ML20086Q903

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Proposed Tech Specs 3.5.1 Re Safety Injection Tank Operability
ML20086Q903
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/26/1995
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20086Q886 List:
References
NUDOCS 9507280242
Download: ML20086Q903 (7)
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Text

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'3/4.5 ENERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each Reactor Coolant System safety injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve open, b.

A containtd borated water volume of between 1679 (78%) and 1807 (83.8%)

cubic feet,,

c. Between 1720 and 2300 ppm of boron, and
d. A nitrogen cover pressure of between 600 and 625 psig.

toPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3*, and 4*.

ACTION:

. a. With one safety injection tank inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAND 8Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b. With one safety injection tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each safety injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:
1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure in the tanks, and
2. Verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve is open.
  • With pressurizer pressure greater than or equal to 1750 psia. When pressur-izer pressure is less than 1750 psia, at least three safety injection tanks must be OPERABLE, each with a minimum pressure of 235 psig and a maximum pressure of 625 psig, and a contained borated water volume of between 1332 (61%) and 1807 (83.8%) cubic feet. With all four safety injection tanks l OPERABLE, each tank shall have a minimum pressure of 235 psig and a maximum pressure of 625 psig, a boron concentration of between 1720 and 2300 ppe boron, and a contained borated' water volume of between 888 (39%) and 1807 (83.8%) cubic feet. In MODE 4 with pressurizer pressure less than 392 psia (700 psia for remote shutdown from LCP-43), the safety injection tanks may be -

isolated.

9507280242 950726 PDR ADOCK 05000382 P PDR WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 5-1 AMENDMENT NO.19

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,, l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS  :

l SURVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENTS (Continued) l I

b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume ]

by verifying the boron concentration of the safety injection tank 1 solution. i l

c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 1750 psia, l by verifying that the isolation valve operator breakers are padlocked 1 I

in the open position.

d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each safety injection 1 tank isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following ,

conditions:

1. When an actual or simulated RCS pressure signal exceeds 535 psia, and .
2. Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.

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WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 5-2

,a 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERA 8ILITY of each of the Reactor Coolant System ~(RCS) safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.

This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration, and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the safety analysis are met.

The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be " operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, whi'ch requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these safety injection tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occuring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. '

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SU85YSTEMS .

The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double-ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

When in mode 3 and with RCS temperature 5000F two OPERABLE ECCS subsys-tems are required to ensure sufficient emergency core cooling capability is available to prevent the core from becoming critical during an uncontrolled cooldown (i.e., a steam line break) from greater than 5000F.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 34

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374.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)  !

3/4.5.1 SAFETY lNJECTION TANKS j LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j

l 3.5.1 Each Reactor Coolant System safety injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

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a. The isolation valve open, j
l
b. A contained borated water volume of between 1679 (78%) and 1807 (83.8%)  ;

cubic feet.  !

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c. Between 1720 and 2300 ppm of boron, and l j
d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 600 and 625 psig. j APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2, 3*, and 4*.  !

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ACTION:

a. With one safety injection tank inoperable, except : : result Of cl0 ed 1:01: tion valve.due to boron concentration not within limits, restore j the boron concentration to within limits inoperable tank t0 OPEP.^SLE status  ;

within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and l in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.  ;

b. With one safety injection tank inoperable due to inability to verify level or pressure, th0.4501:t10n valve being cle:0d, either imediately Open the ,

4" 1501 st40n valv0 Or bc at 1000t "0T ST^SDBV within 1 h0ur and be 4a "0T -

SHU"0E*' withia the next--12 hours. restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT ,

SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.  !

c. With one safety injection tank inoperable for reasons other than ACTION a or  !
b. restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. l
  • With pressurizer pressure greater than or equal to 1750 psia. When pressurizer pressure is ,

less than 1750 psia, at least three safety injection tanks must be OPERABLE. each with a j minimum pressure of 235 psig and a maximum pressure of 625 psig, and a contained borated  !

water volume of between 1332 (61%) and 1807 (83.8%) cubic feet. With all four safety injection tanks OPERABLE. each tank shall have a minimum pressure of 235 psig and a maximum  !

pressure of 625 psig. a boron concentration of between 1720 and 2300 ppm boron, and a contained borated water volume of between 888 (39%) and 1807 (83.8%) cubic feet, In MODE 4  !

with pressurizer pressure less than 392 psia (700 psia for remote shutdown from LCP-43), the -

safety injection tanks may be isolated.  ;

WATERFORD -

UNIT 3 3/4 5-1 AMENDMENT NO. 19 j i

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.. 1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS  !

SURVEILLANCE. REQUIREMENTS-i f

4.5.1 Each safety injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:  ;

'a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover f

pressure in the tanks, and l

2. Verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve is open.

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b .' At least once_ per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume l increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume by verifying the boron . ,

concentration of the safety injection tank solution. This surveillance is not l reauired when the volume increase makeup source is the RWSP and the RWSP has -

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not been diluted since verifying that the RWSP boron concentration is eaual to i or greater than the boron concentration limit. ,

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c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 1750 psia, by l verifying that the isolation valve operator breakers are padlocked in the open l position.  ;

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d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each safety injection tank j isolation valve opens automatically under each of .the following conditions: i
1. When an actual or simulated RCS pressure signal exceeds 535 psia, and I
2. Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 5-2 I i

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A 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) safety injection tanks (SITS) ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the l reactor core through each of the cold logs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

NUREG-1366, " Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements,"

Section 7.4 discusses surveillance requirements for the instrumentation channels used in the measurement of water level and pressure in SITS. It is the recommendation of the NUREG that i when one SIT is inoperable due only to the inability to verify water level and pressure, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> be allowed to restore SIT to an OPERABLE status.

The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration, and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the safety analysis are met. If one SIT is inoperable, for a reason other than boron concentration or the inability to verify level or pressure, the SIT must be returned to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

In this condition, the total contents of the three remaining SITS cannot be assumed to reach the core during a LOCA contrary to the assumptions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

CEOG " Joint Applications Report for Safety Injection Tank A0T/STI Extension,"

CE NPSD-994, provides a series of deterministic and probabilistic findings that support 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as being either " risk beneficial" or " risk neutral" in comparison to shorter periods for restoring the SIT to OPERABLE status. The reDort discusses best-estimate analysis that confirmed that, during large-break LOCA scenarios, core melt can be prevented by either operation of one LPSI pump or the operation of one HPSI pump and a single SIT. I l

The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be

" operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std, 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met, in addition, as these safety injection tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The 'imits for Operation eith a cafety-injection tan' dncpc+able for any rea:On except an isolation valve closed -inimiae the time expecure Of the plant to a LCC^ event escwr-ing-soncer4+r+t-w&th failure of an additiona' cafety injectinn tan' "hich may-result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. " a closed isolation valve cannot be 4"""ediately openedAhe ful' capability Of One cafety injec440n tank 10 not a+a11able and prompt action 4s-required to plac&the reactor " a "cde where-this capabi'ity it not required-WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 34

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