ML20086J983
| ML20086J983 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1984 |
| From: | Weiss E UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8401260164 | |
| Download: ML20086J983 (21) | |
Text
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r 009gEgEIT84 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 J5 25 P3:39 NUCIEAR REGULA'IORY CWMISSION 7~..
. ~,
BEFORE THE CONISSION In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON CWPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart)
('Ihree Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
UNIN OF CWCERNED SCIENTISTS' CWMENTS CN NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO GPU'S MAMAGEMENT PROPOSAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROtN__D By memorardun dated January 9,1984, the Acting Qief of NRC's Dacketing and Service Branch informed the parties to the 'IMI-1 restart proceeding that the Comission has agreed with the staff's suggestion that the parties be given an opportunity to coment on the " Staff Response to GPU's June 10, 1983, Management Organization Proposal and Any Subsequent Gangas as of November 28, 1983,", dated January 3, 1984, and to express any additic,nal views.
Coments are to be received by the D'cketirg and Service Branch no later than close of business January 25, 1984.
'Ihe staf f's response to GPU's management proposal, on which coments by the parties are now permitted, was first presented orally to the Commission at a meeting held on December 5,
1983.
During that meeting, the intervenors spake before the staff presentation and thus wre prevented from considering the staf f's proposal or voicing their views to the Comisssion.
In contrast,
'^ 8401260164 840125 PDR ADOCK 05000289 G
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, GPU was provided the opportunity to speak after the staff and did comment on the proposal.
'Iherefore, on December 12, 1983, trS urged "the Comission to schedule a meetig for the purpose of allowing responses to the Staff's proposal of December 5, 1983."I/
Qi Dec eber 29, 1983, the staff resporded stating that "the Staff has no objection to UCS' Request, althotgh it believes that the subnission of written coments would be adequate. 2_/
Subsequently, the staff prepared its January 3, 1984, memorandun to the Comissioners which "mmorializes the views set forth in the sta f f's oral presentation [on December 5,1983) and how the staff has arrived at its current position."3_/
'Ihus, althotyh the parties are now provided with the opportunity to submit written coments or, the staff's propsal, as far as we are amre the Comission has not yet ruled on (CS' request that the Comission schedule a meeting for the purpose of allowing Intervenor responses to the staff's proposal.
LCS does not consider this an unimportant point.
We have previously remarked that our written filings seem to disappear into a
" regulatory black hole."
We have no irdication that the Comissioners personally read or consider, most of the filings by trS and other Intervenors.
A further disturbing irdication of the ineffectiveness of the present, opportunity to submit written coments on the staff's restart proposal is the fact that the Commission scheduled another cic ed meeting to continue l
l 1/ Ibquest for Opportunity to Respord to Staff Proposal for Restart of 'lMI-1, l
Union of Concerned Scientists, December 9,1983, p. 3, emphasis added.
-2/ NRC Staff Response to Union of Concerned Scientists' Request for Opportunity to Despond to Staff Proposal for Destart of 'IMI-1, December l
29, 1983, p. 2.
l
~3/ Staf f Pesponse to GPU's June 10, 1983, Management Organization Proposal and Any Subsequent 01arges as of November 28, 1983, January 3,1984, p. 1.
i Hereinafter, " Staff Response."
i I
\\
. discussing " future steps in MI-1 restart"A/ or 2: 00 p.m.
on January 24, f
1984, the day before these coments are scheduled to be received.
UCS has previously objected to the holding of closed meetings on 'IMI-1 restart.E/
We refusal to grant UCS' request for a Commission meeting at which the Intervenors can respond to the staff's proposal would not, in and of itself, be objectionable if the staff and licensee were treated in the same manner as other parties. However, they have not been.
UCS' comments on the sta f f's restart proposal are divided into two subject areas.
First, we will discuss some of the most significant outstanding safety issues which must be resolved before the plant is allowed to oFerate.
Second, we deal with the management competence and integrity issues.
COMMMENTS ON STAFF PROPOSAL Harware and Design Issues te staff states that its June 7, 1983, memorandum to the Commission "outlin[ed] the basis steps that would have to be taken before the staff, for its part, could reach a decision on whether restart should be permitted."
Among the steps enumerated by the staff was the " complete resolution of any outstanding safety issues."b/
However, in its January 4, 1984, memorandum to l
the Comission, the staff effectively abardoned this position.
Were is no i
longer any requirement that all " outstanding safety issues" be resolved.
t-
-4/ NRC recorded announcement of Comission meetings, telephone number (202) 634-1498, January 24, 1984, approx. 8:00 a.m.
-5/ Union of Concerned Scientists' Motion to Open Meeting of December 19, 1983, December 12, 1983, p. 2.
. 6f Staff Response, p 2.
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Instead the staff now proposes, prestnably as a substitute, to limit the 'IMI-1 power level "to approximately 25%" stating that "[t]his level would limit fission product build-up and would assure limited consequences in the event of an accident...."Y tat statement would be just as true at any power level -
fission product build-up would be " limited" and the consequences of an accident would be " limited."
We staff avoids saying whether, absent the complete resolution of any outstanding safety issues, the consequences of an accident would be acceptable or what, in fact, they would be.
LCS believes that this omission by the staff is intentional because it has not been, and can not be, demonstrated that the consequences of each and every design basis accident at 25% power will be within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100.
%e Comission has in the past granted low p>wer licenses limiting the plant to suberitical testing or operation at less than a few percent power, usually less than 5% power.
At those power levels, a case can be made that an accident wauld have consequences within NRC limits.
Such is not the case for 25% power and the staff has presented no information to support its bald assertion.
%e staff chose 25% power not for considerations of safety, but because that level wauld " provide a stable plant operatirg level, at which all important plant systems would be operational, * * * [and] "would permit a thorough check-out of the facility itself and permit operator familiarization or refamiliarization with actual plant operations."M Wese goals can not be achieved if 'IMI-1 is limited to suberitical testire or a very low p>wer level.
%erefore, the staff's original propasal should be followed : the complete resolution of all outstarding safety issues before any restart authorization.
7/
Id., pp. 3-4.
8/
Id., p. 4.
'Ihere are a large number of outstanding safety issues that must be resolved prior to restart in order that there be a basis for the requisite finding that operation ~ of 'IMI-1 will not pose undue risk to public health and safety.
Many of these, particularly those dealirg with the crucial issues of the adequacy of decay heat removal, have been expre : sly enumerated by the Appeal Board in its May 26, 1983 decision.9/
'Ihroughout that decision, the Appeal Board noted safety issues which while outside what it believed to be the scope of the proceeding, nonetheless were directly related to the safety of 'IMI-1.
'Iherefore, the, Appeal Board specifically reserved judgment,on whether 'IMI-1 can be operated without urdue risk to the public health and safety.
Instead, it concluded its decisicn as follows:1_0/
In light of the bifurcation of issues between the adjudicatory boards and the Comission, only the Comission can determine - after examining all systems and considering information within and outside this record - whether there is reasonable assurance that Three Mile Island Unit No.1 can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public.
t Despite the unequivocal nature of the Appeal Board decision, the Comission has repeatedly, and as recently as January 19, 1984, postponed a decision on whether to take review of that Appeal Board decision.
'lhe Comission has given no visible sign of recognition that the action now being contemplated is more than merely a lifting of the imediate effectiveness of its July and August, 1979 orders.
UCS is unable to imagine by what legal stratagem the restart could be justified when NRC's Appeal Board found the Atomic Safety ard Licensirg Board's decisions inadequate to support a restart authorization and
-9]
AU6-729,17 NRC 814 (1983).
10/
Id., at 895, emf asis added. 'Ihe Appeal Board also resolved certain LCS h
exceptions by rulirg that the Comission must approve a design for the
'IMI-1 Main Steam Line Rupture Detection System, determine if GPU has made reasonable progress in implementation and decide wh2ther the intervenors
'are entitled to a hearing on that issue.
Id., at 888.
then itself was unable to make the requisite finding of no undue risk to public health and safety.
It is long past the time when it should be recognized that the emperor has no clothes and that the present adjudicatory record is woefully inadequate to support a restart authorization. The practical significance of such a recognition would be to refocus GPU's attention,on the many necessary plant modifications which have been stalled because it believes that restart is imminent.
Some of these safety modifications could be completed in less than six months, but they have not been started because GPU believes that a restart authorization is just over thehorizon.11/
The Connission has already received UCS' January 20, 1984, Petition for Show Cause Concerning the TMI-1 Dnergency Feedwater System in dich we request a suspension of the 7MI-1 operating license unless and until the plant's EEW system complies with the lac rules applicable to systems important to safety (including safety-grade, safety-related, and engineered safety feature systems).
We will not reiterate the safety deficiencies detailed therein. We believe that the " reasonable time" provision of 10 CFR 2.206 for NRC response to such petitions can, in the case of 7MI-1, be interpreted as requiring a decision prior to restart.
In addition to the safety issues which the Appeal Board noted should be resolved and the other emergency feedwater system issues raised in trS' January 20 petition, there are a number of " generic" unresolved safety issues which the staff has neglected. We give three examples here.
11/ A U'S representative attended the GPU/NRC staf f meetings on December 16, 1983, where GPU described the prticular modifications which are not being started for this reason. The staf f's summaries of those meetings failed to describe the particulars which UCS noted and will provide in affidavit form at the appropriate time.
V
. UCS attempted to have the question of the adequacy of fire protection at
'IMI-l resolved within the restart h>roceedirg.
Ibwever, the Licensirg Board and the Appeal Board ruled that issue to be outside the scope of the restart proceedirg.
Nevertheless, the Gunission should consider the followirg facts and determine Wiether 'IMI-1 meets the requirements for safe operation.
In a letter to GPU dated March 9,1983, the staff denied several GPU requests for
" schedular exemptions" (i.e., deadline extensions) from certain fire protection rule (10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R) implenentation dates for 'IMI-1.
In one instance, the staff's denial of GPU's requested delay in implementirg modifications required by 10 CFR 50.48(c) (2) means that GPU must implenent by April 1, 1983, those fire protection modifications that do not require prior NRC approval or plant shutdown.
Ibwever, prior to the staff denial of the exemption request, GPU did rot plan to even begin these modifications until the first refuelirg after restart (then tenatively scheduled for the third quarter of 1983) and completion was not anticipated before May 1984.
'Ihus, i t appears that since the extension ms denied, 'IMI-l cannot restart until the modifications required by 10CFR 50. 48 (c) (2) have been implemented.
To the best of our knowledge, UCS believes that the staff's restart proposal was made without regard to this situation.
In two o the r instances, the staff denied the requested schedular exemptions on the grounds they were unnecessary to achieve the requested delays.
'Ihe "reasonirg" behind this determination serves to illustrate that the staff has abdicated its responsibilities to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety.
'Ihese instances involve the implementation schedule for modifications which require the plant to be shutdown, but do rot require prior NRC approval (10 CFR 50. 48 (c) (3)], and modifications which l
require both plant shutdown and prior NRC approval (10 CFR 50.48(c) (4)].
For I
i
- 'the former, the rule requires that the modifications be implemented before startup after the earliest of the followbg events comencing 180 days or more after February 17,1981 (the effective date of the fire protection rule):
(1) the first refuelirg outage; (2) another planned outage that lasts for at least 60 days; or (3) an unplanned outage that lasts for at least 120 days.
For the L latter, the implementation schedule is identical, except that the modifications must be cenpleted prior to startup followirg the earliest of the above three events commencing 180 days after NRC approval of the modifications.
The NRC staff ruled that the requested schedular exemptions were unnecessary because the current 5-year outage "comenced" after the effective date of the fire protection rule, despite the fact that the outage has continued for three yerrs since.
Such " reasoning," while arguably literally correct, does violence to the Comission's clear intent; the clear intent of 10 CFR 50.48 is to have the necessary fire protection modifications implenented as soon as practicable.
GPU has had much more downtime than any other licensee to make the required changes yet they have been delayed for no justifiable reason. 'Ihe staff's position must be reversed by the Comission.
Another example of an unresolved safety issue that has been ignored by the licensee and staff is the adequacy of protection against steam generator l
tube rupture accidents.
A review of the information provided by GPU concerning this subjectb discloses that GPU recognizes that because of the damage to the 'IMI-l steam generators, the passibility of steam generator tube
(
leaks (including multiple tube leaks in both steam generators) must be l
l
[/ "SG Tube Rupture Procedure QJidelines," GPU Nuclear Technical Data Report No. 406, Revision No. 2, dated August 12, 1983.
t
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considered. GPli is developing new emergency procedures which specify that the affected steam generator should continue to be vented to atmosphere outside the reactor containment building until it is expected that the radiation dose to the public would exceed the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.
'Ihe new emergency procedures violate a ntnber of former safety limits and in one instance require the imposition of a stricter limit which can not be monitored by the operator using safety grade instrumentation.
For example, the new emergency procedures reduce the required subcoolire margin in the reactor coolant system from the 50 F instituted after the 'IMI-2 accident to 25 F.N/
By lowering the reactor coolant system pressure so that it is only slightly higher than the steam generator pressure, the amount of radioactive water leaking into the affected steam generator is reduced.
Ibwever, reducing reactor pressure also brings the system closer to the boiling point ard thus risks the formation of steam bubbles which could block natural circulation cooling of the reactor fuel.
Another safety limit which will be violated by reducing the subcocling margin is the " fuel in compression" limit.E/
Stated simply, when the fuel rods are hot, reactor pressure should be kept relatively high to preclude fuel rod swelling or ballooning which could block or reduce cooling water flow between the fuel rods.
Finally the new procedures violate previous limits on l
the required temperature / pressure limits for reactor coolant pump operation.5/
' Ibis charge may be less significant than the other violations i
of safety limits because the reactor coolant pumps can only be operated if l
l 13/ Id., p. 19.
14/ Id., p. 20.
15/ Id.
1 1
r
-le-offsite electrical power is available and NRC rules (General D2 sign Criterion
- 17) require postulating the loss of offsite power when evaluating the adequacy of protection against accidents.
Ibwever, there has been no demonstration that the protection against steam generator tube ruptures is adequate without operation of the reactor coolant pumps.
We one safety limit (of which UCS is aware) which has been made stricter is the limit on the allowable difference in temperature between the steam generator shell and the steam generator tubes.E/
Previously, the limit was 0
100 F delta T.
Eis has been reduced to 70 degrees because of the damage to the tubes.
One concern is that, as reactor coolant system temperature decreases, tube temperature decreases and "[ alt some point the the difference in temperature between the colder tubes and warmer shell is sufficient to result in tensile stresses that pull apart a leaking tute."E/
%ere are at least three safety concerns with this GPU proposal.
- First, there are no safety-grade instruments to measure the delta T between the steam generator shell and tubes.
We operators will have to rely on readings from the non-sa fety grade plan t computer, which may not be operable or reliable.E/ Second, reducing the delta T extends the tim,e required to cool the plant down to the conditions necessary to initiate operation of the Decay lleat Removal system and raises questions concerning the amount of time that l
venting of radioactive steam is necessary and the sufficiency of the water i
l supply in the condensate storage tanks.
Finally, having to limit the steam generator shell to tube delta T to a stricter limit increases the difficulty l
l r
l 16/ Id., pp. 16-17.
17/ Id., p. 16, emphasis added.
l 18/ Id., p. 72.
I
. of the operator's tasks in coping with a steam generator tube rupture accident.
In stn, the adequacy of protection against a steam generator tube rupture accident, a design basis accident, needs to be evaluated before any restart authorization.
W stress that the above are only illustrative examples.
Many serious and previously unalayzed safety problems are raised by the proposal to operate
'IMI-l with damaged steam generators.
'Ihe final example of a generic safety issue which needs to be resolved prior to restart is the adequacy of protection against a main steam line break combined with a small break loss-of-coolant acvcident.
In a memorandum dated June 23, 1982, to Harold Ihnton, Director, NRR, the Director of the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD), which was formed as a result of the investigations followirg the 'IMI-2 accident, recomended that a combined primary / secondary blowdown accident be classified as an unresolved safety issue for reactors supplied by Babcock & Wilcox.
Although NRR did not agree with the recomendation to formally designate this accident as a generic unresolved safety issue, that does not in way diminish the need to evaluate on a plant-specific basis the adcquacy of protection against such an accident before authorizing restart of 'IMI-1.
Another way in which the staff's proposal for restart fails to completely resolve the outstanding safety issues is that it fails to address the question of whether the plant is safe enough to restart without completion of all the so-called "long-term" lessons learned requiranents.
Such justification was first requested by Mr. 'Ihomas Gerusky, Di rec to r, Bureau of Radiation Protection, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in a letter dated February 16, 1983.
According to the staff, the Comonwealth requested, among other things, " for those items extended beyond restart, a scheduled completion date and al
' justification or reference for that extension...."E/ 'Ihe staff did not reply for almost seven months and then failed to provide the information requested by the Cbmonwealth.
Rather than attempting to explain why MI-1 is safe enotgh to operate without completirg the modifications shown to be necessary by the MI-2 accident, the staff simply referenced the Comission's Order dated Atgust 9,
1979, which only required that the licensee demonstrate
" reasonable progress" toward completion of the lorg-term requirements.E/
Wile this non-answer mey have mollified the Comonwealth, it evades the central question.
On Cbtober 18, 1983, we filed a "UCS Motion to Estiab ish Criteria for Judging ' Reasonable Progress'." He have as yet received no reply from the Comission. We hereby incorporate that filing into these coments on the staff's restart proposal.
GPU has made less progress than other licensees which had only refueling outages in which to complete the changes.
We think it beyond dispute that GPU has made a deliberate decision to place restart as its top priority.
As a consequence, necessary safety modifications which could have been completed have beeen stalled irdefinitely.
This does not
. represent " reasonable progress" as required by the Comission's order.
Nor has the staff or the Comission yet given serious attention to the fundamental question of whether, and if so why, mI-l is safe enotqh to operate without com pleting the modifications shown to be necessary by the mI-2 accident.
l In summary, the staff's restart proposal is inadequate because it fails to resolve what is ultimately the sirgle most important question - whether TMI-l can be operated without undue risk to public health and safety.
I 19/ lbrold R. Denton, Director, Office of Maclear Reactor Regulation, to
'Ihomas M. Gerusky, Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection, Comonwealth of Pennsylvania, Saptember 2,1983, p.1, emphasis added.
20/ Id.
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, l Management Competence and Integrity Issues
'Ihe January 3, 1984, doctanent entitled " Staff Response to GPU's June 10, 1983, Managenent Organization Proposal and Any Subsequent Charges as of Novenber 28, 1983" -(Staff Response), contains a much expanded rationalization of the staff's original proposal for 'IMI-1 restart at 25% power.
Ibwever, it suffers from the same fundamental defects.
Stripped to its essentials, the staff muld allow GPU to operate 'IMI-1 i
without first having a fair, open, on-the-record determination of whether GPU is fit to hold an NRC operating license for a nuclear power plant.
Such circumvention of the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act in the name of sheer expediency would be wrong in the case of any utility. (By way of analogy, the act allows issuance of temporary operating licenses to new applicants only if no serious questions exist as to licenseability.)2_1/
In the case of GPU, it is especiauy odious.
GPU, af ter all, stands irdicted with the most serious offense in the history of the civilian reactor program, has a history of widespread cheating on operator qualification examinations, submitting material false statements to the NRC, is charged by clean-up employees with harassment ard intimidation, and ran a post-accident training program which both the Special Master and Licensing Board found inadequate.22/
Mareover, the "new" post-accident GPU is responsible for the cheating, for the thoroughly inept training and testing prog ram, and for the alleged harassment of employees ergaged in the clean-up operation who attempted to get 21/ See Conference Paport Ib.97-884, accompanying H. R.
2330, September 28, 1982, p. 36.
~22/ 'Ihe Special t1 aster stated: "From this pattern one must conclude that the training department did not take seriously the licensee's obligation to teach the subjects required by the Comission's Order ard that the operators did not take seriously their obligation to learn it."
15 NRC 918, 1017, (1982).
I '
Mherence to NRC rules.
Perhaps most significantly, it is the "new" GPU which has consistently responded to all discoveries of malfeasance by denial, rather than by doing what is necessary to prevent recurrence.
'Ihe fact that the widespreM extent of the cheating ever came to light is due to the fortuity of persevering Intervenors and special Master.
GPU admitted only to the cheating of the two operators who confessed as much.
In addition, the Comission must be aware that it faces its current difficulties only because the "new" GPU never took the steps on its own in the five years since Mr. Ilar unan's disclosures to determine the scope of leak rate falsification at thit 2,
to find who was responsible and to call them to account.
'Ib allow GPU to profit from its intransigence would be a mockery of justice.
'Ibe second offensive element of the staff's proposal is that it would allow both 25% power operation and then full power operation based solely on the staff's views of GPU as presented to the Comission in closed, secret meetings.
'Ihere is no recognition whatever that the public is entitled to participate in the developnent of the record bearing on GPU's integrity and competence, nor even the slightest sensitivity to the fact that the staff's i
legal posture throughout this proceeding has been as an adversary prty h support of GPU's position, not as a neutral advisor to the Comission.
It is important for the Commission to understand that in the context of an l
adjudicatory proceeding such as the restart case, the staf f's role as an adversary means that its views are not entitled per se to any more weight than those of other prties.
In this case, it is particularly crucial that the Comission be sensitive i
to the distinction between the sta f f's role as an adversary in individual adjudicatory cases and its role as an advisor in general areas.
It cannot be l
forgotten that the staf f consistently endorsed GPU management for four years, i
I
E
. even though it knew the truth of Mr. Hartman's allegations and failed for all that time to notify the Licensing Board, Appeal Board or the public of the nature of the evidence of' systematic leak rate falsification.
'Ihe staff is therefore unfortunately now in a position where it has a clear self-interest in minimizing the importance of the questions bearing on GPU's integrity and c;xnpetence so as to defend its prior positions.
thder these circumstances, it is particularly outrageous to suggest that the decisions on operatirq 'IMI-1 could be made by the Commission on the basis of staff briefings, probably in secrecy, without the public ever having had the op: 'rtunity to present any evidence or to question any. witnesses.
Even putting aside basic considerations of fairness and due process, the Commission cannot have the requisite confidence in the quality of the factual evidence and analysis that it will receive from one interested party whose assertions are unchallerged by those in opposition.
UCS also questions the basis premise of the staff proposal -- that 'IMI-1 management integrity can rationally be "decoupled" from assertions arising out of 'IMI-2 operations and clean-up.
'Ibe same company manages both and since the ultimate issue is management competence and integrity, the barring of 'IMI-2 operators from 'IMI-1 operations scarcely resolves that issue.
It should be noted that the barring of 'IMI-2 operations from 'IMI-1 has a gaping loophole because the 'IMI-1 Manager of Operations, the top operating l
1evel supervisor at 'IMI-1, was licensed to operate 'IMI-2.
Mr. Ross, whose l
integrity was judged greatly wanting by the special Master, also plays a central role in 'IMI-1 start-up, bearing responsibility for sign-of f of the successful completion of many of the most important start-up tests and procedures.
l
f
~ l l
We staff finds assurance in the fact that only 18 of 88 top GPU Nuclear managers were with Met-Fd prior to the accident.
tese figures do not not count GPU Service Corp. or GPU employees.
%e staff's observation that the Licensirg Board found GPU's managenent competent is plainly irrelevant since the Licensing Board was not privy to the leak rate falsification evidence --
due to the staff's failure to inform it - and expressly reserved judgment on the implications of such evidence.2_3/
%e _ staff also cites the INPO and Rickover team evaluations.
- Again, these provide no basis for evaluating GPU's integrity.
Neither of them considered the leak rate falsification evidence or the cheating.
Neither of them has ever been tested in any public forum.
Neither oi' them is on the record -in this case.
We Rickover team report is a collection of general assertions and subjective judgments which defy objective analysis.
In i
addition, as UCS has shown,EI the Rickover team report cannot be squared with the objective facts beyond the scope of that review which show a continuing pattern of ineptness by GPU.
We hereby incorporate into this filing the coments in our November 23, 1983, letter to the Comission on the Rickover team report.
We are astonished by the staff's effort to justify restart on the basis that the mI-1 operators have been retested "in accordance with the more stringent NRC criteria developed after the accident at 'IMI-2. "E/
It is precisely these new "strirgent" NRC criteria, which were the basis for the post-accident training and testing program at 'IMI-l and the NRC examination, 23/ 14 NRC 381, 557-558, 1981.
-24/ UCS letter to the Comissioners, re: 'IMI-l Restart /Rickover Task Force Management Review, November 23, 1983.
25/ Staf f Fesponse, p. 5.
~
. and Wich were so egregiously inadequate that the Special Master and even the Licensing Board stated respectively:
%e final problem is this: the operators' opinion of the examination may be right. %e examination may not in fact measure their ability to operate the reactor safely.
15 NRC 918,1034, (1982).
%e reopened proceeding afforded insights into the staff's imple-mentation of 10 CFR Part 55 which leads us now to have certain reservations about licensed operator testing, even in view of the changes which have been made since July 1981. We cannot in good conscience dismiss the subject without bringing certain matters to the Comission's. attention.
16 NRC 281, 369, (1982).
Cne might well conclude that the staff has never read and surely does not take seriously the decisions in this case.
%ose decisions constitute a broad indictment 'of the staff's implementation of post-accident training criteria and are currently pending before the Appeal Board.
At bottom, the staff is now prepared to recommend restart on the basis of its warm feelings a ut the three top GPU personnel, Messrs. Clark, Kintner and Hukill. Ibrold Denton said as much in his presentation to Senator Specter in Harrisburg on December 16, 1983.
UCS has previously pointed out to the Comission specific [ instances where Mr. Clark and Mr.
Hukill have made incorrect assertions to the Comission on matters of safety significance.26/
Such instances argue generally against substituting feelings for the probing that can only take place in a hearing context.
Several fundamental questions which the staff fails to address forthrichtly are: 1) If the OI investigation concludes that widespread leak rate falsification took place, or that the Pa r ks-Ki ng charges are 26/ See " Union of Concerned Scientists' Comments on the Comission's Ex Parte feeting of December 17, 1982 and Statement of Continuing ObjectioFto Ex Parte Communication," dated January 7,1983, and " Union of Concerned
~Tentists' Statement on tree Mile Island Restart," dated December 5,1983.
Sc
O'
. substantiated, does M I-1 then shut down?
- 2) Do the reopened hearings ordered by the Appeal Board go forward af ter the plant restarts? 3) If so, does 2I-1 shut down if the result of the hearing is adverse to GPU?
No provision is made to restore the status quo ante upon the occurrence of these contingencies, neither of which is unlikely.
%is makes it obvious that the staff is not proposing " interim" operation, but a decision that is final in practical effect.
te proposal that such a decision could be made before one witness ever takes the oath to be questioned must be rejected.
%ere is no reason to believe that both the leak rate falsification and Parks-King allegations will not be proven.
Indeed, the information thus far made public is to the contrary.
Yet, the fundamental implicit premise of the staff's l
proposal is that GPU is suitable to hold a license and that only minor
" adjustments" might be called for.
tis improperly prejudges the outcome of the management proceeding, ef fectively commits the staff to continued endorsement of GPU's position so as to avoid embarassment and very probably places at least unspoken pressure on the investigators to avoid ccnclusions that wauld disturb a finding of overall management competence and integrity.
tis case has been characterized by the staff's failure to accept two basic propositions:
- 1) Corporate integrity is, in and of itself, a requirement for an NHC license, and 2) hhile one or tu) lapses may be viewed as isolated incidents, a continuing pattern is grounds for disqualification.
I Instead, each incident, no mattar how many, has been viewed in isolation. We questions bearing on GPU competence and integrity have been fractured ard never considered by the staff, or by any HEC fortm, all in one place at the l
same time. We Appeal Board's attempt to do so has thus far been prevented by l
the Commission.
It should now be allowed to proceed.
GPU, the staf f and, at times, the Commission have spent a great deal of time and effort trying to l
i
_ devise taethods to allow operation before resolving important safety issues in this case.
It is time to address the issues head on and let the chips fall Wre they may.
te staff's proposal adopts the opposite approach.
It would quite simply allow operation of 'H".I-1 with an on-the-record determination of whether GPU is fit te hold a license coming, if ever, at some indefinite time in the future.
Se people of central Nnnsylvania and the elected leaders of their comunity will not accept such a transparent expediency, nor should they be expected to.
Respectfully subnitted,-
f
- h. Weiss General Counsel thion of Concernd Scientists Dated: January 25, 1984 i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULAT0hi COMMISSION In the Matter of
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METROPO!,ITAN EDISON COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-289
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(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
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Station, Unit No. 1)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS' COMMENTS ON NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO GPU'S MAMAGEMENT PROPOSAL" have been served on the following persons by deposit in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, this 25th day of January 1984, except as noted by an asterisk.
- Nunzio Palladino, Chairman
- Gary J. Edles, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
- Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Dr. John.H. Buck Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
' James Asselstine, Commissioner Washington D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,- D.C. 20555
- Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board I
- Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner U.S. Nuclaar Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
- Judge Christine N. Kohl
- Thomas Roberts, Commissioner Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
- Docketing and Service Section
- Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Office of the Secretary Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 i
' Sheldon J. Wolfe, Alterr. ate Chairman
- William S. Jordan, III Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Harmon & Weiss U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1725 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006 Mrs. Marjorie Aamodt R.D. #5 John A. Levin, Assistant Counsel Coatsville, PA 19320 Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission P.O. Box 3265 Douglas R. Blazey, Chief Counsel Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Department of Environmental Resources 514 Executive House, P.O. Box 2357 ANGRY /TMI PIRC Harrisburg, PA 17120 1037 Maclay Street Harrisburg, PA 17103 Ms. Louise Bradford Three Mile Island Alert
- Steven C. Sholly 1011 Green Street Union of Concerned Scientists Harrisburg, PA 17102 1346 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 1101 Washington, D.C. 20036 Dr. Judith H. Johnarud Dr. Chauncey Kepford
- Richard J. Rawson Environmental Coalition on Office of Executive Legal Director Nuclear Power U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 433 orlando Avenue Washington, D.C. 20555 State College, PA 16801 Thomas A. Baxter, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 i
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- Hand delivered.
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