ML20088A516

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Responds to Open Items of Generic Ltr 83-42, Clarification of Generic Ltr 81-07 Re Response to NUREG-0612, 'Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants.'
ML20088A516
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/03/1984
From: Jens W
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To: Youngblood B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR EF2---67-211, GL-81-07, GL-81-7, GL-83-42, NUDOCS 8404120148
Download: ML20088A516 (53)
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Text

-, - .

Wayne H. Jens Vice Pnsident Nuclear Operations Edison E/J!?*- April 3, 1984 EF2 - 67,211 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

> Attention: Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief

'LicensingLDranch No.=1 Division of Licensing U. S. . Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555-

Dear.Mr.-Youngblood:

Reference:

(1) Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit h, 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 (2) NRC letter from B. J. Youngblood to 11 . Tauber dated November 1, 1983, Control of Heavy Loads at Fermi-2 in Accordance with NUREG-0612 (3) NRC Generic Letter 83-42, dated December 1 9,1983 Clarification to Generic letter 81-07 Regarding Response to NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants"

Subject:

- Control of Heavy Loads and Response to Generic Letter 83-42 The . following are in response to open items identified in the Executive Summary of Reference (2) above. The-responses;were discussed in detail with your staff and consultant (EG&G) in a telephone conference on Janua ry 13,11984.

Item No. 1: Final resolution of . identified design deficiencies and their correction is needed for the RPV'Strongback and Dryer / Separator Strongback.

Response: The RPV Strongback and Dryer / Separator Strongback will be upgraded to meet the single failure criteria of Section 6.2 of ANSI'N14.6. Modifications will be completed prior-to the use of these devices 8404120148 840403 PDR ADOCK 05000341 pqdh A PDR I l t

Mr. B. J. Youngblood April 3, 1984 EF2 '-- 67,211 Page 2 after initial criticality. Pages 2.1. 3-15 and 2. 2.3-2 of the Fermi-2 Heavy Load l Handling Review Report have been revised to incorporate the above commitment. (See attachuent.)

Items No. 2: The Reactor Building Crane Auxiliary hook needs mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to supplement the alarm and bypass when using loads above 1500 pounds.

Response: Both the Reactor Building Crane Auxiliary Hoist and Main Hoist operate from the same trolley. Therefore, the placement of mechanical stops to prevent the Auxiliary Hoist from entering the Fuel Pool and Reactor Vessel area would also restrict the Main Hoist from these locations. The single failure proof Main Holst is needed within this area for refueling and reactor maintenance.

It is also intended to use the Auxiliary Hoist to handle light loads (less than 2000 pounds) in the Fuel Pool and Reactor Vessel area. It is impractical to provide a complex mechanical interlock arrangement which would restrict the handling of heavy loads with the Auxiliary Holst yet allow the handling of light loads and the oper-ation of the Main Holst within this restricted area.

In addition, there is serious concern that the addition of a mechanical stop or inter-lock that abruptly interrupts the trans-verse motion of a suspended load, could initiate a serious accident. The proba-bility of such an accident is greater than the probability of a load drop occurring if a suspended load should inadvertenly be carried into a restricted area.

To meet the UUREG-0612 guidelines, yet avoid the impracticality and safety concerns of mechanical stops or interlocks ,

Edison has imposed a load limit feature for the Auxiliary Hoist that restricts this

= - .

Mr. B.'J.'Youngblood April 3, 1984

'EF2 - 67,211

Page 3 hoist from handling heavy loads (greater

.than 2000 pounds) over the Fuel Pool and the open Reactor. Prior to initiating a lift, the hoist operator will place the load limit switch in either the normal or bypass condition. When the switch is in the normal position, the hoist is limited to lifting only 2000 pounds due to a load sensing device in the control circuitry

'which prevents the hoist lifting motors from operating when the load to be lifted exceeds-2000 pounds. A red light on toth the outside of the hoist control cab and the operator's control panel notifies both the operator.and personnel on the refueling floor that the 2000 pound load limit is in effect.

When'the switch is in the bypass mode, the hoist may lift its rated load. Green lights on the outside of the cab and on the control. panel. notify both the hoist opera-tor and personnel on-the refueling floor that the load limit is being bypassed and the. hoist is not to be operated within the fuel pool or Reactor Vessel area.

Maintenance procedure provides rigid admin-istrative controls for-the auxiliary hoist to ensure compliance with -the load restric-tions, . painted barrier lines and the signs posted.in the fuel pool and reactor vessel

, area..

This -informationiis reflected in Section 2;2.4-a-(page 2.'2.4-2) and,2.3.2.b-B (page 2.3.2-76) of the Heavy Loads Report. (See attached)

Item No. 3: Resolve conflicts in hoist identification numbering.

Response: The hoist identification numbers in Table 2.1.1 (page 2.1.1-2)'and Table 2.3.2m (page 2.3.2-20 through-35a) of the Fermi 2'" Heavy Loads Handling . Review" report have been

' corrected.- (See attached)

-4 .

Mr. B.~Ji.Youngblood

-April,3, 1984

' EF2 - 67,211 Page 4' Item No. 4: Resolve the additional analysis needs rec-ognized for Reactor Building load numbers

, 13, 16, 17, 18, and the ventilation equip-

. ment sist. loads.

Response: Load 13:. Fuel Pool Gates A & B will be handled under single failure proof guide-lines.- Single failure proof slings have been purchased to be used with the Main.

Hoist in-the handling of these gates.

' Pages~ 2.3.2-16 and 73a have been updated to commit to the single failure proof handling of these gates. (See attached)

Loads 16 & 17: A portable gantry crane will be. purchased to handle the RWCU floor plugs and the floor plug at column (E-1/2-10-1/2). Page 2.3.2-74, Table 2.3.2 (page 2.3.2-20) and. Table 2.1.1 (page 2.1.1-2) have- been revised to incorporate the above commitment. (See attached).

Load 18: Page 2.3.2-74 has been updated committing to handling of the Equipment-Hatch plugs within single failure proof guidelines. (See attached)

Ventilation Equipment hoist: The contra -

dictions in .the Heavy Loads Handling Review Report have been corrected. Page 2.3.2-80 (attached) has been modified to agree with Table 2.1.1 in'specifying that a future hoist in conformance with ANSI B30.16 will be provided.

Item No. 5: Assure that the additional specification requirements of NUREG-0554 are used in hoists yet to tm purchased.

Response: There are no heavy load handling applica-tions other than those that can be handled

< by the Reactor Building Main Hoist that require handling within single failure aproof guidelines. However, if future single failure' proof requirements should arise that cannot be handled by the Main Holst,' future upgrading of that existing

m

Mr.SB.EJ.'Youngblood y

April 3,.1984

. EF2  : 67,211 Page 5 hoist or procurement of new hoists will be in conformance with NUREG-0554 guidelines.

Page 2.1.3-18 (attached) of the Fermi 2

" Heavy Load Handling Review" report has

, been revised.

Item No. 6: Address NUREG -0612 Article 5.1, Evaluation Criteria I, II, and III, as needed, to supplement the matrix analyses made on non-single failure proof hoists to show consis-tency with guidelines 5.1.4 and 5.1.6.

Response: For response, see revised page 2.3.2-1 and 2.3.2-la of the Fermi 2 Heavy Load Handling Review Report. (Attached)

.The preceding discussions should resolve the remaining NRC

-and EG&G concerns. In addition, as stated by your. staff, none-of~the above items represent fuel load conditions s since rthe interim measure identified in NUREG-0612, Article-5.3 were addressed in EF2-60134, October 15, 1982.

However, the resolutions provided above should alleviate the need for any license conditions on the Fermi 2 Operating License.

In a related matter,' Reference (3) raised a concern deal-Ling with the integrity of a single failure proof hoist

. when one of the three phase power leads is lost. The Fermi 2 Reactor Building Main Holst was reviewed and it was determined that the single failure proof features of

.this hoist preclude this as a possible load drop. scenario.

'The- Reactor Building Main Hoist has two motors each capa- '

ble'of handling-60 percent of the 125-ton rated hoist capacity. Each motor has an electro-mechanical brake which iis . capable of Lholding 150 percent 'of the hoist's rated load.- These brakes are powered from 2 of the 3 power phases supplying the -hoist. . The brakes will set to 5 hold the load upon' loss of power (i.e., an interruption of

.either of the two power; phases'that provide power.to the brakes =will immediately set the brakes).. In addition, the

.  : hoist's raise / low'er. control lever interrupts all' power to the brakes'when it is released by the operator. There-fore, the brakes set to hold the lifted load when'either one, or more than-one,-of the three power. phases is lost, or when the operator releases.the~ control lever.

/

J 1

Mr. B..J. Youngblood April-3,'1984

- EF2 - 67,211 Page 6 Even if there -should be a failure of both electro-mechanical brakes to set, due to an' incredible combination of events, there is also a magnetorque brake on each motor that will retard the uncontrolled lowering speed of the hoist (with- a full rated load)', to a rate whose impact velocity with the refueling floor has been evaluated and deemed allowable. The magnetorque brakes have a' backup shaf t mounted alternator that assures power for the magnetorques to function even if there should also be a failure of the normal power supply to hoist.

Therefore, due to the design and redundancy of the brake systems provided for the Fermi 2 Reactor Building Main Holst as discussed above, a load drop scenario similar to that described in Reference (3 ) is not possible.

If you have any questions concerning the above, please contact Mr. O. Keener Earle (313) 586-4211.

Sincerely,

,O'

'  : y Q cc: Mr. P. M. Byron Mr. M. D. Lynch Mr. W.-T. LeFave Mr. T. H. Stickley (EG&G) 4 4

_ . _ _ , . . . ...m..,, - , - . , . , ~ . . . -

. . .- .- . - . - - . - - ~ _ . . - .

Tr.bla 2.1.1 OVERHEAD HOISTS CAPABLE OF HANDLING

. LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL OR SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM COMPONENTS ,

Hoist

, Identification Hoist Number Tgge Capacity Location

' Reactor Bldg Crain Main Hoist. T3100E002 (1) 125 Ton RB-Sch F1.

Reactor Bldg Crane Aux. Holst T3100E002 (1) 5 Ton RB-Sth F1. '

N&S Torus Hatch Hoists T3100E032&33 (2) 5 Tn/Ea RB-1st F1.

HPCI Holst T3100E030- (2) 15 Ton AB-1st F1.

4 RCIC Hoist T3100E031A (2) 15 Ton' RB-is t Fl.

RHR Pumps-Div.I Basement Hoist. T3100E024 (2) 16 Ton ~ RB-Basement >

RHR Pumps-Div.II. Basement Hoist T3100F025 (2) 16 Ton RB-Basement RHR Pumps-Div.I let Floor Hoist T3100E026' (2) 16 Ton RB-1s t Fl.

. RHR Pumps-Div.II- lat Floor Hoist T3100E027 (2) .16 Ton RB-1s t' F1.

_N&S Racire. Pump Hoists T3100E015A&l6A (2) 25 Tn/Ea RB-1st F1.

' MG Sets, N, C. & S Hoists T3100E035, 036 (2) >12 Tn/Ea - RB-4th Fl. ,

& 037 MG Set Fluid Drive N&S Holst. T3100E038&39 (2) 20 Tn/Ea RB-4th F1.

CRD Repair Hoist T3100E019 (2) 3 Ton. RB-3rd F1.

(2) 16 Ton 4

Core Spray Div. I Hoist T3100E028 RS-1s t F1.

Core Spray Div. II Hoist T3100E029 (2) 16 Ton RB-1s t F1.

Diesel Gen. Div. I NES Hoist * (2) 2 Tn/Ea RRR-Gr. F1. '

Diesel Gen. Div. II NES Holst* (2) 2 Tn/Ea RRR-Gr. F1.

j-Diesel Gen. Motor Control Cent. Div. I N&S Hoists * (2) 4 Tn/Ea RRR-Up. F1.

Diesel Gen.' Motor Control Cent. Div. I* (2) 4 Tn/Ea RHR-Up. F1.

. Ventilation Equip. Ra. Hoist * (2) 8 Ton AB-5th F1.

Refueling Platform Monorail Holst F1500E006 (2) 1/2 Ton RB-5th F1.

-Refueling Platform Aux. Hoist F1500E005 (2) 1/2 Ton RB-5th F1.

Refueling Platform Main Holst F1500E004 (2) 1 Ton RB-Sch F1.  !

i ' Refueling Platform Hand Winch F1100E021 (2) 1 Ton RB-Sth F1.

CRD Handling Cart Service Crane F1100E022 (2) 1 Ton RB-3rd F1. I (2)1-1/2 Ton RB-5th F1. l j' New Fuel Transfer Hoist F1100E023 Fuel Channeling Crane F1100E024 (3) 250 lb. RB-5th F1.

! Fuel Pool Jib Crane F1100E021 1 Ton RB-Sch Fl. ,

NE Equipment Door Hoist T3100E043 (2) 12 Ton RB-1st F1.

j Portable Gantry Holst (3) 16 Ton RB-Sth F1.

.S. Recire Pump Hoist (Outer)*

(1) Overhe'ad Traveling Crane ' RB-Reactor Building (2) Monorail Hoist AB-Auxiliary Building

.(3) Portable Hydraulic Floor Crane RHR-RRR Building .

-l

  • These hoists have not yet been specified for purchase, although the trolley . support for these hoist locations has been installed. The specified des 18 n of these hoists will include conformance with ANSI B30.16 criteria for " Overhead Hoists".

(1) LRevised 10/10/82 (2) Revised (Later)

-100/R92/1.2 2.1.1-2 f 4

020984

-_ - - - - - , . - . , . . , ~ . , _ _ . _ . _ ~ - - . . . . . _ _ _ , _ , - , - _ - _ , - _ _ _ _ . _ _

Tcbio 2.1.3.c (Cant'd)

TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS  ;

OVERHEAD HOIST: NORTH AND SOUTH TORUS HATCH HOISTS (2 5-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR LQAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE North 'and South Torus 5 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Hatches No. 32.000.08 f

I OVERHEAD HOIST: RCIC HOIST (15-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN f LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE [

t

1. RCIC First Floor Hatch 9 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08 2.- RCIC Basement Floor 9 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Hatch No. 32.000.08
3. RCIC Pump (E5101C001) Ton
  • ,+ Maintenance Procedure !

No. 32.000.08

4. -RCIC Turbine Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure

-(E5101C002) No. 32.000.08 i

OVERHEAD HOIST: HPCI HOIST (15-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN-LOAD. WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE

1. HPCI Floor Shield 15-Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Plugs.(3) No. 32.000.08
2. HPCI Pump (E41010001) Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08
3. HPCI Turbine Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure ;

'(E4101C2) No. 32.000.08

  • To Be Determined Later i

+ Not Yet Purchased 2.1.3-12  !

100/R92/1.18 020984

,_ T:bla 2.1.3.c (Cant'd) e j

TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS l

I: OVERHEAD HOIST: RECIRCULATION PUMP GEARED HOISTS (3-24-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE i 1. Recirculation Motor 20 Ton /Ea *,+ Maintenance Procedure

-(2) (B3101C001A,B) No. 32.000.08

2. Recirculation Drive 4 Ton /Ea *,+ Maintenance Procedure l

Mounts (2) No. 32.000.08

3. Racirculation Pump 2.5 Ton /Ea *,+ Maintenance Procedure Covers (2) No. 32.000.08 i 4. Rotating Pump 1.5 Ton /Ea *,+ Maintenance Procedure Assembly (2) ,

_No. 32.000.08

! (B3101C001A,B) i OVERHEAD HOIST: RHR DIVISION 1 AND DIVISION 2 BASEMENT HOISTS (2 16-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING BASEMENT LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE l 1. North and South Floor 7 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure L Hatch- No. 32.000.08

2. Division 1 and 2 RHR 2 Ton' *,>+ Maintenance Procedure l- Pumps (4) (E1102C002A-D) No. 32.000.08 l

l 3. Division 1 and 2 RER 2 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Motors (4) (E1102C001A-D) No. 32.000.08 OVERHEAD HOIST: RHR DIVISION 1 AND DIVISION 2 AREA: FIRST FLOOR HOIST (2 16-TON)

LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE

1. North and South Floor 8 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Hatch No. 32.000.08
2. Division 1 and 2 RHR 2 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Pumps (4) (E1102C002A-D) No. 32.000.08

,- 3. Division 1 and 2 RHR 2 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure l Motors (4) (E1102C001A-D) No. 32.000.08 L

  • To Be Determined Later l + Not Yet Purchased i 2.1.3-13 i 100/R92/1 19

! 020984 ,

I'

2.1.3.d Varifiestien that lif ting devices idsntified in 2.1.4.c, above, comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lif ting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1(4) or 5.1.1(5), are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.

RESPONSE: To date, there are only two lif ting devices provided for the handling of heavy loads that would fall within the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978,' as defined in NUREG-0612. These are the RPV Head Strongback, and the Dryer / Separator lif ting device. A de-sign review bylGeneral Electric finds that the RPV Head Strong-back and Dryer / Separator lif ting device meet the design strength criteria of Section 3.2 of ANSI N14.6-1978, taking into account the combined static and dynamic load forces. However, certain components in these lif ting devices do not meet the additional L

strength criteria of Section 6.2 for single failure proof systems. Based upon General Electric's Design Review, modifica-tion will be made to upgrade the RPV Head Strongback and Dryer / Separator Lif ting Device to meet the Section 6.2 strength criteria. These modifications will be completed prior to the use of these devices af ter initial criticality.

(1) Revised 10/10/82 (2) Revised (Later) 2.1.3-15 100/R92/1.21 020984 e

the requiremento cf ANSI B30.2-1976. Tha requiremsnts cf this standard will be incorporated into the Reactor Building Crane Ceneral Maintenance Procedures Nos. 35.000.120 and 34.000.43.

These procedures will be written prior to fuel load.

For all other overhead hoists listed in Table 2.1.1, inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures will comply with ANSI

-830.16-1973, Chapters 1.2 and 2.2.

2.1.3.f Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapters 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.

RESPONSE: The reactor building main crane is the only single-failure proof

- crane at the plant site. The Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Station FSAR, Section 9.1.4.2.1, describes the single failure proof design features incorporated in the 125 ton crane.

The Fermi 2 Reactor Building Crane was designed under the EOCI

  1. 61 " Specifications for Electric Traveling Cranes".

However, additional, upgraded criteria included in the later CMAA

  1. 70-1976 specification was already a part of the manufacturer's design practices. The following identifies these criteria and (1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1.3-17 100/R92/1 24 o

pecvidsc the r;sulto cf Edison'a en31yais verifying tha Farmi 2

_ crane's conformance.with this criteria.

For all other overhead hoists listed in Table 2.1.1, CMAA #70 and

' ANSI B30.2 are not the applicable standards for these hoists.

ANSI B30.16-1973 is the applicable standard. The recirculating pump hoists design does conform to this standard. The remaining hoists, which' are not yet purchased, have been specified to conform to ANSI B30.16.

These hoists and any other future cranes or hoists that fall within the concerns of NUREG-0612 will meet the applicable design guidelines of Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 or ANSI B30.16; and have been or will be subjected to the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612 - Section 5.1 for non-single failure proof load handling applications.

There are no heavy load handling applications other than those

that can be handled by the Reactor Building Main Hoist that require handling within single . failure proof guidelines.

However, if future single failure proof requirements should arise that cannot be handled by the Main Hoist, the future upgrading of existing hoists or procurement of new hoists will be in conformance with NUREG 0554 guidelines.

-(1) Revised 10/10/82 (2) Revised (later) 2.1.3-18 100/R92/1.25 020984

2.2.3 Idantify cny cren2c listed in 2.2.1, ch:va, which y:u hiva eval-usted as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all laods to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable ' alternative or additional design features). For each erane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e.,

crane-load combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

RESPONSE: The reactor building main crane is the only single-failure proof crane at the plant site. The narrative contained in the Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Station FSAR, Section 9. ,1.4.2.1, describes the design features ' incorporated in the 125 ton crane to achieve single-failure-proof status. The sling and lif t attachments for handling the Spent Fuel Cask with this hoist are also designed to meet single failure criteria. This design, as well as the crane design to meet single failure criteria, has been reviewed and found to be acceptable, as recorded in Section 9.1.4 of the Fermi Unit 2 Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0798).

The handling of the service platform, and refueling bridge over spent fuel within the open reactor, using the main hoist, slings and lif ting lugs designed within the guidelines of Section 5.1.6-(1) (b) and (3) of NUREG-0612 does meet single failure proof criteria. The handling of RPV head insulation over the closed reactor with the main hoist also meets these same single 2'.2.3-1 100/192/1.41

RESPONSE: failure proof guidlelines. The handling of the Reactor Steam Dryer / Separator and Pressure Vessel liead over spent fuel within the reactor, using the " single failure proof" main hoist will meet single failure proof guidelines.

The Lifting Device modifications will be completed prior to use of these devices after initial criticality.

The handling of the fuel pool slot plugs and pool gates in close proximity to spent fuel stored in the fuel pool, using the same main hoist also meets the above single failure proof guidelines.

The handling of these same loads and all other loads by the main hoist, involving no potential impact to spent fuel, is covered under Section 2.3.2.

(2) Revised (later) 2.2.3-2 100/R92/1.42 021184

2.2.4 ~Far ers7:3 id:ntified in 2.2.1 cbsva, n:t categoriztd according to 2.2.3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 1

5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be dem-onstrated in response to Section 2.4 of this request. With res pect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the Reactor Building and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane:

a. Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circum-stances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of such action. Discuss any related or proposed technical specifications concerning the bypass of such interlocks.
b. Where reliance is placed on the operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System, discuss present and/or proposed technical specifications and administrative or physical controla provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.
c. Where reliance is placed on other site-specific consider-ations (e.g., refueling sequencing), provide present or proposed technical specifications, and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the validity of such considerations.

t i

b 2.2.4-1 l 100/R92/1.43

I

d. Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I I

through III should conform to the guidelines of NUKEG-0612, l l'

Appendix A. Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, f

3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed.

I RESPONSE: a. The reactor building crane 5-ton auxiliary hoist is

prevented from carrying a heavy load over the spent fuel pool or open reactor by a load limit switch which prevents this hoist from lifting loads above 2000#.

This limit is placed in its " Restricted" mode by a switch on

^

the crane cab operating panel. This energizes a red light on the control panel and a second red light outside of the control cab to alert the crane operator and personnel on the refueling floor that the hoist 2000f load limit is in effect. ,

When this control cab switch is placed in the bypass I

position, similarly located green indicating lights are energized (red lights are de-energized) to alert personnel that the 2000# l load limit is being bypassed and the Auxiliary Holst must not be I

handling loads over the fuel pool or open reactor vessel.  !

[

r (2)'Kevised (later) 2.2.4-2 '

100/R92/1.44 021184 i

L t

Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.07, which covers the operation

! of the Reactor Building Crane, will provide specific direction i

controlling the application of this load limit switch to limit loads carried by the Auxiliary Hoist over the Spent Fuel Pool from exceeding 2000fs. Any deviations from this Maintenance l

l Procedure requires prior approval from the Fermi 2 Onsite Review Organization, in accordance with Fermi 2 Technical Specification 6.5.1.

b. The Standby Gas Treatment System is discussed in Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Plant FSAR, Section 6.2. Ventilation of the reactor building is also discussed in FSAR Section 9.4.

The reactor building ventilation and filtration system is designed to limit potential releases of radioactive lodine and other radioactive materials. However, credit for SGTS operation is not taken in analysis presented in this report.

c. When reliance is placed on other site-specific,considera-tions for heavy load movements, additional maintenance procedures will be written addressing the guidelines of NUREG-0612 and this report to ensure the validity of such considerations.

(2) Revised (later) 2.2.4-3 100/192/1.45 021184

d. Analyses addressing evaluation criteria I, II, and III, is not required since the hoists identified in Table 2.2.1, and not categorized according to Section 2.2.3, will not be handling heavy loads in close proximity to spent fuel. This includes the auxiliary hoist which will be restricted by a load limit from handling heavy loads over the fuel pool or open reactor.

2.2.4-4 100/R92/1.70 030384

2.3.1 ' Identify any cranes listed in 2.2.1, above, which you have eval-usted as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all laods to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e.,

crane-load combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

f RESPONSE: The reactor building main crane is the only single-failure-proof t

crane at the plant site. See Response 2.2.3.

s 2.3.1-1 100/R92/1.46 030384

2.3.2 Fsr cny crcnso idsntified in 2.1.1 n:t d3cignated as singic '

failure proof in 2.3.1, a camprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:

2.3.2.a _The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related

equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided in 2.1.3.c.

- Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typical matrix.

RESPONSE: . Table 2.3.2 lists those heavy loads to be. handled by non-single failure proof hoists that do not handle these loads in close proximity to the Fuel Pool or Reactor Vessel. Any potential drop of these loads.cannot impact fuel or cause damage to the Reactor Vessel or Fuel Pool. Therefore, only Evaluation Criteria IV in Section 5.1 of NUREG 0612 has been addressed in evaluating these loads. Evaluation Criteria I, II, & III do not apply The handling of most of the heavy loads by the single failure proof Main Hoist has been evaluated or upgraded to meet the single: failure proof guidelines of Section 5.6 of NUREG 0612.

These loads have been included in Table 2.3.2 where it is shown (2) Revised 1-17-84 2.3.2-1 100/R92/1.47 020984

-~ - -

. .- , .m -

t w

thnt Hazard Elininetien Category - d 10 appliccbl3 for the22 loads. (Likelih6bd of. failure is extremely small' because Section 5.1.6 of NUP.EG 0612 is satisfied). Since'the handling of these loads meets single failure proof guidalines, further evaluation addressing Evaluacion Criteria I, II, III and IV is not required.

However, Evaluation Criteria IV has been addressed for these loads and .has be en included in Table 2.3.2.

The Reactor Shield Plugs, Drywell Hoad and Stud Tensioner and Storage Pool Slot Plugs are handled by the single failure proof Main Hoist. However, cheir attachments to the Main Hoist have not been verified to meet single fr.ilure proof guidelines. The Storage Pool Slot Plugs will not be handled in close proximity to the fuel pool or reactor vessel. Therefore, a potential drop of these plugs cannot impact fuel or cause damage to the reactor vessel or fuel pool.

The Reactor Shield Plugs, Drywell Head and. Stud Tc.nsioner are handled over the Reactor Vessel location, but not over the Fuel Pool. A single failure of any of the non-single failure proof attachments will not cause a failure of the remaining attachments. The load remains attached to the hoist. There can be a shif ting of the load to cause contact with adjacent s tructures. However, impact with fuel or damage to the reactor vessel will not occur. Therefore, only Evaluation Criteria IV

has been addressed in the analysis of these three loads and the Equipment Stora8e Plugs.

(2) Reviced (later)

, 2.3.2-la 100/R92/1.68 020984 -

i TABLE 2,.3.2 ENRIC3 FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LNAD HATDLING LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX I HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 -

i -

LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING l

IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 12-1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE A-1/2 TO B-1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY

5. R.P.V. Head Subbasement 1. Div-I RHR b,e,d (89 Tons) 540' - 0" Piping
2. Torus c,e,d Basement 562' - 0" 1. Div I RHR b,e,d Piping
6. R.P.V. Head First Floor 1. Div I RHR b,e,d

-Strongback 583' - 6" Piping T1300E009 (5 Ton) Div I Cable Trays

(2) Revised (later)

CSce Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-10 100/R92/1.56

TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE D ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 TO 12 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY

10. Steam Dryer Subbasement 1. Torus c,e**d B1107D041 540' - 0" (42 Ton)

Basement 1. Div 2 EECW b,e**d 562' - 0" Piping Div 2 Cable Trays

11. Steam Separator First Floor 1. Div 2 EECW b,e**d B1112D002 583' - 6" Piping (73 Ton) Div 2 Cable Trays
12. Storage Pool Gate (14 Ton)

(2) Revised (later)

"See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-14 GODryer & Separator only 100/R92/1.60 020984

q, TABLE 2.3.2 'ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIK HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING' CRANE MAIN HOIST.- T3100E002 LOCATION- BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT 'ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE' 'D ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA -

FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 TO 12 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO.

LOADS ~ SAFETY RELATED HAZARD' ' ~ SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT E L I M'. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY

10. Steam Dryer Second Fir. 1. Div 2 Core b,e**,d B1107D041 613' - 6"- Spray Piping (42 Ton) 2. Div 2 RHR b,e**,d Piping
3. Div 2 EECW b,e**,d Piping
4. Div 2.EECW b,e**,d Service Water
11. -Steam Separator Piping B1112D002 5. Div 2 EECW b,e**,d

'(73 Ton)_ Heat Exchanger P4400B002

12. Storage Pool Gate (2) Revised (Later) 2.3.2-15
    • Dryer & Separator only 100/R92/1.69 021184

s .

TABLE 2.3.2- ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN. HOIST,- T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING:- REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT' 'ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 13 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE C TO E FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT- ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT. ELIM.-

CATEGORY

13. Fuel Pool Gate Basement 1. Div I EECW b,e,d A& B 562' - 0" Piping (4.2 Ton & 2.5 Ton)

~First Floor Div I Cable Trays

  • b,e,d 583' - 6" 1K-035 IP-003 IP-001 lC-106 IP-002 Second Flr. 1. .Div-1 Core b,e,d 613' - 6" . Spray Piping Third. Floor. 1. Fuel Storage e,d 641- 6"- Pool Liner (2) Revised (later)

"See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-16 100/R92/1.61

TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING-CRANE AUXILIARY HOIST - 'S TON - T3100E002 PORTABLE GANTRY HOIST 16 TON LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING TIMPACT- ALONGLBUILDING. COORDINATE LINE- E 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE C AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 .To 10 1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE 15 TO. 17 (17 Only) (18 only)

LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATECORY

16. Concrete Floor Subbasement 1. Torus c Subbasement 1. Torus c Hatch 557' - 9" 540' - 0" 2. Div 1 RHR b 8E 1/ x 10 1/2 Piping Basement 1. Div 2 EECW b Basement. 1. Div 1 RHR b 575' - 0" Piping 571' - 0" Piping .
2. RCIC Turbine. b Div 2 Cable Tray
  • b Exhaust-' Piping 2K-007 to RHR System First Floor Div 2 Cable Tray
  • b 3. HPCIC Turbine b 583' - 6" 2P-079- Exhaust Piping
    • 17. Concrete Floor Second Floor 1. Div 2 EECW b Plugs 613' - 6" Heat Exchanger Div 1 CablejTray* b RWCU DEMIN P4400P002 1C-001 1K-028 1C-002 1C-100 1P-Oll First Floor 1. Div 1 RHR b 600' - 2 5/8" Piping Div l-Cable Trays
  • b 1C-047 1P-035 (2) Revised (later) Second Floor 1. Div 1 RHR b 613' - 6" Piping wSee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-20
    • To be handled only with the Portable Gantry Hoist 100/R92/1.65 020984

._ . _ - . . - .m . _ . . _ . ,

9

. TABLE 2.3L2' -ENRICD FERMI 1UN'IT 2' HEAVY-LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA': IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE TMIN HOIST ~- T3100E002 d

. LOCATION' BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING

. IMPACT 'ALONG-BUILDING. COORDINATE LINE A-1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE i'

AREA

'FROM COORDINATE LINE- 10 TO 11 FROM' COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD' FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY i

18. , Equipment Hatch Subbasement '1. Torus

-Plugs 540- 0" 2. Div 2'RHR. b,d (13 Tons Each) Piping

, 3. Div 2 EECW b,d Piping 1

Basement 1. Div 2 RHR b,d 4

562' - 0" Piping-

2. .Div 2 RHR b,d 3

Service Water Piping j 3._Div 2 EECW b,d Piping Div 2 Cable Trays

i (2) Revised (later) l j usee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-21 I

100/R92/1.66' i.

4

i TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO~ FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX

~

- H'0 I S T : REACTOR BUILDING CRANE. AUXILIARY HOIST - 5 TON -'T3100E002

-LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING-FIFTH FLOOR REACTOR BUILDING-FIFTH FLOOR LIMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE E1/2 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 TO 11 FROM COORDINATE LINE- 13 TO' 15 (1 and 2 Only) (3 Only)

' LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY-RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. . EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMP.NT ELIM.

CATEGORY

1. Maintenance Tools Subbasement' 1.-Torus c Subbasement 1. Torus e i 540' - 0" 2. Div 2 RHR b 540' - 0" Piping 3.~Div 2 EECW- b Basement 1. Div 1 EECW b Piping 562' 0" Piping i

2 .' Lifting Fixtures' Basement 1. Div 2 RHR b Div 1 Cable Trays

  • b 562' - 0" Piping IP-029 DCIP-029
2. Div 2 RHR ~

b 1K-011 1C-100 Service Water First Floor Div 1 Cable Trays

3. Div 2 EECW b IC-040 Piping IC-113
3. New Fuel Vault Div 2 Cable Trays

., -(2) Revised (later) usee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-22 3 100/R92A/1.68

TABLE' ' 2. 3. 2 ~ ENRICO FERMI UNIT ~2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA! IMPACT' MATRIX

^

HOIST: MOTOR GENERATOR SET, NORTH, CENTER AND SOUTH-HOISTS - 12 TON EACH --

T3100E035, 036 & 037:

LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR-NORTH REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR-CENTER-

. IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 'B 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE B1/2 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 13 T0- 15 FROM COORDINATE LINE 11 TO 12 (Motor Hoist Only) (Generator Hoist Only)

LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. ' EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV.. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY 1 .' Motor Generator . Subbasement 1. Torus. c- Subbasement '1. Torus c

. Set' Motor (Without 540' - 0" 2. Div 1 RHR. b 540' - 0" 2. Div 2 RHR b Rotor) (11 Ton) Piping Piping (B31035001 A&B) 2.- Motor Generator Basement 1. Div l EECW b Basement 1. HPCI Steam to b Set Motor Rotor 562' - 0" Piping 579' -2 3/4" Div 1 RHR Heat

'(8 Ton) 2. Div 1 RHR b Exchanger Piping First. Floor- Div 2 Cable Tray

  • b Div 1 Cable Tray
3. Motor Generator First Floor 1. Div 1 RHR- b Second Floor 1. Div 2 EECW b Set Generator 594' - 3" Piping 630' - 9" . Service Water (Without Rotor) 2. RHR Valve b Piping (12 Ton) V23-2012 (B31035001 A&B)

Div 1 Cable Tray

4. Motor Generator Second Floor 1. Div 1 EECW b-Set Generator 594' - 3" Piping Rotor (8 Ton)

(2) Revised (later) mSee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-23 100/R92A/1.69

'020984

TABLE 2.3.2' ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLINGS- LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX-HOIST: MOTOR GENERATOR-SET,; NORTH, CENTER AND SOUTH HOISTS - 12 TON EACH -

T3100E035, 36 & 37-LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR-SOUTH IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE B 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 TO 10 FROM. COORDINATE LINE TO (Motor Hoist Only) ,

LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY

1. Motor Generator Subbasement 1. Div 2 RHR b Set Motor 540' - 0" Piping (Without Motor)

(11 Ton) Basement 1. Div 2 RHR b 575' - 0" Service Water Piping

2. Motor Generator 2. Div 2 RHR b

. Set Motor Rotor Piping (8 Ton)

First Floor 1. Div 2 RHR b 606' - 3" Service Water Valve V15-2010

3. Motor Generator Second Floor 1. Div 2 RHR b Set Generator 517' - 3" Service Water (Without Rotor) Piping (12 Ton) 2. Div 2 RHR b Piping
3. Div 2 RHR b
4. Motor Generator Valve Set Generator V17-2016 Rotor (8 Ton) i (2) Revised (later) 2.3.2-24 100/R92A/1.70

~

TABLE 2'.3.2 'ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2' HEAVY LOAD 1 HANDLING: " LOAD / AREA' IMPACT-MATRIX-HOIST: MOTOR-GENERATOR SET FLUID DRIVE. NORTH AND SOUTH HOISTS -i20iTON-EACH-

.T3100E038.& 39 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR-NOUTH- REACTOR BUILDING 4TE FLOOR SOUTH IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 12 1/2' ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE.LINElO 1/2 LAREA

'FROM COORDINATE LINE B TO B 1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE B TO ' B 1/2 LOADS .

SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT. '

.ELIM.. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY ,

1. Motor Generator Subbasement 1. Torus c Subbasement 'l. Torus c Set Fluid Drives 557' - 9" 2. Div 1 RHR b 557' -'9" (B31035001.A&B) Piping Basement 1. Div.1 RHR b- Basement 1. Div 2 EECW b 562' - 0"- Piping 562' - 0" Piping
2. HPCI Steam to b 2. Div 2 RHR b Div 1 RHR Piping Heat Exchanger

, Piping Div 2 Cable Trays

  • b
3. Div 2 RHR b 2K-001 2P-009 Piping 2C-014 DC2P-009-1

~~

First Floor 1. Div 1 RHR- b First Floor Div 2 Cable Trays

  • b 582' - 6" Piping 583' - 6" 2C-042
2. Div 1 RHR b 2K-023 Valves V8-2092 V8-2161 2 1 i

(2) Revised (later) ,

' *See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-25 100/R92A/1.71

' TABLE 2.3.2! ENRICO FERMI UNIT'2' HEAVY' LOAD' HANDLING LOAD / AREA' IMPACT MATRIX HOIST:- MOTOR GENERATOR SET FLUID-DRIVE NORTH AND SOUTH HOISTS -' 20 TON'EACH T3100E038 & 39 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR-NOUTH REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR SOUTH

~

IMPACT' ALONG BUILDING'C00RDINATE LINE 12'1/2 ALONG BUILDING C00RDINATE'LINEl0 1/2 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE B TO B 1/2 FROM C00RDINATE'LINE B TO B 1/2

-LOADS- SAFETY RELATED HAZARD . SAFETY RELATED HAZARD

' FLOOR /ELEV._ EQUIPMENT ELIM.- FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.-

CATEGORY

1. Motor Generator Second Floor 1. Div 1 RHR b Second Floor 1. Div'2 EECW b Set Fluid Drives 613' - 6" Piping 630' - 9" Service Water
2. RHR Valves b Pipe V8-2179 V8-2180 i

(2) Revised (later) 2.3.2-26 100/R92A/1.72

. . - . . . -, .m. - .

h

  1. ' TABLE'2.3.2 ENRICO. FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING - LOAD / AREA / IMPACT MATRIX-

. HOIST: CONTROL ROD DRIVE. REPAIR. HOIST.'- 3 TON - T3100E019 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 3RD FLOOR- REACTOR BUILDING 3RD FLOOR

' IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE. A 1/3- ALONG BUILDING _ COORDINATE LINE A'2/3 AREA-FROM COORDINATE LINE' ^ 1 '1 ' TO 15- FROM COORDINATE LINE 11 TO 15 LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD-FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT- ELIM..

CATEGORY 1.. CRD Transfer Cask Subbasement 1. Torus 'e Subbasement 1. Torus e i (2 Ton) (C1102E001) 541' 3" 2. Div.1 RHR b,e 541' - 3" 2. Div' 1 RHR. b,e l Piping Piping ,

3. Div 1 EECW

~

i b,e Piping i

Basement 1. Div 2 RHR d,e Basement 1. Div 2 Rild b,e j 570' - 0" Service Water 570' - 0" Piping Piping. 2. Div 1 RllR b,e

{ 2..Div 2 RHR b,e Piping

Piping 3..Div 1-RHR e Div 1 Cable Trayu* b,e i Service Water. IP-009 1P-001 i Piping _

. IC-009 4..Div.1 RHR e

' Piping..

1 Div 1 Cable Trays

i i

(2) Revised (later) i

,! *See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-27 100/R92A/1.73 J

~

TABLE 2.3.2 ENRIC0 FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAL ! ANDLING: LOAD / AREA It! PACT MATRIX HOIST: CONTROL ROD DRIVE REPAIR HOIST - 3 TON - T3100E019 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 3RD FLOOR REACTOR BUILDING 3RD FLOOR IMPACT- ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 1/3 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 2/3 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 11 TO 15 FROM COORDINATE LINE 11 TO 15 LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY

1. CRD Transfer. Cask First Floor 1. Div 1 RHR b First Floor 1. Div 1 RER b (2 Ton) 594' - 3" Piping 594' - 3" Piping Second Floor 1. Div 2 EECW e Second Floor 1. Div 2 EECW b 628' - 0" Service Water 628' - 0" Service Water Piping Piping
2. Div 2 RHR b,e 2. Div 2 RHR b Piping Piping
3. Div 1 EECW b,e 3. Div 1 EECW b Heat Exchanger Piping P4400B001
4. Div 1 EECW b,e Piping
5. Div 1 EECW b,e Pump P4400C001A
6. Div 1 EECW e Service Water l Piping (2) Revised (later) 1 2.3.2-28

~

100/R92A/1.74 020984 i

TABLE'2'3.2'

- . ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING r- LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX

' HOIST: . NORTH AND. SOUTH TORUS; HATCH HOISTS ( 2-5 ' TON)- - T3100E032 :&33-LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR IMPACT ALONG. BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 16 'ALONG BUILDINGLCOORDINATE LINE F AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE. C 1/2 TO D FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 1/2 TO IC[

SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD LOADS FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. . . FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY

1. Norih Torus' Subbasement 1. Torus c Subbasement 1. Torus. c Concrete hatch- 540' - 0" 540' - 0" Basement 1. Div 2 Core b 562' - 0" Spray Piping 4
2. South Torus Concrete Hatch I

2 1

4 4

4 i

(2) Revised (later) j 2.3.2-29 100/R92A/1.75

. . ~ . - _ . _ . _ . _ . .

TABLE 2.3.2- ENRICO FERMI UNIT ~2 HEAVY-LOAD HANDLING LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX;

< . HOIST: RCIC HOIST (15 TON) - DIVISION 1 T3100E031A LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR i

IMPACT 'ALONG BUILDING' COORDINATE LINE 16'1/2 ALONG4 BUILDING COORDINATE LINE

' AREA i FROM COORDINATE LINE F TO F 1/2- ' FROM/ COORDINATE LINE T O ___

LOADS SAFETY.RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR'/ELEV. EQUIPMENT .ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. -EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY 4

1. RCIC Floor. hatch' Subbasement 1. RCIC Piping' b
540' .0" <

Basement Div l' Cable Tray

2. RCIC Basement Floor Hatch l 3. RCIC Pump E5101C001 2

4, RCIC Turbine E5101C002

! I l l 4

i t

i i

) (2) Revised (later)

! *See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-30 i

i 100/R92A/1.76

i .

TABLE 2.3. 2 - 'EIRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA' IMPACT' MATRIX HOIST: 'HPCI ~ HOIST-(15 TON) - DIVISION 2 - T3100E030 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR-

' IMPACT 'ALONG BUILDING' COORDINATE LINE 9 1/2 .ALONG BUILDING: COORDINATE LINE

AREA ~ '

, FROM COORDINATE LINE. G .TO H FROM COORDINATE LINE TO __

, LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.-

CATEGORY

1. 'HPCI Floor Shield Subbasement' 1. HPCI Piping b '

Plugs (3) 540' - 0"'

Div 2 Cable Trays

  • b
-2P-001 DC2P-001

! 2C-001

. Basement 1. Div 2 EECW b

562' - 0" Piping
2. HPCI Pump 2. CRD, Pump b E4101C001 Piping Div 1 Cable Trays
3. HPCI Turbine
E4101C002 i

i l

(2) Revised (later) iwSee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-31 i

1100/R92A/1.77  ;

020984

. - _. - . ~ _ - ~ -, .. .. . .. . -. . , . . .

TABLE 2.3'.2 ENRICO-FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LO AD' H ANDL'ING : ' LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX

-HOIST:. N&S RECIRCULATION PUMP GEARED HOISTS (3) - 251 TON - T3100E015A &L16A'&-later

.(N &.S -' INSIDE DRYWELL - 15A'& 16A),

~~

(S - OUTSIDE DRYWELL' 'Later)**

LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR- -

IMPACT 'ALONG A,LINE FROMLBUILDINGIC00RDINATES. ALONG A LINE'FROM BUILDING  :

AREA ,

C 1/2, 11 3/4,;TO . . B, 10 T3100E015A & SOUTH

COORDINATES D 3/4, 12'1/2 TO E,12-3/4; DRYWELL & OUTER HOIST (605' 7")**- T3100E016A - NORTH HOIST (605' - 7")

l LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT- ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.  !

CATEGORY j 1. Recirculation Subbasement 1. Torus c*** Subbasement 1. Torus. c. i j Motors (20 Ton) 540' - 0" 2.'Div 2 RHR b**. 540' - 0" (B3101) Piping i

! Basement 1. HPCI Steam to b,c**

! 562' - 0" Div 1 RHR I Heat, Exchanger Piping

'2. Recirculation 2. Div 2 EECW b**

Drive Mounts Piping (4 Ton) 3. Div 2 RHR b**

} Piping 5 l 4. Div 2 RHR b** j Service Water

Piping i .

I Div 2 Cable Trays

  • b**

l 3.- Recirculation 2K-001 2P-009 Pump Cover 2C-014 DC2P-009 (2.5 Ton)

  • l 1

! 2.3.2-32

  • *See Cable Tray Index-
    • South Recirc Pump hoist-outer has not.yet been purchased and f equipment number is not yet assigned *

, *** South Recirc Pump hoist-drywell is T3100E015A g00{Rg2A/1.78 1

m , __ ._

TABLE 2k3.2 'ENRICO FERMI' UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD' HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX' R'HR DIVISION 1_AND DIVISION 2 FIRST FLOOR HOIST TROLLEYS ~( 16 TON)

HOIST:

(2) T3100E026 AND'.T3100E027 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 3/4 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A'3/4 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 14 TO 16 FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 TO 10 -

Division 1 - North Division 2'- South LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY

1. North Floor Hatch ' Subbasement 1. Div 1 RHR b Subbasement 1. Div 2 RHR b 541' -

11" Piping 541' - 11" Piping

- 2. Div 1 EECW b 2. Div 2 EECW b Piping Piping

3. Div 1 RHR b 3. Div 2 RHR b Pump and Pump and Motor Motor-
2. South Floor Hatch

! Basement- Div 1 Cable Trays

  • b

'562' - 0" 1C-008 1P-010

j. 1C-009 1P-011
3. Division 1 and j 2 RHR Pumps 4 (E1102C001 A-D)
4. Division 1 and 2 RHR Motors (E1102C001 A-D)

J s

(2) Revised (later) usee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-33 100/R92A/1.79

' TABLE'2.3.2- ENRICO FERMI' UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: ' LOAD / AREA 1 IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: .RHR DIVISION 1 AND DIVISION 2 BASEMENT HOIST TROLLEYS'(2) - T3100E024:& 25 (16; TON) ,

~~

LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT' ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 3/4 ALONG. BUILDING COORDINATE ~ LINE A 3/4 AREA -

FROM COORDINATE LINE 14 TO 16 FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 TO 10 1/2 Division 1 Division 2 LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT. ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT' -ELIM..

CATEGORY Subbasemedt

1. - . North'and' South Subbasement 1. Div l'RHR b. 1. .Div 2 RHR b Floor Hatch 541' - 11" Piping 541' 11" Piping (7 Tons Each) 2. Div 1 ECCW b 2. Div 2 ECCW b Piping. Piping
2. Division I and 2 Basement Div i Cable Trays
  • b Basement Div 2 Cable Trays

'E1102C002A-D IC-009 1C-008

3. Division 1 and 2 RHR Motors E1102C001A-D

'(2) Revised (later) usee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-34 100/R92A/1.80

TABLE 2.3.2 ENRIC0' FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING ' LOAD / AREA. IMPACT MATRIX

~ HOIST: CORE SPRAY' DIVISION 1 and' DIVISION.2 HOISTS-(2) - (16 TON)L- T3100E02816 029' LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR -REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR IMPACT ALONG' BUILDING COORDINATE LINE-15 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE F 'l/2' AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE F 1/2 'TO G FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 1/2 TO 10, Division 1 (North) Division 2 (South)

-LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. . FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY 1.. -Core Spray Floor Subbasement 1. Div 1 Core b Subbasement. 1. Div.2 Core b~

Hatch (2) 540' - 0" Spray' Piping 540' - 0" Spray' Piping (8.5 Tons Each) 2.'Div.1 Core b 2. Div 2 Core b Spray Pump Spray' Pump Motors Motors

3. Div 1 EECW b 3. Torus e Piping 4. Div 2 EECW .b Piping
2. Core Spray Basement Floor Basement 1. Div 1 Core b Basement ~ 1. Div 2 Core b Hatch 562' - 0" Spray Piping 562' - 0" Spray Piping (8.5 Tons Each) 2. Div 1 EECW b 2. Div 2'EECW b Piping Piping
3. RCIC Piping b Div 2 Cable Trays *- b Div 1 Cable. Trays
3. Core Spray Pump 1K-016 1C-016 Motors IP-016 DCIP-016
a. E2101-C001A
b. E2101-C001B
c. E2101-C001C
d. E2101-C001D (2) Revised (later)
  1. See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-35 100/R92A/1.81 021184

TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAID HANDLING: LOAD /AREALIMPACT MATRIX HOIST: NE EQUIPMENT' DOOR HOIST'- (12 TON) - T3100E43 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING - FIRST FLOOR IMPACT-AREA ALONG ALLINE FROM BUILDING-COORDINATES E-1/4, 12-3/4 to.D-1/2, 13-3/4 LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD

' FLOOR /ELEV. . EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY NE EQUIPMENT DOOR BASEMENT - DISCHARGE LINES FROM ADS-SRV V22-2071 AND NON- C ADS-SRV V22-2030 (2) Revised (later) 2.3.35a (REVISED 10-10-82) 100/92A/1.82

TABLE.2.3.2' ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING:. LOAD / AREA IMPACT-MATRIX HOIST: VENTILATION' EQUIPMENT HOIST - 8' TON LOCATION BUILDING: AUXILIARY BUILDING FIFTH FLOOR IMPACT ALONG BUILDING. COORDINATE LINE 11 3/4 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE-AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE G TO' H FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY-

1. Ventilation Basement 1. Div 2 Control b,e Equipment 551' - 0" Air System Compressor P5002D002
2. Div 2 Control b,e Air Piping t
3. Div 2 Control b,e Air Receiver P5002A002 1
4. Div 2 Control b,e Air Dryer P5002D004,6,8
5. Div 2 Control b,e Air Fan Coil Unit 6.'Div 2 EECW b,e Piping.

Div 2 Cable Trays

-(2) Revised (later) 4 l#See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-40

100/R92A/1.87 020984 5

TABLE 2.3a'2 ENRICO FERMI' UNIT 2-HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: ' VENTILATION EQUIPMENT HOIST - 8. TON LOCATION BUILDING: AUXILIARY BUILDING FIFTH. FLOOR IMPACT ALONG BUILDING' COORDINATE LINE 11 3/4 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE- LINE AREA FROM. COORDINATE LINE G TO H FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED- HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT. ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. , EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATEGORY

1. Ventilation Basement Div.1 Cable Trays
  • e Equipment 551' - 0" 1K-022 1C-005 1P-024 DCIP-005 Second Floor Div 1 Cable Trays
  • e 2C-062- 2C-063 (2) Revised (later) wSee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-41 100/R92A/1.88

Item No. 9 Stud Tcnsionsr System redundancy and separation preclude loss of capability to perform safety-related functions in the load drop area of the Stud Tensioner. The Stud Tensioner is only moved in the reactor vessel vicinity to remove and reinstall reactor vessel studs during cold shutdown. Maintenance Procedure No. 5.000.82 shall specify a maximum limit of 12 feet for this load to be lif ted above the floor. Load drop analysis of other loads having greater Lapact potential, which follow the same load travel path, provides verification that there is adequate floor-strength to withstand a potential load drop of the Stud Tensioner within this height limitation.

Items No. 10, 11 and 22 Steam Dryer, Steam Separator and Dryer / Separator Sling The redundant ' direct attachment of the Dryer / Separator Sling to the Reactor Building Crane Main Hook has sufficient strength to meet single failure proof guidelines whenever this lif ting device

~

is moved,_ unloaded, to and from its storage location in the Equipment Pool to - the Drywell area. . The Steam Dryer and Steam

~

- Separator are only moved during cold shutdown. Steam Dryer and

~

Steam Separator' floor drop analyses demonstrate no damage to any safety-related equipment away from the Reactor Vessel when dropped from ' their maximum respective heights of 12 feet and 9 feet.- Maintenance Procedure Nos. 35.000.84 and .85 s5.all specify

! - these height limitations for these loads whenever they are carried along their designated load travel paths and laydown areas.

(2) Revised- (later) 2.3.2-72 100/R92A/1.120 020984-

Additienzlly .ccfsty-relsted system rzdundancy precludse any aya-tem fran1 performing its safety-related function when these loads could possibly be dropped.

The dryer / separator lif ting lugs have sufficient strength to meet single failure ' proof guidelines of NUREG 0612 - Section 5.1.6.

Action 'is being initiated to upgrade the Dryer / Separator lif ting device to meet ANSI N14.6-1978, Section 6.2 Single Failure Proof Guidelines for the maximum combined static and dynamic load forces. These. modifications will be completed prior to post-criticality handling of the Dryer / Separator.

Item No. 12 ' Storage Pool Gate Movement of the 14 ton Storage Pool Gate during a refueling .

outage is from its operating location to a location within the Storage Pool, where it . will be secured to the side of the pool.

(1) Revised 10/10/82 (2) Revised (Later) 2.3.2-73 100/R92A/1.121 020984 .

ESF located below the Storage Pool have sufficient redundancy and separation to preclude the complete loss of a system due to a potentialLload drop. Also, the handling of these gates with the

. main hoist does meet single-failure proof criteria.

Item No.13 Fuel Pool' Gates A & B Movement of the Fuel Gates during a refueling outage is from their operating location to their storage location along the same (south) wall of the Fuel Storage Pool, where the gates are to be secured to the wall. The handling of these gates with the main hoist meets single-failure-proof criteria. This includes the lif ting lugs for these gates.

(2)? Revised (Later) 2.3.2-73a 100/R92A/1.122

Itza No. 15 'Sprnt Funi Cask

- Handling / hoisting procedures and administrative controls for the Spent Fuel Cask are described in the Enrico Fermi 2 Final Safaty Analysis Report, Section 9.1. the likelihood of a handling sys-tem failure for this load has been demonstrated and accepted as being extremely small.

Items No.- 16 and 17 Concrete Floor Hatch (Co. E-1/2 1/2)' and

~

the'RWCU Demineralizer Concrete Floor Plugs The concrete floor hatch located at' building' coordinates E-1/2 -

10-1/2 will be handled by the auxiliary hoist or by the Portable Gantry Hoist. The RWCU demineralizer concrete floor plugs are outside the coverage area of _ the Reactor Building.Holst. These plugs will be handled by the Portable Cantry Holst. This hoist and the maintenance procedure covering the use of this portable hoist will be in accordance with NUREG-0612 guidelines and will be laplemented ' prior to the handling of these plugs af ter initial operation.

i

. Item No. 18 Equipment Hatch Plugs The. Equipment Hatch plugs will be placed in the immediate vicin-ity of the Equipment Hatch opening whenever the hatch is to be opened for access. The handling of these plugs with the main hoist meets single-failure proof criteria.- This includes the lifting lugs for these plugs.

+

(1) Revised 10/10/83 (2) Revision Later 2.3.2-74

100/R92A/1.123 020984 l' .$-

s .

f -

x

.B. REACTOR 'AUILDiNG AUXILIARY CRANE H0lST LOADS

1. Analysis;of the reactor building fif th floor has shown that there is sufficient strength to withstand a free fall load drop up to 12' feet fdr loads handled by the auxiliary hoist, weighing up to

' ~

the hoisti'simaximum rating of 5 tons. This hoist will be

$ handling various loads' including naintenance tools, equipment flifting fixtures, etc. Future maintenance procedures will be developed to address such loads and will specify load height.

limitations'5orthehitndlingoftheseloads.

2. Th'e Reactor Esilding first floor strength under the equipment hatch ~1ocation is adequate to withstand a five ton free fall load

. drop up to 4-3/4 feet for: heavy loadi bandled by the auxiliary hoist or any other non-single failure proof hoist. At heights ,

greater than-4-3/4^ feet abovs Ehe first floor under the equipment hatch, an energy adbdrption mat 'will be plic d on the first floor under t;he suspended load. This collision' mat,is desi,gned to withstand the impact of a five ton load drop from the auxiliary V

hoist maximum hook elevation position. This collision mat will be available prior to-the handling of any heavy loads-with the auxiliary ho'ist or any other non-single failure proof hoist after initial p'lant: operation. Heavy loads otherwise will be handled by'the nain hoist in accordance with single failure proof guidelines. ,

(

(2) Revised _(later)

'2.3.2-76

100/R92A/1.125
  • E '

l021184

-  : .a - , . - - . - - O L -- _

l

3. ' Tha Auxilisry Hoist 'h2s a 2000 pound lord limit that prevants ths hoist from lif ting a heavy load over the fuel pool or open reactor. This load limit can be bypassed by a switch in the control cab' to allow the Auxiliary Hoist to handle heavier loads outside of the Fuel Pool and Reactor Vessel area. Activation of this bypass switch energizes warning lights on the control cab

' operating panel and outside of the control cab to alert the crane operator and other personnel of the Reactor Building refueling floor that the load limit is on bypass and that the Auxiliary Hoist must not be operated within the fuel pool and open reactor vessel area. Rigid administrative control of the Auxiliary Hoist and the load limit bypass is implemented through the written Maintenance Procedures and painted barrier lines and signs around the fuel pool and reactor vessel.

C. MOTOR GENERATOR SET HOISTS Three 12-ton monorail hoists are provided to aid in overhaul of the motor generators. Sufficient separation exists to preclude any loss of safety-related system function following any poten-tial load drop in this area. Administrative procedures will-allow overhaul of these units only whenlthe reactor is in a cold shutdown condition.

. Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08 will specify the lif ting equipment and ha'ndling procedures for' these loads along these monorail hoist travel paths.

(2) Revised (later) 2.3.2-76A 100/R92A/1.139 020984 V - - . - .-..- .., - - - - . . - , - _ - - , - , - , . . ,, .- -- -

r

)

-G.- RCIC HOIST 2

-The RCIC hoist is a 15-ton monorail overhead hoist designed for overhaul of the Reactor Core isolation Cooling system. Suffi-cient physical . separation exists, ensuring that an inadvertant I drop of the RCIC system components would not cause damage to any other system required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

H.. HPCI HOIST The HPCI Hoist is a 15-ton monorail overhead hoist designed for overhaul of the High Pressure Coclant Injection system. Suffi- ,'

.cient physical' separation exists, ensuring that an inadvertant drop of the HPCI system. components _would. not cause . damage to any other system required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

I. -N&S RECIRCULATION PUMP HOISTS The handling of heavy loads with either of the two' recirculating -

- pump 25-ton hand-operated hoists, inside the Reactor Primary Containment will occur. only during , cold shutdown when any pot'en-h .,

tially. af fected safety equipment is not required for safe shutdown or decay heat' removal. ,.

For the hoist:Just outside of the primary containment,- there is adequate floor strength at this lo2ation to withstand a 25-ton load : drop from a height. of one foot. - For lighter loads, higher height limits .which are reviewed and approved by Engineering,

, 'will be imposed.. These limits will be observed any time this outer hoist is used to handle heavy loads when the plant is not

' ~

in a cold shutdown condition.

w

- (2) Revised (Later) 2.3.2-78 100/R92B/1.127 ,

020984 A

Excspt lfor .tha torua, thara is also aufficisnt ssparction and

-redundancy for other safety systems located under this hoist that would prevent a complete loss of that -system for any inadvertent load drop. Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08 will include specifications defining height limitations, and the handling of any heavy loads beyond the height limitations or within the drywell,'only when the plant is in cold shutdown.

J. RHR-FIRST FLOOR HOIST TROLLEY AND RHR BASEMENT HOIST TROLLEYS The RHR first floor hoist trolleys and RHR basement hoist trol-leys are four sixteen-ton hoists used for access of repair equipment and parts including RHR components to the basement and sub-basement. The inadvertent drop of any component, causing the total loss of-a safety system division, cannot prevent a safe shu'tdown and decay heat removal since a redundant division of

. that system still remains operable.

-K. CORE SPRAY HOISTS The Division I and II Core Spray Hoists are two 16-ton hoists designed for overhaul of the Core Spray Pumps. Sufficient-phys-ical separation and system redundancy- exists, ensuring that an inadvertent drop of any Core Spray Pump components would not cause damage to any other system, or the other Division Core Spray equipment, required for safe' shutdown or decay heat removal.

.) -

.(2) Revised-(Later) 2.3.2-79 100/R92A/1.128 020984

= _

r- =

.L. . DIESEL GENERATOR HOISTS AND DIESEL CENERATOR MOTOR CONTROL CENTER HOISTS The diesel generator hoists and diesel generator motor control center hoists are used during corrective and maintenance procedures on the diesel generators. .The accidental dropping of a diesel engine ~ component will have no effect upon any other system required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

M. VENTILATION EQUIPMENT HOIST t

A Ventilation Equipment overhead hoist with up to 8-ton capacity is used for corrective and preventive maintenance on various ventilation components. At present an 8 ton rated trolly beam and trolly have been installed to support a future hoist that will be in conformance with ANSI - B 30.16. There is adequate

' floor strength to withstand an inadvertent load drop up to 10 tons, from the fif th floor to the third floor without impacting critical. systems below the third floor.

(2)' Revised (later)L 2 3.2-80 100/R92A/1.129 020984 2

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