ML20082B854
| ML20082B854 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1991 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082B850 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9107170044 | |
| Download: ML20082B854 (12) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _..... _ _..._. _ ~. _._ _- 6 ATTACHMENT l to JPN 91032 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES REACTOR WATER RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (JPTS 00-017) i i i l l l I i l [ i' New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK 14UCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 i j. 9107170044 910709 1 POR ADOCK 05000333 p FD4 l i J
a f' l l JAFNPP F TABLE 3.2-7 ATWS REClRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 4 i Function Applicable Modes Required Number of ' Trip Seipoint ' Action Operable Channels perTrip System j 1 - Reactor Pressure - High .Run 2 < 1120 psig A, B, or C l 2-Reactor Water Level-Low Low Run 2 1126.5 in. A, B, or C above TAF i [ f i 2 Action A. j When the number of operable channels is one less than the required number of operable channels per trip system for one or both trip systems, restore the inoperable channel to an operable condition within 72 hours. If not restored within_72 hours, place the inoperable channel in a tripped condition within one hour. If placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition would result in a recirculabon pump trip, take 't l Action C. j Action B. [ [ When the number of operable channels is two less than the required number of operable channels per trip system for one or both trip systems,. l either restore at least one channel per trip system to an operable status within one hour or place the inoperable channels in the tripped condition within one hour. If placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition would result in recirculation pump trip, take Action C. 5 ' Action C. { j If Action A or B is not completed within the allowed time, be in the start-up/ hot standby mode within the next six hours. [ Amendment No. 1 1 5 i
i i I l JAFNPP TABLE 4.2-7 l MINIMUM TEST AND CAUBRATION FREQUENCY FOR ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION . FUNCTION CHANNEL. CHANNEL TRIP UNIT CHANNEL SIMULATED AUTO ACTUATION CHECK FUNCTIONAL CAUBRATION CAUBRATION - & LOGIC FUNCTIONALTEST TEST t-1-Reactor Pressure-High Once/ day Once/31 days Once/6 months Once/ Operating Once/ Operating cycle f cycle 2-Reactor Water Level-Low Low Once/ day Once/31 days Once/6 months Orx:e/ Operating Once/@atiig cycle cycle ? 1 - t. t 4 I t Amendment No.[ -
4 ATTACHMENT 11 to JPN 91-032 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES REACTOR WATER RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP INSTRUMENTATION (JPTS-90-017) l New York Power Authority - ' JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 - i
ATTACHMENT ll to JPN 91032 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES PEACTOR WATER RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP INSTRUMENTATION (JPTS-90 017) 1. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed changes to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications (TS) revise pages 77 and 86. Page 77 Revise Table 3.2 7 as follows: Change the title to, "ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip Actuation Instrumentation." Delete column titled, " Total Number of Instrument Channels Provided by Design for Both Channels." Add columns titled, " Applicable Modes" and " Required Number of Operablo Channels por Trip System " Change column titled, ' instrument" to " Function." Change column titled, " Trip Level Setting" to " Trip Setpoint." Replace the Notes for Table 3.2 7 with the following Actions: Action A. When the number of operable channels is one less than the required number of operable channels per trip system for one or both trip systems, restore the inoperable channel to an operable condition within 72 hours. if not restored within 72 hours, place the inoperable channel in a tripped condition within one hour. If plac!ng the inoperable channel in the tripped condition would result in a recirculation pump trip, take Action C. Action B. When the number of operable channals is two less than the required number of operable channels por trip system for one or both trip systems, e.".her restore at least one channel per trip system to an operable status within one hour or place the inoperable channels in the tripped condition within one hour, if placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition would result in recirculation pump trip, take Action C. page 1 of 8
Action C. If Action A or B is not completed within the allowed timo, be in the start up/ hot standby mode within the next six hours. Page 86 Revise Table 4.2 7 as follows: Revise the title to read, " Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip Actuation Instrumentation." Replace columns titled, " Instrument Channel," " Instrument Functional Check," " Calibration Frequency," " Logic System Functional Test," and " Frequency" with columns titled " Function,"
- Channel Chock," " Channel Functional Test," " Trip Unit Calibration," " Channel Calibration," and " Simulated Auto Actuation and Logic Functional Test."
ll. PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES These changos reflect the modification of the reactor water recirculation pump trip logic. They also make the aff~.:ted tables more clear and eastor to use. The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) reactor water recirculation pump trip system provides a way to limit the consequences of a failuro to scram during an anticipated transient. The Authority modified the logic of the rector water recirculation pump trip actuation instrumentation during the 1990 refueling outage to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62. In Reference 1, the NRC approved the now logic and requested an amendment to TS Tables 3.2-7 and 4.2
- to reflect the change. The primary objective of the logic change was to maintain or.mprove reliability of the trip logic while providing a design with on-line testability. FQure 1 is a diagram of the new logic. Figure 2 shows the original logic.
The original logic was 1 out of 2 taken once on reactor low low level or reactor high pressure for each recirculation pump. Each pump had a separate trip system with two channels for level and two channels for pressure. A signal from any one channel would trip one pump. The new logic is 1 out of 2 taken twwo on reactor low low level or reactor high pressure for both pumps. That is, both pumps are tripped together, but they must receive signals from both trip systems. A signal can be generated in either the level trip function or the pressure trip function, but two separate channels must generate the signal to trip the pumps. I l page 2 of 8
4 The actions proposed in Table 3.2 7 provido the following: Action A Action A allows continued operation of the plant in the run mode for 72 hours. This action applies when only one of the two channels in one or both trip systems (I and
- 11) for one or both trip functions (pressure and level) is inoperable (See Figure 1). In I
this condition both trip systems for both trip functions remain capable of performing l their safety function. If tho inoperable channel or channels are not made operablo within the allowed 72 hour period, the inoperable channel must by tripped within the following hour unless tripping the Inoperable channel would trip the reactor water recirculation pumps. If tripping the inoperable channel or channels would result in reactor water rocirculation pump trip, plant operators will take Action C following the 72 hour period. Action C places the plant in a mode in which the safety function is not required. i Action B Action B applies when both channels of one or both trip systems (I and ll) for one or both trip functions (pressure and level) are inoperable (See Figure 1). A trip system with both channels inoperable is allowed to remain in this condition for one hour. Within the one hour, at least one Inoperable channel must be mado operable (thus exiting Action B and making Action A applicablo) or the Inoperable i channels must be tripped to provido the safety function, unless tripping the Inoperable channels would trip the reactor water recirculation pumps. If tripping the Inoperable channels would result in reactor water recirculation pump trip, Action C is taken after the allowed one hour period. As noted above, Action C places the plant in a modo in which the safety function is not required. Action C Action C places the plant in the start-up/ hot standby mode. Operators would take Action C if Actions A or B could not be completed within the allowed timo period or if Actions A or B would result in a reactor water recirculation pump trip. Placing the plant in the start-up/ hot standby mode results in a mode of operation in which the ATWS reactor water recirculation pump trip actuation instrumentation is not required to be operable. From the start-up/ hot standby mode, the plant may be returned to the run mode after both channels of both trip systems for both trip functions are made operable, or the plant may be placed in any other mode in j which the ATWS recirculation pump trip actuation Instrumentation is not required (assuming other technical specification requirements for changing modo are met). page 3 of 8
The requirements in proposed Table 4.2 7 provide the following surveillances: 1. A daily instrument check consistent with other FitzPatrick TS for analog transmitter trip system (ATTS) instruments, e.g., FitzPatrick TS Table 4.2-2 Items 1 and 3b. 2. A channel functional test, i.e., a functional test of the trip unit every 31 days. This is consistent with other FitzPatrick TS and STS associated with ATTS Instruments e.g., FitzPatrick TS Table 4.2-2, items 1 and 3b. 3. Trip unit calibration every six months. This is consistent with other FitzPatrick TS, e.g., Table 4.2-2, Items 1 and 3b and Note 15. 4. A channel calibration once/ cycle. 5. A simulated automatic actuation and logic functional test once/ cycle. 111. SAFETY IMPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES 10 CFR 50.62 provides requirements for reducing risk from ATWS events. The proposed amendment reflects changes to the logic in the reactor water Recirculation Pump Trip system which were made to comply with 10 CFR 50.62. This modification will improve overall system rehability. The changes in the format and content of Tables 3.2-7 and 4.2 7 will also make the technical specifications clearer and easier to use. IV. EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined !n 10 CFR 50.92, since it would not: 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, The proposed changes reflect modifications in the logic of the ATWS reactor water recuculation pump trip system. The logic changes ensure that instrumentation would be available in case of an ATWS event by using a logic design which is reliable and which is testable while the reactor is at power. Requirements for instrument operability and surveillance do not increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident. page 4 of 8 i
~. 2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Tha proposed changes reflect _ modifications in the logic of the A1WS recirculation pump trip system. This new logic cannot contribute to or initiate any new type of plant transient. The requirements for instrument operability and survelilance do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed changes provide operability and surveillance requirements for instrumentation required in case of an ATNS. These changes increase the level of protection provided at the RtzPatrick plant. The operability and surveillance requirements for the new instrumantation are consistent with those previously approved for emergency core cocling system instrumentation at the FitzPatrick plant. V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CH ANGE Implementation of the proposed changes will not adversely affect the ALARA or Fire Protection programs at the RtzPatrick plant, nor will the changes affect the environment. VI. CONCLUSION The changes, as proposed, do not constitute an unroviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. That is, they: 1. will not increase the probabiltty nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report; 2. will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different froin any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report; 3. will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification; and 4. Involve no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92. l page 5 of 8 I
Vll. REFERENCES 1. NRC letter, D. E. LaBarge to J. C. Brons, dated August 13,1990, " Analog Trip Unit Diversity for Anticipated Transients without Scram (ATWS) Rule - James A. FitzPatrick Nucloor Power Plant (TAC 59095)." 2. NYPA Ictter, J. C. Brons to NRC, dated December 28,1990, "New Projects," (JPN 90 078). 3. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 7.9.4.4 and Figure 7.4 9. 4. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Safety Evaluation Report (SER), dated November 20,1972, and Supplements. l l l page 6 of 8 l
- - - -. -. - - ~ I t i FIGURE I. f NEW TRIP LOGIC i l i I i i LEVEL TRIP FUNCTION PRESSURE TRIP FUNCTION - TRIP SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM i I I l Channel Channel Channel Channel i A C A C t TRIP SYSTEM TRIP SYSTTR II II Channel Channel Channel Channel [ B D B D - ;l t i TRIPS BOTH PUMPS TRIPS BOT 11 PUMPS - i .) .i r I i t V page 7 of 8 -{ i l t l + i
i I .i l FICURE II. ORIGINAL TRIP LOGIC I I i LEVEL TRIP FUNCTION PRESSURE TRIP FUNCTION Channel Channel Channel Channel A C A C 1 I J l 3 i N TRIPS PUMP A t LEVEL TRIP FUNCTION PRESSURE TRIP FUNCTION ii: Channel channel Channel' ' Channel l' B D - B D i t l- = 4 -TRIPS PUMP B l t i i-page 8 of 8 I-i .,.,..i, + e y - - -. - ~,. -, ~. - - - - - -.v.. c, . d, m-3 '}}