ML20085M327
| ML20085M327 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1995 |
| From: | Marcus G NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20085M330 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9506290146 | |
| Download: ML20085M327 (8) | |
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. UNITED STATES E
'l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 0001 j
IES UTILITIES INC.
CENTRAL IOWA POWER COOPERATIVE CORN BELT POWER' COOPERATIVE DOCKET NO. 50-331 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 212 License No. DPR-49 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by IES Utilities Inc., et al.,
dated March 28, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility wili operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized
?
by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be i
conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifi-cations as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 is hereby
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amended to read as follows:
9506290146 950614 PDR ADOCK 05000331 p
i 7
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' l (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised
~through Amendment No. 212, are hereby incorporated in the license..
i The. licensee shall' operate the facility in'accordance with the
. Technical Specifications.
3.
The license amendment.is effective as.of the date of issuance and i
shall be implemented within 60 days of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9
g [$4 Q 0 vtbj Gail H. Marcus,, Pro ect Director Project Directorate III-3 Division.of Reactor' Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications l
t Date of issuance:
June 14, 1995 i
I
(
6 1
3
)
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 212.
[ACillTY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-49 DOCKET NO. 50-331 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by vertical lines.
Remove Insert 3.2-3 3.2-3 3.2-4 3.2-4 3.2-7 3.2-7 3.2-44 3.2-44 l
l
Table 3.2-A ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION k
MINIMUM VALVE s
OPERABLE GROUPS APPLICABLE CHANNELS ISOLATED z
OPERATING PERTRIf*I BY TRIP FUNCTION TRIP LEVEL SETTING MODE SYSTEM SIGNAL ACTION Common Isolation Siunals G
Reactor Water Level-Low 2 170 Inches 1,2,3','and *
!'*8 3
1,2,3 2
4,5 23
'ro Reactor Water Level - Low-Low-Low 2 18.5 Inches 1,2,3 2
1 21 G
1,2,3 4 ")
7 20 8
Drywell Pressure - High 5 2.0 psig 1,2,3 2
2 20 1,2,3 2
3 '*)
26 1,2,3 2
4 23 y
1,2,3 1")
9 23
'"4 Main Steam Line Isolation Main Steam Line Pressure - Low 2 850 psig 1
2 1
22 Main Steam Line Flow - High 5 140% of Rated 1,2,3 2/line 1
20 Steam Flow Condenser Backpressure - High s 20 In. Hg 1,2**,3**
2 1
21 Main Steam Line Tunnel 5 200 F 1,2,3 4 (* 3 1
21 Temperature - High Turbine Building Temperature - High 5 200 F 1,2,3 4
1 21 Main Steam Line Radiation - High 53 x Normal Rated 1,2,3 2
itb>
21 Power Background (33
I l
t 3
E "able 3. 2-A (Co ',t:clued)
ISOLAT::ON ACTUATION I3 ST RUMENTATION A
MININUM VALVE OPERABLE GROUPS APPLICABLE CHANNELS ISOLATED w
3 OPERATING PER TRIf'8 BY u
TRIP FUNCTION TRIP LEVEL SETTING MODE SYSTEM SIGNAL ACTION
}
Refuel Floor Exhaust Duct -
5 9 mr/hr 1,2,3 and
- 1 3"8 26 3
High Radiation o
Reactor Building Exhaust shaft s 11 mr/hr 1,2,3 and
- 1 3 "'
26 yg
- High Radiation Offgas Vent Stack - High Note k Note a 1
348 27 Radiation P'
RHR System Shutdown Coolino Reactor Vessel Pressure - High 5 135 psig 1,2,3 1
4 23 Reactor Water Cleanuo RWCU Differential Flow - High s 40 gpmd 1,2,3
.1 5
23 RWCU Area Temperature - High 5 130*F 1,2,3 1
5 23 RWCU Area Ventilation A 14*F(d8 1,2,3 1
5 23 Oifferential Temperature - High Standby Liquid Control System NA Note i 1 SBLC 5"8 23 Initiation S stem RWCU Area Near TIP Room Ambient 5 111.5'F 1,2,3 1
5 23 Temperature - High
lable 3.2-A (Continued 1 JSOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 20 -
.1000th $$$kn N N s"
ACTION 21 -
ga ggt S T
ig (heys g t g ig g g g g AC"'ON
$affe t Sh U
hh fhuhs AC ON
-C ea Ab.
hk,agsggare gcte e a fggm isolat' on valgge.within one hour s
system :nopera
- estnb S q!uI!"obour and b!cIare t$e a$ $e "fS"k wtbnthenext cose$
ffectedsystemionNives f
SoSate$conjaryCog}"ainmentwiththeStandbyGasTreatme ACTION 26 -
hk$00E$ouh se t "
ACTION 27 -
$marycontainmepventandpurge w$th" con $5nbou! t$ In
$kt Nna$ i$st um $a$10$
ILO.1Q When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and f0N"kLTERATIONSandoperationswithapotentialfordrain
$ n $ny kuhh ne stop valve is greater than 90% open and/or when k$-lockedbypassswitcgisintheNORMposition.
ofm! e"k NqbNdsuEv$'la0!es
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(b) b' $Ns akh !"e$$ " MS!n k $$okak!
ha5ves.
rou k Sat 70n oh k$e M$fa$1 h
hb huctSo$ a !
Also k
cI0a$!etpo $ h$$ be $k' $$ Yt1 ON'oerationambient bi$!qsMO[$7bS"nb$02 Noon $["
kanu!sS$s~o$gh$olationc,o$e I
ROYUb 0
!"ak sesM0b40;onIy$uhRCICinit!ationsignal o
(g) a va av
,i ka!uaS Isolation closes M0-2239 only, if HPCI initiation sign (h)
Ohn$hegtandhyLjqg'ijControlSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABL (i) 0$ thy 24ho$hs (j) ri6r t6 the lanned start of the lydro en p0M
$$ $ m uk -E d!!fkon a$f bnd l$ e af e oh he t$o"iIf e!te[dur he"t$st Y
d
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th t!
am3$$e gYcSc0kat$oNsor d
$nNS$$n ba h ou$
assock d trip setp ints sba iat'$ h evki $hal dIt in$dand Th gy bybhog n !
$$t nfest fb$ kin 3$y$ogestwuthin2 aours of k of e$ abk $0i$g
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e bi$$en$Io eow$hedoseha$e1 t!
n"00kM se!tkon N$EN R$TYishequIed fo I.
f 2 temperature sensors (instrument channels)
Amendment No.89, ???,193 rag,212 3.2-7
DAEC-1 emergency diesel generators. These trip level settings were chosen to be high enough to prevent spurious actuation but low enough to initiate ECCS operation and primary system isolation so that post accident cooling can be accomplished and the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 will not be exceeded. For large breaks up to the complete circumferential break of a 22-inch recirculation line and with the trip setting given above, ECCS initiation and primary system isolation are initiated in time to meet the above criteria. Reference Sections 6.3 and 7.3 of the Updated FSAR.
The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal for malfunctions to the water level instrumentation and in addition to initiating ECCS, it causes isolation of Group 2 and 3 isolation valves. For the breaks discussed above, this instrumentation will generally initiate ECCS operation before the low-low-low water level instrumentation; thus the results given above are applicable here also. The water level instrumentation initiates protection for the fun spectrum of loss-of-coolant accidents and causes isolation of allisolation valves except Group 6.
Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel ducing a steam line break accident. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steam line. There are four differential pressure instruments on each venturi, yielding 16 totalinstrument channels. Because of the number of instrument channels, they are arranged in a unique manner to achieve both electrical and spatial separation. One instrument channel from each of the four venturis, /A, one from each Main Steam Line (MSL), is combined into one logic channel. The four logic channels are then combined into the standard "one-out-of-two-twice" trip actuation arrangement. This allows one logic channel to be out-of-service and still provide isolation capability in the event of a steamline break in any MSL. The Allowed Outage Time (AOT) for required surveillance is applied at the instrument channel level, since the associated trip function and isolation capability are maintained via the companion logic channel. This is consistent with the " normal" trip arrangements with one instrument channel feeding each logic channel. Thus, a six-hour AOT is applied to each instrument channel undergoing required testing.
For the worst case accident, main steam line break outside the drywell, a trip setting of 140% of rated steam flow, in conjunction with the flow limiters and consequently main steam line valve closure, limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel clad temperatures peak at approximately 1000*F, and release of radioactivity to the environs is below 10 CFR 100 guidelines. Reference Subsection 15.6.5 of the Updated FSAR.
Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam line tunnel and turbine building to detect leaks in this area. There are four resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) located along each MSL in the MSL tunnel area, yielding 16 total instrument channels. Because of the number of instrument channels, they are arranged in a unique manner to achieve both electrical and spatial separation. The four instrument channels from each MSL are combined into one logic channel. Eight instrument channels from two MSLs (2 logic channels) make up a trip system. To ensure spatial coverage is provided by these channels, a minimum of two instrument channels per MSL is required. Since the MSLs outside the MSL tunnel (Turbine Building) have fewer RTDs monitoring them (two RTDs per line), all eight instrument I
channels (four per trip system) are required to ensure spatial coverage. As with the 4
Amendment No.109,? 28,1S2.103, 3.2-44 212
DAEC-1 differential pressure transmitters on the MSL venturis, the A0T for required surveillance is applied at the instrument channel level, since the trip function and isolation capability are maintained via the companion logic channel. Thus, a six-hour A0T is applied to each instrument channel undergoing required testing. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause closure of isolation valves.
The setting is 200*F for the main steam line detectors.
For large breaks, the high steam flow l
instrumentation is a backup to the temperature instrumentation.
High radiation monitors in the main steam line tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. A trip setting of 3 times normal full-power background is established to close the main steam line drain valves, recirculation loop sample valves, and trip the Mechanical Vacuum Pump.
For changes in the Hydrogen Water Chemistry hydrogen injection rate, the trip setpoint may be adjusted based on a calculated value of the radiation level expected. Hydrogen addition will result in an increase in nitrogen (N-16) activity in the steam due to increased N-16 carryover in the main steam.
Reference Subsection 15.4.7 of the Updated FSAR.
Pressure instrumentation is provided to close the main steam isolation valves in the RUN Mode when the main steam line pressure drops below 850 psig.
The Reactor Pressure Vessel thermal transient due to an inadvertent opening of the turbine bypass valves when not in the RUN Mode is less severe than the loss of feedwater analyzed in Subsection 15.6.3 of the Updated FSAR; therefore, closure of the Main Steam Isolation valves for thermal transient protection when not in the RUN Mode is not required.
Pressure instrumentation provides a permissive function for opening RHR shutdown cooling isolation valves and provides automatic isolation of RHR shutdown cooling on increasing system pressure.
This instrumentation provides assurance that the RHR piping transient pressure limits are not exceeded during shutdown cooling operation.
The HPCI high flow and temperature instrumentation are provided to detect a break in the HPCI steam piping.
Tripping of this instrumentation results in Amendment No. 109,1??.!??.1 %
3.2-44a 212