Text

Amends 94 & 58 to Licenses NPF-39 & NPF-85,respectively, Permitting Rev to Action Statements Re ECCS
	ML20085N714
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	06/22/1995
From:	Stolz J; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	; Philadelphia Electric Co
Shared Package
ML20085N715	List: ML20085N714; ML20085N732;
References
	NPF-39-A-094, NPF-85-A-058 NUDOCS 9506300297
	Download: ML20085N714 (12)
	v • d • e

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Il UNITED STATES y

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E

WASHINGTON. D.C. 206eMNiot og...../

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-352 LIMERICK GENERATING STATION. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.94 License No.-NPF-39 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company (the licensee) dated August 12, 1994, as supplemented by letter dated i

March 29,.1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the. Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

l i

i 9506300297 950622 DR ADOCK 0500 2

1

l

. i 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-39 is hereby amended to read as follows:

j Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Apper.11x B, as revised through Amendment No.

94, are hereby incorporated into this license.

Philadelphia Electric 1

Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/.

Jh

. Stolz, Director et Directorate I-2 ision of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

)

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: June 22, 1995

)

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.94 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-39 DOCKET NO. 50-352 i

i Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages.

The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and i

contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Insert i

l 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 B 3/4 5-2 8 3/4 5-2 I

I i

9 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

~ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION:

a.

For the' core spray system:

1.

With one CSS subsystem inoperable, provided that at least two LPCI subsystems are OPERABLE, restore the inoperable CSS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within-the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .#

2.

With both CSS subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within,12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b.

For the LPCI system:

1.

With one LPCI subsystem inoperable, provided that at least one CSS subsystem is OPERABLE, restore the inoperable LPCI pump to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the 4

next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

l 2.

With one RHR cross-tie valve (HV-51-182 A or B) open, or power not removed from one closed RHR cross-tie valve operator, close the i

open valve and/or remove power from the closed valves operator within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.

With no RHR cross-tie valves (HV-51-182 A, B) closed, or power not removed from both closed RHR cross-tie valve operators, or with one RHR cross-tie valve open and power not removed from the other RHR cross-tie valve operator, be in at least HOT l

SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next j

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

4.

With two LPCI subsystems inoperable, provided that at least one CSS subsystem is OPERABLE, restore at least three LPCI subsystems to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD S'4UTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .#

5.

With three LPCI subsystems inoperable, provided that both CSS l

subsystems are OPERABLE, restore at least two LPCI subsystems to

-i OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

6.

With all four LPCI subsyste'es inoperable, be in at least HOT i

SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next i

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .*

j CWhenever both shutdown cooling subsystems are inoperable, if unable to attain COLD SHUTDOWN as required by this ACTION, maintain reactor coolant temperature as low as practical by use of alternate heat removal methods.

l

The Allowed Outage Times (A0Ts) of the 'B' Core Spray subsystem and the 'B' and 'D' LPCI subsystems may be extended up to 14 days to allow for installation of the common ESW and RHRSW system Modifications P-0166, P-0167, and P-0168 during the Unit 2 third I

refueling outage (2R03).

LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 86, 94

-1

3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION:

(Continued) c.

For the HPCI system:

1.

With the HPCI system inoperable, provided the CSS,.the LPCI system, the ADS and the RCIC system are OPERABLE, restore the HPCI system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the nut 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and reduce reactor steam done pressure to s 200 psig within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

I 2.

With the HPCI system inoperable, and one CSS subsystem, and/or LPCI subsystem inoperable, and provided at least one CSS subsystem, three LPCI subsystems, and ADS are operable, restore the HPCI to-OPERABLE within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , or be in HOT SHUTDOWN in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and in COLD SHUTDOWN in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

d.

For the ADS:

-1.

With one of the above required ADS valves inoperable, provided the HPCI system, the CSS and the LPCI system are OPERABLE, restore the inoperable ADS valve to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to s 100 psig within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2.

With two or more of the above required ADS valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to s 100 psig within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

I i

e.

With a CSS and/or LPCI header AP instrumentation channel inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or i

determine the ECCS header AP locally at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ; l

otherwise, declare the associated CSS and/or LPCI, as applicable, inoperable.

f.

In the event an ECCS system is actuated and injects water into the reactor coolant system, a Special Report shall be prepared and sub-i mitted to the Connission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 33, 94

fMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES f

i ECCS - OPERATING and SHUTDOWN (Continued) i With the HPCI system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization system and both the CS and LPCI systems.

In addition, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the safety i

analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor operating pressures on a reactor low water level condition. The HPCI out-of-service period of 14 days i

is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems and the RCIC system. The HPCI system, and one LPCI subsystem, and/or one CSS subsystem out-of-service period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ensures that sufficient ECCS, comprised of a minimum of one CSS subsystem, three LPCI subsystems, and all of the ADS will be available to 1) provide for safe shutdown of the facility, and 2) mitigate and control accident conditions within the facility.

The surveillanc requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test with reactor vessel injection requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to provide cooling at the earliest moment.

Upon failure of the HPCI system to function properly after a small break loss-of-coolant accident, the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automa-tically causes selected safety / relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure core cooling systems can enter the core in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200*F. ADS is conserva-tively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 100 psig.

This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cool-ing systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring ADS.

ADS automatically controls five selected safety-relief valves. The safety I

analysis assumes all five are operable.

The allowed out-of-service time for one valve for up to fourteen days is determined in a similar manner to other ECCS sub-system out-of-service time allowances.

3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER The suppression chamber is required to be OPERABLE as part of the ECCS to ensure that a sufficient supply of water is available to the HPCI, CS and LPCI systems in the event of a LOCA. This limit on suppression chamber minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core. The OPERABILITY of the suppression chamber in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3 is also required by Specification 3.6.2.1.

Repair work might require making the suppression chamber inoperable. This specification will permit those repairs to be made and at the same time give assurance that the irradiated fuel has an adequate cooling water supply when the suppression chamber must be made inoperable, including draining, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5 the suppression chamber minimum required water volume is reduced because the reactor coolant is maintained at or below 200'F.

Since pressure suppression is not required below 212'F, the minimum water volume is based on NPSH, recirculation volume and vortex prevention plus a safety margin for conservatism.

LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. S/N/9# EU, 94

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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j

t UNITE 3 STATES j

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20065-0001 1

49.....

P_H_ILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-353 LIMERICK GENERATING STATION. UNIT &

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 58 License No. NPF-85 I

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company (the licensee) dated August 12, 1994, as supplemented by letter dated March 29, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; l

D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

s m.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical i

Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-85 is hereby amended to read as follows:

t Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and'the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No.

58, are hereby incorporated into this license.

Philadelphia Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

t 3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall i

be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

{

Joh

. Stolz, Director Pr j ct Directorate I-2 i

Di sion of Reactor Projects - I/II i

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

June 22, 1995 I

i i

i f

r f

i i

i

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 58 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-85 DOCKET NO. 50-353 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Insert 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2

i 0

. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION:

a.-

For the core spray system:

1.

With one CSS subsystem inoperable, provided that at least two LPCI subsystems are OPERABLE, restore the inoperable CSS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDO W within--

the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

)

2.

With both CSS subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN

.I within.12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b.

For the LPCI system:

1.

With one LPCI subsystem inoperable, provided that at least one CSS subsystem is OPERABLE, restore the inoperable LPCI pump to OPERABLE 4

status within 30 days or be in at least H0T SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2.

With one RHR cross-tie valve (HV-51-282 A or B) open, or power not j

removed from one closed RHR cross-tie valve operator, close the i

open valve and/or remove power from the closed valves operator.

within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12. hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.

With no RHR cross-tie valves (HV-51-282 A, B) closed, or power i

not removed from both closed RHR cross-tie valve operators, or with one RHR cross-tie valve open and power not removed from

-l the other RHR cross-tie valve operator, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

4.

With two LPCI subsystems inoperable, provided that at least one CSS-subsystem is OPERABLE, restore at least three LPCI subsystems to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

5.

With three LPCI subsystems inoperable,. provided that both CSS subsystems are OPERABLE, restore at least two LPCI subsystems to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

6.

With all four LPCI subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .*

Whenever both ' shutdown cooling subsystems are inoperable, if unable to attain.

COLD SHUTDOWN'as required by this ACTION, maintain reactor coolant temperature as low as practical by use of alternate heat removal methods.

LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2 Anendment No. 58

j i.

-EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

LkMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(Continued)

ACTION:

.(Continued) c.

For the HPCI system:

1.

With the HPCI system' inoperable,' provided the CSS, the LPCI.

system, the ADS and the RCIC system are OPERABLE, restore the

'HPCI system-to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to s 200 psig within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2.

'With th'e HPCI system inoperable, and one CSS subsystem, and/or LPCI subsystem inoperable, and provided at least one CSS subsystem, three LPCI subsystems, and ADS are operable, restore the HPCI to OPERABLE within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , or be in H0T SHUTDOWN in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and in COLD SHUTDOWN in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

.d.

For the ADS:

-1.

With one of the above required ADS valves inoperable, provided the HPCI system, the CSS and the LPCI system are OPERABLE, restore the inoperable ADS valve to OPERABLE. status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and reduce reactor steam done pressure to s 100 psig within the next 24-hours.

7 2.

With two or more of the above required ADS valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to s 100 psig within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

e.

With a CSS and/or LPCI header AP instrumentation channel inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or determine the ECCS header AP locally at'least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ; otherwise, declare the. associated CSS and/or LPCI, as applicable, inoperable.

f.

In the event an ECCS. system is actuated and injects water into the

- l reactor coolant system, a Special Report shall be prepared and sub-mitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total l

accumulated actuation cycles to date.

The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

.l LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 58 I

C q

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES ECCS - OPERATING and SHUTDOWN (Continuedi With the HPCI system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization system and both the CS and LPCI systems.

In addition, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the safety l

analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor operating pressures on I

a reactor low water level condition. The HPCI out-of-service period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems and the RCIC system. The HPCI system, and one LPCI l

subsystem, and/or one CSS subsystem out-of-service period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ensures that l

sufficient ECCS, comprised of a minimum of one CSS subsystem, three LPCI subsystems, and all of the ADS will be available to 1) provide for safe shutdown of the facility, and 2) mitigate and control accident conditions within the facility.

The surve'iiance requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testrble and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop durirs reactor operation, a complete functional test with reactor vessel injection requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to provide cooling at the earliest

' moment.

Upon failure of the HPCI system to function properly after a small break loss-of-coolant accident, the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automa-tically causes selected safety / relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure core cooling systems can enter the core in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200*F. ADS is conserva-tively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 100 psi This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cool g.

ing systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring ADS.

ADS automatically controls five selected safety-relief valves. The safety analysis assumes all five are operable. The allowed out-of-service time for one valve for up to fourteen days is determined in a similar manner to other ECCS sub-system out-of-service time allowances.

3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER The suppression chamber is required to be OPERABLE as part of the ECCS to ensure that a sufficient supply of water is available to the HPCI, CS and LPCI systems in the event of a LOCA. This limit on suppression chamber minimum eater volume ensures that sufficient water is available to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core. The OPERABILITY of the suppression chamber in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3 is also required by Specification 3.6.2.1.

i Repair work might require making the suppression chamber inoperable. This sp;cification will permit those repairs to be made and at the same time give assurance that the irradiated fuel has an adequate cooling water supply when the suppression chamber must be made inoperable, including draining, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

(

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5 the suppression chamber minimum required l

tater volume is reduced because the reactor coolant is maintained at or below

)

200*F.

Since pressure suppression is not required below 212*F, the minimum

)

eater volume is based on NPSH, recirculation volume and vortex prevention plus l

a safety margin for conservatism.

LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Anendment No. 8/10/N M/, 58

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ML20085N714

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