TER-C5506-340/341 FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Researca Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connaission (Office of ,

Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the NRC.

Mr. C. Bomberger and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc.

a ..

W G

e e

he me_

TER-C5506-340/341

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy and procedures at the Carolina Power and Light Company's (CP&L) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2 Plant. This _

evaluation was performed with the following objectives:

o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],

Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.

1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND, Generic Technical Activity Task ' A-36 was established by the Nuclear

~

Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing

, criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes in these. measures. This activity was. initiated by a letter issued by

,the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Imada at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.

In order to upgrade measures provided to control the handling of heavy

-loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first part of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling

I '

TER-C5506-340/341 systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their

' probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second part of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are -

provided, in addition to these required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that th'e potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequencer is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria. .

~

A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines so as to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is appropriately small. The intent of the

', . guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the following:

o define 's'afe load travel paths, through procedures and operator training, so that, to the extent practical', b9avy loads are not ,

carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o' provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system.

Staff 3uidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 tof NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREGs0612 recommended that a program be initiated to ensure dmat these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.

1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a' letter [3] to CP&L, the Licensee

'for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant,-requesting that the Licensee review provisions for the handling and control of heavy loads at the Brunswick plant, evaluate there provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent o ,

. I Udw Franidin Research Center . .

A Dhasen of The Fiemen hemans

l i

, TER-C5506-340/341 determination of conformance to these guidelines. CP&L responses to this -

request were submitted on September 22, 1981 [4], November 16, 1982 [5],

February 3, 1984 [6], and February 6, 1984 [7). Clarifications to Licensee statements were identified in a conference call conducted on February 21, 1984 (8) and in an additional submittal dated March 20, 1984 [91 All information submitted has been incorporated into this technical evaluation. -

9

.~

i. .

l u00 en aso me ch c.n ,  !

Aom- wnmr mmmmm j

'6 * "

TER-C5506-340/341

2. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2 with respect to NRC staff guidelines provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the' general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim _

measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. In each case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, Licensea-provided information is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional action where appropriate, is presented. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1.

2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES -

The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth ap'proach for the handling of heavy

~

~

loads. These guidelines c'onsist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures _

Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices Guideline 5 - Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed)

Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)

Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling systems and procedures used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the ,

reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. 'The Licensee's verification of the extent to which these guidelines have been satisfied, and evaluatiens of I .this verification are contained in the susneeding paragraphs.

i renidin Research Center -

• A Chaman af The F#enten buemme

w- .. -

} .

e

- Table 3.1. Stunswick 'auclear Power Plant /tsumEG-0612 Compliance statels C3 Interte Interim weight

' Culdeline S Culdeline 6 Culdeline ? Meneere I steasure 6 or Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Caldeline 3 Caldeline 4 Techalcal special Capacity safe lead Crane operator special Lifting Crane - Test Neavy toads Itonal Pathe Procedure s Traintne Devices Si lsma s and laspection Crane Deelen gpeelticatione Attention sL:3

-~ - * - - * * *

• F" Dis t id t swg Crano

- C -- - -- C a shielding / 110 C C Accese Plag g

C -- - -- +- C u Drywell need el C C -

4 and Strongback C - -- -- - C peactor Vessel 70 C C -

Mead esel I Strongback

-- - C -- -- -- C Steae Dryer 37.5 C e C and Silevy -

• Assembly I -- -- C

• - - C -

noletate' St C .C

.e,.r.to, en.

Sting Asseshly .

- C - - - C p.P.V. Serelce 1 C C -

Platform and Sling Assembly C ~ - -- - C Need Strongback 5 C C -

( w -- -- -- - C n.v. mea.1 2 C C -

l i insulation and Strongback R -- -- -- - C

' Stol Tensioner 3.5 C C -

C C - - C HEPA Filter 2 and Sling l

assembly

- C -- -- C --

W sgient ruel 4 C C -

A

, C.t.. (11

{

and slang Assembly

[

m l

0 W'

l'

' C = Licensee action complies with gesnEG-0412 Culdeline.

• o R = Licensee has proposed reelefone oc andlfications which, when Septemented, will be in compliance with NUMEG-0642. \

W

- = Not appllcable.

8 e

i ,

i I

A

m _ .

c-era .

c:: .a

> =vg Table 3.1 tcont.)

' 3 3 Interte latesta E teelght Guideline 1 Guideline 3 Culdeline 3 Guideline 4 Guldeline S Guideline 6 Culdeline 7 steasure 1 neasure 6 13 or Cuane - Test Technical Special Safe Lead crane oposator Special Lif ting fM g e.e, -e Capacity iton.i ,at ,,.ee.u.a. T..inine meices Sii . .nd Ine ecti.n Cr.ne . . en , S.eci,ie.tions .ttenti.n C -= == = C -

Spent Fuel SG C -C -

~

Shipping Cast

- C - -- C --

-

• ruel pack and 4.3 C C -

Sling Aseeably

-- C - -- C -

Cattle Chute 12 C C ~

C - - - - C Shielded Per- 4.3 C C -

sonnel tensk Basket e

~ - -- -- - C --

peplacement ruel - "C Storage packe g

On R - *- - -- C

,I p.v. Ilead Stud 0.3 C C -

~ C -- -- -- C aseed Mut and 8.3 C C ~ .

Washot peck

- C -- -- -- C leead Stud pack 1.5 C C -

- - - -- C --

. Refueling and 0.4 C C --

seswice Toole I - -- -- -- C --

New Fuel C.3 C C -

~ - C -- -- - C Dehrlo Cack 11 C C R -- -- - -- C 5 lavessel serence el C C -

Platform anel

~

St rongtMt

- C = -- C --

Flus stonitor 2.5 C C ==

pil and Shipping Csate -

Ut Ut O

On I

w b

O

\

w b

V f

}

. 1

T7 h -

.f c= Table 2.1 lCont.)

5 m

N tielght ,

lateria latesam os Culdeline 3 Culdeline 4 Culdeline 5 Culdeline 6 Caldeline 7 Deeaouse 3 feessisse 6 Capacity, Culdeline Safe Lead I Culdeline 2 Cr ane Opes atot Special Lifting Crane . Test Technical $6ecial aseavy Imads Pathe Procedur e s Tsalaine Devices slange and last+ction Crane Design Speeltications Attention

.g itonal

1. 25 a De f ue ling S.4 -- -- C -- - C C C C 2.

Plattose C -- - -- - C --

Stet Puel 9.4 C ==

Assemblies 4.1 C C -- -- -- -- - C --

B Ptsa Puel

- -- -- - C --

Defueling and 0.4 C C --

Service Toofs i -- C C C C

3. ste f ueling e.S - -- C --

J ll> Cr one e

C C - - C * -- -- C --

selveling Tools - .

0.5 - C -- C -- - C --

I peactor C -

Comnenente Pe act os sudIding 20 -- - C -- -- C C -- --

4. '

noists pesa Pumps and 4.3 , C C - ~ C -- - -- --

Sting Assembly DCic Pump and 0.3 C C == -- C -- -- -- -

Tusbine ulth Sling Assembly perCI Pump and 4.2 C C -- == C -- -- -- --

Tushine ulth Sting Assembly

- C -- -- -- --

I esta Seswice 5 C C --

teates and boostes ruage ulth Sting g

Assembly O

-- -- L8 pecisculation 17 C C -- -- C -- --

tn Pumps and Sling o Assema,lr m

I ta -

b O

\

- La b

Y i

e

' I i 1!

n gygOU o s.O\ tov as 6 n n l o ieai r sit eecn -

t s ee aspt l eSt M A e

n o

1li n at I eca

si c

' eunI - - - - -

t mhf nacl i eee st Te p

s t

1 ls t

ue D e

t - - - - - - -

e e C - C - C - - - - - -

d n l e u a C C n

at o si eet nTc i e l - p e s - - - - -

d ea nl C - C - C - - - - - -

lea Crd Cn a e S

e n e l e l n e l d l S

- C - C - C C C C C C

.au

)

C t g n n o 4i C

(

t '

ef s nie 1 i l Lci el v 2 d ae 4 iD l

e luc ce b p -

a s T

r 3o~ t t

eae nr n i et l pn - - - -

d eOi a

C - C - C ~ - - - - -

es lent Ga r

C 2

s e e n r u

il d e e d c C - C - C C C C C C i o a r Cs P i

d ea noe i l h l t eea df P ia

- C - C - C C C C C C s

= S C .

y 8 7 1 0 5 6 t t ) S.

h l e S' 1 S $ . 3 1 8 2 7 0 igt eeo en 3 2 2 2 1 e pt w a( r r t n C oe oh o h e g d e t e t t y t t t y n a y ny e,

an aI t ss ij a sl s l al s r a s uhe sl wh r el e b b s ee er nC e

nee eo n C tS t m nsm ns n S e et s nH e

s e as e a ade W asns ope oo o k t.

s Cg n

Gns eA Cg n

e s gA t

a Wt my eal e A ims t us aPA i t g t ony aMil i g

n id c t na aaba an.,n, g

ei.

d a

li l n eog li h cg et c h ce l l t h l n l ci ed sl spn ed sl t n t c au is.

vpe l s g ean ur g cen erS n ce e e.lur ve n

t eiS .

vv e l

o el u

eai inl el e

ii wt t e nt e es ees st l eaI r ta ial s t J s ans a.cee r

r t s asI ee y

v lOS DCS lOS SS iS SPA Sn e S CWs iCwaA Tuiat cwS s

T S e .e a

e . .

.sI S 6 1.

D .

iC3, n #

e . .'

=

c 13

1. Fg -

7O =

lll ll

TER-C5506-340/341 ,

2.1.1 Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee's review of overhead handling systems identified the follow-ing overhead handling systems to be subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612:

Reactor' Building o reactor building crane o refueling platform o refueling jib crane o hand-operated chain hoists

( HR- 2 , - 3 , - 4 , -7 , -10 , -11, -12 , -13 , -2 0 , - 21)

Diesel Generator Building o 5-ton single bridge cranes (4) -

o 5-ton hr7d operated chain hoist Intake Structure:

'-~

o intake structure crane.

Ndmerous handling devices identified by the Licensee have been excluded -

from compliance with NUREG-0612. The following handling systems were excluded on the basis that no safety-related ' equipment 'or irradiated fuel is located in -

close proximity:

Reactor Building ,

o vacuum breakers hoist o CRD and RCIC pumps hoists o valve removal hoist and trolley o contamination equipment room hoist and trolley o -gamma scan lead plug hoist o access and hatch covers hoists and trolley o removable platform hoist .

o neutron monitoring equipment hoist o relief valves hoist and davit Intake structure o intake structure hoist I

remi Remenh Cwer

. ADhaman af The homen huahme .

I l

TER-C5506-340/341 Radwaste Building .

~

o HVAC equipment hoists and trolley o demineralizer tank hoists and trolley o fuel pool and waste collector filter hoist and trolley o floor drain filters hoist and trolley o centrifuge hoists.

The following handling systems were excluded on the basis that no system ~

or components required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal are located in the areas where the handling systems are located:

Turbine Building

.: o turbine building overhead traveling bridge o auxiliary bay semi-gantry crane o recirculation pumps hoists -

o condensate booster pumps hoist _

o air compressor hoist Shop Cranes and Miscellaneous Hoists o hot machine shop crane .

o clean machine shop crane o floor plug and offgas filter hoist and trolley -

o pumps and valves hoist o HVACfequipment hoist

.o. AOG equipment hoist. _

b. Evaluation and Conclusion The Licensee's exclusion of listed handling systems from compliance with NUREG-0612 is acceptable on the basis of the Licensee's justification that

. either (1) physical separation exists between the handling system and any safety-related system or irradiated fuel or (2) no systems or components required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal are located in the arcas where the handling systems are' located.

2.1.2 Safe Load Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(1)]

" Safe load paths should be defined for the covement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe

~

shutdown-equipment.' The path should follow, tc the extent practical, Ubu Frenidin Research Center

• A Chemen of The huseen busnes

.c.

r - m -

) TER-C5506-340/341

, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly. marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

a.

~

Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions All heavy loads have been tabulated with their respective written procedures (except for replacement of fuel racks) . Safe load paths have been developed, identified in plant drawings, and included in plant procedures.

The Licensee noted that loads are moved by the safest and shortest paths in accordance with the above procedures and drawings, and with due consideration to the avoidance of irradiated fuel and sa'fety-related equipment. The procedures refer operational personnel to the applicable load path drawings which, with electrical interlock's, should prevent loads from being carried over the spent fuel and the reactor except during specific operations.

.In lieu of marking the load path, the Licensee stated that Procedure MP-06 will be revised to require the signalman and crane operator to review and walk the path to the extent possible prior to load movement. 'In addition, devi3tions'to approved load paths are reviewed in accordance with Technical -

Specification 6.5, and procedures will be revised to caution users that deviations must be performed in accordance with special procedures prepared by the Brunswick engineering staff.

b. Evaluation .,

The Licensee's response clearly states that load paths have been

. developed,. defined in procedures (except for replacement of fuel storage racks), and incorporated into drawings which are in turn, included in

. appropriate procedures. Load paths have not been marked on the floors; however, the Licensee's decision to require the presence of a signalman who checks the path prior to movement is consistent with the intent of load path marking to provide visual aids for the crane operator.

'4 l!UUU Frenidin Research Center A OMmma ad The Poemaan kumme Q . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . -

TER-C5506-340/341 In addition, the Licensee has provided information which verifies tha.t deviations from established load paths will require written alternatives which must be reviewed and approved by the plant engineeering staff. Such an approach is consistent with the criteria of NUREG-0612.

c. Conclusion _

Development and implementation of safe load paths at the Brunswick plant are consistent with Guideline 1 of NUREG-0612.

2.1.3 Load Handling Procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(2) ]

" Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or coald be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures .

should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

These procedures should includes identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required befo,re movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions

. A detailed list of heavy loads and procedures governing the handling of . _

each load has been supplied b'y the Licensee, who states that these procedures meet the intent of Section 5.1.l(2) of NUREG-0612 and generally include sections concerning purpose, responsibility, precautions, special equipment and descriptions, references, safe load paths, and step-by-step instructions.

~

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Specific procedures identified by the Licensee for load handling in the reactor building have been developed in a manner consistent with Gu'ideline 2.

2.1.4 crane operator Training (Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(3))

l

" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in l

accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry l- Cranes' 110)."

L I

A brenklin Research Center A Dmmn W Dw Fwen heum .

-~_ , , . , , , ,,

I I

l .

~.

TER-C5506-340/341

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions -

The Licensee stated that all crane operators are trained in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 without exception, and that Brunswick Plant crane operators are required to requalify annually. To qualify initially, crane operators are required to receive classroom instructions, gain practical operating experience, and pass a written and physical examination. In addition, the immediate supervisor of the crane operator and signalman is tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that these individuals conduct themselves in a manner consistent with applicable standards and procedures.

b. Evaluation -

Programs for crane operators at the Brunswick plant satisfy the require-ments of this guideline on the basis of the Licensee's verification that existing programs comply with ANSI B30.2-1976. In addition, programs exist to monitor operator condu'ct following qualification.

c. Conclusion

' Training and qualification of crane operators at the Brunswick plant are conducted in accordance with the provisions of ANSI B30.2-1976 and Guideline 3 of NUREG-0612. .

2.1.5 Special Lifting Devices [ Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4)}

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978,

' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [11]. This standard should apply:to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard.

In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI

.N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads,that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the

- crane which will be used. This is stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device (NUREG-0612, Guideline 5.1.l(4)]."

N Pharden Reseweh Cenkt I A Dhemen elThe PsangSm hugnas

TER-C5506-340/341

a. Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions

, The following special lifting devices have been identified by the Licensee for review in accordance with this guideline:

o spent fuel cask yoke o shielded personnel work basket lifting apparatus o head strongback -

o dryer / separator sling o stud tensioner frame o invessel service platform strongback These special lifting devices are handled by the reactor building crane and the intake structure crane, which have maximum speeds of 3 and 13 feet per minute, respectively. Therefore, based upon guidance contained in CMAA-70, maximum dynamic loads may be considered to be 1.5% and 6.5% and may be -

~

disregarded.

The special lifting devices that have been identified were designed with a minimum safety factor of 4.5 (yield strength) and 6 (ultimate strength) .

values of design safety factors of the critical components of each device have been provided for review. Based upon present design, no modifications to -

accommodate current' standards are planned.

~

'The Licensee stated that the spent fuel cask yoke and'the ' shield'ed personnel lifting apparatus are of redundant design and are lifted by a single-failure-proof crane; therefore, a load drop of equipment handled by these devices is not considered credible.

All special lifting devices have been load tested; the head strongback

.has been load'terted to 142% (100 tons) of rated load, whereas the dryer /

separator sling and the spent fuel cask yoke have been load tested to 2004 of

. rated load. Remaining special lifting devices will be load tested in compliance with ANSI N.14.6-1978.

Regarding programs for assuring continuing compliance, the Licensee stated that programs are currently in place or will be fully implemented which satisfy Section 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978 with the following exception:

nklin Research Center

• A Dhemen af The Fransen basame

• .A -._u_ - _ __ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

+

TER-C5506-340/341 1

o For the spent fuel cask yoke and the shield personnel lif ting ,

apparatus, visual inspections required by Section 5.3.7 are performed i prior to use due to infrequent usage.

b. Evaluation Sufficient information has been provided by the Licensee to provide reasonable assurances of the design adequacy of the special lif ting devices subject to compliance with NUREG-0612. It is agreed that dynamic loads are reasonably small and may be disregarded. Design safety factors identified in the Licensee's submittal are well in excess of those required by ANSI N14.6-1978.

Regarding load tests, the performance of load tests of all lifting devices substantially in excess of 100% of rated load is or will be sufficient ..

to demonstrate fabrication practices and proof of workmanship of the assembled devices.

._ Programs that ensure continued compliance are also satisfactory based upon the Licensee's statements that, programs are in place or'will be developed which comply with Section 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978. The Licensee's proposal to perform inspections required by Section 5.3.7 on a prior-to-use b'asis,-is also _

consistent'with this guideline.

c. Conclusion .

Design of special lifting devices and programs to ensure their continued compliance at the Brunswick plant is consistent with the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978 and NUREG-0612, Guideline 4.

2.1.6 Lif ting Devices' (Not Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(5)]

" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings'

[12]. However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be

the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' that produces'the l

l 6

nE A Onnman of The Piensen tuuman

. . -. ,, ,,.om - , , :---.-. _ . _.n- -____ _ _ . ,

_ _ .. . .. _ .~. . . . . ,. . . ..

I TER-C5506-340/341 maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use .on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that "non-special" lifting devices are in compliance with ANSI B30.9-1971 or other applicable standards; however, components were sized to maintain a minimum safety factor of 5, based on ultimate strength and with consideration for static load only.

In addition, the safe working load of all slings will be reduced by 15%

to account for maximum dynamic. loading and will be appropriately marked to so indicate. No other restrictions exist on crane use.

b. Evalaation and Conclusion Selection and use of slings, including consideration of dynamic loading, are performed in a manner consistent with Guideline 5 of NUREG-0612.

2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) (Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(6)]

"The crane should be inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use when it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 mcnths during refueling operations and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, tests, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)." -

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions CP&L stated that crane inspection, testing, and maintenance programs at the Brunswick plant comply with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, and with the Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Secticn 179, 29CFR, Part 1910.

A -16 .

Ob Frdnklin Research Center A Dmun d Dw Fwen haue -

l TER-C5506-340/341

b. Evaluation and Conclusion The Brunswick plant satisfies the criteria of this guideline on the basis of the-Licensee's verification that the crane inspection, testing, and maintenance programs comply with ANSI B30.2-1976.

2.1.8 Crane Design - { Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, ' Section 5.1. (7) ] .

"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes, and of CHAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [13]. Jm alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

a.

Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions CP&L stated that all cranes and hoists used at the Brunswick plant (except the refueling bridge) were purchased in accordance with United

,__ Engineers specifications as follows:

1. The reactor building overhead cranes' specification requires that ,

these " cranes shall conform to the latest editions of CMAA Specification'Es. 70 for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes and ANSI B30.2 for Overhead .and Gantry Cranes .unless otherwise specified or ,

noted."

2. The' reactor building crane is of single-failure-proof design. The Licensee states that details of crane design were provided to the NRC by letters dated June 18, 1976 [14] and July 26, 1976 [15].

3. The intake structure. crane's specification requires that " cranes furnished under this specification shall conform to the requirements of American National Standard Safety Code for Overhead Gantry Cranes, ANSI B30.2 and the Crane Manufacturers Association of America,-Inc.,

, Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes, CMAA

. Specification No. 70." -

4. The . refueling jib crane'r specification requires that the " Jib crane shall conform to applicable portions of the following codes: AISC, NFPA, NEMA, ASA Safety Codes for Cranes, Derricks and Hoists, AWS, SSPC, ASTM, and ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, Division 1, and that the hoist shall be designed to the requirements 4

u00u r,.nkiin ne.e.,ch cenier.

A h of 7tte Piemen buense

_ ._. _ _ _ _ _ __ [.

TER-C5506-340/341 of NEMA and NEC as they apply to a hoist. The jib crane and its.

components were designed to withstand seismic events (while fully loaded) to the extent that a static loading of 1.0g applied in the direction of least resistance to that loading will not cause any part of the unit to be overstressed and will not result in a loss of control of load."

5. The remainder of cranes and hoists (except the refueling bridge) were _

purchased in accordance with specifications which require that the hoist and cranes "shall be furnished and designed in accordance with the Occupa'.ivual Safety and Health Administration Standard, 29CFR, which includes ANSI B30.2-1967. Overhead and Gantry Cranes and electrical equipment shall conform with the National Electric Code.

All equipment shall be secured in such a manner as not to fall during a seismic reaction while in an unloaded condition.".

b. Evaluation Cranes and hoists at the Brunswick plant satisfy the criteria of Guideline 7 on the basis that they were specified to conform to ANSI B30.2, CHAA-70, and other equivalent standards (refuell'ng jib' crane) .

c. Conclusion -

Design of cranes at the Brunswick plant'is consistent wit G'uideline 7 on ~

the basis of the Licensee's stated ' compliance with CMAA-70 and equivalent standards.

2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES

• The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potenLial for accidental load drops to impact on . fuel in the core; or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measutas of the report consist of Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:

4 .

4@JUU Fmnklin Reseanth Center -

. _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - I

l l

TER-C5506-340/341

1. Heavy load technical specifications

2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection -1 measures are contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.2.1 Technical Specifications (Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, l Section 5.3(1)]

" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,

' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementa-tion of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."

b. Evaluation, Conclusions, and Recommendations The Brunswick plant complies with Interim P'rotection Measure 1 on the basis that the reactor building crane 'is an approved single-failure-proof Crane.

2.2.2 Administrative Controls [ Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5. 3 ( 2)-5. 3 ( 5) ]

" Procedural or administrative measures (including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection] . . .

can be accomplished in a short-time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 (of NUREG-0612]~."

a. Evaluation The specific requirements for load handling administrative controls are contained in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6. The Licensee's compliance with these guidelines has been evaluated in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7, respectively, of this report.

4 Udd Franidin Research Center A Deveen af The Fransen kuunar 9- O

TER-C5506-340/341

b. Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions and recommendations concerning the Licensee's compliance with these administrative controls are contained in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7 of this report.

2.2.3 Special Review for Heavy Loads Handled Over the Core (Interim Protection -

Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5. 3 ( 6) ]

"...special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lif ting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, ,

slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies -

that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are f amiliar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of

,_ operation, and content of procedures."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions

, Interim actions identified in Reference 3 were implemented at the -

Brunswick plant in May 1981. A review of procedures was performed and the results were documented. Minor revisions were made for inclusion of and/or reference to loa'd paths, lif ting device inspections, training and qualifica-tion of operators, and repair and replacement of defecti'.e components.

'b. Evaluation and Conclusion Interim measures performed by the Licensee are in accordance with Interim Protection Measure 6.

l 4 -20 , -

I 000d Franklin Research Center a t>=.n et 1w r=nnen > . .

. . , - . . _ - . - ~

• l l

l

, TER-C5506-340/341

3. CONCLUSION This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NRC staff guidelines into an overall evaluation of heavy load handling at. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2. Overall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommen-dations for interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) .

3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR IDAD HANDLING The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for

~

handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas' where an accidental load drop could damage equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these guidelines.is twofold. A plant conforming'to these guidelines will have.

developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training,' safe load

~ -

travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical,' heavy loads are not

. carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant _

conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at Brunswick Units 1 and 2 can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines.

3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION ,

The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) certain measures l

that should be initiate.d to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performsd in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specified measures

! include the implementation of'a technical specification to prohibit the 1

U{. Frenidin Research Center A Onesen of The Psuneen buense

._ . - -7 --.--.---J .

e TER-C5506-340/341 handlitig of heav; loads over fual in the storage pools compliance with

, Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of WURT.G-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lif ting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component j failure. Evaluation of information provided indicates that the Licensee has .

satisfactorily complied with the interim protection measures at the Brunswick plant.

l

' , e e

renidin Research Center A Onnesen of The Fransen busans ,

~ . .o

~

TER-C5506-340/341

4. REFERENCES

' l. NRC -

" Control of Heavy Icads at Nuclear Power Plants" July 1980 NUREG-0612

2. V.'Stello, Jr. (NRC) -

Letter to all Licensees.

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel May 17, 1978

3. D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Letter to all operating reactors.

Subject:

Control.of Heavy Loads December 22, 1980

~ u . :, . , .

~

4. E. E. Utley (CP&L)

Letter to T. A. Ippolito (NRC).

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads -

September 22, 1981

5. S. R. Zimmmerman (CPL)

Letter to D. B. Vassallo (NRC) ,

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads November 16, 1982

6. S. R. Zimmmerman (CPL)

Letter to D. B. Vassallo (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy -Loads -

February 3,1984

7. S. R. Zimmmerman (CPL)

Letter to D. B. Vassallo (NRC) .

Subject:

Control of Heavy Icads February 6, 1984

8. Telephone Conference Call Involving Representatives of NRC, CPL, and Westec Services, as documented in Reference 9.

- February 21, 1984

9. S. R. Zimmerman Resq.onse to NRC Request for Additional Information -

Control of Heavy Loads. -

March 20, 1984

10. American National Standards Institute

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" New York: 1976 ANSI 330.2-1976 MJ Franklin Research Center 4 % .t w re.n ,

. , - - x . . . .. .. -.

o.

TER-C5506-340/341

.11. American National Standards Institute

" Standards for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000

. _ Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" ANSI N14.6-1978 .

12. American National Standards Institute

" Slings" ANSI B30.9-1971

13. Crane Manufacturers Association of America

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" Pittsburgh, PA CMAA-70

14. J. A. Jones (CP&L)

Letter to B. C. Rusche (NRC).

Subject:

Reactor Building Crane June 18, 1976

15. J. A. Jones (CPEL)

Letter to B. C. Rusche (NRC) .

Subject:

Reactor Building Spent Fuel Handling Cranes July 26,.1976

~

E Ubh Frenidin Research Center A Chnmen af1he Peeneen bustar ,

3

_