Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Secondary Containment
	ML20085E620
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	06/09/1995
From:	; NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20085E615	List: B15215, Application for Amend to License NPF-49 Re Secondary Containment; ML20085E620;
References
	NUDOCS 9506190044
	Download: ML20085E620 (33)
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Docket No. 50-423 r B15215 i

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Attachment 1 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Secondary Containment Marked-up Pages June 1995 9506190044 950609 PDR ADOCK 05000423 P PDR

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12/08/93 2EEI NFINITIONS 3EI15 fAK 1.n m iu m 0MS 3.1 ACTION ............................. 1-1 1.2 ACTUATION LOGIC TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.3 ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.4 AKIAL FLUX DIFFERDCE . . . .................. 1-1 1.5 CHANNEL CALIBRATION ...................... 1-1 1.5 CHANNEL CHECK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.7 CONTAlletENT INTEGRITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE ....................... 1-2 1.9 CORE ALTERATIONS ........................ 1-2 1.10 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 1.11 T-AVERACE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 1.11 ($ s6NDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDl0iY) .d.d.d.d . . . . . . . . . . . . %

1.13 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME ............ 1-3 1.14 DELETED j 1.15 FREQUENCY NOTATION ....................... 1-3 1.16 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE ....................... 1-3 1.17 MASTER RELAY TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1 1.18 MEMBER (5) 0F THE PUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 l 1.19 OPERABLE - OPERABILITY ..................... 1-4 1.20 OPERATIONAL fEDE - MODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 l

1.21 PHYSICS TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 l 1.12 PRESSURE B0UNDARY LEAKAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1.23 PURGE - PURGING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1.t4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1.25 RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1.26 RAD 10 LOGICAL EFFLUENT MONITORING AND OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATIONALMANUAL(REMODCM) ................. 1-5 1.27 RATED THERMAL POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1.28 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1.29 REPORTABLE EVENT .. . . .................... 1-5 .

1.30 SHUTDOWN MARGIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 l

, 1.31 SITE BOUNDARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 R!LLSTONE - MIT 3

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- -- - - - AmendmentNo.57.87 --

May 26,1995 1E13 I

LIMITING C0E ITIONS FOR OPERATION A M SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS EGIl05 P.AE Air Temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-9 Containment Structural Int'ogrity . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-10 l

Containment Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-11 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

' containment Quench Spray System . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-12 Recirculation Spray System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-13 3/4.6.3 CONTAIMENT ISOLATION VALVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-15 ,

l 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Monitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-16 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-17 3/4.6.5 $UBATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM Steam Jet Air Ejector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-18 ;

3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT !

Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System . . . 3/4 6-19 l

. Secondary Containment' Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-22 Secondary Containment Boundary -

Structural Integrity . . . 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-23 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Valves ..................... 3/4 7-1 TABLE 3.7-1 MAXINUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRCN FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING FOUR LOOP OPERATION ............... 3/4 7-2 TABLE 3.7-2 MAXINUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLOX HIGH '

SETPOINT WITW INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES i DURING THREE LOOP OPERATION .............. 3/4 7-2 I

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i MILLSTONE - WIT 3 1x Amendment No. 77, 77, 77 77. Jpp.115 esoe

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. e DEFINITIONS (src8HDARYTOMNTENT m m k ./ gg,M

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1.12We SECONDARY CONTAINNENT BOUNDARY is comprised of the containment

@cT'osure buildini and all contiguous buildings (main steam valve

[ partially), enrneering safety feat"ns building hydrogen recombiner building [ partially), and 6, ?ary buildjpartially),

ng). The SECONDARY CONTAINMENT B0UNDARY shall exist when;

a. Each door in each access opening is closed except when the access opening is being used for normal transit entry and exit,

b. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g.,

welds, bellows. or 0-rings) is OPERABLE. -

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME I 1.13 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) RESPONSE TIME shall be that time ;

interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF Actuation Setpoint ;

at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its ;

safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump i discharge pressures reach their required values, etc . Times shall include

, diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays are applicable.

1.14 Deleted l

FREDUENCY NOTATION l

1.15 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1.1 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be: i l

a. Leakage (except CONTROLLED LEAKAGE) into closed systems, such as i pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured and conducted )

to a sump or collecting tank, or

b. Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both i specifically located and known either not to interfere with the :

operation of Leakage Detection Systems or not to be PRESSURE '

BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or

c. Reactor Coolant System leakage through a steam generator to the Secondary coolant Systas.

MASTER RELAY TEST 1.17 A MASTER RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each master relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The MASTER RELAY TEST shall

'{' include a continuity check of each associated slave relay.

I MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 1-3 Amendment No. pf,87 M89 l

. CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS May 8,1995 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

'a . An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal to L.,

0.3% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months at P.,

53.27 psia (38.57 psig);

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b. A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L, for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P ;

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c. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.042 L, for all penetrations that are L5ICONWAKT bunsmnntni DUUNW bypass leakage paths when pressurizet w r..

gy7 CanMmed APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, ACTION:

With the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L., or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type 8 and C tests exceeding 0.60 L , or the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding 0.042 L., restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than 0.75 L., the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject 7 to Type B and C tests to less than 0.60 L., and the combined bypass leakage #

rate to less than 0.042 L prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 using methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972 (Total Time Method) and/or ANSI /ANS 56.8-1981 (Mass Point Method):

a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at approximately equal intervals during shutdown at a pressure not less than P., 53.27 psia (38.57 psig), during each.

30-year service period.*

b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet 0.75 L., the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet 0.75 L., a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 L, at which time the above test schedule may be resumed;

The third Type A test will be conducted during the sixth refueling outage. As a result, the duration of the first 10-year service period will be extended to }

the end of the sixth refueling outage.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. JJ. J7, 77,111

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January 3,1995 CONTAINpfENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEN LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.1 Two independent Supplementary Leak Collection and Release Systems ,

shall be OPERABLE with each system comprised of:

a. one OPERABLE filter and fan, and I

b. one OPERABLE Auxiliary Building Filter System as defined in Specification 3.7.9.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System inoperable, restore the inopera)1e system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Wh me. Swetemenhvy Lee.ik c-stukow c*a R<. tease _sys4e~.iaofeva ^

% Ce dA oa s cud. R4 5 t. (N c h s us. c.t M e a m. % 5. p e c.g e% % 3 4. t. . l. s m na muw6 e.u+ % .

$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.6.1 Each Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System shall be demon-strated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying a system flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm and that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating.

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b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any stmetural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communi-cating with the system by:

1) Verifying that the system satisfies the in-place penetratfor, and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than s 0.05% and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Posi- -

tions C.S.a. C.5.c. and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, March 1978,* and the system flow rate is 7600 cfm to 9800 cfs; NILLSTONE - W IT 3 3/4 6-19 Amendment No. J. F7 77.

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January 3,1995 C0KTAI MENT SYSTEMS i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory ;

analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accord-ance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of itegulatory Guide 1.52, i Revision 2, March 1978,* meets the laboratory testing criteria '

of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revi- l sion 2, March 1978,* for a methyl iodide penetration of less i than 0.175%; and ,

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3) Verifying a system flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm during i system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. l l

c. After every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, ;

within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre- ;

sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory -

Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,*

meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978,* for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175%:

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6.25 inches I Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 1 7600 cfm to 9800 cfs, '

2) Verifying that the system starts on a safety IrJection test l signal, and ,,

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[ reater than or equal to 0.4 inch Water ative pressure of Verifying that each system produces a uilding at 24'6' elevation within 120 seconds after a start _ ,

signalfand l

3 Af Verifying that the heaters dissipate 50 15 kW when tested in !

accordance with ANSI N510-1980.

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ANSI N510-1980 shall be used in place of ANSI M510-1975 referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2. March 1978.

NILLSTONE - IBIIT 3 3/46-20 I en AmendmentNo.b9,F. i

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tM C:o o M L. Y January 3,1995 CONTAINMDrr SYSTDis l

$URVEILLANCE REQUIRDIDfTS (Continued) l

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration i and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating ,

the system at a flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfs; and '

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleaisup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfa.

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g y - totIT s s/4 s.21 Amenennt no. g, y, g, 100

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CONTAINNENT SYSTENS j SECONDARYCONTAINMENTEDUNDARD LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j 3.6.6.2 $ECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY shall be maintained seema=wc oa.a % F sws b<. ovs ee,ws, APPLICABILITY: NODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

sem% c %.,ca incieedi; C* " "" ~

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WithcMis50NDALY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARP, C restoref(Seced*7EC3 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in .

COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . J- ~i _ - - - - uWe d'" N AcTsu sh4~c4 4%. c%%s a 9 $ L "=4 ;' 6 3- @ dss - cme 4 "* a SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENT S&chh 'B s, t t % .Lx W M % bee 4 W -

etc orevau w e xe=am um%.+ '

4.6.6.21ECONDARY 00NTAINNENT-900NDARY shall be demonstrated at least once per 31 days by verifying that each door in each access opening is closed except when \

the access opening is being used for nomal transit entry and exit.

4 - c . c. 2, 2 . W \ e=W eme p e. r savmmw s,venty esc % 53 plewe.wb 7 W k, c4(c c.Ww cmcl MAe Syde% po dw t<_s A we$s k ?M-is e c-cY 9'>cde < hw cre q%\ 4-o e.y Wedu 3%p 4 4% AnM7 s e \ h p

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I NILLSTONE - LMIT 3 3/4 6-12 Amendment No. 77 l

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January 3,1995 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT (BOUND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION S c_c e 4 q Cow W % M 3.6.6.3 The structural integrity of the SECONDARY-CONTAINMENT-BOUNDARY shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.6.3.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACllQfi: E ccwany C""

With the structural integrity of the($fCONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUjiDARY not confoming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limits within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , c A cen W '~

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT / //

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4.6.6.3 The structural integrity of the $ECONDARY CONTAlhMElpjHDARY'shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A containmenf lea ~tge rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a visual inspection _of_the_expdsed ccessible interior and exterior surfaces of the (ECONDARYl 0NIAINMENT BOUNDARY nd verifying no apparent E changesinappearanceofthe(concretesurfacesor_otherab abnormal degradation of the ECONDARFCONIAIMERT BOUNDAR 3dreal degradation.

etected Any during the above required inspections shall be reported to the Comission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 15 days.

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f NgLSTONE-UNIT 3 3/46-23 Amendment No. U

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gj08/93

.s ColffAllstENT SYSTEMS BASES . <

3/4.5.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT 2/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM Rackaround ,

The OPERABILITY of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) ensures that radioactive materials that leak from the primary contain- !

ment into the secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) ,

are filtered out and adsorbed prior to any release to the environment.TThT design of the nCRS11 to acni v. e n.v.sive 3ressure witn in the secondary ]

containment boundary within 120 seconds of a 18A. }

In order to jnsure a fegative pressure in all areas within the secondary containment (boundary 7vnder most meteorological conditions, the negative pressureacceptancecriteriaatthemeasuredlocation(i.e.,24'6 elevation intheauxiliarybuilding)is0.4incheswatergauge. '

M [Thebuilding secondary containment and all contiguous WNssteam buildings (main comprised of (partially),

valve building the containme ,

engineered (partially) andsafety features auxiliary building building t. (partially)lish To accomp this, the SLCRS works in, hydrogen !

conjunction with the Auxiliary Building Filter (ABF) system (see Sec-tion 3/4.7.g). The SLCRS and the ABF fans and filtration untis are located in !

the auxiliary building. The SLCRS is described in the Millstone Unit No. 3 ,

FSAR, Section 6.2.3. _

-J Acolicable Safety Analyses The SLCRS design basis is established by the consequences of the limiting DBA, which is a LOCA. The accident analysis assumes that only one train of the SLCRS and one train of the auxiliary building filter system is functional due to a' single failure that disables the other train. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction of the airborne radioactive I material provided by the remaining one train of this filtration system. The

, amount of fission products available for release from the containment is ;

determined for a LOCA.

The SLCRS is not normally in operation. The SLCRS starts on a SIS signal. The modeled SLCRS actuation in the safety analysis (the Millstone 3 ,

FSAR Chapter 15, Section 15.6) is based upon a worst-case response time i following an SI initiated at the limiting setpoint. One train of the SLCRS in I i

conjuncttonwiththeABFsystemiscapabeofdrawin9anegativepressure (0.4 inches water gauge at the auxiliary building 24 6" elevation) within 120 seconds after a LOCA. This time includes diesel generator startup and sequencing time, system startup time, and time for the system to attain the required negative pressure after starting.

NILLSTONE - 15 TIT 3 3 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 87 l

12/08/93 CONTA110 TENT SYSTINS f BASES l

1/4.8.8.1 SUPPLEMENTARYLEAKCOLLECTIONANDRELEASESYSTEM(Continued) ira '

. In the event of a DBA, one SLCRS is required to provide the minimum postulated iodine removal assumed in the safety analysis. Two treins of the SLCRS aust be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one train will operate, assuming that the other train is disabled by a single-active failure. The SLCRS works in conjunction with the ABF system. Inoperability of one train of the ABF system also results in inoperability of the corresponding train of the SLCRS. Therefore, whenever LCO 3.7.9 is entered due to the ABF train A (B) being inoperable, LC0 3.6.6.1 aust be entered due to the SLCRS train A (B) being inoperable.

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Ano11cability In MODES 1, 2,3, and 4 a DBA could lead to a fissio roduct release to containment that leaks to the secondary containmentt undar The large i

. break LOCA, on which this system's design is based, is Na -power event.

Less severe LOCAs and leakage still require the system to be OPERABLE through-out these MODES. The probability and severity of a LOCA decrease as core l Power and reactor coolant system pressure decrease. With the reactor shut !

down, the probability of release of radioactivity resulting from such an i accident is low.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are low due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Under these conditions, the SLCRS is not required to be OPERABLE.

AC110NS ,

With one SLCRS train inoperable, the inoperable train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The operable train is capable of providing 100 percent of the iodine removal needs for a DBA. The 7-day Com>1stion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the reliability of tse OPERABLE redundant SLCRS train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The Completion Time is adequate to make most repairs. If the SLCRS cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a *4DDE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the p ant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and ICDE 5 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full-power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

33/46-6 Amendment No. 87 NgLLSTONE-IBl!T3

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Insert 'B' to Page B 3/4 6-5 ,

Lla When a Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System LC0 is not met, it is not necessary to declare the secondary containment inoperable. However, in this event, it is necessary to determine that a loss of safety function does not exist. A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed.

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i\J o Cb ;K. 12/08/93 teffAlletENT SYSTDt3 BASES 3/4.5.5.1 EUPPLEMENTARYLEAKCOLLECTIONANDRELEASESYSTEM(Continued) harve111ance Raoufrements Cumulative operation of the SLCRS with heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce tie buildup of asisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31-day frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan actors and con-trols. This test is perfomed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS once per 31-days.

b. c. a. and f I These surveillances verify that the required SLtRS filter testing is

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perfomed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2. ANSI 18510-1980 shall be used'in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in Regulatory Suide 1.52. Revision 2. The surveillances include testing HEPA filter

performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations).

A The automatic startup ensures that each SLCRS train responds properly.

The 18-month frequency is based on the need to perfors this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance was Mrformed with the reactor at power. The surveillance verifles that the 5.CRS starts on a SIS test signal.

It also incindes the automatic functions to isolate the other ventilation systems that are not part of the safety-related postaccident operating configuration and to start up and to align the ventilation systems that flow through the secondary containment to the accident condition.

The main steam valve building ventilation system isolates.

Auxiliary building ventilation (normal) system isolates.

Charging pump / reactor plant component coolinfi water pap area cooling subsystem aligns and discharges to the auxil< ary building filters and a !

filter fan starts. -

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Ilydrogen receabiner ventilation system aligns to the postaccident ;

configuration. l

The engineered safety features building ventilation system aligns to the postaccident configuration.

RILLETCHE - 1311T 3 33/46-5 Amendment No. 87 em

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CONTA100 TENT SYSTEMS y psEM k

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i 2/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SY m M (Continued)

P liith the SLCRS in postaccident configuration, the required negative pressure in the secondary containment boundary is achieved in 110 seconds from the time of simulated emergency diesel generator. breaker closure. Time delays of dampers and logic delays must m accounted for in this surveillance. The time to achieve the required negative pressure is 120 seconds, with a loss-of-offsite power coincident with a SIS. The surveillance verifles that one train of SLCRS in conjunction with the ABF system will produce a negative pressure

_of 0.4 inches water gauge at the auxiliary building 24'6" elevation relative to the outside atmosphere in the secondary containment boundary. For the purpose of this surveillance, pressure measurements will be made at the 24'6" elevation in the auxiliary building. This single location is considered to be adequate and representative of the entire secondary containment due to the large cross-section of the air passages which interconnect the various but dings within the boundary. In order to ensure a negative pressure in all areas inside the secondary containment boundary under most meteorological conditions, the negative pressure acceptance criteria at the measured location

, is 0.4 inches water gauge. It is recognized that there will be an occasional meteorological condition under which slightly positive pressure may exist at some localized portions of the boundary (e.g., the upper elevations on the down wind side of a building). For example, a very low outside temperature

, l combined with a moderate wind speed could cause a slightly positive pressure at the upper elevations of the containment enclosure building on the leeward face. The probability of occurrence of meteorological conditions which could result in such a positive differential pressure condition in the upper levels of the enclosure building has been estimated to be less than 2f, of the time.

The probability of wind speed within the necessary moderate band, combined with the probability of extreme low temperature, combined with the small portion of the boundary affected, combined with the low probability of airborne radioactive material migrating to the upper levels ensure that the overall effect on the design basis dose calculations is insignificant.

3/4.6.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT B00NDARY SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY ensures that the release of radioactive

! materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with operation of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System, and Auxiliary Building Filter System will limit -

the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 l CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

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[I, y - WlIT 3 B3/46-7 Amendment No. 87 t - - -

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e December 8, 1993 gggggry gygygg3 BASES 7

2/4.6.6.3 EECONDARY CONTAINMENT (B0UNDAM Y RUCTURAL INTEGRITY

, Sec da~y This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the 4ECONDARY AIMENT-BOUNDARY will be maintained comparable to the original design st.andards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to provide a secondary boundary surrounding the primary containment that can be maintained at a negative pressure during accident conditions. A visual

, inspection is sufficient to demonstrate this capability. .

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i 3 3/4 6-8 Amendment No. 87 EgLL5 TONE-ISt!T3

l INSERT A to Page 1 of 3 Page B 3/4 6-7 >

3ht. 6.6. 2. Se_c.cmdar y c_m nhu M-The Secondary Containment is comprised of the containment enclosure ,

building and all contiguous buildings (main steam valve buildinq [ partially], !

engineering safety features building [ partially), hydrogen recom)iner building

[>artially), and auxiliary building). The Secondary containment shall exist wien: ,

a. Each door in each access opening is closed except when the access opening is being used for normal transit entry and exit,

b. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE.

Secondary Containment ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with operation of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System, and Auxiliary Building Filter System will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10

CFR Part 100 during accident conditions. ;

The SLCRS and the ABF fans and filtration units are located in the i auxiliary building. The SLCRS is described in the Millstone Unit No. 3 FSAR, Section 6.2.3.

In order to ensure a negative pressure in all areas within the Secondary '

Containment under most meteorological conditions, the negative pressure acceptance criteria at the measured location (i.a., 24'6" elevation in the auxiliary building) is 0.4 inches water gauge.

LGQ ;

The Secondary Containment OPERABILITY sust be maintained to ensure proper ;

operation of the SLCRS and the auxiliary building filter system and to limit i radioactive leakage from the containment to those paths and leakage rates '

assumed in the accident analyses.

Anolicability Maintaining Secondary Containment OPERABILITY prevents leakage of l radioactive material from the Secondary Containment. Radioactive material may enter the Secondary Containment from the containment following a LOCA.

Therefore, Secondary Containment is required in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when a design basis accident such as a LOCA could release radioactive material to the containment atmosphere.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are low due to the RCS temperature and pressure limitation in these MODES. Therefore, Secondary Containment is not required in MODES 5 and 6.

INSERT A to Page 2 of 3 Page B 3/4 6-7 ACTIONS In the event Secondary Containment OPERABILITY is not maintained, !

Secondary Containment OPERABILITY must be restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Twenty- I four hours is a reasonable Completion Time considering the limited leakage design of containment and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period. Therefore, it is considered that there exists no loss of safety function while in ACTION Statement.,

Inoperability of the Secondary Containment does not make the SLCRS fans and filters inoperable. Therefore, while in this Action Statement, the conditions and required actions associated with Specification 3.6.6.1 (i.e., Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System) are not required to be entered. If the Secondary Containment OPERABILITY cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required completion time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full-power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Surveillance Reauirements 4.6.6.2.1 Maintaining Secondary Containment OPERABILITY requires maintaining each door in each access opening in closed position except when the access opening is being used for normal entry and exit. The normal time allowed for passage of equipment and personnel through each access opening at a time is defined as no more than 5 minutes. The access opening shall not be blocked open. During this time, it is not considered necessary to enter the action statement. A 5-minute time is considered acceptable since the access opening can be quickly i closed without special provisions and the probability of occurrence of a DBA concurrent with equipment and/or personnel transit time of 5 minutes is low.

The 31-day frequency for this surveillance is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the other indications of access opening status that are available to the operator.

4.6.6.2.2 The ability of a SLCRS to produce the required negative pressure during the test operation within the required time provides assurance that the Secondary Containment is adequately sealed, u With the SLCRS in postaccident configuration, the required negative pressure in the Secondary Containment is achieved in 110 seconds from the time of simulated emergency diesel generator breaker closure. Time delays of ,

dampers and logic delays must be accounted for in this surveillance. The time J to achieve the required negative pressure is 120 seconds, with a loss-of- j I

l

INSERT A to Page 3 of 3 Page B 3/4 6-7 l

offsite power coincident with a SIS. The surveillance verifies that one train of SLCRS in conjunction with the ABF system will produce a negative pressure of 0.4 inches water gauge at the auxiliary building 24'6" elevation relative to the outside atmosphere in the Secondary Containment. For the purpose of this surveillance, pressure measurements will be made at the 24'6" elevation in the auxiliary building. This single location is considered to be adequate and representative of the entire Secondary Containment due to the large cross-section of the air passages which interconnect the various buildings within the Secondary Containment. In order to ensure a negative pressure in all areas inside the Secondary Containment under most meteorological conditions, the negative pressure acceptance criteria at the measured location is 0.4 inch water gauge. It is recognized that there will be an occasional meteorological condition under which slightly positive pressure may exist at some localized portions of the boundary (e.g., the upper elevations on the down-wind side of a building). For example, a very low outside temperature combined with a moderate wind speed could cause a slightly positive pressure at the upper elevations of the containment enclosure building on the leeward face. The probability of occurrence of meteorological conditions which could result in such a positive differential pressure condition in the upper levels of the enclosure building has been estimated to be less than 2% of the time.

The probability of wind speed within the necessary moderate band, combined with the probability of extreme low temperature, combined with the small portion of the boundary affected, combined with the low probability of airborne radioactive material migrating to the upper levels ensures that the overall effect on the design basis dose calculations is insignificant. ,

1 3/4.6.6.3 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the Secondary i Containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to provide a ,

secondary boundary surrounding the primary containment that can be maintained '

at a negative pressure during accident conditions. A visual inspection is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

.. _ .. .- .=. . . ~ .-

.i i

e Dgsket No. 50-423 B15215 i

i Attachment 2 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications secondary Containment Retyped Pages i

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June 1995

l!ElG DEFINITIONS SECTION EAGE 1.0 DEFINITIONS 1.1 ACTION ............................. 1-1 l'

1.2 ACTUATION LOGIC TEST ...................... 1-1 1.3 ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.4 AXIAL' FLUX DIFFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 ;

1.5 CHANNEL-CALIBRATION ...................... 1-1 1.6 CHANNEL CHECK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 ;

1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

.1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE ....................... 1-2 :

1.9 CORE ALTERATIONS ........................ 1-2 .;

1.10 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 1.11 E-AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . 1-2 ;

1.12 DELETED l l 1.13 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME ............ 1-3 1.14 DELETED >

1.15 FREQUENCY NOTATION ....................... 1-3 -

1.16 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE ....................... 1-3 j 1.17 MASTER RELAY TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 ;

1.18 MEMBER (S) 0F THE PUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 l.

1.19 OPERABLE - OPERABILITY ..................... 1-4 l 1.20 OPERATIONAL MODE - MODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 l 1.21 PHYSICS TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 i 1.22 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1.23 PURGE - PURGING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 l 1.24 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 !

1.25 RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1.26 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT MONITORING AND OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATIONAL MANUAL (REM 0DCM) ................. 1-5 1.27 RATED THERMAL POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1.28 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 !

1.29 REPORTABLE EVENT ........................ 1-5 1.30 SHUTDOWN MARGIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1.31 SITE BOUNDARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 ,

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 i Amendment No. JJ, 77, essa

l INDEX LINITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS SECTION PEE Air Temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-9 Containment Structural Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-10 Containment Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-11 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Containment Quench Spray System . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-12 Recirculation Spray Systea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-13 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-15 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Monitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-16 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-17 3/4.6.5 SUBATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM Steam Jet Air Ejector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-18 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System . . . 3/4 6-19 Secondary Containment ................. 3/4 6-22 Secondary Containment Structural Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-23 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Valves ..................... 3/4 7-1 TABLE 3.7-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING FOUR LOOP OPERATION ............... 3/4 7-2

! TABLE 3.7-2 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH l

SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING THREE LOOP OPERATION .............. 3/4 7-2 l

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NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 1x Amendment No. 77 77, 77, pp, Jpp.

? m lil, l

i DEFINITIONS l

1.12 DELETED l ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME 1.13 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) RESPONSE TIME shall' be that time !

interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds'its ESF Actuation Setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include ,

diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable.

1.14 Deleted FREQUENCY NOTATION l 1.15 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for' the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE f

1.1 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be: ;

a. Leakage (except CONTROLLED LEAKAGE) into closed systems, such as ;

pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured and conducted ;

to a sump or collecting tank, or

b. Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both !

specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of Leakage Detection Systems or not to be PRESSURE l BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or !

c. Reactor Coolant System leakage through a steam generator to the :

Secondary Coolant System. l MASTER RELAY TEST i 1.17 A MASTER RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each master relay and :

verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The MASTER RELAY TEST shall include continuity check of each associated slave relay.

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h NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 1-3 Amendment No. JJ, 77, 0363

CONTAll01ENT SYSTEMS

,. CONTAIBBIENT LEAKAGE LINITING C0le! TION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal to L.,

0.3% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months at P., i 53.27 psia (38.57 psig),

b. A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L, for all penetrations I and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P ; !

and :

c. A combic:d leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.042 L, for all 1 penetrations that are Secondary Containment bypass leakage paths l l when pressurized to P,.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

l With the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75-L., or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L , or the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding 0.042 L., restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than 0.75 L., the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject :

to Type B and C tests to less than 0.60 L., and the combined bypass leakage rate to less than 0.042 L. prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*F.

I SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS i i

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall.be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 using methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972 (Total Time Method) and/or ANSI /ANS 56.8 1981 (Mass Point Method):

a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at ap)roximately equal intervals during shutdown at a pressure not less tian P , 53.27 psia (38.57 psig), during each 10-year service period.*

b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet 0.75 L., the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet 0.75 L , a !

Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 L, at which time the above test schedule may be resumed;

The third Type A test will be conducted during the sixth refueling outage. As !

a result, the duration of the first 10-year service period will be extended to the end of the sixth refueling outage. '

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. pp, 77, pp, JJ/,

om

d CONTAIMENT SYSTENS 3/4.6.6 SEC0E ARY CONTAIMENT l

SUPPLENENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AW RELEASE SYSTEN ;

LINITING COMITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.1 Two independent Supplementary Leak Collection and Release Systems ;

shall be OPERABLE with each system comprised of: ;

a. one OPERABLE filter and fan, and

b. one OPERABLE Auxiliary Building Filter System as defined in ,

Specification 3.7.9.

APPLICABILITY: N0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ,

ACTION:

With one Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System inoperable, restore ,

the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . With one Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System inoperable, the conditions and required actions associated with Specification ,

3.6.6.2 are not required to be entered. !

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.6.6.1 Each Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System shall be demon-strated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying a system flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm j and that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with ,

the heaters operating. I

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following i painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communi-cating with the system by-

1) Verifying that the system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Posi- I tions C.5.a. C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, March 1978,* and the system flow rate is 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm; NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-19 Amendment No. 7. 77, 77, om 199, j i

i

f CONTAll01ENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Contiaued) t

2) Verifying, within 31. days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accord- !

ance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,* meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, Narch 1978,* for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175%; and

3) Verifying a system flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980,

c. After every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Narch 1978,*

meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Narch 1978,* for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175%:

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6.25 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfs, 7

2) Verifying that the system starts on a Safety Injection test signal, and

3) Verifying that the heaters dissipate 50 i5 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.

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ANSI N510-1980 shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Narch 1978.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-20 Amendment No. 1, 77, 77, ouw 799,

CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINNENT l

LIMITING COMITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.2 Sacondary Containment shall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: N0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With Secondary Containment inoperable, restore Secondary Containment to OPERABLE >

status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . While in this ACTION Statement, the conditions and required actions associated with Specification 3.6.6.1 are not required to be entered.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENT 4.6.6.2.1 OPERABILITY of Secondary Containment shall be demonstrated at least l once per 31 days by verifying that each door in each access opening is closed except when the access opening is being used for normal transit entry and exit.

4.6.6.2.2 At least once per 18 months, verify each Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System produces a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.4 inch water gauge in the Auxiliary Building at 24'-6" elevation within 120 seconds after a start signal.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-22 Amendment No. 77, Jpp, CM4 i

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CONTAIMEhT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAIMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY l i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION .

3.6.6.3 The structural integrity of the Secondary Containment shall be .

at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.6.

faNTAIME5 APPLICABILITY: MODES I, 2, 3, and 4.

BASES

~~

EUM:

With the structural integrity of the Secondary Containment not conforming i 3/4.6.6 ol the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limi hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHL the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . O %)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SLCRS ment inti 4.6.6.3 The structural integrity of the Secondary Containment shall be a are fil@

during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (referenct Specification 4.6.I.2) by a visual inspection of the exposed accessible inte Aeolicah and exterior surfaces of the Secondary Containment and verifying no apparent I appearance of the concrete surfaces or other abnormal degradation. Any abno Th degradation of the Secondary Containment detected during the above required limitint shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specific train o' within 15 days. function acciden materi amount determi t

signal <

FSARCQ follow)

ConIMj drawin 24'6" gener syst MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-23 Amendment No. JC 0364

CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAlletENT l

LINITING C0fEITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.2 Secondary Containment shall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: N0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With Secondary Containment inoperable, rerstere Secondary Containment to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . While in this ACTION Statement, the conditions and required actions associateo with Specification 3.6.6.1 are not required to be entered.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENT 4.6.6.2.1 OPERABILITY of Secondary Containment shall be demonstrated at least l once per 31 days by verifying that each door in each access opening is closed except when the access opening is being used for normal transit entry and exit.

4.6.6.2.2 At least once per 18 months, verify each Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System produces a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.4 inch water gauge in the Auxiliary Building at 24'-6" elevation within 120 seconds after a start signal.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-22 Amendment No. 77 JPP, ONM

CONTAINNENT SYSTENS SEC0BARY CONTAlletENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY l LINITING COMITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.3 The structural integrity of the Secondary Containment shall be maintained l at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.6.3.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the structural integrity of the Secondary Containment not conforming to l the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limits within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENT 4.6.6.3 The structural integrity of the Secondary Containment shall be determined l during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a visual inspection of the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the Secondary Containment and verifying no apparent changes in l appearance of the concrete surfaces or other abnormal degradation. Any abnormal degradationoftheSecondaryContainmentdetectedduringtheaboverequiredinspectionsl shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 15 days.

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NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-23 Amendment No. 77, Jpp, i omu 1

C0KTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT l

3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM Backaround ;

The OPERABILITY of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) ensures that radioactive materials that leak from the primary contain-ment into the Secondary Containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) are filtered out and adsorbed prior to any release to the environment.

Acolicable Safety Analyses The SLCRS design basis is established by the consequences of the limiting DBA, which is a LOCA. The accident analysis assumes that only one train of the SLCRS and one train of the auxiliary building filter system is functional due to a single failure that disables the other train. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction of the airborne radioactive material provided by the remaining one train of this filtration system. The amount of fission products available for release from the containment is determined for a LOCA.

The SLCRS is not normally in operation. The SLCRS starts on a SIS signal. The modeled SLCRS actuation in the safety analysis (the Millstone 3 FSAR Chapter 15, Section 15.6) is based upon a worst-case response time following an SI initiated at the limiting setpoint. One train of the SLCRS in ,

conjunction with the Auxiliary Building Filter (ABF) system is capable of l drawing a negative pressure (0.4 inches water gauge at the auxiliary building 24'6" elevation) within 120 seconds after a LOCA. This time includes diesel generator startup and sequencing time, system startup time, and time for the system to attain the required negative pressure after starting.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 77.

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM (Continued)

LCD In the event of a DBA, one SLCRS is required to provide the minimum postulated iodine removal assumed in the safety analysis. Two trains of the SLCRS must be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one train will operate, assuming that the other train is disabled by a single-active failure. The SLCRS works in conjunction with the ABF system. Inoperability of one train of the ABF system also results in inoperability of the corresponding train of the SLCRS. Therefore, whenever LC0 3.7.9 is entered due to the ABF train A (B) being inoperable, LC0 3.6.6.1 must be entered due to the SLCRS train A (B) being inoperable.

When a SLCRS LC0 is not met, it is not necessary to declare the secondary containment inoperable. However, in this event, it is necessary to determine that a loss of safety function does not exist. A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed.

Acolicability In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to containment that leaks to the secondary containment. The large break LOCA, l on which this system's design is based, is a full-power event. Less severe LOCAs and leakage still require the system to be OPERABLE throughout these MODES. The probability and severity of a LOCA decrease as core power and reactor coolant system pressure decrease. With the reactor shut down, the probability of release of radioactivity resulting from such an accident is low.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are low due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Under these conditions, the SLCRS is not required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS With one SLCRS train inoperable, the inoperable train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The operable train is capable of providing 100 percent of the iodine removal needs for a DBA. The 7-day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the reliability of the OPERABLE redundant SLCRS train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The Completion Time is adequate to make most repairs. If the SLCRS cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and MODE 5 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full-power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-5 Amendment No. U ,

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT The Secondary Containment is comprised of the containment enclosure building and all contiguous buildings (main steam valve building [ partially),

engineering safety features building [ partially], hydrogen recombiner building

[ partially), and auxiliary building). The Secondary Containment shall exist when:

a. Each door in each access opening is closed except when the access opening is being used for normal transit entry and exit,

b. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g.,

welds, bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE.

Secondary Containment ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with operation of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System, and Auxiliary Building Filter System will limit the SITE B0UNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

The SLCRS and the ABF fans and filtration units are located in the auxiliary building. The SLCRS is described in the Millstone Unit No. 3 FSAR, Section 6.2.3.

In order to ensure a negative pressure in all areas within the Secondary Containment under most meteorological conditions, the negative pressure acceptance criteria at the measured location (i.e., 24'6" elevation in the auxiliary building) is 0.4 inches water gauge.

LCD The Secondary Containment OPERABILITY must be maintained to ensure proper operation of the SLCRS and the auxiliary building filter system and to limit radioactive leakage from the containment to those paths and leakage rates assumed in the accident analyses.

Apolicability Maintaining Secondary Containment OPERABILITY prevents leakage of radioactive material from the Secondary Containment. Radioactive material may enter the Secondary Containment from the containment following a LOCA.

Therefore, Secondary Containment is required in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when a

design basis accident such as a LOCA could release radioactive material to the containment atmosphere.

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT (continued)

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are low due to the RCS temperature and pressure limitation in these MODES.. Therefore, Secondary Containment is not required in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS In the event Secondary Containment OPERABILITY is not maintained, Secondary Containment OPERABILITY must be restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Twenty-four hours is a reasonable Completion Time considering the limited leakage design of containment and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period. Therefore, it is considered that there exists no loss of safety function while in ACTION Statement. ACTIONS Inoperability of the Secondary Containment does not make the SLCRS fans and filters inoperable. Therefore, while in this Action Statement, the conditions and required actions associated with Specification 3.6.6.1 (i.e., Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System) are not required to be entered. If the Secondary Containment OPERABILITY cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required completion time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full-power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Surveillance Recuirements 4.6.6.2.1 Maintaining Secondary Containment OPERABILITY requires maintaining each door in each access opening in closed position except when the access opening is being used for normal entry and exit. The normal time allowed for passage of equipment and personnel through each access opening at a time is defined as no more than 5 minutes. The access opening shall not be blocked open. During this time, it is not considered necessary to enter the action statement. A 5-minute time is considered acceptable since the access opening can be quickly closed without special provisions and the probability of occurrence of a DBA concurrent with equipment and/or personnel transit time of 5 minutes is low.

The 31-day frequency for this surveillance is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the other indications of access opening status that are available to the operator.

4.6.6.2.2 The ability of a SLCRS to produce the required negative pressure during the test operation within the required time provides assurance that the Secondary Containment is adequately sealed.

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CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT fcontinued)

L 6.6.2.2 (cont'd.)

With the SLCRS in postaccident configuration, the required negative pressure in the Secondary Containment is achieved in 110 seconds from the time of simulated emergency diesel generator breaker closure. Time delays of dampers and logic delays must be accounted for in this surveillance. The time to achieve the required negative pressure is 120 seconds, with a loss-of- ,

offsite power coincident with a SIS. The surveillance verifies that one train of SLCRS in conjunction with the ABF system will produce a negative pressure of 0.4 inches water gauge at the auxiliary building 24'6" elevation relative ,

to the outside atmosphere in the Secondary Containment. For the purpose of l this surveillance, pressure measurements will be made at the 24'6" elevation in the auxiliary building. This single location is considered to be adequate and representative of the entire Secondary Containment due to the large cross-section of the air passages which interconnect the various buildings within the Secondary Containment. In order to ensure a negative pressure in all areas inside the Secondary Containment under most meteorological conditions, the negative pressure acceptance criteria at the measured location is 0.4 inch water gauge. It is recognized that there will be an occasional meteorological condition under which slightly positive pressure may exist at some localized portions of the boundary (e.g., the upper elevations on the down-wind side of a building). For example, a very low outside temperature combined with a moderate wind speed could cause a slightly positive pressure at the upper elevations of the containment enclosure building on the leeward face. The probability of occurrence of meteorological conditions which could result in such a positive differential pressure condition in the upper levels of the enclosure building has been estimated to be less than 2% of the time.

The probability of wind speed within the necessary moderate band, combined with the probability of extreme low temperature, combined with the small portion of the boundary affected, combined with the low probability of airborne radioactive material migrating to the upper levels ensures that the overall effect on the design basis dose calculations is insignificant.

3/4.6.6.3 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the Secondary Containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to provide a secondary boundary surrounding the primary containment that can be maintained at a negative pressure during accident conditions. A visual inspection is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 6-9 Amendment No. 77, om

ML20085E620

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