ML20083N431
| ML20083N431 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1984 |
| From: | Broome L, Casper M, Edmonds R, Glover R, Kulash W, Potter T DUKE POWER CO., MECKLENBURG COUNTY, NC, PLANNING RESEARCH CORP., PLG, INC. (FORMERLY PICKARD, LOWE & GARRICK, INC.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20083N288 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8404190187 | |
| Download: ML20083N431 (91) | |
Text
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0 IED UNITED STATES -OF AMERICA g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LIC19(SIAPR 1FIDApq;jf
',C '.' r Tani A SEpyr *TrlCE 0: SECFETAFY
"~Ci In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPAi1Y, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
APPLICANTS' TESTIMONY ON EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 Duke Power Company (Robert F.
Edmonds, Jr.
Mark A.
- Casper, R. Michael Glover)
Thomas E.
Potter Walter M. Kulash Mecklenburg County (Lewis Wayne Broome) l I
l April 16, 1984 c~
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6 1
TESTIMONY OF DUKE POWER COMPANY 2
(ROBERT F.
- EDMONDS, JR.,
MARK A.
- CASPER, 3
AND R.
MICHAEL GLOVER) 4 ON EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 5
Background Information on Mr. Edmonds 6
Q.
PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT.
7 A.
My name is Robert F.
Edmonds, Jr.
I am employed as 8
Senior Engineer, Duke Power Company, 422 South Church 9
Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242.
10 Q.
WHAT IS YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT WORK 11 EXPERIENCE?
12 A.
Please see my current resume, which is attached to 13 this testimony as Attachment A.
(RE) 14 Q.
ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY 15 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (PLUME EPZ) FOR THE CATAWBA 16 NUCLEAR STATION?
17 A.
Yes. (RE) 18 Q.
'ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE POPULATION-DATA FOR THE 19 CATAWBA PLUME EPZ AND THE AREA SURROUNDING THE PLUME i
20 EPZ?
21 A.
Yes. (RE)-
22
'O.
WHAT'IN YOUR BACKGROUND QUALIFIES YOU-TO DISCUSS 23-POPULATION STUDIES? -
24 A.
In my.present job, -I am responsible-for an 25
' Environmental Engineering group whose : duties include r
- 2 46 -
power plant siting.
Power' plant siting requires 27'
- population. data._.(RE) l 3
e 1 Q.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
2 A.
I am testifying on the population data for the 3-Catawba plume EPZ and the surrounding areas in 4
. connection with Emergency Planning Contention 11.
5 (RE) 6 EPC-ll Testimony of Mr. Edmonds 7
Q.
WHAT IS THE 1980 POPULATION WITHIN 10 MILES OF 8
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION AND WHAT WAS THE SOURCE?
9 A.
Based on a detailed study using the 1980 census,'the 10 population within 10 miles of Catawba was 78,769.
11 (RE) 12 Q.
'WHAT IS THE' PERMANENT 1980 POPULATION OF 2, 5,
AND 10 13 MILES FROM THE CATAWBA STATION?
14 A.
The 1980 population within 2 miles of Catawba is 537, 15 between 2 and 5 miles is 10,540, and between 5 and 10 16 miles is.67,692..The cumulative population at 2, 5,
17 and'10 miles is 537, ll,077, - and 78,769 respectively.
18 (RE) 19
-Q.
WHAT WAS THE 1980 PERMANENT' POPULATION OF THE CATAWBA-20 NUCLEAR STATION EPZ, TOTAL AND sY COUNTY?
f21
-'A.
Again based on the 1980 census 93,483 people were 22 residents of the: Catawba'EPZ.
Of this number, 2672 23 -
were Gaston_. county residents, _ 5724:were Mecklenburg
~
'24 and '85,087 were York County ; residents. -- (RE) -
-- 2 5 ; - Q.
WHAT IS THE ESTIMATED POPULATION IN THE EPZ FOR 1985,-
'26L
.THE'. PROJECTED DATE OF.. COMMERCIAL OPERATION?
1 e
W 7
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ee
o 1 A.
Based on growth trends, field surveys and building 2
permits issues since the 1980 census, it is estimated 3
that the population of the EPZ in 1985 will be about 4
104,700. (RE) 5 Q.
HOW MANY OCCUPIED DWELLINGS ARE IN THE EPZ?
6-A.
Based on the 1980 census statistics, there were 7
31,737 occupied dwellings in the Catawba EPZ. (RE) 8 Q.
WHAT WAS THE 1980 POPULATION WITHIN 50 MILES OF 9
CATAWBA?
10 A.
Based on 1980 census data, the 1980 population within 11 50 miles of Catawba was 1,405,256, for an average l
12.
density within 50 miles of Catawba of 179 people per 13 square mile. (RE) 14 Q.
WHAT IS THE 1980 AND PROJECTED 2020 CUMULATIVE 15 POPULATION AND DENSITY AT 5, 10, 20, and 30 MILES?
o 6 !
1 A.
The 5, 10, 20, and 30 mile cumulative population and 2
density at Catawba are as follows: (RE) 3 CUMU LATIVE POPULATION DEgSITY PERSONS /mi 4
PgPULATION3 5
MILES 1980 2020 1980 2020 6
0-5 11,077 22,377 141 285 7
0-10 78,769 94,436 251 301 8
0 526,532 712,164 419 567 9
0-30 814,686 1,120,996 288 396 10 1.
Trip points per Regulatory Guide 4.7 11 2.
Source 1980 Census 12 3.
Source Catawba-Nuclear Station FSAR (RE) 13 Q.
WHAT IS THE TRANSIENT POPULATION WITHIN THE EPZ?
14 A.
Based on recreation studies by Duke and personal 15 contacts by Duke employees and James Carroll, York 16 County Director of Emergency Preparedness (deceased) 17 there was a transient population of approximately 18 89,699 in-1982, which includes recreation and 19.
industry. (RE) 20 Q.
WHAT IS THE MAXIMUM EXPECTED TRANSIENT POPULATION 21 WITHIN 2, 5, and 10 MILES.OF THE STATION?
22
'A.
The1 anticipated maximum transient population at 2, 5, 23' and 10 miles is:
at 0-2 miles-16,206; at 2-5 miles 24
- 31',298; and at 5-10 miles - 52,200. (RE) 25 Q.
WHAT IS.THE POPULATION OP.. SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE, E26 DEFINED AS BEING SOUTH OF US 74 AND-WEST OF NC 16?-
4
+
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~
- 1 A.
Based on the 1980 census, the population of southwest 2
Charlotte is approximately 124,000. (RE) 3 Q.
WHAT IS THE SPECIAL FACILITIES POPULATION WITHIN THE 4
EPZ?
5 A.
The special facility (Schools, Nursing Homes, 6
Hospitals, Day Care Centers, Penal Institutions) 7 population within the EPZ is 36,231. (RE) 8 Q.
WHAT IS THE REGISTERED POPULATION OF SCHOOLS WITHIN 9
THE EPZ?
10 A.
The enrollment of schools in the EPZ is approximately 11 25,310. (RE) 12 Q.
HAVE THE AREAS IN THE EPZ OF APPROXIMATELY ONE SQUARE 13 MILE OR GREATER THAT HAVE A POPULATION DENSITY OF 14 GREATER THAN 2000 PER SQUARE MILE BEEN IDENTIFIED, 15 AND IF SO, WHAT WERE THESE AREAS?
16 A.
Such a study has_been performed.
Parts of the cities 17 of Rock Hill,. Fort Mill, and Clover were found to 18 have areas of about one square mile and larger within 19 their town limits with a population density greater L
20 than 2000 per square mile.
York,~ South Carolina was 21 checked in detail and was found to have no areas with 22 a density greater than 2000 per square mile.
All-23 other areas in the~ EPZ were eliminated based on a 24 previous study of the 1980 population distribution.
5
-(RE) 2
9 1 Q.
WHAT IS THE 1980 POPULATION AND DENSITY FROM 5 TO 30 2
MILES IN THE NORTH THROUGH EAST SECTORS?
3 A.
These numbers are shown in a table titled " Catawba 4
Nuclear Station 1980 Population and Population 5
Density, 5-30 miles, North through East Sectors,"
6 attached to Duke's letter to the Board dated August 7
25, 1983. (RE) 8 Q.
WHAT IS THE PERMANENT, TRANSIENT, AND SPECIAL 9
FACILITY POPULATION OF THE VARIOUS ZONES WITHIN THE 10
- EPZ, i.e.,
A-0, A-1, B-1, ETC.?
11 A.
The populations previously identified are distributed 12 into the various zones as follows: (RE) y SPECIAL FACIL{TY 13 PERMANENT TRANSIENT 14 ZONE POPULATION POPULATION POPULATION 15 A-0 720 6,206 0
-16 A-1 529
-10,187 0
17 A-2 4,838
.4,073 2,862 18 B-1 2,631
< 2,588 24 19 B-2 9,771 46,826 3,094 20 C-1 6,161 16,827 1,544 21 C-2 44,964 0
21,031 22 D-1 1,414
.109 0
23 D-2 9,169 0
4,023 24 E-1 429' O
O 25 E-2 4,957
- 0 2,820 26 F-1 2,573 1,582 364-27 F-2 2,655 650 0
28 F-3 2,672 651 469 29-Total EPZ 93,483 89,699 36,231 30~
1.
Includes individuals that may also be included in 31.
Permanent Population column. (RE)'
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1 Q.
ARE THERE ANY NUCLEAR PLANTS EITHER OPERATING OR 2
UNDER CONSTRUCTION WHICH HAVE PERMANENT POPULATION 3
CONCENTRATIONS SIMILAR TO OR GREATER THAN CATAWBA 4
FROM 10 TO 20 MILES FROM THE PLANT?
3 A.
Yes. (RE) 6 Q.
WHAT ARE SOME OF THEM7 7
A.
A sampling of these plants with Catawba as a 8
comparison is as follows: (RE) 9 Largest Population Sector 1980 10 Station Population in 10-20 Mile Ring Sector 11 Catawba 140,455 NE 12 Quad Cities 216,916 SW 13 Turkey Point (1978) 184,900 NNW 14 Salem (1967) 187,000 N-15 Enrico Fermi 95,716 NNE 16 Surry 160,000 SE 17 Indian Point 176,083
.SSW 18 Peach Bottom 115,720 N
19 Ginna 401,191 WSW 20 Shoreham 145,025 WSW 21 Davis Besse 419,223 WNW 22 Fort Calhoun 160,998 S
23 Sequoyah 115,955 SW 24 Three Mile Island 98,600 NW 25 Byron 143,554 NE-26 Lime rick 124,311' ESE 27 Waterford 236,347 NNW 28 EPC-ll Testimony of Mr. Glover 29 Q.
CONTENTION 11 ASSERTS THAT ALL OR~PART OF SOUTHWEST 30 CHARLOTTE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE 10-MILE EPZ FOR 31 CATAWBA, BECAUSE OF POPULATION IN SOUTHWEST 32' CHARLOTTE, THE LOCAL' METEOROLOGICAL' CONDITIONS, AND-33' THE ANTICIPATED FLOW OF EVACUEES'THROUGH EVACUATION 34 ROUTES IN CHARLOTTE.
IN YOUR OPINION, MR. GLOVER, 35 SHOULD.THIS AREA BE INCLUDED IN THE CATAWBA EPZ? -WHY
~36 OR WHY.NOT?.
+
1 6.
J d
1 A.
In my opinion Charlotte should not be a pa rt of the 2
Ca tawba plume EPZ.
My reasons are twofold.
J 3
Statements in NUREG-0396 and NUREG-0654 seem to 4
address the very issue here in this case.
Also, an 5
emergency plan already exists for Charlotte and has 6
been used to evacuate residents for actual J
7 e me rgen cie s.
(RMG) 8 NUREG-0396 -- In NUREG-0396, Appendix 1, p.
52,
'9 the NRC and EPA Task Force that evaluated the
~
10 necessary distance for the plume exposure pathway l
11 made a summary statement as to the importance or the 12-necessity of planning outside of 10 miles.
It says,
-13 "Therefore, although protective actions may be 14 required for individuals located in a'reas further j
than 10 miles from the reactor, for an atmospheric 15 f
16
? release - the actual-measures ' used and - how rapidly or 17-
_ ' efficiently they are ! implemented will not strongly
~
'18_
' influence the number of projected early health 19-effects." (RMG)
- 2iO Also, in NUREG-0654 on p.
12, the considera tions.
21-
~,of-the NRC/ EPA Task Force that established the plume W
.22 exposure pathway EPZ atl"about 10 miles" are shown.
23' Item "d"
of'that list states " detailed planning.
24 within'10 miles would provide a substantial base for-25 expansion of' response efforts in the event that this I
-26 provided'necessary."
Regulators'havei nEessence i
,4..
6 1 approved "ad hoc" planning outside the 10 mile area 2
based on the capabilities available and in place for 3
the area inside 10 miles.
Further, the regulators 4
seem to anticipate that if resources are established 5
within 10 miles that a " tie" of some sort exists to.
6 those outside the zone if the need arises to 7
facilitate this "ad hoc" planning.
When I read that 8
statement and had reviewed the City of Charlotte All 9
Hazards Plan, I realized that the City of Charlotte's 10 "All Hazards Plan" addresses the need for a " tie" to 11 resources and a way of facilitating "ad hoc" 12 planning.(RMG) 13 In the case of the Catawba area and specifically 14 Charlotte, local planners have taken the planning 15 process one step further than envisioned in the minds 16 of those who wrote. NUREG-0654 and 0396, and rather l'7 than waiting to react on an "ad hoc" basis, they have 18 developed the City of Charlotte All-Hazards Plan to 19 deal with an event affecting this area.
The " tie" 20 contemplated to the resources that would be used in 21 Charlotte to protect residents is the All-Hazards 22 Plan.
In addition to the " tie," the plan provides,
-23 the Charlotte /Mecklenburg Emergency. Management Office 24 is a " tie" to resources outside the EPZ, in that it 25' serves as a coordinating agency for both city and
~
26-county resources.
Therefore,. if necessary, without
. 1 extension of the existing plume exposure EPZ in the 2
direction of Charlotte, protective action can be 3
implemented for residents outside the EPZ.
The 4
existence of the "All Hazards Plan" and the 5
Charlotte /Mecklenberg Manage. ment Office (a joint 6
City-County agency) gives me confidence that the EPZ 7
is properly configured in relation to local emergency 8
response needs and capabilities and that item "d"
of 9
- p. 12, NUREG-0654 has been adequately addressed in 10 the Charlotte area.(RMG) 11 Background Information on Mr. Casper 12 Q.
PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT.
13 A.
My_name is Mark A.
Casper.
My business address is fl<4 Duke Power Company, 422 South Church Street, 15 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242. (MC) 16 Q.
WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT POSITION WITH DUKE POWER 17 COMPANY?
18 A.
I am a meteorologist for the Design Engineering 19-Department of Duke Power Company.
In this position I 20 conduct-various meteorological analyses associated
'21 with Duke Power Company's fossil and nuclear 22 generation facilities.
My professional
~
23-qualifications are attached'to this testimony as 24' Attachment A.
(MC) 25 EPC-ll Testimony of Mr. Casper 26 Q.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS TESTIMONY?-
o o 1 A.
This testimony puts into perspective the 2
meteorological conditions in the area of Ca tawba 3
Nuclear Station so that the meteorology question in 4
Palmetto Alliance and CESG's Emergency Planning 5'
Contention 11 can be rationally resolved. (MC) 6 Q.
WHAT ARE THE WIND DIRECTION FREQUENCIES FROM CATAWBA r
7 TO THE CHARLOTTE AREA?
8 A.
Using meteorological data gathered at Catawba at the 9
10 meter level from the most representative time 10 period (December 17, 1975 through December 16, 1977) j 11 the wind direction frequencies from the west-12 southwest, southwest, and south-southwest sectors are 13 5.2, 13.5, and 13.9 percent respectively (three 22.5 14 degree sectors).
If one were to consider' joint 15 frequencies with only stable atmospheric conditions 16 (Pasquill Stability Classes E, F, and G)'these wind 17 direction frequencies become 2.4, 5.5, and 6.3
-18 percent respectively.- The total three sector (67.5 19 degree) frequencies become 32.6 percent for all 20 stability classes and 14.2 percent for stable cases.
l-21 (MC).
22 Q.
WOULD YOU CALL THE SOUTH-SOUTHWEST DIRECTION THE 23
' PREVAILING WIND DIRECTION?
24 A.
.In the strict definition of' prevailing wind
~
25 directions. yes. - However,a meteorologist will not 26 only look;at'the'section'with the; highest percentage t
E..
- 1 of winds, he/she would also consider the other 2
sectors with high frequencies of winds.
For 3
instance, the Piedmont area is generally known to 4
have bimodal prevailing winds, that is prevailing 5
wind directions from both the southwest and northeast 6
sectors.
During the fall months especially, the 7
predominant wind direction in the Piedmont region is 8
from the northeast. (MC)
- 9 Q.
.IS THE PREVAILING WIND PHENOMENON UNIQUE TO THE 10 CATAWBA AREA?
11 A.
No.
All sites have a prevailing wind direction.
If 12 one were to look at annual surface wind roses in the 13 Climatic Atlas of ' the United States, most of the 14 stations have prevailing winds with greater 15 frequencies than the piedmont area.
The prevailing 16 wind direction is attributed to various factors.
17
_These factors-include the channelling of wind by 18 surrounding terrain and the effects of land-sea i
19 interface.
In absence of.these effects, the wind
[
I 20 direction in the mid-latitudes is due to migratory 21 high~and low pressure systems or synoptic scale 22 meteorological. phenomena. (MC)
13 -
1 Q.
I AM LOOKING AT MR. EDMONDS' PART OF THE TESTIMONY 2
LISTING THE LARGEST POPULATION SECTOR IN A 10-20 MILE 3
RING BY STATION (P. 6).
DO ANY OF THESE LARGEST 4
POPULATION SECTORS COINCIDE WITH THE PREVAILING WIND 5
DIRECTION?
6 A.
Yes.
The Indian Point plants' largest population 7
sector (10-20 miles) is also the sector into which 8
the prevailing wind direction blows, 13.5% of the 9
time, based on January 1971 to December 1971 data.
10 Also the Surry plant's largest population sector 11 (10-20 miles) is also 8.7% of the time, based on 12 November 1967 to December 1969 data.
Enrico Fermi 13 and Peach Bottom have similar situations with wind 14 direction freq-lencies of 8.8% and 8.5%, respectively, 15 into the largest population sector (10-20 miles).
16 Although not " prevailing wind directions," these 17-frequencies represent sectors with greater 18 frequencies than that given by a uniform wind 19
. distribution. (MC) 20
-Q.
ARE WIND DIRECTION SHIFTS A PART OF THE' METEOROLOGY i-21 OF THE AREA?
l-22 A.
Yes.
The wind direction will-shift over time.
23 Generally theLahift is gradual.
During very-low wind 1
-24 speed ' conditions,. there is a meandering of.the wind 1
25 direction, usually over-a wide range, but never a
(
'26' complete wind reversal (180-degree) unless there is i
_ 14 _
1 some kind of orographic or s~ea-breeze effect.
The 2
other case of sudden wind direction change is the 3
passage of a frontal system, but in terms of a 4
direction reversal of a plume, the direction change 5
is moot.
The plume is traveling with its initial air 6
mass.
Fronts in the ideal sense may be considered as 7
separating walls in the moving air streams through 8
which the air particles cannot move but which must 9
move along at the same speed as the normal component 10 of the air particles.
For example, if one imagines a 11 continuous plume before frontal passage, it is 12 traveling in one direction with the air mass.-
As the 13 front passes, the plume exiting its source would 14 follow the wind direction of the new air mass, 15 however, the previously emitted plume would still be 16 going'in the same general-direction of th'e old air' 17 mass. (MC) 18
'Q.
DOES A PREVAILING WIND DIRECTION HAVE AN IMPACT ON 19 THE RESULTS OF A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT (DBA)
-30 ANALYSIS?
21 A.
'The wind direction frequencies are figured-into the 22 DBA analysis. (MC)
R2 3.
Q..
HOW DOES THE PREVAILING WIND AFFECT THE RESULTS OF A 24 SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS?
.. 1 A.
In the case of the Staff's severe accident analysis 2
(CRAC Code), the consequences are the same in terms 3
of deaths, cancer, economic loss, etc., but the 4
probability of the event happening varies with wind 5
direction frequencies.
For example, if the 6
probability of a consequence is one in a million 7
under a uniform wind direction distribution, under a 8
prevailing wind direction that occurs twice as 9
frequently as uniform wind direction, the consequence 10 probability is two in a million.
Conversely, if the 11 wind direction frequency is half the uniform l
12 frequency, the probability of the consequence is 13 one-half in a million. (MC) 14 Q.
WHAT IS THE URBAN HEAT ISLAND EFECT?
15 A.
The urban heat island effect is the characteristic 16 warmth of an urban area due to the man-made local 17 weather modifications on the natural radiation 18 balance, obstacles to the wind, water vapor balance, 19 and the generation of heat in the urban area. (MC) 20 There are several dispersion characteristics in 21
-an urban area.
Urban areas tend to have much lower 22 inversion frequencies than the surrounding rural 23 areas.
This would mean that there are less instances 24 of stable conditions in an urban area, therefore, j
25 dispersion'is greater.
Second, the surface roughness r
26 (mechanical dispersion) increases dramatically as_a
- 1 plume travels from rural to urban areas, thereby 2
increasing dispersion even further.
Third, there 3
tends to be a circulation cell where a plume entering 4
the urban area would rise away from ground level.
5 (MC) 6 Q.
WOULD YOU ANTICIPATE THAT CHARLOTTE WOULD GIVE RISE 7
TO AN URBAN HEAT ISLAND EFFECT?
8 A.
Yes. (MC) 9 Q.
WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE PIEDMONT REGION HAS AN USUAL 10 AMOUNT OF RAINFALL?
11 A.
No, it is average for the southeastern United States, 12 even below average.
Coastal and mountain regions 13 tend to have greater precipitation amounts.
14 Therefore since the Piedmont region is neither 15 coastal nor mountain, the rainfall amounts tend to be 16 minimum for the southeastern United' States. (MC) em-1 i
1 TESTIMONY OF THOMAS E.
POTTER 2
ON EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 3
Background Information 4
Q.
PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
5 A.
My name is Thomas E.
Potter.
My business address is 6
Pickard Lowe & Garrick, Inc., 1200 Eighteenth Street, 7
N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
8 Q.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
9 A.
The purpose of this testimony is to compare the results 10 of assessments of accident-related radiation dose 11 performed for the Catawba plant to the results of 12 comparable generic studies in NUREG-0396 which were used 13 to support the establishment of a Plume Exposure Pathway 14 Emergency Planning Zone (plume EPZ) radius of about 10 15 miles.
Such a comparison shows whether features 16 specific to the Catawba plant or site affect the 17 validity of the plume EPZ distance of about 10 miles as 18 applied to Ca tawba.
19
-Q.
WHAT IS YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT JOB 20 EXPERIENCE?
21 A.
I have had a major role in preparing reactor accident 22
' probabilist'ic risk assessments for six different nuclear 23_
facilities.
These facilities were Oyster Creek, Zion J 24 and 2, Midland 1 and 2, Shoreham, Seabrook 1 and 2, and 25 Indian Point 2 and 3.
I have also performed other 26 analyses, such as one to determine the importance of 27 source' term release severity assumptions on radiological
. 1 dose as a function of distance and release conditions.
2 Please see also my current resume, which is attached to 3
-this testimony as Attachment A.
4 EPC -11 Testimony 5
Q.
ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE PLUME EPZ ESTABLISHED FOR THE 6
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION?
7 A.
Yes.
8 Q.
HOW DID YOU ACQUIRE THIS FAMILIARITY?
9 A.
I have studied the maps of the current plume EPZ and 10 intervenors' proposed plume EPZ supplied by Applicants.
b 11 These maps were attached as exhibits to the Applicants' 12 November 3, 1983 filing with the Licensing Board and 13 their. January 12, 1984 filing with the Appeal Board.
I 14-have also studied NUREG-0396, which contains background 15-material tha t went into the establishment of the plume
-16 EPZ radius at "about 10 miles."
17 Q.
DID YOU PREPARE A REPORT AS-A: RESULT OF THIS WORK 7 18 A.
Yes.
My report is attached to this testimony as 19 Attachment B and is part of my testimony.
20 Q..
PLEASE SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY THE' CONSIDERATIONS FORMING-THE
~21 BASIS FOR SELECTING 10 MILES AS A PLUME EPZ DISTANCE'AND 22 DESCRIBE HOW YOUR TESTIMONY RELATES TO THESE 23-CONSIDERATIONS.
F
. 1 A.
The basis for a plume EPZ of about 10 miles was 2
developed in NUREG-0396, and is stated most succinctly 3
in NUREG-0654:
4 "The size (about 10 miles radius) of the plume 5
exposure EPZ was based primarily on the 6
following considerations:
7 a.
projected doses from the traditional 8
design basis accidents would not exceed 9
Protection Action Guide levels outside the 10 zone [the Protective Action Guide is 11 defined by the EPA as the projected dose 12 to individuals in the population which 13 warrants taking protective action; see 14 Manual of Protective Action Guides and 15 Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, 16 EPA-520/1-75-001, Sept. 1975];
17 b.
projected doses from most core melt 18 sequences would not exceed Protective 19 Action Guide levels outside the zone; 20 c.
for the worst core melt sequences, 21 immediate life threatening doses would 22 generally not occur outside the zone; and 23 d.
detailed planning within 10 miles would 24 provide a-substantial base for expansion 25 of response efforts in the event that this 26 proved necessary.
27 My testimony addresses the.first three of these four 28' considerations and whether they are supported by 29 analyses specific for Catawba.
30 Q.
PLEASE SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY THC-METHODOLOGY YOU USED IN 31 YOUR ASSESSMENTS.
32 A.
The approach used for testing consideration "a,"
33 identified in my previous answer, was different from 34 that used for considerations "b," and "c."
The Catawba
e 1 FSAR contains results of assessments of doses from 2
design basis accidents that can be directly extrapolated 3
to a distance of 10 miles, so little analysis was 4
required.
5 For considerations "b," and "c," also identified in 6
my previous answer, the probabilistic approach used in 7
the NUREG-0396 analyses was followed in this study.
8 This approach resulted in estimates of the probabilities 9
of exceeding certain selected doses at different 10 distances.
The overall probability depends upon the 11 probability.of a core melt accident, the probability of 12 each of the types of release (release categories) that 13 might occur given a core melt accident, and the 14 probability that meteorological conditions, given a 15 certain type of release, limit atmospheric dispersion 16 sufficiently to produce a dose exceeding the dose of 17 interest at the distance of interest.
For this analysis 18 I used PWR release categories from the Reactor Safety 19 Study to represent core melt releases from the Catawba 20 plant. -.' Available data indicate the catawba core melt 21 spectrum would be less severe than that calculated for 22 the Reactor Safety Study, but these data are not 23 comprehensive enough to permit complete quantification.
f o
w 1 1
In practice, the analysis consisted of numerous 2
(100 to 300) separate mathematical simulations of 3
radiation dose consequences from each release category.
4 Because the intent of the analysis is to determine the 5
zones in which planning for protective action is needed, 6
it was assumed in these simulations that no protective 7
action is taken for twenty-four hours after the passage t
8 of airborne released material.
Each simulation was 9
based upon meteorological conditions determined by a
~ 10 randomly _ selected release time (month, day, and hour).
11 Meteorological conditions for that release time were
.12 '
extracted from a one-year meteorological data base _ in -
13 ho'ur-by-hour forma t.
Meteorological conditions were 14 permitted to change during release transport as i
15 determined.by hour-to-hour' changes in the meteorology 16
-da ta _ ba se.
My analysis used meteorological data i'
17-collected at the Catawba sito.;
18-
'The results in Tables 2~and 3 of my study are total 19
. absolute (i.e., overall) probabilities.
In the NUREG.
20
.0396 analyses,2 results are expressed conditional on core
- 21-melt.
That is, the core melt'is a_given and its low.
22 probability is not. included in the estimate of'
~
123 probabili ty. -
(The low probability of a ' core melt-
- 24' accident is discussed separately in NUREG-0396.)
25 Translation from one form of expression to the other is-
- 1 straightforward and the discussion of my results and 2
conclusions includes probabilities expressed in the 3
NUREG-0396 convention.
These Catawba-specific 4
probabilities were then compared with those arrived at 5
in NUREG-0396.
6 Q.
HAVE YOU COMPLETED YOUR REPORT?
7 A.
Yes, it is Attachment B to my testimony.
8 Q.
IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR CONCLUSION CONTAINED IN YOUR 9
REPORT?
10 A.
Yes.
11 Q.
DO YOU ADOPT THIS REPORT AS YOUR TESTIMONY FOR USE IN 12 THIS PROCEEDING?
13 A.
Yes.
14
~Q.'
WHAT CONCLUSION DID YOU REACH 7 15 A.
Analyses.related to the first three considerations (a, 16 b,- and c, identified above) are included in NUREG-0396.
17 Plant-specific and site-specific analyses performed in
.18 the course of licensing various nuclear power plants 19 support the conclusion that projected doses from.
t 20 traditional design basis accidents would not exceed f-21 upper Protective Action Guide doses beyond the 10-mile 22 zone even based on assumption of poor dispersion 23
. conditions.
Summaries of these analyses are included in r
. 1 NUREG-0396.
Data in the Catawba FSAR indicate that the 2
conclusion applies to Catawba as well.
See Catawba 3
FSAR, Chapter 15, 4
The analyses I conducted also establish that there 5
is no significant dif ference between the probabilities 6
of exceeding Protective Action Guide doses or life 7
threatening doses beyond 10 miles at Catawba and the 8
comparable probabilities calculated in the generic core 9
melt accident analyses contained in NUREG-0396.
These 10-probabilities were factors in the decision to establish 11 a 10-mile plume EPZ.
Thus, projected doses from most 12 core' melt sequences would not exceed the EPA's 13 Protective Action Guide levels outside the Catawba plume 14 EPZ.
For the worst case-core melt sequences, immediate 15 life threatening doses would generally not occur outside 16 the Catawba plume EPZ.
This is also consistent with the 17 generic analyses in NUREG-0396.
18 Thus, I conclude that the plume EPZ boundary-for 19 the Catawba-facility has been properly determined in 20 rela tion to radiological _ considerations 'in ' the basis for' 21 determination of plume EPZ' size.
Allowance for~such 22' site-specific factors as local meteorological conditions
- 23 and the design. of the Catawba facility does not affect
= -.
4
. 1 the validity of these considerations, and therefore does
.i i
2 not justify extending the boundary of the plume EPZ in 3
'any' direction.
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1 TESTIMONY OF WALTER M.
KULASH ON 2
EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 3
Background Information 4
Q.
PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
I 5
A.
My name is Walter M.
Kulash.
My business address is 6
PRC Engineering, 1500 Planning Research Drive, "7
McLean, Virginia.
8 Q.
PLEASE STATE YOUR JOB TITLE.
9 A.
Associate Vice-President, PRC Engineering.
10 Q.
PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND 11 RELEVANT JOB EXPERIENCE.
12 A.
My educational-background and professional experience 13-is-summarized in the ' resume-included as Attachment A
~
14 to my testimony.
15 Q.
ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE RESPONSE PLANS IN SUPPORT 16 OF THE CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION?!
17
'A.
I am familiar with those parts of the. North Carolina 18 and South Carolina plans, and the York-County, Gaston
' 19 '
County,.and Mecklenburg County plans, that' deal with 20 evacuation routes and the transportation of 21-
-individuals:without vehicles.
~
22.
Q.-
HOW DID'YOU' ACQUIRE THAT FAMILIARITY?
23 A.
I a ttended. meetings. with representatives. of the 24
-various jurisdictions in which evacuation' routes -in
~
25
' North and South Carolina.were. discussed,:and I have
- = _ _
2-
=
J l
read those portions of the North Carolina plan, the 2
South Carolina plan, and the county plans, which deal 3
specifically with evacuation.
4 Q.
HAVE YOU READ THE CESG/ PALMETTO ALLIANCE CONTENTIONS 5
DEALING WITH EMERGENCY PLANNING THAT HAVE BEEN 6
ACCEPTED AS ISSUES IN THIS PROCEEDING?
i 7
A.
I have read those contentions that deal with 8
evacuation and the evacuation time study -- that is, 9
Contentions 11, 14, and 15.
10 EPC 11 Testimony 11 Q.
EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 ARGUES THAT SOME 12 PARTS OF SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN 13 THE PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY. EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE.
14 AS AN EXAMPLE, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT HIGHWAYS 74 AND 15 16 IN SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE-MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE PLUME 16 EXPOSURE EPZ BOUNDARY LINES-DID YOU DISCUSS WITH 17 DUKE POWER COMPANY AND APPROPRIATE LOCAL OFFICIALS 18 THE POSSIBILITY OF IDENTIFYING. ALTERNATIVE EPZ 19 BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE CITY ~OF CHARLOTTE?
20 A.
Yes.
The issue of alternat(ive EPZ boundaries which partofsouthwesthharlottewas
- 21:
would include 22 discussed.
As a result-of these discussions, PRC i
23 performed two studies' relating to evacuation of areas 24
-beyond the EPZ as prese tly defined.
One of these studies, entitled "Ef fe'ct of ' Shadow' Evacuation on 25 26 the ' Time to Evacuate the" Catawba Nuclear Station
~
r e
. 1 EPZ," evaluated the ef fect on EPZ evacuation traf fic 2
flow, of voluntary evacuation of the entire Charlotte
-3 area.
In this analysis, we tested various 4
combinations of voluntary evacuation percentages and 5
notification times.
A copy of this study is included 6
as Attachment B to my testimony on Contention ll.
7 In addition, PRC considered evacuation times for 8
2 expanded EPZ's:
first, the southwest third of 9
Charlotte, encompassing an area out to 17 miles from 10 the Catawba plant; and second, the entire city of 11 Charlotte, extending 20-25 miles from Catawba.
This 12
. study entitled " Catawba Nuclear Station Evacuation 13 Analysis / Evacuation Time Estimate for the City of 14 Charlotte," is included as Attachment C to my 15' testimony on Contention 11.
16 Q.
DO YOU ADOPT ATTACHMENTS B AND C AS PART OF YOUR 17 TESTIMONY FOR USE IN THIS PRCCEEDING?
18 A.
I do.
19 Q.
WHAT WERE THE FINDINGS IN THE VOLUNTARY. EVACUATION 20 STUDY?
21' A.
Voluntary ovacuation could, under certain conditions, 22' hinder EPZ evacuation traf fic on one route by 30 23 minutes.
Such delay would occur only if more than 24 50% of the total Charlotte population chose to Q
,y,',
- 1 e va cua te, and if such population prepared to ovacuate 2
within 30 minutes of the time required by the EPZ 3
population.
4 Q.
WHAT WERE THE FINDINGS IN THE EXPANDED EPZ STUDY?
5 A.
For the southwest third of Charlotte, extending to 6
approximately 17 miles from the Catawba Nuclear 7
Station, an evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, 15 minutes is 8
es tima ted.
The critical determinant of this time is 9
notifica tion time and not traffic congestion.
In 10 other words, any traffic congestion on evacuation 11 routes has dissipated by the time that all of the 12-
' popula tion in the expanded EPZ is notified and 13 prepared.
14 For the entire city of Charlotte, extending to 20-25 15 miles from the Catawba Nuclear Station, an evacuation 16 time of approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> is estimated.
t 5
'I
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e 1
TESTIMONY OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY 2
(LEWIS WAYNE BROOME) ON 3
EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 4
Q.
EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 ARGUES THAT SOME 5
PART OF SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE (ILLUSTRATED BY AN 6
EXAMPLE OF THE BOUNDARIES OF HIGHWAYS 74 AND 16) 7 SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE EPZ.
WHERE IS THE EPZ IN 8
MECKLENBURG COUNTY DISCUSSED IN THE MECKLENBURG 9
COUNTY EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN?
10 A.
Part 3,Section IV.B and Part 3, figure 4 and Annex I a
ll-to the N.C.
State Plan.
12 Q.
DID YOU DISCUSS WITH DUKE POWER COMPANY OFFICIALS THE g
13 POSSIBILITY OF IDENTIFYING ALTERNATE EPZ BOUNDARIES.
14-WITHIN THE CITY OF CHARLOTTE?
15 A.
This has been discussed, but there has been nothing 16 in writing.
Options were looked at.
No alternate 17 EPZ.was defined.
18.
Q.
AS PAR AS YOU KNOW, IS DUKE POWER COMPANY OR YOUR 19 OFFICE PROPOSING OR RECOMMENDING THE EXPANSION OF
'201 THAT EPZ?_'
l 21 A.
Speaking for ' the < Emergency Management Of fice,; we have J22
-made no such recommendation.-
-23 Q.-
DO YOU BELIEVE THE lO-MILE EPZ IS ADEQUATE TO PROTECT L24
- THE CITIZENS'OF-MECKLENBURG. COUNTY LIVING.WITHIN THAT 25 EPZ?
t.
b
e
' l l
1 A.
Based on the standards that local government have to 2
go by with regard to planning for nuclear power 1
3 plants, the term about ten miles -- we would consider 4
that to be adequate especially in view of the NRC 5
investigation which preceded the decision to set the 6
EPZ radius at about ten miles.
7 Q.
WOULD YOU PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TRAFFIC CONTROL SUPPORT 8
IN THE AREA OF CHARLOTTE TO AID IN THE EVACUATION OF 9
EPZ RESIDENTS THROUGH CHARLOTTE?
10 A.
Yes, we would.
If necessary, we would call in
-11 additional resources from the Charlotte police 12 department to assist us in traffic management.
13 Q.
ASSUMING-THAT THE EPZ IS NOT EXPANDED, IF A SITUATION 14 AROSE WHERE THERE WAS SOME POSSIBLE NEED TO TAKE 15 PROTECTIVE ACTION WITH REPECT TO PEOPLE IN SOUTHWEST 16 CHARLOTTE, DO YOU HAVE ANY EXISTING MECHANISM FOR 17 DOING THAT?
18 A.
Yes, we could utilize the All Hazards Plan, which is 19 a combined Charlotte-Mecklenburg plan that addresses 20 protective actions people could take and that city 21 and county resources could implement.
There is-22 enough flexibility built into both the All Hazards 23' Plan and the-basic emergency plan for the Catawba 12 4
_ Nuclear Station and the supporting documents that 25 will be developed out of this office so that you can
.6 take the concept of operation that applies for a 10-2
+
- i 1
mile EPZ and expand it to 11 miles, 12 miles, 15 2
miles.
The concept stays the same and the 3
flexibilicy is there to expand the area of response, 4
if needed.
You're dealing with the same 5
organizations, the same departments, the same people,
-6 you're just increasing the numbers in order to cope 7
with 60,000 or 80,000 or 100,000.
So, the concept 8
remains the same and you would just would call in 9
additional people and identify additional resources.
10 You would look at mutual aid, which would be 11' available from the surrounding counties.
There's a 12-fallacy in people thinking that you cannot expand on 13 something once you have identified something.
14-Q.
IS THE CITY OF CHARLOTTE ALREADY INVOLVED THROUGH THE 15 CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG JOINT EMERGENCY PLANNING AGENCY 16 IN PLANNING FOR THE PARTS.0F MECKLENBURG COUNTY 17 ALREADY IN THE EPZ?
(.
18 A.
That's correct.
l 19 Q.
SO YOU DON'T HAVE TO BRING IN ANY NEW COORDINATING I
20
. MECHANISM IN ORDER TO TAKE PROTECTIVE ACTION?-
-21l A.
Absolutely not.
It's.in-place.
.22 Q.
HAS THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG~ JOINT EMERGENCY
~ 23 PLANNING: AGENCY PREVIOUSLY-DONE PLANNING AND WRITTEN'
.24 PROCEDURES FOR AT.LEAST ONE OTHER NUCLEAR-POWER
'25 PLANT?
l u.
=
4
- 1 A.
Tha t 's correct.
Developing procedures for Catawba 2
has involved looking at a different geographic area 3
than McGuire.
We've looked at different problems and 4
different resources, but the basic concept has 5
remained the same.
The basic concept is to ensure to 6
the maximum extent possible the protection of the 7
public.
8 Q.
WOULD YOU AGREE THAT AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 9
CALLING AN AREA PART OF THE EPZ AND NOT CALLING IT 10 PART OF THE EPZ IS SIMPLY THAT YOU DON'T HAVE FIXED 11 SIRENS IN THE PART THAT IS NOT PART OF THE EF7?
12 A.
Well, that's one element.
I guess the primary thing 13 that a lot of people would look at is that inside the 14 10-mile EPZ, the magic. line that is drawn,.you are 15
.very, very specific with regard to function.
Outside 16 that, the specificity is not there, but the concept 17 is there and the flexibility to expand on that is 18
'there.
You've got a very detailed, well-identified 19 plan for the 10-mile EPZ which looks at, for example,
- 20 day-care centers and schools and hospitals-and f
-21 prisons and evacuation routes and this type of thing.
22 Outside.that 10-mile EPZ, you don't need to~ identify 23 these matters in the specific terms that -you do 24-inside that, but that is not to say that you can't 25
~ expand on it: because you are dealing' with a concept.
.y
-e
. 1 Q.
WHEN YOU SAY EXPAND ON IT, DO YOU MEAN EXPAND ON IT 2
IF THE OCCASION ARISES OR EXPAND ON IT THROUGH 3
ADVANCE PLANNING?
4 A.
I think if the situation were to arise, if 5
regulations dictated it, or if the request from the 6
city manda ted it, you could expand it.
It could be 7
any number of things.
8 Q.
ASSUMING THAT THERE WERE NO SIRENS, HOW WOULD YOU GO 9
ABOUT ALERTING RESIDENTS IN SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE OF 10 THE NEED TO TURN ON THEIR RADIOS OR TELEVISION SETS?
11 A.
First of all, you'would go in and activate the 12 Emergency Broadcasting System, which most cases and 13 studies indicate would catch the majority of the i
14 people.
In addition to that you would take specific 15 law enforcement units and other emergency vehicles to
'16 patrol those areas down there and make the 17 announcement with the siren, etc., to turn on their 18 radio and television and listen for instructions that 19.
will be broadcast.
20 Q.-
IF YOU WERE GOING'TO USE SOME KIND OF POLICE OR 21 EMERGENCY VEHICLES TO DRIVE THROUGH NEIGHBORHOODS IN
- 22 THE SOUTHWEST PART OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTE, WOULD
'23 THEY KNOW WHERE TO GO?
24 A.-
_ If you are _ talking about outside the IO-mile EPZ
- 25 there would be some minor logistics problems.until-12 6 "
there is some coordination and we could identify who
9
. s 1
is going to be doing what in an EOC environment.
2 Once that logistics problem has been clarified we 3
could assign specific emergency teams to specified 4
affected areas.
5 Q.
THE ALL HAZARDS PLAN THAT YOU ALREADY HAVE IN PLACE 6
IS NOT SPECIFIC TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES AT 7
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, IS IT?
8 A.
All Hazards is just that -- all hazards.
It just so 9
happens that an accident at a nuclear power plant 10 represents a potential hazard for the community, 11 Q.
HOW DO YOU DETERMINE WHAT AREAS SHOULD BE ALERTED IN 12 AN EMERGENCY?
13 ~ A.
Currently, the All Hazards Plan identifies 14 eva cua tions by voting precincts.
That is something 15 that will-have to be looked at because there is a 16 great deal of the public out~there that does not know 17 what voting precinct they are in.
Perhaps the best 18 way to look at an evacuation for a~ situation would be 19 to look at it within the context that occurred in the 20 recent chemical fire' emergency response this office I
21 was involved in.. Law enforcement were sent in there 22
'with the sirens'and PA systems.
We did.that.
We had 23 the: flexibility there because we expanded the zone R24 and we changed direction of_the zone on several 25 occasions.
However, the function of the law 26 enforcement, i.e.,. warning and notifying the public,
- I was carried out in such a manner that it didn't cause 2
any undue concern on the part of the population in 3
there.
In addition to that, when it was identified 4
or learned that X number of people did not have 5
transportation, the law enforcement relayed back to 6
us via radio in their cars that transportation was 7
needed.
We called in city buses, and from that 8
standpoint, that operation went well.
9 Q.
PLEASE DESCRIBE BRIEFLY WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE PEOPLE 10 WHO WERE EVACU ATED IN THE CASE OF THAT CHEMICAL FIRE.
11 A.
They were transported to a shelter location.
We had 12 to change shelter locations because of the wind 13 conditions and wind shifts.
We extended the 14 evacuation zone several times during the fire.
A lot 15 of people did not have transportation.
City buses 16 ran into the area and picked up the people who did 17 not have transportation and transported those people 18 to a shelter.
We fed..the people in the morning and 19 we had sufficient shelter staff, we had sufficient 20 people. associated with the medical community to 21 provide service if it was needed.
.The majority of 22 the departments were city department,s but we had 23 certain' county departments there that assi'sted in the
.24 operation.
There were some logistics. problems, and 25
-procedural problems, but nothing that would have an 26:
adverse ef fect on the, general safety of the public.
- 1 and for the most part the plan was implemented and it 2
addressed the problems and was carried out in a very 3
good ma nne r.
4 Q.
HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE EVACUATED?
5 A.
Somewhere around 3,000 people.
We had a little over 6
2,000 people to show up at shelters.
We don't know 7
how many people went to friends or relatives.
8 Normally, when you look at tha t many people in a 9
shelter you'can probably add maybe another 20 or 30 10 percent to account for those people who go to 11 re la t ive s ' home, because that's common in an 12 eva cua tion.
13 Q.
HOW LARGE AN AREA WAS INVOLVED IN THAT CHEMICAL FIRE?
14 A.
Somewhere in the neighborhood of 3 1/2 to 4 1/2 15 square miles.
16 Q.
DO YOU THINK THERE ARE ANY OTHER CHANGES THAT NEED TO 17 BE MADE IN THE ALL HAZARDS PLAN TO-ADAPT IT TO THE 18 CONTINGENCY OF TAKING PROTECTIVE ACTION WITHIN 19 CHARLOTTE 7 20.
A.
I don't think so.
I think there was a little bit of 21-a problem associated with shelters but that has been 22 addressed.
We have simplified the shelter : activation 23 procedure to assure resources have been identified 24 for shelter startup.
e
-9_
l-Q.
ASSUMING THAT YOU ASKED THE POLICE AND OTHER 2
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNITS, SUCH AS CITY AND VOLUNTEER 3
FIREMEN, TO NOTIFY THE PEOPLE IN SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE 4
TO TURN ON THEIR RADIO OR TELEVISION TO THE EMERGENCY 5
BROADCAST STATION, HOW LONG DO YOU THINK THIS 6
ALERTING PROCESS WOULD TAKE?
7 A.
I would say about 2 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, depending on resource 8
capability.
Actually resources would be increased 9
with the time factor.
The dispatchers or whoever is 10 in command could look at what the resources are, who 11 patrols the area and make the determination about the 12 most capable units to patrol there to ensure proper 13 cover. age of-that specific area.
14 Q.
DO YOU HAVE AN ESTIMATE AS TO HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE 15 TO EVACUATE THE AREA DESCRIBED BY THE BOARD'S EXAMPLE 16 OF HIGHWAYS 74 AND 167 17 A.
I would determine thatJ you are looking at probably 18 around-7 hours.
19-Q.
DOES THAT INCLUDE THE ALERTING PROCESS-THAT WE 20 DESCRIBED BEFORE7 21 A.
From-the time the alerting process was. instituted 22 un'til;the time the last person who was going to leave
.23 was out?of the area, I would say you would be looking 24
'at' about 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />, under normal-weather conditions.
25 Q.
WOULD THAT INCLUDE PERSONS WHO COULD BE' MOVED FROM 26 HOSPITALS 7
e
' 1 A.
Well, the hospital population might or might not be 2
moved.
It would depend on the recommendation of the 3
medical community with regard to whether it would be 4
safer for the patient to remain at the facility as 5
opposed to trying to transport that individual.
6 Those specifics, we would leave those to the experts 7
in that field or attending physicians, the staff 8
doctors and things of this nature, to make that 9
determination.
10 Q.
COULD YOU GET TRANSPORTATION TO THE HOSPITAL FOR 11 THOSE WHO NEEDED IT AND COULD NOT MOVE?
12 A.
There would be some delay, but yes, transportation 13 would be available.
14 Q.
WOULD THAT ADD TO THE OVERALL 7-HOUR ESTIMATE OR DO 15 YOU THINK THAT THAT, TOO, COULD BE ACCOMMODATED
'16 WITHIN'THE 7 HOURS?
17 A.
I think probably within the 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
You would be 18 looking at specific resources there as opposed to 19 general resources.
20 Q.
IS THERE ANY HOSPITAL IN THAT AREA THAT WE ARE 21 TALKING ABOUT?
22 A.
Yes,-there would be one hospital, Charlotte Memorial 23-Hospital and Medical Center.
24 Q.
IS THAT A SIZABLE HOSPITAL IN TERMS OF PATIENT "1
25 POPULATION?
~
- 1 A.
Very much so.
It is one of the la rge s t, probably the 2
largest hospital from a bed standpoint in North 3
Carolina.
I 1
4 Q.
DOES IT HAVE ITS OWN EMERGENCY PLAN?
5 A.
They have an internal emergency response plan that is 6
required for continued accreditation, and they 7
exercise it at least annually.
8 Q.
ARE YOU REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT THEY COULD GET THOSE 4
9 PATIENTS THAT CAN BE MOVED READY TO BE MOVED IN GOOD 10 ORDER PROMPTLY?
11 A.
Oh, I think so.
Like I say, it's a hospital and 12 medical center which means that they have a lot of 13 trainees there, a lot of staff there, so I think they 14 would be fairly capable of activating their plan, 15 bringing in a lot of resources such as buses and 16 taking the necessary action for developing and 17 getting. people ready to move.
18 -- Q.
ARE THERE ANY OTHER SPECIAL FACILITIES IN THAT AREA 19 THAT YOU' CARE TO MENTION?
20' A.
Well, -there are numerous day care centers..
I know
. :21 that there are schools, both private and public, the 22 hospital and rest homes.
A: city fire department is 23-located in there.
e-
- 1 Q.
ARE YOU SATISFIED THAT FOR THE PEOPLE IN SOUTHWEST 2
CHARLOTTE, ROUGHLY WITHIN THOSE APPROXIMATE 3
BOUNDARIES THAT WERE USED AS AN EXAMPLE, EVACUATION 4
COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN ABOUT 7 HOURS?
5 A.
I think so.
I think that with the resource 6
capability that is present in Charlotte-Mecklenburg 7
County, plus what you could call in from the 8
surrounding counties that would get here in less than 9
the period of time that we spoke of, that it could be 10 done.
You could get them out of the area.
I would 11 note that you've got a basic document and you've got 12 some basic concepts in place and I think the elements 13 of continuity of operations and command and control
'14 functions eliminate a lot of the problems and a lot 15 of the rumors.
These elements give people more 16 confidence when you tell them to do something that s
17 they are going to do it, and for that reason, I think 18 that the majority of the people would listen to us 19 and that we could evacuate that number of people 20 w1 thin the time frame that was referenced with very i
21 little problem.
22 Q.
HAS MECKLENBURG COUNTY EVER HAD TO MOVE A LARGE 23' NUMBER OF PEOPLE OUT OF ANY AREA IN ' CHARLOTTE?
24 A.
The largest population that we have ever had to 25 evacuate was during the chemical fire.
o
' i l
1 Q.
ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH ANY OTHER EVACUATIONS IN OTHER 2
CITIES WHERE YOU MIGHT HAVE HAD TO MOVE SOME 3
COMPARABLE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE?
4 4
A.
Well, yes, there was an incident that occurred a year 5
and a half or two years ago in Missasaugus County, 6
which is right outside of Toronto, Canada.
They 7
evacuated nearly a quarter of a million people in 8
about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
There were no disabling automobile 9
accidents and there were no serious injuries on the 10 part of the evacuation people, and they got out of 11 the area.
I think it speaks well for the people, and 12 I think it negates the panic factor.
L I
t e
EPC 11 Edmonds Attachment A RESUME ROBERT F. EDMONOS, JR.
l 4
L PERSONAL:
Home Address:
Route 14, Box 624-P Charlotte,NC 28214 f
Telephone:
(704) 392-4531 (Home) e r
(704) 373-8105 (Office) i Age: 36 Height:
6,'0" Weight:
150 lbs.
FORMAL EDUCATION:
Clemson University: BSCE 1968 i
i Clemson University: MS Water Resources Engineering 1970 Colorado State University: Graduate work in Environmental Engineering 1971-1972 (Part-Time)
ADDITIONAL TRAINING:
Engineering Economics - Duke Power Company Management Development - Duke Power Company Effective Management - Duke Power Company 4
~
PROFESSIONAL i
INVOLVEMENT: Registered Professional Engineer: - North Carolina 7578-Registered Professional En Member - ASCE, ANS (Local)gineer - South Carolina 6086
. WPCF-Member - N.C. Water Resources Research Institute Advisory Comittee Member - Electric Power Research Institute Advisory Comittee on Environmental Control Systems 4
Member - MIT Energy Lab Technical Comittee on Environmental Management
~
Member - ANS Standards Comittee 2.9 - Nuclear Power Plant Water Supply Member - Utility Water Act Group (UWAG) Policy Committee WORK TSTRIENCE:
?
FROM 10 TITLE PROGRAM COMPANY 0
-3/82.
Present Senior Engineer Civil / Environmental Duke Power In charge of groups responsible for Environmental Engineering, Fire Protection Coatings and Roofing. Duties included power plant ' siting, air and water qual-ity-studies,* obtaining air and water permits, physical and mathematical model --
ing, conceptual design of air, water, and fire protection ' hardware and systems, as well as developing roofing and coating systems and specifications.. Super-l vised 12-14 engineers and technicians.
m
.m
',~ 5 Robert F. Edmonds, Jr.
Page 2 FROM TO TITLE PROGRAM COMPANY 8/75 2/82 Supervising Design Environmental Duke Power Engineer Section Supervised environmental engineering group responsible for environmental work described above.
~
12/74 7/75 Assistant Design Staff Engineer Duke Power Engineer Assistant to Chief Engineer, Civil / Environmental Division, responsible for recruiting, training, and administrative duties for 200-person division.
10/72 11/74 Assistant Design Environmental Duke Power Engineer / Engineer Section Associate Responsible for Environmental Report /EIS Preparation for two nuclear plants, environmental assessment and thermal m6deling.
8/70 9/72 Lieutenant Minuteman USAF Responsible for Combat Targeting Team involved in targeting and alignment of minuteman missiles.
e 9
6 W.
__ 7 _ _ _ _
i EPC 11 Casper Attachment A ;
MARK A. CASPER i
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS DESIGN ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT DUKE POWER COMPANY l
I' have been a Meteorologist with Duke Power Company, Design Engineering Departetent, Civil / Environmental
- Section, since January 1981.
I received a BS degree in Meteorology from the University of Michigan in 1979.
While an undergraduate, I participated in a j
study of the environmental impact of the once through cooling -
systems and subsequent emissions of waste heat and moisture into the atmosphere at the Cook and Palisades Nuclear Power Plants on Lake Michigan.
My responsibilities included the processing and analysis of the meteorological data ' acquired near the plants.
I I entered the graduate program at the University of Michigan in 1979, and was awarded an MS degree in Meteorology in 1980.
In addition to continuing my association with the Cook and Palisades
- project, I
participated in the solar and
-meteorological
. measurement' program conducted at the University of Michigan under i
contract ' by the Solar Energy - Research Institute.
I was also a teaching assistant' for a senior level meteorological synoptic lab class.
C/1360746 6
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_ _. - = _ _ - - -..
s i
1l' I accepted my present position in January 1981.
In this position i
j I conduct various meteorological analyses associated with Duke Power Company's electric generation operations at all facilities,
[
both nuclear and fossil.
Such meteorological aspects typically i'
involve (a) diffusion applications involving estimates of atmospheric transport / diffusion of pollutants related to both coal-fired and nuclear electric generation including the development of transport / diffusion models for nuclear emergency
}
response, and (b) synoptic applications involving estimates of specialized short-term weather forecasts.
Diffusion applications also involve the transport / diffusion of excess water vapor 4
4 associated with cooling tower and cooling pond releases.
t I am a member of the American Meteorological Society, the Air 1
l Pollution Control Association, and the Utility Air Regulatory Group's Atmospheric Modeling Committee.
t 1
t C/1360746 7
4/13/84-
4 EPC 11 Potter Attachment A NAME THOMAS E. POTTER EDUCATION M.S., Environmental Science (Radiological Health), University of Micnigan,1972.
B.S., Chemistry, University of Pittsburgh,1963.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 1973-Present Consultant, Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.
Consultant on health and safety aspects of nuclear power. Performing probabilistic analyses of off-site consequences of power reactor accidents as part of full-scope probabilistic risk assessments for nuclear power plants.
Performing environmental dose assessments for nuclear power plant safety analysis, environmental reports and operating reports. Assisting clients in design.and implementation of radiological or environmental monitoring programs and interpretation of results.
Providing independent review of in-plant radiological protection programs and effluent analysis programs.
Participated in design and development of. the CRACIT code, a computer program for probabilistic assessment of power reactor accident consequences. Participated in an international comparison study of reactor accident consequence assessment models.
. Participated in a comprehensive assessment of off-site radiation from the Three Mile Island accident.
1972-1973 Consultant _to Dr. G. Hoyt Whipple, University sf Michigan Consultant in radiological health aspects of nuclear power. Prepared radiological health section of safety analysis reports and environmental monitoring programs and evaluated data from those programs.
Developed a mathematical model to predict radiation doses from nuclear power plant effluents.
1963-1970 Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC).
License administrator, plutonium fuel facility health-
'and safety supervisor.
License administrator, plutonium fuel factitty health and safety supervisor. Provided radiologic '.' safety review of major facility modi fications. Used these analyses and nuclear, criticality analyses performed by others to prepare AEC special nuclear materials and byproduct license applications.- Served as corporate contact with AEC in matters related to licensing. Organized and~ supervised a radiological protection program for a plutonium fuels fabrication facility and hot cell facility. : Instituted personnel monitoring programs using thermoluminescent. dosimetry and breathing-zone aerosol sampling in 1967.
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RESUME - THOMAS E. POTTER PAGE 2 Served as secretary of a plant safety committee which inspected all operations and reviewed detailed written procedures for operators.
Served as member of a corporate safety committee which determined corporate policy regarding health and safety matters.
REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS Woodard, K., and T. E. Potter, " Consideration of Source Term in Relation to Emergency Planning Requirements," presented to the Workshop of Technical Factors Relating Impacts from Reactor Releases to Emergency Planning, Bethesda, Maryland, January 12-13, 1982.
Garrick, B. J., S. Kaplan, G. Apostolakis, D. C. Iden, K. Woodard and T. E. Potter, " Seminar:
Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Nuclear Power Plants," PLG-0141, July 1980.
Garrick, B.
J., S. Kaplan, G. E. Apostolakis, D. C. Bley, and T. E. Potter, " Seminar: Probabilistic Risk Assessment as Applied to Nuclear Power Plants," PLG-0124, March 1980.
Woodard, K., and T. E. Potter, " Modification of the Reactor Safety Study Consequences Computer Program (CRAC) to Include Plume Trajectories,"
presented to the 1979 ANS 25th Winter Meeting, San Francisco, California, November 11-15, 1979.
Woodard, K., and T. E. Potter, " Assessment of Noble Gas Releases from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident," presented to the 1979 ANS 25th Winter Meeting, San Francisco, California, November 11-15, 1979.
Garrick, B. J., S. Kaplan, P. P. Bientarz, K. Woodard, D. C. Iden, H. F. Perla, W. Dickter, C. L. Cate, T. E. Potter, R. J. Duphily.
T. R. Robbins, D. C. Bley, and S. Ahmed, "0PSA, Oyster Creek Probabilistic Safety Analysis," (Executive Summary, Main Report.
Appendixes) PLG-0100 DRAFT, August '979 Woodard, K., and T. E. Potter, "Probabilistic Prediction of X/Q for Routine Intemittent Gaseous Releases," Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, Vol. 26, June 1977.
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EPC 11 Potter Attachment B 4
't l
RADIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE CATAWBA PLUME PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE DISTANCE 4
J
~
by Thomas E. Potter 1
i Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.
Washington, D.C.
April 13,1984
W 1.0 Introduction l
The basis for a plume exposure EPZ of about 10 miles was developed in NUREG-0396 (Reference 1), and is stated most. succinctly in NOREG-0654 (Reference 2):
j "The size (about 10 miles radius) of the plume exposure EPZ was based primarily on the following considerations:
a.
projected doses from the traditional design basis accidents would not exceed Protection Action Guide levels outside the zone; b.
projected doses from most core melt sequences would not exceed Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone; c.
for the worst core melt sequences, immediate life threatening doses would generally not occur outside the zone; d.
detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary.
The NRC/ EPA Task Force concluded that it would be unlikely that any protective actions for the plume exposure pathway would be required beyond the plume exposure EPZ. Also, the plume exposure EPZ is of sufficient size for actions within this zone to provide for substantial l
reduction in early severe health effects (injuries or deaths) in the event of a worst case core melt accident."
i Analyses related to the first three considerations are included in NUREG-0396. Plant-specific and site-specific analyses performed in the course of licensing support the conclusion that projected doses from traditional design basis accidents would not exceed upper Protective 1
75100041384
Action Guide doses beyond the 10-mile zone even based on assumption of poor dispersion conditions.
Summaries of these analyses are included in NUREG-0396. Data in the Catawba FSAR indicate that the conclusion applies to Catawba as well (Reference 3).
Generic analyses included in NUREG-0396 support considerations b and c.
These analyses consist of estimates of the probability (given a core melt release) that specified doses would be exceeded versus distance. Because the analysis was intended to show whether emergency response was appropriate, it was assumed for the analysis that people took no emergency response for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and were shielded only to the extent they would be in the course of normal activities.
The results (NUREG-0396 Figures 1-11 and 1-13) showea that the probability given core melt release of exceeding the lower Protective Action Guide levels (I rem whole body, 5 rem thyroid) was less than about 0.3 beyond 10 miles and the corresponding probability of exceeding the upper PAG 1evels (5 rem whole body, 25 rem thyroid) was somewhat lower.
The results also showed that the probability, given melt release, of exceeding life threatening doses (200 rem whole body) at the 10-mile EPZ was low, about 0.03, and declined rapidly at greater distances.
In this discussion " life threatening dose" should be interpreted to be the dose above which the
. probability of fatality from the acute radiation syndrome begins to be significant.
These generic analyses were based on core melt release characteristics and release frequencies developed for PWR ' reactors in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) and meteorology data collected for the six sites analyzed in RSS (Reference 4).
This study is designed to detemine whether features peculiar to Catawba would affect considerations b and c, thereby affecting the selection of 10 miles as an appropriate plume pathway EPZ distance.
This was achieved by calculating the probability, conditional on core melt re, lease, of exceeding PAG and life threatening doses comparable to probabilities from NUREG-0396 generic studies except for use of meteorology data from the Catawba site.
2 75100040484
The analysis described provides an estimate of exceeding a specified doses at a specified distance in any direction.
Because the area in question in this contention is limited to a sector about 45 degrees in width, the probability of exceeding the specified doses in the contested area is lower. The analysis was extended to obtain an estimate of probability of exceeding the specified doses at a specified distance in the contested area.
2.0 Methodology The first objective of this study is an assessment of the probability of exceeding specified doses from core melt releases. The methodology followed in this study was the same as that used for the generic study described in NUREG-0396, and is described briefly here. Minor departures from NUREG-0396 methodology are noted.
The doses calculated result from exposure to radiation emitted by airborne radioactive material during transport past the receptor or from exposure to radiation emitted by radioactive material inhaled during transport past the receptor or from radiation emitted by radioactive material deposited on surfaces during transport past the receptor.
The doses calculated include the sum of the three components.-
The probability depends upon the characteristics and probabilities of all core melt releases in the spectrum and upon exposure conditions assumed for the hypothetical stationary receptor.
The important exposure condition assumptions are the magnitude of dose reductions afforded by structures and the duration of exposure to radiation from radioactive materials deposited on surfaces during passage of the airborne material. The probability can also depend strongly upon the liklf hood of different meteorological conditions during and following-a release. These conditions determine the extent of atmospheric dispersion of released material.
Common variations in meteorological conditions can result in large variations in dose.
'3 75100040484
v 6
In this analysis exposure conditions were assumed to be constant throughout. To be consistent with assumptions used in NUREG-0396, it was assumed that no emergency response occurs for a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following passage of airborne material and that doses are reduced only to the extent that would be expected in the course of normal activities.
I That is, no dose reduction was assumed for inhalation dose and factors of 0.75 and 0.33 were applied to the direct doses from airborne material and material deposited on surfaces.
The spectrum of core melt releases is represented by a set of release categories. Each release category is a release for which important characteristics are calculated explicitly.
The important characteristics include the release magnitude for various isotope groups (expressed as a fraction of core inventory), the time between the initiating event and release to the atmosphere, release duration, height, heat content, and Wdrning time prior to release.
The probability of each release Category is calculated by adding the calculated probabilities of all accident f
sequences tnat would lead to a-release similar in characteristics.
The release category spectrum fully reflects the entire core melt release spectrum while keeping the number.of discrete releases manageable for analytical purposes, i
The influence of variable meteorological. conditions on the probability of exceeding specified doses is determined by performing a large' number of
{
computer simulations of each release category with a randomly selected release start time (month, day, and hour) for each simulation.
Meteorological data for the corresponding time are selected from a one-year hourly data base.
Sequential hourly measurements are used to
. calculate trajectory and concentration changes during transport downwind.
The approach permits simulation of the effects of changing meteorological conditions on transport and dispersion along the trajectory. The number cf simulations for each release category ranges-from 100 to 300 to assure adequate sampling from the range of.
{
meteorological conditions. Life threatening doses more than a few miles i
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l 1
4-W
from the plant can occur only for the most severe release categories and, even then, only in unlikely meteorological conditions.
The larger number i
of simulations is usually reserved for the most severe release categories to assure adequate sampling of these meteorological scenarios.
The probability, conditional on occurrence of the release category, of exceeding a specified dose at a specified distance is simply the number of simulations producing that result divided by the number of simulations made for the release category. The absolute probability of exceeding the specified dose at the specified distance is the probability, conditional on release, times the probability of occurrence of the release category.
The total absolute probability of exceeding the specified dose at the specified distance is the sum of the absolute probabilities of all release categories.
Results in NUREG-0396 are expressed conditional on core melt release.
This is the total absolute probability divided by the probability of core.
melt.
The expression of results conditional on core melt release reflects the fact that such release categories range from minor to severe and reflect the finding that minor release categories are the most likely. For purposes of illustration, assume that it is found that life threatening doses at 10 miles occur only for a severe release category and that the probability conditional on release category of exceeding the dose at 10 miles is 0.08.
Then assume that it is found that only 10 percent of the core melt releases fall into this severe category.
That is the same as saying that the probability of a severe release, conditional on a core melt release, is 0.1.
In this illustration then, the probability of exceeding a If fe threatening dose at 10 miles, given a core melt release, is 0.08 x 0.1 = 0.008.
~ The CRAC (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences) computer model was used in the NUREG-0396 probabilistic dose analysis.
It was developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Reactor Safety Study (Reference 4). The CRAC code was the first developed to perform a 5
75100040484
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4 comprehensive probabilistic assessment of consequences of a severe reactor accident.
It included simulation of plume rise, wet and dry deposition, and changes in meteorological conditions (except, for wind direction) during transport downwind.
A modified version of CRAC called CRACIT (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences Including Trajectories) was used for this analysis. The major improvement in CRACIT relevant to its application in this analysis is the incorporation of variable wind direction.
(Other substantial differences between CRAC and CRACIT are related to modeling of dispersion at deep river valley and coastal sites and modeling of evacuation trajectories, but thos'e differences are not relevant to this analysi s. ) Minor improvements were also made in the dispersion model to better simulate limitation of dispersion by a stable layer aloft, buoyant penetration of the stable layer aloft, and effects of buildings on suppression of buoyant plume liftoff in hign wind speed situations.
The CRACIT code has been used in full-scope probabilistic risk assessments for reactors at six sites and has been used in several other more limited applications.
Another derivative of CRAC, called CRAC2, is very similar to CRAC in its dispersion model and is also commonly used in accident consequence assessment.
Comparisons of results from CRAC, CRAC2, and CRACIT exercised on benchmark problems have shown only small differences in probabilistic distribution of dose and health effects even ~ though results for individual simulations occasionally varied markedly (Reference 5).
Details of the three codes are described in the PRA Procedure Guide (Reference 6).
In this study, CRACIT was selected based upon i+s more realistic treatment of atmospheric dispersion.. But CRAC2 kas used for one run for release category PWR-2 to examine whether modeling code differences
~
affect the estimates of probabilities of exceeding PAG orlife i.
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fhreatening doses in the range of 10 to 20 miles.
Estimated probabilities from the two codes varied by less than 20 percent.
Therefore, it may be concluded that model differences do not affect the results of this study.
3.0 Data The meteorological data used in this analysis was a one-year data base of sequential hourly measurements from the Catawba site meteorological monitoring program towers.
The data were collected during the period December 17, 1976 through December 16, 1977 and submitted as part of a two-year data base in the Catawba FSAR.
Wind speed and direction data collected at the 10 meter level were used in this analysis. Atmospheric stability classification was based on the vertical temperature difference i
measured between the 40 meter and 10 meter levels.
The period of record l
. selected for use in this analysis was recommended by the utility meteorologist as a representative period during which recovery of data was high (Reference 7).
Certain characteristics of the dispersion meteorology at the Catawba site were noted in the NRC Final Environmental Statement (Reference 8).
These characteristics are reflected in the data base used in this analysis. Winds blow from the south-southwest and I
southwest sectors approximately 27 percent of the time and wind speeds during stable conditions are low.
l Release characteristics and probabilities for the spectrum of core melt releases for typical light water reactors were developed as part of the Reactor Safety Study (Reference 4). One set of release categories was developed for Surry, the model PWR, and one set was developed for Peach Bottom, the model BWR.
Characteristics for these PWR core melt release categories are shown in Table 1.
No comprehensive assessments of core melt release characteristics or probabilities for' the Catawba plant are j
'available and performance of such an assessment is beyond the scope of
{
this limited study.
Available studies for plants similar to Catawba'were reviewed to determine the most appropriate set of release categories L
7 75100040484
- e (References 9,10, and 11). These studies indicate that the core melt release spectrum for Catawoa would be less severe than that calculated in the RSS but the studies are not comprehensive enough to permit complete quantification.
Therefore, RSS PWR releases and probabilities were used in this study.
4.0 Results and Conclusions The probability of exceeding Protective Action Guide Doses (1 rem whole body or 5 rem thyroid) and life-threatening dose (200 rem whole body) was computed for three distances--10,12 and 16 miles.
The RSS PWR release categories and probabilities were used with meteorology data from the Catawba site. Results expressed as total absolute probabilities are shown in Table 2.
Results from the NUREG-0396 analyses are included for compari son.
Inspection of Table 2 shows that results from the Catawba analysis are quite similar to those from NUREG-0396.
The results clearly show that the probability of exceeding Protective Action Guide doses is very low and the probability of exceeding life threatening doses is substantially lower.
The low probability of occurrence of a core melt accident is an important component of the low probabilities in Table 2 which are based on a core melt accident probability of 6 x 10-5 er reactor year. Although there is considerable uncertainty in the estimate of core melt probability, recent probabilistic risk assessments which include estimates of l
ur. certainty indicate that the probability of ccre melt is low even considering the uncertainty (Reference 12).
The experience of operating power reactors in the free world also indicates.that the probability of core melt is icw. Approximately 1600 reactor-years of operation have been accumulated to date (Reference'13).
8 75100040484 I..
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The absolute probabilities can be expressed as probabilities conditional on core melt release by dividing them by the probability of a core melt accident, the sum of release category probabilities in Table 1, 6 x 10-5 per reactor year.
This shows that even if a core melt accident should occur it is likely that Protective Action Guide doses would not be exceeded beyond 10 miles.
The probability of exceeding l
I these doses is about 0.25 given a core melt accident.
It also shows that even if a core melt accident should occur the probability of exceeding a j
life threatening dose beyond 10 miles is very low, about 0.03.
The analysis described above estimates the probability of exceeding doses in any direction at the specified distances.
Because the area in contention in this case is limited to a sector approximately 45 degrees in width, the probability of exceeding doses at specified distances in the contested area is lower than indicated in Table 2.
Analysis limited to the sectors of interest results in probabilities approximately 30
~ percent of those in Table 2.
This finding is consistent with the observation that wind blows in the direction sectors of interest about 30 percent of the time.
The probability of exceeding Protective Action i
Guide doses and life threatening doses for distances of 10,12 and 16 miles in the zone in contention are shown in Table ~3.
These absolute i
probabilities can be translate'd to probabilities conditional on a core melt accident by dividing by the core melt accident probability. This shows that even if a core melt accident occurred, the probability of exceeding Protective Action Guide doses in the zwie in Gntention would be low, about 0.1 and that the probability of exceeding a life threatening dose in the zone in contention would be very low, about 0.01.
These findings lead to the conclusion that the considerntions based on-l NUREG-0396 generic core melt accident analyses that were factors in the L.
Ldecision to establish a' 10-mile plume pathway. Emergency Planning Zone are 9
. supported as well by a similar~ analysis performed for the Catawba plant at the Catawba' site:
.e Projected ' doses from most core melt sequences would not exceed PAG' f!
. levels outside-the zone.
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75100041384
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e For the worst case core melt sequences, immediate life threatening doses would generally not occur outside the zone.
These findings also lead to the conclusion that even if a core melt accident should occur, the probability of requiring protective action in the zone in contention is low (about 0.1) and the probability of exceeding life threatening doses in the zone in contention without protective action is very low (about 0.01).
l l
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TABLE I r
$48MRRY OF RSS RELEASE CATEGORIES FOR PWR CORE MELT RELEASE $a 1
Release-Probability ~ ' Time of Duration Werning Elevation Energy of t
-Category per release ' of release Time of release" release Fraction of core inventary released" 6
d r
.9eactor-yr (hr. ) '
(hr.)
(hr.)
(meters)
(10 Stu/hr)
Xe-Kr I
Cs-Rb Te-Sb Ba-Sr Ru' La PWR.I.
9 10'#
2.5 0.5 1.0 25 20 and 5209 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.05 0.4 3a10'3 PWR-2 Sal'0-6 2.5 0.5 1.0 0
170 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.06 0.02 4x10~3 PWR-3 4a10
5.0 1.5
- 2. 0 0
6 0.8 0.2
- 0. 2 -
0.3 0.02 0.03 3:10'3 PWR-4 Sal 0' 2.0
- 3. 0 2.0 0
1 0.6 0.09 0.04 0.03 5:10-3 3:10~3 4x10'*
PWR-5 7x10~
2.0 4.0 1.0 0
0.3 0.3 0.03 9ul0" 5:10~
1a10' 6a10 7a10-5 l
~4
-PWR-6
'6al0'I-12.0 10.0 1.0 0
N/A 0.3 Sal 0 8a10-4 1x10'3 9:10-5 7410-5 la10-5 PWR '4al0' 10.0 10.0 1.0 0
N/A 6x10' 2x10" la10' 2 10-5 1:10
1.10 2x10'I
-6 1
AWASH-1'400, App. VI.
bA 10-m elevation is used in place of zero representing the midpoint of a potential containment break. Asw impact on the results would be slight and conservative.
C eckground on the 'sotope groups and release mechanisms is presented in the Reactor Safety Study, hpendia VII (USNRS,1975).
h i
80rganic iodine is combined with elemental fodine in the consequence calculations. Any error is negif gible since the release fraction of organic todine is relatively small for all large release categories.
' Includes Ru, Rh, Co, Mo, Tc.
t l
fincludes Y La, 2r, Nb,' Ce, Pr,' Nd, 85, Pu, Am. Ca.
9 Accident sequences within the PWR-1 category have two distinct energy releases that affect consequences. The PWR-1 category is subdivided into PWR-1A, with a probablitty of 4 a 10-' per reactor-year and an energy of release of 20 a 10-6 8tu/hr; and PWR-18, with a probability of 5 a 10-1 per
' reactor-year and an energy of release of 520 m 10' 8tu/hr.
TCMf%nal 404 :
'h TABLE 2 PROBA8ILITY OF EXCEEDING SPECIFIED DOSES VERSUS DISTANCE a
WASH-1400 PWR RELEASES - NO D4ERGENCY RESPONSE FOR 24 HOURS T
ORGAN DOSE PROBA8ILITY OF EXCEEDING DOSE (PER REACTOR YEAR)
(REM) 10 MILES 12 MILES 16 MILES CATAWBAb NUREG-0396c CATAWBA NUREG-0396 CATAWBA NUREG-0396 WHOLE BODY 1 (PAG) 1.5E-05d 1.8E-05 1.4E-05 1.6E-05 1.4E-05 1.4E-05.
THYROID 5 (PAG) 1.5E-05 1.6E-05 1.4E-05 1.6E-05 1.4E-05 1.4E-05 WHOLE BODY 200 1.7E-06 1.8E-06 1.4E-06 1.3E-06 4.8E-07 2.4E-07 abased on core melt prooability of 6E-05 per reactor year.
See. Table 1.
b atawba site meteorology, C
cBased on data from NUREG-0396, Figures 1-11, 1-13.
d robability numbers should be interpreted as follows:
P 1.0E-05 = 1 in 100,000 per reactor year 1.0E-06 = - 1 in 1,000,000 per reactor year 1.0E-07 = 1 in 10,000,000 per reactor year i
- 7516D041384.
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TABLE 3 PROBASILITY OF EXCEEDING SPECIFIED DOSES VERSUS DISTANCE IN CATAWBA ZONE IN CONTENTION WASH-1400 PWR RELEASES - NO EMERGENCY RESPONSE FOR 24 HOURSa ORGAN DOSE PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDING 00SE (PER REACTOR YEAR)
(REM) 10 MILES 12 MILES 16 MILES WHOLE BODY 1 (PAG) 4.5E-06b 4.2E-06 4.2E-06 THYROID 5 (PAG) 4.5E-06 4.2E-06 4.2E-06 WHOLE BODY 200 5.1E-07 4.2E-07 1.4E-07 abased on core melt probability of 6E-05 per reactor year.
See Table 1.
Catawba. site meteorology.
bProbability numbers should be interpreted as follows:
1.0E-05 =.1 in 100.000 per reactor. year 1.0E-06 = 1 in 1,000,000 per reactor year 1.0E-07 = 1 in 10,000,000 per reactor year l
l
' 13.
-75160041384
4 REFERENCES 1.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396 and EPA 520/1-78-016, December 1978.
2.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654 and FEMA-REP-1 (Revision 1), November 19801 3.
Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba Nuclear Station Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15.
4.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission, " Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,"
Appendix VI, October 1975.
5.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, " International Comparison Study. on Reactor Consequence Modeling," September 1983.
6.
_U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "PRA Procedures Guide,"
NUREG/CR-2300, January 1983.
7.
Personal telephone cor.aunication between T. Edward Fenstermacher-(PLG) and Mark' Casper (Duke),1/26/84.
8.
U.S. Nuclear-Regulatory-Commission, " Final. Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Catawba Nuclear _ Station Units 1 and 2,"
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, NUREG-0921, January 1983; 14
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9.
Carlson, David D., et al, Sandia National Laboratories, " Reactor Safety Study Methodology Applications Program:
Sequoyah #1 PWR Power Plant," NUREG/CR-1659,1 of 4, February 1981.
10.
Gieseke, J. A., et al, Battelle Columbus Laboratories, "Radionuclide Release Under Specific LWR Accident Conditions -- Volume IV PWR, Ice Condenser Containment Desgn," December 20,1983 (Draft).
11.
Duke PowerCompany, "An Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures at McGuire Nuclear Station," Revision 9, submitted to NRC under cover letter dated October 20, 1983.
12.
Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc., "Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment," PLG-0300, December 1983.
- 13. McGraw Hill, Inc., Nucleonics Week, March 22, 1984.
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EPC 11 Kulash Attachment A o
l WALTER KULASH Associate Vice President 4
Education North Carolina State University, B.S., Industrial Engineering University of North Carolina, M.S., Business Administration Northwestern University, Candidate for Doctor of Civil Engineer-ing in Transportation and Systems Analysis Previous Kurt Salmon Associates, Management Consultants, 1965-1968.
Positions Staff Consultant Northwestern University Transportation Center,1970. Research Assistant I
Experience Emergency Management Planning. Directed the independent evac-uation time assessments for the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) at the Seabrook and Zion Nuclear Power
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Plants. The methodology developed for these assessments has been incorporated into the FEMA regulatory guide NUREG 0654.
Directed evacuation feasibility studies for three nuclear power plant sites for Duke Power and arranged for appropriate technology transfer to facilitate. Duke Power staff to independently assess" alternative emergency scenarios. Currently, project manager for the emergency response and preparedness plan development in northeastern Ohio.. This planning effort includes basic plan preparation, resource assessment, training, and development of standard operating procedures.
Management. - Directed a study 'to develop a TSM plan'for the
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Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Central. Business District. Included in.
the plan are improvements to vehicular traffic, transit, pedestrian travel, and parking. Responsible for management of multimodal transportation studies in various U.S. and foreign locations.1 Man-l aged regional PRC Voorhees office in Buffalo, New York.
Multimodal Transportation Planning.. Conducted a study of multi-modal passenger travel improvement in the Cross Florida Transit i
Corridor Study.
Performed internal circulation planning, com-munity impact, and facility staging for planned new towns; internal circulation, transit, pedestrian, and parking planning _ for univer-sity/ medical complexes; and transportation-master plans for-various'small cities.' Managed Maryland Statewide Aviation Study,
- with surveys of air passengers and cargo, projection of ground access requirements, and modeling of airport access.
Transit Planning. Conducted study of bus priority treatments 'for Caracas,; Venezuela; analysis. :of ' rapid - transit alternatives ~ in er r
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Kulash, Continued Buffalo, New York. Was project manager for Buffalo Station Areas Impact Study, involving neighborhood impact and access require-ments for twelve rapid transit stations. Conducted rapid transit patronage estimation and community forum presentation of patron-age impacts in Buffalo, and ridership and scheduling impacts of reduced fares for the elderly in Chicago. Developed short-range transit alternatives to meet community needs in Pittsburgh. Eval-uated short-and medium-range bus priority measures, in Cleve-land, and transit improvement alternatives for a transit-dependent semi-rural area in Geauga County, Ohio; and the new town of Audubon, New York. Integrated Buffalo rapid transit station into a high-activity medical center.
Traffic Planning and Engineering. Incorporated traffic flow with bus priority treatments in Caracas. Developed areawide traffic improvement plans (TOPICS) in Buffalo, New York, and New Brunswick, New Jersey.
Conducted numerous traffic impact studies for new communities, industrial parks, and shopping centers, and presented court testimony on impact of Interstate Highway facilities on site access and market areas, projected arterial street volumes, and on community impact of a Planned Unit Development.
Affiliations American Society of Civil Engineers Institute of Transportation Engineers 4
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i EPC 11 KULASH ATTACHMENT B Prepared for Duke Power Company Effect of " Shadow" Evacuation on the Time to Evacuate the Catawba Nuclear Station EPZ I
. Prepared by l
PRC Engineering -
1500 Planning Research Drive l
McLean, Virginia 22102 February 1984 1
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's EFFECT OF " SHADOW" EVACUATION ON THE TIME TO EVACUATE THE CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION EPZ Prepared for Duke Power Company Prepared by PRC Engineering 1500 Planning Research Drive McLean, VA 22102 February 1984
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS P_ age List of Exhibits.
iii EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
I STUDY OBJECTIVES 1
ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 3
ASSUMPTIONS USED 3
Departure Time Distribution 4
Evacuation Routes 4
Highway Capacities 7
Population Assignment 7
Vehicles Per Evacuees 7
Fraction of Population Evacuating 8
Traffic Control 8
SIMULATION RESULTS 8
CONCLUSION 9
e e
6 LIST OF EXHIBITS Exhibit Eage 1
Summary of Evacuation Traffic Flows 2
2 Departure Time Distributions for Evacuees 5
3 Evacuation Routes 6
4 Delay to EPZ Residents Evacuating Via I-77 Northbound 9
J h
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s EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Four main roads leading out of the Catawba EPZ pass through the Charlotte metropolitan area:
I-77, US 521, NC 160, and NC 49.
If some or all of the Charlotte area population were to voluntarily evacuate because of an emergency at the Catawba Nuclear Station, severe congestion could occur in the downtown area and on main roads leading north and east from the City. If one assumes the average Charlotte evacuee leaves home an hour later than the average EPZ evacuee, the congestion in the Charlotte area does not delay anyone from leaving the EPZ. If one assumes that the Charlotte evacuees depart only half an hour af ter the EPZ evacuees, there would still be no impediment to evacuating the EPZ on i
three of the four rotites. On the fourth route, I-77, backups could extend into the EPZ if 70 percent or more of the Charlotte area residents were to evacuate and if no mitigating traffic control actions were taken. In that case, if 70 to 80 percent of the Charlotte residents evacuated voluntarily, some EPZ evacuees using I-77 northbound would be delayed up to half-hour. Total time to evacuate the EPZ would, however, remain at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. If 100 percent of the Charlotte residents evacuated voluntarily, the EPZ evacuees using I-77 would be delayed I hour, delaying completion of the entire EPZ evacuation by 30 minutes, i
I STUDY OBJECTIVES In April of 1983, PRC Engineering used computer modeling to estimate the time L
required to evacuate the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) surround--
. ing Duke Power's ' Catawba Nuclear Station.
The results of that analysis are h
summarized in Exhibit i.
Those estimates were based 'on the assumption that evacuees could exit the EPZ unimpeded by traffic congestion outside the EPZ.
I-Subsequently, Duke asked us to determine whether voluntary evacuation of people living outside the EPZ in the Charlotte area could create enough traffic congestion j.
to delay traffic leaving the EPZ.
This report describes our analysis _ of that question and presents our findings.
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SUMMARY
OF EVACUATION TRAFFIC FLOWS (4/83 PRC Study)
Maximum Routes Out Population Vehicles Evacuation time of EPZ Carried Carried (Hours)I
- I-77 NB 10,798 4,428 3:25 l
SC 901 13,556 5,829 3:30 Lyle Boulevard 4,459 1,917 3:25 US 21 SB 15,897 6,835 4:00 SC 322 5,284 2,272 3:25 US 321 2,281 980 3:25 SC 5 WB 1,763 758 3:25 SC 161 WB 2,468 1,061 3:25 I-77 SB 8,079 3,473 3:45 YC 150 1,470 632 3:25 SC 55 1,286 552 3:25 US 321 NB 3,275 1,408 3:25 NC 247 NB 1,068 459 3:25 NC 279 4,529 1,947 3:25
- US 521 1,525 655 3:25
- NC 49 2,213 951 3:25 l
SC 160 EB 4,926 2,118 3:25-
- NC 160 NB 1,721 740 3:25 l
Routes leading to Charlotte area a
1 W nter weekday, daytime, normal driving conditions I
2
4 ANALYSIS PROCEDURES The analysis was conducted using the same traffic simulation model, QUEUE, used in the original evacuation study.
Except as noted in the next section, the underlying assumptions were also unchanged.
The analysis proceeded in the following steps:
1.
Develop a departure time distribution, an estimate of the fraction of the population leaving home in each time interval af ter the evacu-ation has been announced.
I 2.
Identify the evacuation routes. These are the main roads heading away from Catawba Nuclear Station.
As part of this step, the intersections are identified where people get on to the routes.
3.
Determine Highway Capacities for each segment (between consecu-tive intersections) of the evacuation routes.
4.
Assign the population to the routes. In this step, each person in the study area is assigned to the evacuation route and intersection that provide him the most direct exit from the area.
6.
Estimate the number of vehicles per evacuee 7.
Estimate fo'r each area the fraction of the population that evacuates 8.
Determine recommended traffic control actions such as expressway ramp closings, traffic redirection, etc.
9.
Conduct the simolation using PRC Engineering's QUEUE model. The model simulates the: flow of vehicles over the evacuation routes and determines when all the evacuation traffic on each route has left the area. ' The model takes into account the fact that evacuees leave home at different times and that _ highway capacity _is limited. For-each time period and each intersection, the model.determin's' the e
length of the traffic queue 'watting to get through the intersection.-
l 10.
Examine the cueue' lengths' to determine when the backups:on each
- route no longer extend into the EPZ.
. ASSUMPTIONS USED '
Our analysis consisted of a series of simulations made with different assumptions.
The ' assumptions we^ varied were theLiraction of the non-EPZ population that.
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e evacuates voluntarily and the time at which those people leave home. The other assumptions were the same in all the simulations.
Departure Time Distribution For EPZ residents, we used the same departure curve as in our April 1983 study.
That curve, shown graphically in Exhibit 2, indicates that h'alf the evacuees leave home within I hour and 10 minutes after the start of evacuation and the rest within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 10 minutes of the start.
The derivation of this departure time distribution is discussed at length in our earlier report.
Charlotte area evacuees would leave later and more gradually than the EPZ evacuees, for two reasons. First, since there will be no siren sounding or other government efforts to notify Charlotte residents of the emergency, people in Charlotte will become aware of the situation more slowly than people in the EPZ.
Second, once aware of the situation they are likely to more fully ascertain the need to evacuate.
That is, their decision will involve more extensive information gathering and attempts at confirming the need to evacuate. The effect of the later, more gradual departure of Charlotte residents is to reduce the congestion experienced by EPZ evacuees. In fact, it could be that EPZ evacuation would be complete before congestion outside the EPZ becomes significant.
Since the amount of this lag between the Charlotte area evacuation and the EPZ
- evacuation is unknown, we conducted two sets of simulations, one using an assumed lag of I hour and the other set using an assumed lag of 30 minutes.
Evacuation Routes i:
Exhibit 3 shows the evacuation routes used in this study. Only routes used by both
- EPZ and Charlotte ' evacuees were modeled; congestion on ' routes used only by Charlotte evacuees would not affect EPZ evacuation times.
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As the routes !ndicate, all evacuees are assumed to travel radially away from the power plant until they are at least 25 miles away. Since government officials will be recommending evacuation out to only ten miles or less, and since many evacuees will know of friends, relatives, or hotels in the Charlotte area, it is unlikely that all evacuees will travel to the 25-mile mark. If they do not, congestion on the segments further from the EPZ will be less than our simulation predicts.
Highway Capacities Following generally accepted traffic engineering practice, we assumed that ex-pressways carry 1,800 vehicles per lane per hour and other roads 1,200 vehicles per lane per hour. (Expressway ramps are assigned an intermediate capacity of 1,500 vehicles per hour.) These capacities do not reflect the delays caused by congestion at the modeled intersections; that delay is computed separately by the QUEUE model.-
Population Assianment As noted earlier, each potential evacuee is assigned to the most direct route that-.
will take him 25 miles away from the po_ er plant, if preliminary simulation shows w
that our: initial assignments give congestion that is much ' worse on one of two --
parallel routes than on the other, the ' population assignments are adjusted to -
reflect drivers' preference for the less congested route.
Vehicles Per Evacuees -
We assumed 0.43 vehicles per evacuee (2.33 people per vehicle),' the same as in the g earlier study. That figure was developed using household auto' ownership for EPZ residents.1Since cities normally have fewer cars per household than rural areas, it
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'less than for EPZ evacuees. If the vehicles per evacuee were adjusted downward to L account for this, the result would be less highway congestion than our ' simulation
- predicts.'
4
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Fraction of Population Evacuating All simulation runs evacuated 100 percent of the EPZ residents and a portion of the Charlotte area residents. The fraction of the Charlotte residents choosing to evacuate was varied between 40 to 100 percent.
The fact that we did not simulate cases with less than 40 percent of Charlotte residents evacuating does not mean that we expect at least 40 percent to evacuate voluntarily. Forty percent was the smallest value tried because it did not produce congestion that delayed people from leaving the EPZ. Therefore, it is clear that smaller numbers of Charlotte evacuees would also not delay the EPZ evacuees.
Traffic Control As in our earlier studies, traffic is allowed to flow normally with a minimum of special controls. No special traffic control measures were assumed to be used outside the EPZ.
SIMULATION RESULTS The simulations showed that, even if everyone in the Charlotte area evacuated, the traffic backups would not extend into' the EPZ on routes US 521, NC 160, and NC 49. For the remaining route out of the EPZ into Charlotte, I-77, the simulation predicted backup into the EPZ under 'certain conditions. If backups occurred, they would delay the time that the last EPZ residents using 1-77 northbound would leave the EPZ.
We used the QUEUE model to estimate the delay to EPZ evacuees for several different scenarios. Exhibit 4 summarizes the cases studied and the associated delay. As noted in the discussion of assumptions, the simulations overestimate the -
delay because they use a high estimate of Charlotte residents' auto ownership, keep all evacuees on the evacuation route until they are 25 miles from the power plant, and assume no special traffic control. To mitigate the congestion delaying EPZ S.
t evacuees on I-77, the ramps onto 1-77 northbound could be closed by the police at the first three exits north of the EPZ, giving EPZ residents exclusive use of that segment of I-77. (Voluntary evacuees who would otherwise use those ramps would have to use US 521 and Nations Ford, both which are parallel to 1-77 for a few miles.)
EXHIBIT 4. DELAY TO EPZ RESIDENTS EVACUATING VIA I-77 NORTHBOUND Fraction of Charlotte Area Residents if Charlotte Depatures if Charlotte Depatures Voluntarily Evacuating Lag EPZ Departures Lag EPZ Departures (Shown in Percent) by One-Half Hour by one Hour 60 No Delay No Delay 70 15 Minutes No Delay 80 30 M'inutes No Delay 90 45 Minutes No Delay 100 1 Hour No Delay Note that our April 1983 report showed that all evacuees using 1-77 northbound could be out of the EPZ 30 minutes before the evacuation was complete on one other route. Therefore, an extra 30 minutes on I-77 would not change the time to evacuate.the entire EPZ. In the case producing a delay _ of I hour, the time to evacuate the entire EPZ would be increased by 30 minutes.
CONCLUSION Voluntary evacuation could delay EPZ evacuation on just one route and only under very unfavorable assumptions about the extent and timing of the voluntary evacuation.
'9
r reparou sur Duko Power Company
- EPC ll KULASH ATTACHMENT C Catawba Nuclear Station' Evacuation Analysis Evacuation Time Estimate for the City of Charlotte i
t PRC Engineering 1500 Planning Research Drive McLean, Virginia 22102 April,1984
0 I
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
SUMMARY
OF THE METHOD FOR ESTIMATING EVACUATION TIMES..
1 THE AREA TO BE EVACUATED.
I DEPARTURE CURVES FOR CHARLOTTE 2
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS 9
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1
SUMMARY
OF THE METHOD FOR ESTIMATING EVACUATION TIMES The estimates of evacuation time for the City of Charlotte in combination with the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Catawba Nuclear Power Station are based on 1980 population data.
The methodology used in the derivation of these evacuation time estimates is the same as that used for the EPZ around the plant site.
Specifi:: ally, for each population segment, a series of discrete action steps is identified and the completion time for each step is estimated. The advantage of this method is that time is estimated for each individual step of the evacuation sequence rather than for the entire evacuation as a single activity. Thus, an erroneous assumption about the time required for a particular step has only a very limited effect on the overall results.
The key sequence of events in an evacuation of the City of Charlotte is as follows:
o Notification of the area population that an evacuation is recom-mended e
Propagation of the alert information throughout the City population e
The departure from work and return home of the work force prior to evacuation e
Preparation for an evacuation including assembly of family members and collection of essentials e
Driving out of the area j
l THE AREA TO BE EVACUATED j
The analyses described in.this technical memorandum relate to the evacuation of l
the City of Charlotte. The parameters used in establishing the boundaries for the area, the determination of the population to be considered, and the distance to be traversed to exit the area, are as follows:
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1 e
In addition to the basic EPZ (nominal 10-mile radius area around the Catawba plant) the area considered for evacuation includes the entire-area within the city limits of Charlotte.
e The time estimate for evacuation is based upon the premise that the entire population is to be movea to a point 30/niles distant from the plant. This distance consideration applies only to northeast sectors of the area that encomparses the City of Charlotte.
e The population between not within the City limits and the 30-mile-distance radius of the plant are not considered in this analysis.
People between the 10-mile EPZ and the city limits are included.
e The 1980 population in the City of Charlotte is estimated at 314,447.g The geographic allocation of this population to subareas comprising e
one mile rings and 22.5 degree sector was conducted on the basis of detailed maps and the available geographic aubdivisions of the U.S.
Census data.
A separate analysis has been conducted for a southeast subarea of the City that is nearer to the Catawba plant. This subarea is bounded by routes 16 and 74 along the east and north and by the City limits on the south and west.
The population within this area is estimated to be 124;000.I DEPARTURE CURVES FOR CHARLOTTE Assumptions -
1 1.
radio -or television in use during daytime hours.ps will have either It can be expected that 25 percent of a i househo
'Durin hours about 65 percent of all households will have radh or,g evenin6 television" in use.
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It is assumed that about'5 percent of the households will have bg radio and television in use simultaneously.
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2 Nielsen Research,1982. Arbitron Survey,1981.
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It is expected that 90 percent of all listeners are tuned to local radio and television stations.
4.
It is assumed that all local stations would relay the evacuation recommendations transmitted over the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).
1 5.
The following relevant statistics were obtained from the 1980 U.S.
Census for the Charlotte metropolitan area:
a.
Average persons per households = 2.76 b.
Total number of households = 226,200 c.
Family households = 143,400 d.
Non-family households = 8,400 e.
Female householders and one person households = 74,400 f.
Civilian labor force = 347,900 Economic participation rate = 54.5 percent g.
Total metropolitan population = 637,218 h.
Percent of City of Charlotte no-worker households = 8.5 i.
Percent of City of Charlotte 2+ worker households = 60.0 j.
Percent of City of Charlotte 1-worker households = 31.5 6.
It is assumed that 50 percent of the households have no one at home during the day time.
7.
Based on limited data from the. Radio Advertising Bureau it is assumed that in 50 percent of the work places in the City there is at least one worker that has a radio turned on..
I 8.
Based on U.S. Census data a small percentage of all business establishments have by far the largest numbers of employees. Based on the assumption _that the larger the number of employees the greater the likelihood that one worker has a radio turned on, it is 4
1 estimated that the 50 percent of workplaces noted above employ 69 percent of the labor force.
' Percentane of Population Within immediate Reach of EBS Households - During the day, approximately 25 percent of households are timed in to radio and the same percentage are watching television. With the assumptions that 5 percentage of the households-have both radio and television on the total.
number of " tuned in" households is 47.5 percent. Of this total, it is assumed that '
ICounty and City Data Book,1983.
3
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only 90 percent are tuned to local stations; i.e., about 43 percent. iherefore, 43 percent of the households would be reachable directly via EBS messages to advise the residents of an alert status or the need to evacuate.
It is assumed that 50 percent of the households would have no one at home. These are primarily multiple wage earner households. The remaining 7 percent of the households with persons at home would not be directly reachable through the EBS message broadcast.
Workers - It has been assumed that at about 50 percent of the work places one or more employees will be turned in to a radio and will be immediately apprised of an alert condition through an EBS message.
It is also assumed that an alerted employee will pass the information to all co-workers within a period of 30 minutes.
Because of the increased probability that a' worker in a large estabishment will have a radio turned on, it is estimated that 69 percent of the work force will be notified in this way.
It is expected therefore that 69 percent of the work force will be alerted within 30 minutes following the EBS message broadcast.
I Information Dissemination to Non-Alerted Workers and Households It is estimated that 43 percent of family households would be alerted directly through the EBS messages. It is expected that these households will attempt to contact the family wage-earner (s) at their place of work. Although the-telephone 1
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system may be stressed beyond capacity, it is. expected l that an additional' 13 percent of the non-alerted workers will be notified through direct or indirect I
calls -from alerted persons l from. households - that -were tuned 'to either radio or.
s television. " Direct telephone contact" means that a household member speakso directly to the wage earner at work.J " Indirect telephone contact" means;that a--
household member speaks with someone otler than the wage earner at his place of s
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-t work. This process of notification would leave about 18 percent of the work force not alerted. There is a threshold level of time in which members of the work force interact with members of the community at large. These thresholds are set by normal breaks in the workday at lunch, at the end of the day, and intermittent business contacts during the day. On average, therefore, this threshold time period is assumed to be about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. It is within this time frame that the remaining l
18 percent of the work force would be notified of an alert condition.
l In addition to this EBS information dissemination, the existing Protective Response Plan for All Hazards for the City of Charlotte contains provisions for public t
alerting via mobile units and aerial units. The mobile units are largely based at five stations and can therefore be mobilized immediately. The helicopter units are expected to be mobilized within a time period of 30 minutes.
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A summary of the EBS notification tree is shown in Exhibit i for a daytime p
evacuation.
l l
Estimated Time When Population is Alerted l
s For purposes of this analysis, it has been assumed that the plant condition has led to the decision to evacuate the EPZ (approximate 10-mile radius area) and the City
[
of Charlotte simultaneously. The established alerting system within the EPZ is l
expected to provide notification to the public largely within 15 minutes, and with j
an expected notification time of 45 minutes within which the entire EPZ population is alerted. This notification process is based upon prompt EBS broadcasting of appropriate messages to the public.
With the inclusion of the City of-Charlotte in.an evacuation decision, the EBS messages to be broadcast would reflect this decision and appropriately alert the City population to prepare to evacuate. Those households in the City that are tuned in to an EBS station would be alerted within about 5 minutes. - For purposes of 'this study it was assumed that-these households would be alerted within 15 minutes, to allow for the opportunity to listen to the message for a second time.
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I Exhibit 1.- EBS Notification Tree HOUSEtt0LDS m
WOBItEfl5 43%
Tuned to i7g EBS 45%
F 20%
65% frosn 2+ Worker 3%
Not Tuned g
g Alerted 3%
to EBS or Hosnee m
with Worker Not T Not Hosne Alerted M
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Householde Not Alerted 4g NonFemdy 100%
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uned Lunch Not et 4
KK EBS et or End of Dey a gro,n g
Home or Home Not Tuned 1 Worker m grm toEBS Homes yig 29%
Not Alerted 33%
Not et 33%,, o, 6%
Home M et p,,
Not Alerted Homeor 4%
M Tuned untMLunch 4%
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- d or End of Day Not Tuned to EBS I"
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At those places of work and business where a worker has a radio turned ' n, one or o
more workers would be alerted within about 5 minutes, similarly as with households-noted above. To allow for some confirmation, a time period of about 15 minutes has been assumed for purposes of this analysis. The dissemination of the alert information throughout the work place to all employees and patrons is estimated to require 30 minutes, with appropriate allowance for notification of management at the work place, confirmatory action and actual alerting of the employees.
The spread of information from this basic group (comprised of about 43 percent of the households and 69 percent of the workers) can be expected to involve active
" word-of-mouth" dissemination. With a significant attempt to contact relatives and public places to confirm the alert information, the phone system may become overloaded. It is likely, however, that some notification of workers via telephones will take place by calls from household members that were alerted very early at home via the EBS broadcast. Based upon the estimate that 43 percent of the households will be alerted by the first EBS message, an estimated 13 percent of the workers may become alerted through telephone contact from home. It is estimated that this could take place within about 30 minutes following the receipt of Information by the household members.
p The remaining 18 percent of the work force are estimated to receive the alert information over a period ending 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> following the initial broadcast over the EBS system.
At the household level there may be an estimated seven percent of the residential units where people are at home but have not received the broadcast information.
This percentage of households would become alerted, if not notified otherwise, at -
the time that the wage earner returned home from his place of work.
. A summary of notification times is shown below 1'
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Time Following Percentage of Beginning of Population Notification Process Alerted 15 minutes 28 45 minutes 72 180 minutes 100 EVACUATION ROUTES The evacuation routes selected for the time estimate analyses are the major thoroughfare facilities through the City and that provide a logical pattern of travel in the northerly, northeasterly, and easterly direction. A summary of the routes is listed below:
Route cad & City Interstate 77 3,600 N.C.51 1,200 Interstate 85 3,600 N.C.27 2,400 U.S.21 1,200 N.C.29 2,400 N.C.I15 1,200 N.C.16 NB 1,200 N.C. 49 1,200 N.C. 84 1,200 j
U.S. 74 2,400 These primary routes constitute the exit constraint on capacity. Within the City, the overall road capacity is by major orders of magnitude greater than the
' available exit capacity. This capacity availability within the City allows for shifts in queueing patterns from those estimated to occur on the major facilities, but l
those internal dynamics of route changes by evacuees do not alter the limiting i
capacity of the major exit routes. -
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SUMMARY
OF RESULTS The results of the evacuation time estimate analyses for the City of Charlotte are presented in two segments:
e Time Estimate to Evacuate the entire City of Charlotte e
Time Estimate to Evacuate the Southeast Sector of the City of Charlotte Evacuation Time for the Entire City of Charlotte As noted earlier, the evacuation time estimate includes the evacuation of both the EPZ (10-mile area around the plant) plus the entire City of Charlotte. The scenario selected for this analysis is a typical weekday.
The analysis results show that the overall evacuation of the City, plus the EPZ, would involve a time period of about 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. The evacuation time is primarily controlled by the exit capacity of the roadway system. Although notification of l
the population is a key factor in initiating the evacuation process, the magnitude of l
the number of evacuees diminishes the impact on overall evacuation time of the notification process. For example, if the rate of notification of the public was slower than that outlined in earlier sections of this memorandum, it is unlikely that the evacuation time would be altered, since the change would only produce a shorter route congestion : time but not an overall increase in evacuation time.
Similarly, a more rapid rate of notification would increase congestion time, but would not have a significant effect on overall evacuation time.
The analysis results are shown below, by major route. It should be recognized that significant time differences between routes would be more closely balanced in an-actual evacuation through relatively simple and readily implementable diversions as the evacuation of the City is approaching completion.
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Route Evacuation Time I-77 9 hrs. 30 min.
I-85 8 hrs. 30 min.
U.S. 21 10 hrs.
N.C.16 NB 5 hrs.15 min.
N.C. 27 7 hrs. 45 min.
N.C. 29 8 hrs. 30 min.
N.C. 51 11 hrs. 45 min.
U.S. 74 11 hrs. 45 min.
N.C.16 SB 6 hrs.15 min.
N.C.115 8 hrs.15 min.
N.C. 49 9 hrs.
This analysis is a time estimate, not a local preparedness plan. Therefore, it does not include an in-depth review of the operational and other issues that would be required to thoroughly prepare for such an evacuation.
The results indicate that an evacuation of the City of Charlotte could be completed within a time frame of about 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />.
Evacuation Time of the Southeast Sector of the City of Charlotte The time to evacuate the EPZ and the southeastern third of Charlotte is only 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and 15 minutes. Unlike the more massive evacuation described above, this evacuation would not produce congestion that would extend beyond the departure l
time for the last evacuees. Therefore, the evacuation time is simply the time required to warn the last evacuee (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) plus the time for that evacuee to complete the other steps in the evacuation (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />,15 minutes). These remaining steps include the time to drive out of the area, but no delay due to traffic congestion.
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