ML20082E383

Proposed Tech Specs,Changing Definition of Core Alteration & Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio & Clarifying Unit 1 Operational Mode Parameters

ML20082E383
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/06/1995
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20082E372	List: ML20082E369 ML20082E383
References
NUDOCS 9504110215
Download: ML20082E383 (13)

Text

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ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL' SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE .

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNITS 1 AND 2 j DOCKET NOS.' 50-327 AND 50-328 l f-

(TVA-SON-TS-95-08) l- LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES  !

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1-2 l.. 1-5 18 l Unit 2 1-2 1-5 b

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DEFINITIONS' j

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL 1EST

'1.6 h CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall.be:

a.. Analog channels - the injection of al simulated signal ~ into the channel -

as close to.the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY' including

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alarm and/or trip functions.

b.: Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or. trip functions.

c. Digital channels - the injection of a' simulated signal into the channel .as close to the sensor input to the process racks as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip ,

functions.

Q HIAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident-conditions are either:

1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or

2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic s valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification-3.6.1.3, k. s

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 4.6.1.1.c,

e. The sealing mechansim associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE, and

f. Secondary containment bypass leakage is within the -limits of Specification 3.6.1.2.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE bWer

%t 1.8 CONTROLLEO LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor- -

coolant pump seals.

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' CORE ALTERATIM 1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any. component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in.the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

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'CORYTIPERATINGLIMITREPORT R159 1.10 The CORE OPERATIP:G LIMITS REPORT (COLR) is the unit-specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle.

These. cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance.with Specification 6.9.1.14. Unit operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

1-2 Amendment No. 12,71,130,141,155,

.SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 176 February 10, 1994

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CORE ALTERATIONS  :

1.9. CORE ALTERATIONS shall be the movement _ of any. fuel, sources, reactivity .

control components, or other components affecting reactivity within the reactor vessel-with the head removed and fuelin the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS

. shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

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PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE 1.22 PRESSURE B0UNDARY (AGE shall be leakage (except steam generator tube lR15' leakage) through a non-). table fault in a Reactor Coolant System component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.

PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM'(PCP) 1.23 The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM shall contain the current formulas, sampling, lR15d analyses, tests, and determinations to be made to ensure that the processing and R152-packaging of solid radioactive wastes based on dernonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will be accomplished in'such a way as to assure-compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71; State regulations; and other R152 requirements governing the disposal of solid radioactive wastes.

,. PURGE - PURGING 1.24 PURGE or PURGING is the controlled process of discharging air or gas R155 from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is

, required to purify the confinement.

QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO 1.25 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excore R155' detector calibrated output to the average of the upper ~excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater.

With- One- excere tietecter inoperable, the reinaining three detecter chall be-

-ttsed-for compuu ng the overoye. -

RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP) R145 1.26 RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP) shall be a total reactor core heat transfer x15 rate to the reactor coolant of 3411 MWt.

1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.27 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from alp when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor unt'l loss .of stationary gripper coil voltage.

REPORTABLE EVENT 1.28 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in l gig Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 1-5 Amendment No. 12, 71, 141, 148, 155 00T PJ M  :

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TABLE 1.1 OPERATIONAL MODES

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REACTIVITY' -

% RATED AVERAGE COOLANT MODE CONDITION, K,7f THERMAL POWER *~ TEMPERATURE

1. POWER OPERATION B0.99 >/5% 'k350'F

2. STARTUP 20.99 55% 2350'F

3. HOT STANDBY '< 0.99 0 ?f350*F

4. HOT SHUTDOWN <0.99 0 350 F > T

>200*Favg  ;

5. COLD SHUTDOWN <0.99 0 $200'F

6. REFUELING ** $0.95 0 ff140F Excluding decay heat.

• • Fuel in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts-less-than-fully tensioned or with the head removed.

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SEQUOYAH'- UNIT 1 1-8 Amendment No. N 71 R May 18.-1988

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. DEFINITIONS

-CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST R63_

1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

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a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated _ signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

c. Digital channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the chan- R132 nel as close to the sensor input to the process racks as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY R63-4 1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1) Capable of being closed _ by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or

2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions,_ except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification- R(

3.6.1.3, ( ,

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d. The containment leakage rates are within the~ limits of Specifica-tion 4.6.1.1.c,

e. The sealing mechansim associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or 0-rings) is'0PERABLE, and. ,

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f. Secondary containment bypass leakage is within the limits of Speci- ]

. Rnwr min fication 3.6.1.2.

R63.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE i 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water ficw supplied to the reactor' l coolant pump seals, LTERATION Y C R63 1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a' component to a safe conservative position,

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@RE OPERATING LIMIT REPORT 1.10 The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) is the unit-specific document R146

-that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle.

These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.14. Unit operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual' specifications.

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.SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 1-2 Amendment No. 63,117,132,146, 167 (

February 10 -1994 3

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- CORE ALTERATIONS -I 1.9 CORE ALTERATIONS shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, reactivity

' control components, or other components affecting reactivity within the reactor vessel '

with the head removed and fuelin the vessel.' Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS ~

shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.-

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DEFINITIONS-

-OPERATIONAL MODE - MODE 1.20 An OPERATIONAL'HODE (i.e., MODE) shall correspond to any one inclusive lR141 combination of core reactivity condition, power level and average reactor coolant. temperature.specified in Table 1.1.

PHYSICS TESTS-1.21 PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the' fundamental IR14d nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation and 1) described in Chapter 14.0 of the FSAR, 2) authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, or 3) otherwise approved by the Commission.

PRESSURE B0UNDARY LEAKAGE 1.22 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage (except steam generator tube IR14(

leakage) through a non-isolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.

PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) 2 1.23 The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM shall contain the current formulas, sampling,  !

lR14f analyses, tests, and determinations to be made to ensure that the processing and packaging of solid radioactive wastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will be accomplished in suc1 a way as to R134' '

assurecompliancewith10CFRParts20,61}dradioactivewastes.and requirements governing the disposal of sol 71; State regulations PURGE - PURGING 1.24 PURGE or PURGING is the controlled process of discharging air or gas lgi43 from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or other operating condition, in such a manner-that replacement air or gas is required to purify the confinement.

I QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO 1.25 QUADRANT POWER tT RATIO shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excore IR14d detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector cali-brated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower.excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower excore detector calibrated outputs, which-ever is greater. Mth-ene-excore-de tec tor-inoperaM erthe-rema i ning-th ree-4tectors shah-be usettorcomputing-the-averager-.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 1-5 Amendment No. 63, 134, 146 March 30, 1992

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j .., ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 :

(TVA-SON-TS-95-08)

DESCRIPTION AND JUSTlFICATION FOR CHANGES i

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Descriotion of Chance TVA proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SON) Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TSs) to change the definition of core alteration and quadrant power tilt ratio (OPTR) and clarify the Unit 1 operational mode parameters.

The proposed TS change is modeled after the Westinghouse Electric Corporation Standard TS (STS), NUREG 1431.

Reason for Chanae The change for core alterations definition is needed to clearly define the evolutions and components that are associated with core alterations. The current definition is intended to pertain to core components that could affect reactivity. However, a broad interpretation of the current wording could refer to items such as underwater lighting, nylon ropes, or hand-held tools as components in the reactor vessel. The change in the definition clarifies that components that do not effect reactivity may be moved without any additional conditions, such as direct supervision of a senior reactor operator and eliminates potential confusion that may delay performance of activities.

The change in the OPTR definition is needed to provide consistency between the OPTR specifications and the definitions section. The change in the QPTR definition will eliminate the conflict with TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.2.4.2. The action to take in the event that one channelis inoperable is controlled by the SR and should not be defined in the definitions section.

The change in the Unit 1 operational mode paiameters is to provide consistency between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TSs.

Justification for Chanae The proposed change to the definition of core alterations is consistent with the intent of the definition and reflects change made to standard TSs in NUREG-1431.

The proposed change to the definition of QPTR allows alternate methods of determining QPTR that are consistent with TSs and is consistent with the change made to standard TS in NUREG-1431.

The change for clarifying the Unit 1 operational mode parameters is administrative in nature and does not affect unit operation.

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4 2-Environmental Imoact Evaluation The proposed change does not involve an unreviewed environmental question because

- operation of SON Units 1 and 2 in accordance with this change would not:

1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmentalimpact previously evaluated in the Final Environmental. Statement (FES) as modified by NRC's

. testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, supplements to'the FES, environmentalimpact appraisals, or decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing g e3..

Board.

2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.

3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SON that may l have a significant environmentalimpact.

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' ENCLOSURE 3 j

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- PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE -

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA SON-TS-95-08)

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION b

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5 Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification (TS) change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SON) in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

1. Involve a significent increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes provide TS improvements that ensure the plant operates within the bounds of SON's accident analysis as contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and only affects the definitions and does not have any affect on any work performed. The change to core alteration is to clarify those components that may result in reactivity changes. The change will not effect movement of fuel or components that effect reactivity, therefore, a fuel handling accident will not be effected. The change in the definition of quadrant power tilt ratio (QPTR) a' lows the alternate method of determining QPTR to be utilized. The current TS surveillance requirement (SR) and bases allow alternate means for determining QPTR, therefore, revising the definition will have no effect on any accident. The revision to the mode parameters is administrative in nature, therefore it will have no effect on any accident. This change has no impact on accident initiators and does not involve a physical modification to the plant.

Accordingly, the proposed changes do not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

This revision will not change any plant equipment, system configurations, or accident assumptions. This change will better define the associated parameters and will eliminate potential ambiguity and confusion. The change in the definition of core alteration allows components that do not affect reactivity to be moved within the reactor vessel. The change in the definition will not effect the monitoring of QPTR with one channel inoperable. The core will be monitored in accordance with the SRs. Therefore, this change will not affect the safety function of any components and will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes provide improvements for SON's TS. This change does not involve a physical modification to the plant nor change the methods of monitoring plant parameters. Accordingly, the margin of safety has not been reduced.

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