ML20083F645

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Final Deficiency Rept Re Failure of MSIV Actuators During Qualification Testing.Initially Reported on 831109. Deficiency Does Not Exist Since Qualification Tests Part of Vendor Design Development Phase
ML20083F645
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/09/1983
From: Mangan C
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To: Starostecki R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 7800, NUDOCS 8401030238
Download: ML20083F645 (2)


Text

.

NuMOHAWK Y NIAGARA NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATl0Nr 300 ER:E BOULEVARD WEST SYRACUSE N Y 13202/ TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 December 9, 1983 (7800)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I Division of Project and Resident Programs 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem regarding failure of main steam isolation valve actuators during qualification testing. This problem was reported via telecon to W. Borchardt, of your staff, on November 9, 1983.

Very truly yours,

@ i M RA\\

L C. V. Mangan Vice President Nuclear Engineering & Licensing CVM/TL:ja Enclosure xt: Director of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. R. Gramm, Resident Inspector OhhohO[0 PDR I l-ISc t'

NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 DOCKET N0. 50-410 Final Report for Problem Concerning Failure of MSIV Actuator During Qualification Testing Description of the-Problem The problem concerns the actuators of main steam isolation valves (MSIV) supplied by Bonney Forge Engineered Valve (BFEV), a division of Gulf + Western i

Manufacturing Company. The vendor is currently attempting to qualify these actuators to IEEE-323 requirements.

During the dynamic testing of the actuator, 19 of 20 required emergency trips of the actuator were successful.

The actuator failed to close on the last attempt. An additional attempt also failed to trip the actuator.

In both cases, the latching roller was found to be cracked. Additional interrelated damage (e.g., loose bolts, misaligned parts) was observed.

Analysis of Safety Implications The purchase specification requires that the actuators conform to IEEE-323 requirements; however, the vendor has not made any guarantees to Niagara Mohawk that the actuators currently would meet the IEEE requirements.

The qualification program / testing could indicate modifications which would have to be made. Therefore, it is Niagara Mohawk's opinion that the qualification tests performed by the vendor are part of its design development phase and that a reportable deficiency does not exist; however, since this is a critical application of a naw technology, Niagara Mohawk plans to keep the NRC informed of significant developments regarding the design and testing of these actuators.

l