ML20083P115
| ML20083P115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1984 |
| From: | Diederich G COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20083P087 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8404190384 | |
| Download: ML20083P115 (27) | |
Text
.
Commonw Ilth Edison a
LaSalle County Nuclear Station Rural Route #1, Box 220 V
Marseilles, litinois 61341 Telephone 815/357-6761 March 29, 1984 Mr. James C. Keppler
/_ PRINCIPAL STAFF I Regional Administrator V ;4A
/e.2PRP.
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Region III D/RA
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JE U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4/RA DP4SF l
799 Roosevelt Road
'R0 I
Glen Ellyn, IL.
60137 oAO 1~,
3GA l
Attn:
Mr. Roger Walker ENF F it _Q4P
Subject:
LaSalle Station Butt Splice Inspection Attached is a report outlining LaSalle Stations actions taken in response to recent allegations made to the NRC. An informational LER will follow in the near future.
If any additional information is required, please contact Mr. J.W. Gieseker on extension 549.
G J. Diederich Station Superintendent GJD/JWG/bej xc:
R. D. Bishop W. R. Huntington h3 N
0 S
4 March 29, 1984 i
DVR l-1184-l0'8 i
I EVENT DESCRIPTION:
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I An allegation made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pertaining to the use of an incorrect splicing technique resulted in the inspection of butt i
splices used to extend control / instrumentation conductors (usually #14AWG).
Initial inspection of the Unit 1 safety related Switchgear and Motor Control Center panels identified 110 butt splices.
Of the 110 identified butt splices, sixteen (16) were rejected. Based on these results, the inspection
)
was expanded to include the remaining safety related Panels, Penetrations (containing control cables), Switchgear and McC's in Units 1 and 2.
The results are tabulated in Attachment A.
I A separate, but related allegation was'made on an improper technigue used to remove the outer jacketing from multiconductor cable whic'h could result in nicking / cutting of the individual conductors insulation.
II. CAUSF:
The apparent cause in both of the above allegations was the failure of the particular terminator to follow the Electrical Contractors termination i
procedure WIS00-(specifically paragraphs 3.2.6 and 3.2.12) and good work practices commensurate with the Journeyman Electrician trade classification.
In addition, a minor procedural deficiency aided incorrect butt splices not belns identified by contractor Quality Control in that the installer was not
[l
- specifically required to inform QC when a butt splice was installed to extend a conductor nor was QC specifically required to inspect this type of installation.
j III.
PROBABLE CONSEOUENCES OF THE OCCURENCE:
An evaluation of the safety significance was performed for each of the conductors that failed the pull test during this inspection. As detailed in Attachments B and C, the potential loss of 58 conductors was evaluated. 33 in Unit 1 and 25 in Unit 2.
LNo safety impact would have resulted from failure of 48 of the conductors and 9' additional conductors could have. failed with only minimal impact. Loss of the remaining conductor, IRH256, would have prevented valyc 1E12-F042C from opening and initiation of LPCI "C".
The health and safety of the public was'not affected due to the remote possibility of this t' allure occurring and the availability of other ECCS systems.
l IV.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
i The safety related Panels, Penetrations, Switchgear and NCC's in Units 1 and 2 were' inspected for the installation of butt splices on control and.
instrumentation cables.- Except as indicated below, all of the butt splices' identified were visually inspected to the'following criteria:
1.
PIDG window splice was sized correctly for the wire spliced.
2.
Crisp shape and " dots" indicate correct crimping tool was used 1.e.
not pliers - see note below.
DOCUMENT 0156r
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Conductor insulation was under the nylon insulation of the splice -
3.
see note below.
4.
End of the conductor was flush with or extended beyond end of terminal wire barrel.
5.
Butt splice was covered with Okonite taping sequence in the Containment, Reactor Bldg. or Steam Tunnel.
6.
Any nicks or cuts identified in the conductor insulation were repaired.
NOTE:During this inspection it was determined that the Electrical Contractor used a calibrated crimping tool sized for #16 - #22 AWG connectors to crimp the PIDG window splices on #14 AWG conductors and that the insulation thickness of #14 Okonite conductors will not fit under the insulation barrel of the splice preventing the insulation crimp from gripping the conductor insulation. Review of these items by the splice manufacturer and CECO Engineering indicates that the splices as installed will meet their design function - for details see Discrepancy Report 1-84-132.
Repair packages were initiated and completed for all butt splices which either failed a pull (tug) test or the required visual inspection criteria.
It should be noted, however, that the visual inspection criteria was upgraded after the inspection the Unit I safety related Switchgear and Motor Control Centers and seven (7) of the Unit 1 containment penetrations. This upgrade was the result of a concern that the pull (tus) test might disable a control circuit. A work request has been written to reinspect the 94 (110-16)
Switchgear and MCC butt splices and the 11 containment penetration butt O'
splices identified during the first stage of the inspection to the upgraded visual inspection criteria.
(All of these 105 butt splices were acceptably pull tested during the initial inspection and are therefore not a concern for continued operation). Any splice found that does not meet this criteria will be replaced.
To resolve the nick / cut insulation allegation, Project Construction performed an inspection on certain panels as indicated in Attachment D "Special Inspection Procedure to Ascertain Cable or Conductor Damage Due to Misapplication of Craft Tools." The results are tabulated in Attachment E and CECO Station any required repairs completed per Work Requests L33996,7.
Nuclear Engincaring Department has reviewed the repair procedures for the nicked / cut conduc*. ors and has determined that the repair method restores the insulation system to its full 600v. level. During a meeting with the NRC on 3/7/84, SNED committed to further confirm one aspect of the repair procedure by actual test. An environmental test is to be performed on the Okonite taping sequence applied over a nick / cut at the point'where the cables outer jacket has been removed. Discrepancy Report 1-84-113 has been written to track this item.
O DOCUMENT 0156r
To help pesvent further problems in this area, AIR l-84-67051 has been written to upgrada Electrical Maintenance and Contractor procedures to better de' fine craft and QC responsibilities in these, areas.
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V.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:
None.
VI. PREPARER:
J. W. Gieseker, Ext. 549.
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ATTACHMENT A
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SUMMARY
OF BUTT SPLICE INSPECTIONS 3.
NUMBER
. NUMBER OF ITEMS OF SPLICES FAILED
' FAILED SPLICES COMPLETED INSPECTED INSPECTED
-VISUAL INSP.
PULL TEST REPLACED
' UNIT 0.1 1.
Switchgear & MCC's 19
~ 110**
16 16*
16 3/11/84 2.
11***
O O
O 3/11/84 3.
Penetrations 11 0
0 0
0 3/16/84 4.
Control Panels 151 641 174 17
.174 3/18/84 UNIT 2 1.
Switchgear & McC's 18 102 54 3
54 3/18/84 2.
Penetrations 20 0
0 0
0 3/19/84 3.
Control Panels 90, 424 86 22 86 3/20/84 s
85 were not pull tested because they failed the initial visual inspection criteria.
94 require additional visual inspection to the dpgraded inspection criteria.
na
- 11 require additional visual inspection to the upgraded inspection criteria.
l DOCUMENT 0162r t
PAGE 1 ATTACHMENT B CABLE SPLICES PULL TEST FAILURE EVALUATION UNIT ONE CABLE NUMBER WIRE COLOR SEGREGATION CODE 1.
ICM329 drain (shield cable)
IBK 2.
1HG020 drain (shield cable)
IBK 3.
1HP156 orange 1GC 4.
1PR137 White IBK 5.
1PR210 Orange IBK 6.
1RH124 Black 1BC 7.
1RH156 White 1BC 8.
1RH256 Black 1BC 9.
1RIO33 White 1YC 10.
1RI184 Green 1YC 11.
1RP066 Black B2C 12.
1RP066 White B2C 13.
1RR288 Red 1BC 14.
IRR389 Red 1BC 15.
IVC 099 White 1BC 16.
ILC189 White 1YC 17.
ILC189 Black 1YC 18.
1D0036 Black 1YC 19.
INB421 Orange 1YC 20.
IVQ152 White 1YC 21.
1RR035 Red / Black 12C 22.
1RR035 Green / Black 12C 23.
1RH237 Red / Black 1BC 24.
IVE015 Black 1BC 25.
IVE015 Red 1BC 26.
1D0044 White 1YC 27.
1AP251 Black 1BC 28.
IVP019 Blue 12C 29.
IVE015 Orange 1BC 30.
IVE015 White 1BC 31.
1DG013 White / Black 1BC 32.
ICM016 drain (shield cable)
IBK 33.
Pni,1H22-P026 Term:NN-1 to AV-1C B2C 0
DOCUMENT 0142r
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PAGE 2
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Cable Number:
ICH329
()~WireColor:
drain f
Function:
Shielded cable, cable shield to ground.
t Safety Impact:
No impact.
Cable Number:
1HG020 Wire Color:
deala l
Function:
Shielded Cable, shield Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact I
l Cable Number:
1HP156 l
Wire Color:
Orange j
Function:
1HP156, Orange, is the Control Room Closing Control leg for l
system Aux. transformer to bus 143 normal feed. ACB 1432.
With the loss of 1HP156, orange. ACB 1432 can still be closed at PNL 1E22-P301B.
Safety Impact:
No safety impact. Bkr will trip if required, and D/G will e
pick up bus.
Cable No:
1PR137.
Wire Color:
White f
Function:
1PR137, orange, is the -15VAC power supply from the trip / aux unit, 1D18-K751C..to the Detector Assy.
()
1D18-N451C, (Control Room ventilation radiation monitor.)
A break in IPR 137, orange, will de-energize the pre-amp, l
causing the monitoring unit to drive down scale. This will cause the Green " Operating" light to go out on Pn1 OPM14J, and bring up the " Control Room KVAC Rad Monitoring FNL trouble" alarm at PNL IPM13J.
Safety Impact:
No safety impact 1) failure is in conservative direction.
- 2) VC logic is 1 of 2 twice so no action occures except alarm.
' Cable No:
1PR210 Wire Color:
orange Function:
1PR210, orange, is the high range' signal connection between the RM-80, micro-processor unit, and the RM-23, Remote Control and display device, for Standby Gas Treatment Vent W.R.G.M.
A break in IPR 210 orange, will cause the "Migh Range" backlit selector button, of tho'RM-23 Unit,'to flash. 'Per LOP-PR-04 the operator would then perform a channel check, which would point out the problem. Also a-
. break in 1PR210, orange,-would not affect the input to the Process Comp.
Safety Impact:
No safety impact: Low range readings ~still available. Old 38GT Monitors stt11'available.
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PAGE 3 Cable No:
1RH124 Wire Color:
Black O Function:
1RH124,Blk, is a wire connection in " Norm" leg of the t
"Open" control circuit of the RHR Containment Spray Outboard Valve, 1E12-F016B.
1E12-F016B has two control locations one from the control Room (Norm) and one from the Remote shutdown panel (Emer.)
A break in 1RH124,bik, will disable "0 PEN" Control of 1E12-F016B from the Control Room. The Valve can still be opened from the remote shutdown panel.
Safety Impact:
Minimal impact:
valve could rtill be operated from Rem S/D panel.
Not required to auto open during accident.
Cable No.:
1RH156 Wire Color:
White Function:
1RH156, White, is a wiring connection for the over21oad bypass of RHR injection valve, 1E12-F0428. ('B' LPCI injection). A break in the IRH156, White, will disable the overload bypass function.
i Safety Impact:
Minimal impact: Valve has been tested to cycle with Thermal O/L protection in place.
Cable No.:
1RH256 Wire Color:
Black Function:
1RH256, black, is a wiring connection in.the Rx low pressure permissive circuit to OPEN RHR injection Valve, 1
l J
A break in 1RH256, black, would prevent both automatic and manual (handswitch) opening of IE12-F042C, as well as disabling the 1E12-F042C OL by pass circuit.
Safety Impact:
Because of the pull test failure of this wire, it is believed that under certain seismic conditions, this wire could have pulled loose, preventing valve IE12-F042C from opening and initiation of LPCI "C".
The chance of this i
occuring is possible, but remote. Further more this would have been isolated to the lE12-F042C valve and all other ECCS systems would remain available.
t Cable No.:
1RIO33
[
Wire Color:
White
. Func' tion:
1RIO33, white, is a wire connection in the " Norm" leg of the "0 PEN" Control Circuit of the RCIC Pump suction from condensate storage tank valve, 1E51-F010.
Note: 1E51-F010 has two control locations. One from the-Control Room (Norm) and one from the remote shutdown Panel (EMER). A break in 1RIO33, white, will prevent opening 1E51-F010 from the control room. The valve can still be opened from the remote shutdown panel.
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Safety Impact:
No safety impact: Valve is normally open, and'can be A._,)
closed if needed to shift suction to Supp. Pool.
DOCUMENT.0142r
PAGE 4 1
Cable No.:
1RI184 Wire Color:
Green Function:
1RI184, green, is a wire connection for " Closed" light indication in the Control Room for outhcard steam line isolation valve, 1E51-F008.
A break in 1RI184, green, would prevent the " CLOSED" indication light for 1E51-F008, from lighting on the Control Room Panel.
Safety Impact:
No safety-impact, indication only.
Cable No.:
1RP066 i
Wire Color:
Black Function:
1RP066, black, is a wire connection in the Primary Containment High Pressure Trip circuit. A break in IRP066, Black, would give a primary containment high pressure trip alarm. This would result in a possible scram and possible group II & III and outboard isolation logic initiating if any other relays associated with isolation logic are deenergized.
Safety Impact:
Minimal Impact:
1.) Fails to trip logic systems. 2.) Logic strings are 1 of 2 twice, so no actions occur, only alarms.
Cable No:
1RP066 Wire Color:
White Function:
1RP066, White, is a wire connection in the primary containment high pressure trip circuit.
A break in 1RP066, white, would give a primary containment high pressure trip alarm. This would result in a possible Scram and possible Group II & III and outboard isolation icgic initiating, if any other relay associated with isolation logic are deenergized.
l Safety Impact:
Minimal Impact:
See evaluation for 1RP066, Black.
f Cable No.:
1RR288 Wire Color:
Red
. Function:
This red wire of 1RR288 is connected to the trip circuit of 6.9KV Brk 3B of Swgr 152.
The failure of this wire would prevent the trip of the RR pump 3B breaker from either a Turbine Stop Valve fast closure or Turbine stop Valve < 90% open.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact:" Pump would still trip via the 4 Bkr.
In
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addition 3 Bkr would trip due to RR Downshift Logic.
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DOCUMENT 0142r-
PAGE 5 Cable No.:
1RR389 Wire Color:
Red
(
Function:
This red wire of 1RR389 is connected to the Turbine Stop valve fast closure Trip circuit of the 6.9 KV RR pump Breakers AA and 3B.
The failure of this wire would disable the above mentioned trip however an alternate trip is present from the Turbine Stop Valve < 90% open logic that would provide the same function in the event of a turbine Stop Valve fast closure.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact:,,TSV fast closure will still cause trip through Trip System A.
Bkr will also trip due to TSV 90%
Lim. Sw.
Not required until EO Cycle.
Cable No.:
1VC099 Wire Color:
White Function:
IVC 099 White is a wire connected to the fire detection alarm circuit for the control room Emergency make up filter OVC015A.
This contact is associated with an interlock relay in such a manner if the white wire of IVC 099 were to "open" the fire protection deluge valves for OVC0lSA would be prevented from opening.
Safety Impact:
Minimal Safety Impact: VC Emergency M/U train is a habitability concern, not a safety concern. Train is not normally used.
O Cable No.:
1LC189 Wire Color:
White Function:
The white wire of cable ILC189 is the thermal overload bypass of MSIV Leakage Control Inboard Isolation valve 1E32-F003E.
Failure of this wire would prevent the thermal overload circuit from functioning.
Safety Impact:
None, this valve has been tested to cycle as. required with the thermal overload in the circuit, i
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Cable No.:
1LC189 Wire Color:
Black Function:
The white wire of cable ILC189 is the thermal overload bypass of MSIV Leakage Control Inboard Isolation valve 1E32-F003E.
Failure of this wire would prevent the thermal overload circuit from functioning.
Safety Impact:
None, this valve has been tested to cycle as required with the thermal overload in the circuit.
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PAGE 6 Cable No.:
1DOO36 Black
( )
Wire Color:
Function:
The Black wire of 1D0036 is part of the annunciator circuit for the loss of power to DG-0 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump OD00lP. The failure of this wire would prevent the annunciator from actuating a loss of pwer at 135Y-2 Compt.
F3.
Safety Impact:
None, this pump has an auto transfer to unit 2 power on the loss of Unit 1 power.
Cable No.:
1NB421 Wire Color:
Orange Function:
The orange wire of INB421 is part of the open circuit for Main Steam Line Drain Valve IB21-F067D (outboard). The failure of this wire would prevent the opening of the drain s.
valves.
Safety Impact:
None, the valve will still function as required on a containment isolation and line drain can be accomplished via the inboard drain line.
Cable No.:
1VQ152 Wire Color:
White Function:
The white wire of IVQ152 is part of the overload bypass circuit of D.W.' vent / purge inlet valve IVQO29.. Failure of this wire would prevent the thermal overload for this valve
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from functioning.
Safety Impact:
None, this valve has been tested to cycle as required with the overload protection in the circuit.
Cable No.:
1RR035 Wire Color:
Red / Black Function:
The Red / Black wire of cable 1RR035 is part of the closing coil circuit of Recirc Pump Suction Valve IB33-F0238.
Failure of this wire would prevent closing the valve from l
panel 1H13-P602.
Safety Impact:
None, the valve is normally lined up "open" and is not required for any Containment Isolation.
j Cable No.:
1RR035 Wire Color:
Green / Black l
Function:
The Green / Black wire of cable 1RR035 is part of the light, open, and close circuits for Recirc Pump Suction Valve IB33-F023B. Failure of this valve would cause loss of l
indication, and the inability to open and close the valve I
from panel 1H13-P602.
Safety Impact:
None, the valve is normally lined up "open" and is not required for any containment Isolation.
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DOCUMENT 0142r
PAGE 7 4
Cable No.:
1RH237 Wire Color:
Red / Black O-Function:
The Red / Black wire of cable IRH237 is part of the close circuit of RHR Heat Exchanger Shell Side Bypass Valve 1E12-F0488.
Failure of this wire would prevent the value from being closed from 1C61-P001 and 1H13-P601.
Safety Impact:
None, the valve will still function as required to auto open on initiation. The parallel flow path has been proven to be an acceptable means of System operation in the event the RHR Heat Exchanger is required to be placed in service.
Cable No.:
1VE015 Wire Color:
Black Function:
Connection for indication lights and part of trip circuit for OVE03CA (same as orange & white of IVE015)
Failure will result in the following:
- 1) Lose indication at local panel 0PA09J for OVE03CA 2)
Lose manual remote trip from handswitch for OVE03CA
- 3) Lose trip of OVE03CA on no supply air flow with OVE01CA running.
Safety Impact:
Minimal impact:
only trip function & indication effected.
1 Cable No.:
1VE015 Wire Color:
Red Function:
Wire to trip coil for OVE03CA failure will result in the O.
loss of all remote trip functions for OVE03CA.
Safety Impact:
Minimal impact:- only trip function & indication effected.
Cable No.:
IDOO44 Wire Color:
White Function:
Cable ID0044 is the wire connection of U1 control power to the QDG fuel oil transfer pump discharge valve ODOC04.
A break in 1D0044, white, would eliminate the automatic transfer of U2 control power to the valve along with loss of U1 control power.
Safety Impact:
Minimal Impact:
Power would have to be transfered manually when 0 D/G day tank low level Alarm occurred.
Cable No.:
1AP251 Wire' Color:
Black
~ Function:
Cable 1AP251, black, is the common power connection for the positive indicator lamps of the " Bus 136X 480v breaker. A break in 1AP251, black, would eliminate power to position lamp resulting in loss of breaker position indication.
Safety Impact:
No safety impact, indication only.
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PAGE 8 Cable No.:
lVP019 Wire Color:
Blue Function:
Cable 1YP019, blue, controls the trip lamp of the PC 1A veut supply fan. A break in IVP019, blue, would eliminate trip indication.
Safety Impact:
No safety impact, indication only.
Cable No.:
lVE015 Wire Color:
Orange Function:
Is a wire for closing circuit of 480v swgr 136x Comp 303C A.E.E.R. Air Cooled Cond. Fan ')A EPN OVE03CA.
Failure 2 would prevent closing the breaker remotely.
Safety Impact:
No safety impact breaker could still be closed locally.
Cable No.:
lVE015 Wire Color:
White Function:
Is a wire for the closing circuit of the breaker for OVE03CA - same as orange of IVE015 cable above.
Failure would prevent closing the breaker remotely.
Safety Impact:
No safety impact breaker could still be closed locally.
Cable No.:
1DG013 Wire Color:
White / Black F
One of two wires to closing circuit of 136X Comp. 303A. lA O
unction:
DG Cooling Water Pump " Auto start circult". Failure causes the auto start capability of cooling water pump to be lost.
Safety Impact:
None, Pump can be manually started with the control switch through the other wire.
Cable No.:
ICM016 Wire Color:
drain (shield cable)
Function:
Shielded cable, shield.
Safety Impact:
None.
)
Panel No.:
1H22-P026 Terminals:
NN-1 to AV-lC Function:
Same as 1RP066, Black.
Safety Impact:
Minimal Impact:
1.) Fails to -trip logic systesm.
2.)
Logic strings are 1 of 2 twice, so no actions occur, only alarms.
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DOCUMENT 0142r
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PAGE 1 ATTACHMENT C CABLE SPLICES p
PULL TEST FAILURE EVALUATION U
UNIT TWO CABLE NUMBER WIRE COLOR SEGRECATION CODE 1.
2DC053 Red 21C NSR 2.
2D0047 Orange Space 3.
2NBD31 White / Black 2YC 4.
2NBD31 Green 2YC 5.
2NBD32 Blue / Black 2YC 6.
2NBD33 Creen 2YC 7.
2NBD33 Blue 2YC 8.
2NRD33 White / Black 2YC 9.
2NBD33 Orange 2YC 10.
2NBD33 Black 2YC 11.
2NRD33 Red 2YC 12.
2R1236 Black 21C NSR 13, 2CM221 Blue 2BC 14.
2AP246 Green 2BC 15.
2CM168 White A2K 16.
2CM132 Black A2K 17, 2CM152 White A2K 18.
2CM136 White AIK 19.
2VC110 White 2BK 20, 2DC055 Red 22C Os 21, 2DC042 Orange 2GC 22, 2C0079 Red 2WC 23.
2C0079 Red / White 2WC
- d *-
24.
Pal:2PLF6J Term: CH-1 to TB2 CM 2 DTE8 25.
Pnl:2E22-P301 Term: TB7-51 to TB11-38 i
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.PAGE 2 1
Cable No.:
2DC053
'l Wire color:
Red Function:
The red wire of 2DC053 is connected to the 125VDC Batt 2A Ground detector Alarm circuit. A failure of this wire will i
remove the +65V power supply from the annunciator input card for R-Point R0197125VDC Batt 2A Ground detector alarm.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Significance: Alarm only, and failure will cause alarm.
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Cable No.:
2DC047 Wire Color:
Orange Function:
Cable not used.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Significance.
i Cable No.:
2NBD31 Wire Color:
White / Black j
Function:
2NBD31, White / Black, is a wire cor.nection in the open position indication and startrec computer point circuit for SRV 2821-F013E.
A Break in 2NBD31. White / Black, would prevent the "0 PEN" i
indicating light for 2B21-F013E from lighting. Also it would disable Startrec computer point #197, " Monitor Relief Viv. I position".
j Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact: Doesn't affect valve function or alarms.
Redundant open indicatimt is available:. in the Control Room.
O i
Cable No.:
2NSD31 Wire Color:
Green 2NBD31, Green, is a wire connection in the "0 PEN" position Function:
i indication and Startree computer point circuit for ADS Valve 2821-F013D.
A Break in 2NSD31, Croes, would prevent the "0 PEN" Indicating light for 2821-F013D from lighting.
Also it l
I would disable Startree signal No.196, "Nonitor Relief Viv "D" position".
i Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact: See previous evaluation of 2NBD31 White / Black.
Cable No.:
2NBD32 Wire Color:
Blue / Black Function:
2NSD32, Blue /Blac'k, is a wire connection in the "0 PEN" position indication circuit for 3RV 2B21-F013K.
A break in 2NBD32, Blue / Black, would prevent the "0 PEN" indicating light for 2B21-F013K, from lighting.
Safety Impact:
No safety Impact: See sealuation of 2NBD33 Green.,
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DOCUNKNT 0142r m.
PAGE 3 Cchio No.:
2NBD33 Wire Co' lor:
Green Function:
2NBD33, Green, is a wiring connection for 125 VDC power to the following:
()
--Oper./Close indication for SRV 2B21-F013M
--Startree Comp. point #204
--R1y K30, Annun. & Process computer point #ID2317 A break in 2NBD33, Green, would lose Control Room indication for 2B21-F013M. Also it would disable the Startrec point and bring up "2B21-F013M Fully Open " Alarm (and computer point) on pn1 2PA03J.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact:, Valve would still function as designed.
Alarm would identify failure. One valid open/not open indication would still exist in the control Room.
Cable No.:
2NBD33 Wiro Color:
Blue Function:
2NBD33 Blue, is a wiring connection for SRV 2B21-F013M closed indication, Startrec point #204 and annunciator (R1y K20).
A break in 2NBD33. Blue, would deenergize closed indication in the Control Room, disable Startrec point #204, and bring up "2B21-F013M Fully OPEN" Alarm (and computer point) on pn1 2PA03J.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact:
See previous evaluation of 2NBD33 Green.
Cable No.:
2NBD33
()
Wire Color:
White / Black Function:
2NBD33. White / Black is a wiring for power to SRV 2B21-F013N closed /open indication, Startrec point #205 and control Room Annunciator (Relay K31).
A break in 2NBD33. White / Black would lose Control Room indication for 2B21-F013N. Also it would disable Startree point #205 and bring up "2B21-F013N Fully OPEN" Alarm (and computer point) on Pn1 2PA03J.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact:
See previous evaluation of 2NBD33, Green.
Cable No.:
2NBD33 Wire Color:
Orange Function:
2N8D33, orange, is a wiring connection for SRV 2821-F013M "0 PEN" indication and Startrec point #204.
A break in 2N8D33, orange, would disable the "0 PEN" indicating light and Startrec point #204.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact:
See previous evaluation of cable 2N8D31 White /81ack.
O DOCUMENT 0142r
.m
.pAGR 4 Cablo N3.:
2NBD33 Wire Color:
Black Function:
2NBD33 Black, is a wiring connection for power to the Open and Close indication for SRV 2B21-F013L, Startrec point O_-
- 203, and 2B21-F013L open alarm and computer point.
s A break in 2NB33, Black, would disable the Open and Closed indicating lights for 2B21-F013L. Also it would disable Startrec point #203 and being up "2B21-F013L fully Open" Alarm (and computer point) on pn1 2PA03J.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact:
See previous evaluation of cable 2NBD33, Green.
Cable No.:
2NBD33 Wire Color:
Red Function:
2NBD33. Red, is a wiring connection for SRV 2821-F013L
" Closed" indication and startrec point #203, also R1y K29, alarm & computer point.
A break in 2NBD33. Red, would disable the closed indicating light for 2B21-F013L and Startrec point #203.
It would also bring up "2B21-F013L Fully Open" alarm (and computer point) on pn1 2PA03J.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact:
See previous evaluation of 2NBD33, Green.
Cable No.:
2RI236 Wire Color:
Black Function:
The black wire of 2RI236 is connected to the position indication circuit for the RCIC Governor valve.
N.
If this wire should fall, proper valve position indication would be maintained, but the digital computer point for covernor valve closed would be lost.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact: Computer input only.
Cable No.:
2CM221 Wire Color:
Blue Function:
The blue wire of 2CH221 is part of the Div. 2 inboard isolation logic to sample pump 2CM03PB.
If this wire should fall it would simulate a Div. 2 inboard Isolation to pump 2CM03P8 resulting in the inability to start this pump.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact:
Sample pump is non-safety related, and is tripped and isolated during an accident.
(~j) u_
DOCUMENT 0142r
PAGE 5 Cablo N3.:
2AP246 Wire C61or:
Green Function:
The green wire of 2AP246 is the SWGR 2424 interlock with 2361.
O If this wire should fail the close coil for 2361 main feeder would be disabled.
Safety Impact:
None the 2361 feeder breaker does not trip on any under f
voltage or no voltage condition therfore a closing action would not be required in the event of a loss of bus 242Y.
Cable No.:
2CN168 Wire Color:
White Function:
The white wire of cable 2CN168 is part of the RTD circuit for Suppression Pool temp monitor 2TECM57N.
The failure of this wire would have no impact on plant operation since the redundant element would continue to monitor this particular area.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact: Redundant indication is available.
Cable No.:
2CM132 Wire Color:
Black Function:
The black wire of 2CM132 is part of the RTD circuit for Suppression Pool temp monitor 2TECM057D.
The failure of this wire would have no impact on plant operation since the redundant element would continue to monitor this particular area.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact: See previous evaluation of 2CN168, White.
)
Cable No.:
2CN152
-Wire Color:
White Function:
The white wire of 2CM152 is part of the RTD circuit for Suppression Pool temp monitor 2TECM057J.
The failure of this wire would have no impact on plant operation since the redundant element would continue to monitor this particular area.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact: See previous evaluation of 2CM168, White.
Cable No.:
2CN136 Wire Color:
White Function:
The white wire of cable 2CN136 is part of the RTD circuit for. Suppression Pool temp monitorin8 2TECN0578.
The failure of this wire would have no impact on plant operation since the redundant element would continue to monitor this particular area temp.
Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact: See previous evaluation of 2CN168. White.
O DOCUMENT 0142r
.PAGE 6 Cable No.:
2VC110 Wire Color:
White Function:
Cable 2VC110, white, is a wire connection between temperature element, OTE-VC042, and temperature monitor, 2TN-VP105. A break in 2VC110, whi'te, would peg temperatur,e monitor downscale.
. Safety Impact:
None, indication only.
Cable No.:
2DC055 Wire Color:
Red FuLction:
Alarm contacts denoting 112Y/212Y crosstle is closed.
Failure results in no alarm for crosstled buses.
Safety Impact:
None, Bus breaker indication is still maintained to show status of crosstled buses.
Cable No.:
2DC042 Wire Color:
Orange Function:
Space Wire Safety Impact:
None.
Cable No.:
2C0079-Wire Color:
Red Funtion:
Feed to ductronic horn for Central File / Archives Halon System.
If wire falls the horn is silent upon alarm.
None.
)
Safety Impact:
Cable No.:
2C0079 Wire Color:
Red / Black Function:
Feed to revolving light in the Central File / Archives Halon,
System. No light upon alarm if wire breaks.
Safety Impact:
None.
Fanel No.:
2PLF6J Terminals:
GH-1 to T32CH2 DTES Function:'
Not used Safety Impact:
No Safety Impact.
Panel No.:
2E22-P301 Terminals:
Ts7-51 to T811-38 Functions-The wire between T87-51 and T311-38 is in the K9 laterlock with the K15 lockout relay circuit.
If this wire were to fail the lockout relay would not be tripped following 3 unsuccesfull starts as timed by the logic circuits the diesel would not continue to start since the K39 device will still time out and terminate the starting sequence.
Safety Impact:
No safecy Impact:
Same functions will occur due to circuit
\\_
design.
DOCUMENT 0142r
March 5, 1984 7 rAcua4Eur 2)
Rav. O Pags 1 of 3 4
SPECIAL INSPECTION PROCEDURE
(
TO ASCERTAIN CABLE OR CONDUCTOR DAMAGE DUE TO MISAPPLICATION OF CRAFT TOOLS 1
1.0
References:
1.1 H. P. Foley Co. Works Instruction WI-500 Rev. 9 1.2 Ceco QA Manual
2.0 Purpose and Scope
2.1 The purpose of this procedure.is to describe the method used in performing a sample inspection to detect and evaluate possible cable or conductor damage due to misapplication of craft tools in the removal of cable jacketing during the termination process.
This procedure will be used to evaluate work by individuals identified as having performed work in Fire Protection panel 0FP16J.
2.2 The procedure applies to LaSalle County Station Units I & II 3.0 Prerecue:ites Prior to the sample inspections the following shall be considered:
3.1 Personnel Safety 3.2 Equipment protection with necessary Out of Service (005) cards.
3.3 Accessib1]ity of equipment as determined by plant start-up or operating conditions.
)4.0InspectionProcedure k
4.1 Termination cards containing the names of the suspect individuals were collected from twelve (12) safety related systems as noted below.
A sample of cables were selected from the following systems with considerations as stated in 3.0 above:
)
NB VY 4.2 The sample selected shall be documented on Attachment A.
Divisional I
cable will be included. Associated cable within safety related I
panels will be included in the sample.
4.3 The following as a minimum will be checked for the cables selected in the sample:
4.3.1 Cable or conductors are not nicked, crimped or otherwise damaged.
The inspection coverage will include the individual conductors from the terminal block along the length to where the outer jacket was removed & covered with protective tape.
4.3.2 If damage is noted in the conductor the protective tape shall be removed from the cable and that area will also be inspected.
()
Of the cables selected in the sample, approximately 20% of x'
4.3.3 these shall have the protective tape temoved and the area under this tape inspected.
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Pogs 2 of 3
'Rav. 0 4.4 Inspection results are documented on Attachment A.
Items to be i
included are:
O
.4.4.1 Equipment number where cable was terminated.
.4.4.2 Cable number 4.4.3 Items inspected, as well as, indicating whether the inspection was performed with or without the removal of the protective tape.
4.4.4 Results of inspection including description of damage noted.
4.4.5 Signatures of inspection & verification individuals.
5.0 Evaluation of Inspection Results.
5.1 Damaged cable on conductors shall be identified to LaSalle Station for proper tracking and resolution according to established station procedures.
5.2 The items will be properly dispositioned using one of the following methods:
5.2.1 Item repaired per approved procedures.
5.2.2 Accept item as is based on engineering review.
4 6.0 Final Equipment Status 6.1 Protective tape and tyraps, unless specified otherwise in the repair procedure, shall be reapplied to meet the original requirements.
Prepar" t,y D.
Skora U Approved D
R.
Ho nak k
Reviewed y
'V 6
T. E. Quaka 1841 L l
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P
Attachment'A Paga 3 of 3 Rav. 0 W Idli SAMPLE INSPECTION RESULTS Final Equipment #
Cable #
Protective tape Damage Condition
& Location
& Sea. Code Removed (ves/no)
Noted Inspected by I
49 10 t
o b
bV Sample Prepared by inspected by Verified by Reviewed by L
A rrx<.amettr E 4
UNIT II-SAFETY RELATED INSPECTION SCOPE i O
- of Panels
- of Cables
- of Cables where Approx. #
Inspected Inspected Tape was removed of termination 16 46 42 210
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0 4
4 0
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Page 1
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INSPECTION OF UNIT II SAFETY RELATED CABLES
(
TAPE
(~'
REMOVE 0 RESULTS PANEL #
CABLE #
SEG. CODE YES/NO UNDER TAPE EXPOSED CM System 2AP78E 2CH072 2BC Y 95/35/-
nicked to Cu OK i
2AP78E 2CM217 2BC Y 95/35/-
OK OK Y
OK OK 2C61-P001 2CM303 2YK 2C61-P001 2CM302 2YK Y
OK OK 2AP78E 2CM061 2BC Y 95/35/-
2-tiny nick OK DG System 2H13-P629 20G213 2YC Y-slight nick OK 2AP21E 2DG014 2BC Y-Oko B1k OK OK HP System 2AP07E 2HP012 2GK Y-35/95/-
OK OK 2AP79E 2HP019 2GC Y-Oko B1k nicked OK
[\\'
2AP79E 2HP018 DGP Y-Oko B1k nicked OK 2AP79E 2HPO404 OGC Y-Oko B1k nicked 1/2 nick 2AP79E 2HP059 2GC Y-Oko-B1k nicked OK 2H22-P028 2HP014 2GC Y-35/95/-
OK OK l
0 2H22-P028 2HP062 2GK Inaccessible 2H22-P028 2HP087 2GC Y-35/95/-
slight nick OK 2H22-P028 2HP064 2GK Inaccessible 2H22-P028
.2HP063 2GK Inaccessible 2H22-P028
- 2HP065 2GK Y-35/95/-
OK OK 2E22-P3018 2HP061 2GK Y-Oko S1k OK OK 2AP79E 2HP030 2GC Y-Oko 81k OK OK 2AP79E 2HP034 2GC No OK
( )
2AP79E 2HP035 2GP Y-Oko B1k slight nick OK 2AP79E 2HP037 2GC Y-Oko B1k
'OK OK 2AP79E 2HP036 2GC Y-Oko 61k slight nick OK w
,. ~. -
4 Pags 2 TAPE REMOVED RESULTS O LP System PANEL #
CABLE #
SEG. CODE YES/NO UNDER TAPE EXPOSED 2AP76E 2LP060 2YC Y-35/95/C OK tiny nick NB System 2H22-P004 2N8354 2YK Y-95/35/C OK OK 2AP80E 2NB244 2BC No-Oko 81k~-
OK 2AP80E 2NB245 28C Y-Oko B1k OK OK 2APs0K
- NN#40
- NC Y-Oko 81k OK OK PC System 2AP71E 2PC09s 21C Y-95/35/C Main J.
OK 2H13-P623 2PC097 2YC Y
OK OK 2H22-P004 2PC126 21K Y-95/35/C OK slight nick at lug RH System 2AP76E 2RH042 2YC Y-95/35/-
OK OK 2AP76E 2RH057 2YC Y-35/95/C nick 3/4 OK 2AP76E 2RH098 2YC Y-95/35-Cut to Cu 2AP76E 2RH097 2YC Y-95/35/C OK OK 2AP82E 2RH032 2BC Y
Slight nick OK 2AP82E 2RH064 28C Y
OK OK L
RI System 2H13-P621 2RIl04 2YC Y
OK OK
'2H13-P621 2RI110 2YC Y
OK OK 2H13-P621 2R1158 2YC Y
nick OK 9
(-')
v
+
Pags 3 P
VD System 2AP79E 2VD022 2GP No split
~
2AP79C 2VD021 2GC Y-Oko 51k slight nick OK 2AP79E 2VD024 2GP Y-Oko 51k OK OK
(
2AP79E 2VD025 2GC Y-Oko 51k OK OK 2PL25J 2VD019 2BC Y-OK OK I
t 2PL25J 2VD104 28K No OK i
i 2PL25J 2VD099 2BK No OK i
2PL25J 2VD064 25C Y
OK OK I
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Pag 3 4' Cables not inspected 2PL24J 2V0044 23C O
2AP04E 2AP119 2VC 2AP20E 2AP316 2VP I
2AP78C 2CM065 28P 2AP71E 2CM064 2VP 2AP81E 20G022 28P 2APO4C 2DG070 2VC 2AP80E 20G020 2BP 2AP76E 2LP030 2YP 2AP04E 2LP086 2YC 2DC11E 2LP034 wYC 2APS2C 2RH162 2BP 20C06E 2RIO27 2YP 2DC06E 2RI123 2YC 2DC06E 2R1027 2VP ECSA at 2821-F0228 2RP015 A1C 0030N 4
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