ML20081C349
| ML20081C349 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1984 |
| From: | Hodder M CENTER FOR NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY, HODDER, M.H. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20081C353 | List: |
| References | |
| 84-496-03-OLA, 84-496-3-OLA, OLA, NUDOCS 8403140017 | |
| Download: ML20081C349 (20) | |
Text
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'84 HM 12 A11:39 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ;-
- e..
re, c' BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARb Before Administrative Judges:
Dr. Robert M.
Lazo, Chairman Dr. Richard F. Cole Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-250 OLA Florida Power & Light Company )
ASLBP No.
8 -496-LA Turkey Point Units #3 and #4
)
March 7, 1984 PETITIONERS RESPONSE TO STAFF AND FLORIDA POWER &
LIGHT RESPONSES TO AMENDED PETITION TO INTERVENE (a)
The petitioners contend that the amendments requested involve a significant hazard consideration, because they will result in an increase in the authorized core peaking factors, an increase in the core power density and an increase in the operating temperature of the fuel.
There can be no lawful issuance of the proposed license amendments before the holding of a formal hearing before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB).
Petitioners have previously noted (Amended Petition to Intervene, P.5, Footnote 2) that because the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) has issued the license amendments Nos. 92 and 98 on December 9, 1983 (noticed in the Federal Register July 20, 1983 48 FR 33080) and Nos. 93 and 99 on December 23, 1983 (noticed in Federal Register October 7, 1983 4 8 FR.4 5862 to facility operatig licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41, the issue raised in Contention (a) can be considered " moot".
As a result, Petitioners have challenged the final agency 8403140017 840307 PDR ADOCK 05000250 b
(2) actions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in case No. 8333370, Center for Nuclear Responsibility In.c s and Joette Lorfon V. U.S., Nuclear -Regulatory Commission and Florida Power and Light Company,in a complaint ffled November 29, 1983 Nevertheless, Petitioners urge the consideration by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) of the issue posed in Contention (a) so as to preservle the issue should administrati$e review be either appropriate or become necessary.
Petitioners urge the Board to issue a declaratory, order which addresses independently (1) the propriety of the no significant safety hazards consideration determination that allowed issuance of the amendments that were made by the NRC Staff on those amendments based on both the July 20, 198'
..d October 7, 1983. Federal Register notices and (2) whether the NRC actions of conducting a hearing on agency action after the fact, -is a denial of due' process of law.
Contentions (b) through (e)
Petitioners have stated on the Record at the Pre-Hearing Conference on February 28, 1984 that they are satisfied with the legal adequacy and basis for contentions [b) through (e) as argued at the PrewHearing Conference and in thesPetitioners' Brief on the Conflict Posed by the Legal Requirement of Timeliness and Eauitable Considerations which is incorporated by reference herein.
Contentions (b) through (e) were prepared with the cooperation and assistance of Petitioners' technical experts.
Petitioners are confident that these Contentions satisfy 10 CFR Part 2 criteria.
-c.
(3)
Contention (b) states:
hether the entirely new ocmputer model used by the utility for calculating reflond portions of the accident meets the Otanission's ECCS Acceptance Criteria:specifically, whether a 2.2% reduction in re-ficod rate is miclaading because for a small decrease in re-flood rate, there results a large increase in fuel tenperature. Re-flood rates are critical if i
below 1 or 2 inches per minute.
Contention (c) states:
Petitioners have been infomad and believe amendment would increase the rod drop time frun 1.8 to 2.4 seconds ( a 33% increase in rod drop time).
Wat increase.would significantly and adversely reduce the safety margin and create the possibility or probability of a new or different kind of an accident whose occurance or consequences have not been analyzed or which may increase the possibility of an accident previously analyzed.
Petitioners contend that Cannission's tentative conclusion that safety l
limits "are met" is not supported by any evidence.
Contention (d) statesr The propo' sed incream in departure in the nucleate boiling ratio IDNBR) would significantly and daversely affect the margin of safety for the operation of the reactors. The restriction of the DNBR safety limit is intended to prevent overheating of the fuel and possible cladding perforation, which would result in the release of fission products frun the fuel, If the minimtIn allowable DENR is reduced frun 1.3 to 1.7 as proposed, this would authorize operstion of the fuel much closer to the upper boundary cf the nucleate boiling regime. Thus, the safety margin will be significantly reduced. Operation above the boundary of nuckeate boiling regime could result in excessive cladding t%atures Mm'e of the departure fran the nucleate boiling (DNB) and the resultant sharp reduction in the heat transfer coefficient hus', the proposed ene-Asit will both significantly reduce the safety margin and significantly increase the possibility of serious consequences fran an accident.
l.
Contention (e) states:
he' increased fuel core ternperatures would reduce safety margins and would result in unam W 1e swellino or bowing of fuel rods. During an accident, fuel rod swelling due to higher. temperatures impedes emergency cooling water flow and increases the probability of fuel rod rupture during an accident.
h is could result in a significant increase in the possibility and/or musequences of an accident.
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(4) -
CONTENTIONS (i) THROUGH (r)
(i) That the FPL Ocarpany be required to meet the requirernents of NRC Report No. NUREG-0609 (Asymetric Blowdown Ioads on PWR Primary Systems, Unresolved Safety Issue A-2) and sul:mit a plant specific analysis to evaluate fuel assembly structural adequacy and the design adequacy of reactor vessel supports and other structures to withstand the loads tier. asyIretric loss of coolant accident forces are taken into account. This is especially important because the new OFA and existing IDPAR fuel assemblies have slightly different structural properties and this mixed configuration should be analyzed for structural adequacy before the amendment is issued.
Contention (i) is based on the concern that the NRC has for the potential of asymetric loads, resulting from rapid depressurization, to affect the structure of a mixed core containing OFA and LOPAR assemblies.
There is a concern on the part of the Petitioners that the mixed core configuration may be structurally inadequate to cope with such an incident and that the potential for asymetric loads, which could be increased by the mixed design, may damage systems designed to cool the core; affect the capability of the control. rods to function properly; and/or damage other reactor systems primary components, including the reactor pressure vessel.
Plant specific analyses of the mixed core and fuel core design modifications should be mada before operation is allowed to continue, since any of the above could result in a serious accident and release of radioactivity to the environment.
Petitioners have not merely paraphrased the NRC SER but rather base their contention on NUREG-0609 (Asymetric Blowdown Loads on PWR Primary Systems, Unresolved Safety Issue A-2).
(j) That the reduction in guide tlumble rod control cluster (BCC) rodlet clearance will have an adverse effect on the extent of guide tube weru and consequently, the structural integrity.of the 15 x 15 OFA will not be maintained with respect ot the load carrying capability of the guide thimble tubes and "scramability'! will be jeopardized. This coald lead to the inability of the reactor to shutdown and increase the possibility of an accident other than those accidents previously evaluated n,
(5) or analyzed. This increase in risk that accidents, such as an antici-pated transient without scram might occur should require that FPL perform a PPA of the increased risk of such accidents occurring at Turkey Point 3 and 4.
Contention (j) is based on the concern that the reduction in rod control cluster clearance (RCC) could cause the guide tube wear to increase over time (because of increased friction) and that this in turn could jeopardize the structural integrity of the OFA design and in turn jeopardize "scramability".
This could in turn increase the chances of a feared reactor accident
- Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) occurring.
In some anticipated transients, rapidly shutting down the nuclear reaction (initiating a " scram"), and rapidly reducing the reaction in the core is an important safety measure.
If there were a potentially severe tran-sient and the reactor did.not scram, there is a possibility that one would not be able to control a reactor accident.
In the past the Staff has excluded low probability events, such as ATWS, from the design basis.
However, since FPL is increasing the probability of such an incident, they should be forced to assess the consequences of an ATWS before they are allowed to change the fuel core design.
Such consideration is mandated because.it constitutes a different accident from any accident previously evaluated.
(k) Whether hydraulic cartpatability exists between the OFA and IDPAR assemblies and whether the hydraulic flow conditions due to cross-i flow b3 tween fuel assemblies will adversely affect lift forces, pressure j
drops, cross flow and fuel vibrations, and fuel rod clad wear.
Contention (k) addresses the possibility that the mixed fuel core assemblies may be incompatible hydraulically and that this
- =
will adversely affect the structural adequacies of the new fuel re 5L core design and could increase the possibility of an accident.
The G.
thermal-hydraulic analysis perfcrmed by FPL and the NRC uses the
,e iF
(6) same methods described in the FINAL SAPETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR) which was based on a homogenous full core of either LOPAR or OFA, rather than a mixed fuel assembly.
No data basis or long term experience in the field or laboratory exists to show that the mixed design is compatible, indicating that the NRC cannot state with certainty that hydraulic mixing will not adversely affect lift forces, pressure drops, cross flow and fuel vibrations, and fuel rod clad wear.
(1) 'Ihat the use of the Zircaloy grid will increase the anount of Zircaloy that can react chamielly with water or steam and impede the acceptance criteria of ECCS in 10 CFR 50.46.
Contention (1) is based on the fact that Zircaloy reacts chemically with water or steam to form hydrogen.
This could be especially significant in a nuclear accident such as the one at Three Mile Island in which hydrogen buildup impeded safety systems and directly endangered public health and safety.
(m) That the demonstration experience with 17 x 17 OFA containing Zircaloy grids does not provide evidence of the satisfactory operation of the 15 x 15 OFA Zircaloy gride and that a plant specific analysis taking into account the deterioraced condition of the Turkey Point pressure vessel should be performed before the new fuel core design is inplemented.~
i Contention (m) advocates that any consideration of the new j
fuel core design at Turkey Point should be analyzed on a plant f
specific, not generic, basis and that a safety analysis, which
[
considers the deteriorated condition of Turkey Point should be performed.
This is based on the fact that although the 15 x 15 b
OFA and 17 x 17 OFA are similar, they are not identical and thus cannot be properly substituted one for the other in any safety h
analyses that are performed.
(n)
That as indicatei in the Standard Review Plan Section 4.2.I.I.D.3.,
a post irradiation fuel surveillance program should be established at Turkey Point to detect anamolies in the fuel.
A similar program should be inplemented for the WABA rods.
Contention (n) is based on the need for a post irradiation fuel b
surveillance program,
=
since Turkey Point will be running at higher E
2 z
5 (7) peak heat temperatures for longer periods of time.
Surveillance would be important in detecting anomolies in the fuel which could lead to fuel. failure and release fission products to the environment.
This is relevant to safety of operation, fuel storage,and fuel transportation.
(o)
'Ihat inservice inspection program be implenented to mnitor the deterioration in the pressure vessels in Turkey Point Units 3 ard 4.
Contention (o) asks that Turkey Point be required to shu.
down every six or twelve months (more frequently than the current eighteen month cycle) for inservice inspection to check for flaws in the reactor pressure vessel.
This program, like the inspection program that was initiated for steam generator degradation, would help detect minor flaws that if left unnoticed could lead to a crack in the pressure vessel.
Such a program might decrease the possibility of pressure vessel rupture occurring.
(p)
That the new fuel core design coupled with the eighteen mmth fuel cycle recently adopted by FPL will, and has caused an increase in radioactive iodine and a higher coolant activity at Turkey Ibint as a result of fuel failure and that this increased activity in the primary system and four fold increase in radiciodine poses a threat to the health and safety of nuclear workers during refueling and maintenance of Turkep Point and is not in crrnpliance with the requirements of 10 T R Part 20, 50, 51 and 100.
Contention (p) is based on the Technical Specification Changes granted on an emergency basis in August 1983 (see Footnot.e 2 supra) allowing a 400% increase in radioiodine and other coolant activity at Turkey Point.
As a basis for the amendment FPL refers to a fuel failure being experienced at similar PWR facilities.
The amendments were granted for both Turkey Point Units on an emergency basis with no public notice or review.
The emergency was alleged to have existed only at Unit 3, yet both Units received amendments.
Since the eighteen month cycle exposes the fuel to greater thermal pressures,it is reasonable
(8) to assume that this could cause increased wear on the fuel cladding resulting in increased fuel failure and release of radioactivity to the environment.
Adverse effects on workers have already been observed at Turkey Point.
On October 8/83 the Miami News reported that approximately one hundred workers were exposed to dangerous amounts of radioiodine gas for a three hour period.
This exposure.to radioactive iodine 131 should not be taken lightly.
According to Dr. Karl D. Morgan, who chaired an international council on radio-protection, says
" Iodine 131 primarily irradiates the thyroid gland and it can lead to thyroid cancer... any exposure has some risk."
Thus compliance with 10 CFR, Part 50, 100 criteria on permissible levels of radioiodine and other primary activity raises significant and unanswered issues of safety.
(q) That the increase in radiciodine and higher coolant activity poses a danger in the form of offsite releases that will not be in ocmplance with 10 CFR Parts 20, 50, 51, 100, NEPA, or the PWPCA and will pose a danger to the health and safety of the public and the Biscayne Bay environment.
Contention (q) is also based on the concern about increased radiciodine and other activity in'the primary system of the reactor.1
.In the Final Environmental Statement,for the Turkey Point plant issued in July of 1972, the AEC staff estimated radiation doses 1.
Increased generation of airborne and waterborne radioactive' effluents becmes all the more significant in light of an FPL request (sulmitted September 26, 1983) for an operating license Emiurdre.nt allowing deletion of certain aspects of their radiological environmental monitoring program, including scne aspects of airborne monitoring, precipitation monitoring and testing at sample locaticms for foodstuffs, water, etc. According to the NBC Turkey Point Project manager Dan MacDonald, the September 26, 1983 request has not yet been advertised in the Federal Register. Thus, an increase in radioactive iodine 131 or other radioactive isotopes could build up in the vicinity of tha plant and not be discovered. This is especially dangerous to people living nearby who derive a large part of their animal protein frcm fish in the area of Turkey Point, eat vegetable produce grown in the area, and breathe the air. Such an increase in risk of accidental exposure to radia6 ion could result in nonompliance with 10 CFR Parts 20, 50, and 100.that could escape timely notice.
(9) to persons in the environs of the Turkey Point plant from the gaseous effluent release rates given in Section III.D.2.
Since this data has changed significantly, along with the demographics of the area, a new dose assessment for the people living,-working and. recreating in the vicinity of the plant should be performed, taking into account the increased amounts of radioactivity, to see if FPL will comply.with NRC and EPA' guidelines for radiation doses to the workus, members of the public,and the environment.
According 4
to EPA 40 CFR 190, " Environmental Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Operation of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle",
the largest potential contributor of radiation to the individual is via airborne release, with over 90% of all pathways to environ-i ment, including air, water and foodstuffs, resulting from airborne transport of effluent.
This is especially significant in light of-the fact that a 400% increase in allowable limits of radioactive l
. iodine 131 gas will increase the amount of this gas that is released to the site environs.
The workers, the public and the environment could be exposed to. levels of radiation in excess
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i of 10 CFR 20, 50, and 100.
A threat could also be posed to the l
l fragile Biscayne Bay environment and the National Parks and endangered species-therein and be in violation of the Federal Water Pollution r
l Control Act (FWPCA) if the radioactivity becomes waterborne.
l (r)
That the new eighteen month fuel cycle.at Turkey Point, in light of the inpaired condition of the pressure vessels and increased heat peak
. factor, poses a danger of fuel failure and that Turkey Point Unit 3 and 4 should'be returned to the traditional 12 month refuelling cycle.
[
Contention (r) is based on the March 25, 1983 letter from
(
Robert E. Uhrig, FPL, to Steven A. Varga, NRC, which contains FPL's i
l program to resolve pressurized thermal shock in Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
Attatchment B, Section.5, (Chronological Appendix 9) states, "as a-general point, annual cycles can achieve lower vessel flux levels l
l-
(10) because of the greater inherent operating margin to LOCA and DNB limits.
The lower number of feed Assemblies increases the designers flexibility.in ~ shif ting power away from the core flats."-
Thus, it is clear that a 12 month cycle can increase the rate of. vessel flux reduction and that the use of an eighteen month cycle is based purely on considerations of economic profitability.
A 12 month fuel cycle, with in-service inspections, enhances the safe ope' ration of the reactor because it exposes the fuel rods to less wear and tear, poses less of a danger of fuel failure, and increases the probability that a pressure vessel rupture might be mitigated.
We contend that FPL, purely for economic reasons unrelated to reactor safety, switched to a longer duration fuel cycle at a time when the impaired condition of the reactor vessel should cause them to inspect the fuel at more frequent, rather than less frequent intervals, Petitioners submit that the 18 month cycle poses an increased threat to public health and safety because it allows the fuel to be exposed to higher temperatures for longer periods of time, thus increasing the chance of fuel failure and because the greater intervals between reactor reload and maintenance mitigate against the. adequate surveillance of the embrittled reactor pressure vessels and inherent fuel core problems.
(11)
BEYOND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT and NEPA CONTENTICNJ Petitioners' proposed contention (f) states:
(f)
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA")
imposes the requirement of an Environmental ImpactStatement
("EIS") for this proposed major federal action.
Petitioners' proposed contention (g) states:
(g)
A NEPA cost-benefit analysis would probably establish that the preferred solution to the problem of pressurized thermal shock (PTS) and the impaired reactor pressure vessels could be better ahcieved by premature decommissioning or by derating the reactors' power levels.
A full hearing is necessary to determine what, if any percent of deration would achieve safe levels of operation.
Petitioners' proposed contention (h) raises an issue as to:-
(h)
Whether the determination of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the final environmental impact statement for the Turkey Point Nuclear Plants, issued in July 1972, that accidents beyond the design basis of the plants (then Class 9) pursuant tv p.roposed Annex A to Appendix D, 10 CFR 50, 36 Federal Register 22851, December 1, 1971, have a probability of occurence so low that their environmental risk is propor-tionately low and that they need not be considered in the Final Environmental Statement or its supplements is still a valid judgment in light of the reactor pressure vessel embrittlement being presently experienced by the Turkey Point Power Plants.
While issuing a series of operating license amendments without the reviews required by federal law the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is engaged in a major federal action or " program" at the Turkey Point l
l Nuclear Power Plants.
That federal program is denominated the l
" Integrated Program for Vessel Flux Reduction".2/
l 2/ See NRC letter of December 23, 1983 from Daniel G. Mcdonald to Dr.
Robert E. Uhrig, Florida Power and Light Company accompanying Amendment l
No. 99 to facility operating License DPR-31 and Amendment No. 93 to facility operating License DPR-41; Also see letter of December 9, 1983 l
, Mcdonald to Uhrig issuing License Amendments 92 and 98 to the same l
respective operating licenses.
Also see Safety Evaluation related to facility operating license amendments No. 95 to DPR-31 and No. 89 to DPR-41 where a fourfold increase in the tolerable radioactivity at the i
Turkey Point Plants was allowed by changing the Technical Specifications on radiciodine.
The amendments were issued thirteen days after they were requested by the Licensee on an emergency basis.
They were issued without notice to members of the public.
Since the emergency basis for l
no public notice was alleg2d to exist only at Turkey Point Unit 3, the l
issuance of the amendment for Unit 4 where no emergency existed was i
improper and unlawful.
(12)
The existence of the reactor pressure vessel embrittlement problem and pressurized thermal shock has been known to exist at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plants since at least as early as 1977.
(See attached Chronological Appendix of Commission and FPL Responses to PTS problem.)
In a letter dated April 10, 1981 Demetrios L.
Basdekas, a NRC Reactor Safety Engineer, wrote the Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, warning that there could occur a catastrophic " fracturing of a reactor pressure vessel that has been exposed to a neutron fluence corresponding to only a few full power years equivalent operation (FPYE) and has a high copper content of about 0.4% in its welds".
He explained that "a reactor vessel fracture (is) one of the most serious accidents a reactor may experience.
Depending upon its location and mode, it is almost certain that it will cause a core meltdown with all its public health and safety ramifications."
Mr. Basdekas continued:
taking the approach that if we err we should err in the direction of safety, it is apparent to me that those PWR's with nigh copper alloy welds that have operated four FPYE must be shut down until this matter is resolved in the technical area... " 3/
The Commission's first major response was the Policy Issue SECY-81-286 (Chronological Appendix 2) in which it publicly recognized the reactor pressure vessel embrittlement problem and announced plans for dealing with it on a generic basis.
The Commission failed to meet its continuing responsibility under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 42 USC 4321 et. seg. (NEPA) to invoke its NEPA processes with hearing opportunities 3/ FPL reports:
As of January 1, 1983 Unit 4 has accumulated 6.37 (figure 3.1) EFPY and Unit 3 slightly less - Letter Dr. Uhrig, FPL to Varga NRC March 25, 1983.
Attachment B, Vessel Flux Reduction Program, Page 13 (Chronological Appendix 9).
l
(13) for interested members of the public and the requirement of a new or supplemental Environmental Impact Statement JEIS) in lfght-of the "significant new circu~ stances"' posed by the reactor pressu~re vessel m
embrittlement and pressutized thermal shock IPTS).
When new information comes to light the agency mu'st consider it, evaluate it and make a reasoned determination whether it is of such significance as to require implementation of formal NEPA filing procedures".
ss
' Warm Springs Dam Task' Force V'.-Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1024 19th Cir 1980)
The NEPA responsibilities of the commission are s
ongoingr "The Commission's NEPA responsibilities did not come to an end when it' prepared an initial EISr the " continuing activity of regulating TMI is federal aciton within the scope of NEPA.
' People'Against Nudlear Energy V. NRC - F.2d - D.C. Cir. 1982.
A reading of the Policy Issue SECY-81-286 becomes a chilling experience When it deals with the Rancho Seco Tr-nsient and thereby gives u~s a full understanding of the concerns expressed by the NRC Reactor Safety engineer, Mr. Basdekas. A supplement entitled
' Preliminary Assessment of Thermal Shock to PWR Reactor Pressure Vessels,, a most frightening revelation, states:
t "At Rancho Seco.s. on March 20',
1978..
(occurred)... the most severe over cooling transient experienced by any PWR:
in the U.S."'
The Commission's Executive Director for Operations indicated to the Commissioners that-One of the results of a recent fracture mechanical analysis carried out by the ORNL { Oak Ridge National Laboratories) indicated that if the Rancho Seco transient had occurred after ten effective full power years (more than twice its current level), the probability of failure of the Rancho Seco vessel would have been very high.
-SECY-81-21-286 The "recent analyses" conducted by the Oak Ridge Laboratories coupled with the high probability of a Rancho Seco type accident
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8 (14) constitutes a "significant new development" involving the Commission's a
NEPA responsibilities.
The Commission has consistently failed to invoke the NEPA process while implementing a new major federal action to deal with the PTS problem incrementally and in a manner designed to escape regulatory review.4/
~
The next response of the Commission came on August 21, 1981 in a letter from Daniel G. Eisenbutt, Director, Division of Licensing, ONRR, NRC, to Dr. Robert Uhrig, V.P. FPL (Chronological Appendix 4).
In this letter, the Commission shifted the handling of the pressure vessel and PTS problem from the previously declared generic basis to a site-specific mode of handling.
The letter indicated that " reductions in fracture toughness for some RPV's (Turkey Point is named as one in the letter) are approaching levels of concern."
By January 25, 1983 the FPL had met with the NRC staff to devise plans and schedules for resolving th7 PTS problem at Turkey Point (Chronological Appendix 7).
This meeting and the FPL Flux Reduction Program is amply referenced in the March 25, 1983 letter of FPL's Dr. Uhrig to Varga, NRC.
That letter had two 4/ The NRC's PTS Report of 11-13-82 states:
Core Melt - The core melt safety goal guideline states, "The likelihood of a nuclear reactor accident that results in a large scale core melt should normally be less than one in 10,000 per year of reactor operation."
ascribable to one sequence,This suggests that the core melt frequency for example PTS, should not exceed approximately 10-5 per reactor year.
Because of the unusually large uncertaintyintheriskestimationgorPTS,comparedtoother sequences, a value of less than 10-might be well assigned for as a goal for PTS.
We have not done this in the discussion in this section but have used 10-5 The reader should keep in mind that the risk number of PTS given in the following discussion are highly uncertain.
We have no technical analysis of the course and consequences of a PTS sequence L
that involves RPV failure.
NRC Staff PTS Report Nov. 82 (Chronological l
Appendix 5).
(15) attachments: A
'"Present Plant Status" and B
" Vessel Flux Reduction Program".
The major federal program represented by the
" Vessel Flux Reduction Program" includes the following as " increments" of the plan:
1.
Increased duration of fuel cycle.
Change from twelve to eighteen months.
Attachment B, part 3.
2.
Cycle 9 March 1982 utilization of " Modified low leakage" loading pattern.
Attachment B, part 4.
3.
Utilization of dummy assemblies possibly as early as 1986.
Attachment B, part 4.
4.
Fuel Core Design Change.
Attachment B, part 5.
5.
Technical Specification Changes required by third quarter of 1983.
Attachment B, part 5.
6.
Enrichment of the amount of U-235 loaded in the core.
Attachment B, part 5.
7.
In situ annealing.
It is these actions discussed by FPL with the Staff in Bethesda, Maryland on January 25, 1983 announced in the form of a plan in the March 25, 1983 letter of Uhrig to Varga and reinforced by the subsequent communications between FPL and the Staff of June 3, 1983 (Appendix 10), July 6, 1983 (Appendix 11), August 11, 1983 (Appendix 11),
August 19, 1983 (Appendix 12) and September 9, 1983 (Appendix 13) all taken with the SERs accompanying the license amendment of December 9, 1983 (Appendix 15) and December 23, 1983 (Appendix 16) that outline in detail all the segments of the NRC-FPL scheme to implement a major federal action known as a " Flux Reduction Program".
Federal Law provides:
SEC. 102.
The Congress authorizas and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:. (1) the policies, regulations and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall -
(A) Utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decision-making which may have an impact on man's environment; (B) Identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations; l
(16)
(C) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i)The environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) Alternatives to the proposed action, (iv)The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
- National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub L.91-190, 42 USC 4321-4347, as amended.
When a federal agency identifies a chain of components such as the " Flux Reduction Program", a program statement and an Environmental Impact Statement are required:
Individual actions that are related either geographically or as logical parts in a chain of contemplated actions may be more appropriately evaluated in a single, program statement.
Such a statement also appears appropriate in connection with... the development of a new program that contemplates a number of subsequent actions...
- Council on Economic Quality (CEQ) Memorandum to Federal Agencies on Procedures for Improving Environmental Impact Statements (May 16, 1972) BNA Environment Reports 82, 87.
CEQ Third Annual Report 233-234 August 1972 Development of a Technology serves as much to affect the environment as does a Commission decision granting a construction permit for a Specific Plant.
I
- Scientists Institute for Public Information (SIPI)
Inc. V. Atomic Energy Commission 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The SIPI V. AEC case addressed the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) program of the AEC.
J. Skelly Wright Chief Judge wrote:
We hold that the Commission's program comes within both the letter and the spirit of SEction 102 (C)
(of NEPA) and that a detailed statement about the program, its environmental impact and alternatives thereto is presently reauired**
- Emphasis supplied SIPI V. AEC supra.
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(17)
Clearly the technological program being implemented by the NRC to achieve " Vessel Flux Reduction" is no different in either its NEPA requirements or its intrinsic nature than the LMFBR program.
What is different is the Commission's method of implementing the program.
They have issued amendments in a manner designed to escape formal agency review by fragmentation of the process.of issuing amendments, and an overall failure to disclose and acknowledge generally, that a new experiment in " Vessel Flux Reduction" is being conducted in the field rather than in the laboratory where it belongs.
The pressure vessel problem at Turkey Point falls into a worst case category among some 82 operating U.S. reactors.
The Commission, by its own recognition, has designated their handling here to be site-specific rather than generic 5/which could be the subject of rulemaking.
Without the procedural protection of the rulemaking proceedings the Board must acknowledge that the program being permitted here is one that comes within the " spirit and intent" of Section 102 JC) of the National Enyironmental Policy Act of 1963..
The Licensing Board should order that the NEPA and Beyond Design Basis Accident Contentions (f, g, and'h) are fairly presented 1
5/ On February 25, 1983 - after agreeing on the FPL Flux Reduction l
Program at a Bethesda meeting January 25, 1983 (Appendix 7) the NRC also implemented in SECY-83-79 a direction to the Staff to l
develop a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Appendix 8).
On October 17, 1983 Richard P. Levi, USNRC, OGC, advised Petitioners'- Counsel:
"The Staff has developed a draft proposed rulemaking which is currently pending before the Commission."
Letter Levi to M.H. Hodder 10-17-83.
l l
t e
(18) for litigation in this license amendment proceeding.
CONCLUSION The Nuclear Regulatory Commission by issuing operating license amendments to the Florida Power and Light Company without the reviews required by federal law continues to conduct a major federal action illegally.
It has repeatedly granted amendments to the Turkey Point Nuclear Plants operating licenses that involved sienificant reductions in previous margins of safety that the Commission itself had originally established.
It has done so with the full knowledge that the reactor pressure vessel embrittlement at those nuclear plants poses significant and unresolved safety hazards and threatens potentially catastrophic damage.
It has done so acknowledging that over pressurization accidents, the initiating event in Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS), is a credible and frequent event.
It has unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed taking action required by the National Environmental Policy and Atomic Energy Acts.
It has conducted agency business laulessly, unlawfully and improperly while denying due process of law to members of the public who may be adversely affected by its agency misconduct.
The Board should issue a ruling allowing all of Petitioners' contentions which recognizes that the Integrated Program for Vessel Flux Reduction at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plants is a major federal action under NEPA which requires full NEPA review including an Environmental Impact Statement and that the license amendments sought and obtained in these proceedings are but increments of that major
(19) federal program and are therefore subject to all of the Commission's NEPA processes.
Re.=pectfully Submitted, l
Martin H. Hodder 1131 NE 86 Street Miami, Fl. 33138 Telephone: (305) 751-8706 Attorney for the Center for Nuclear Responsibility and Joette Lorion Dated: March 7, 1984 a---
- - -.,, ~
e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-250 OLA Florida Power & Light Company
)
50-251 OLA Turkey Point Units #3 & #4
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the " Petitioners' Response to Staff and Florida Power & Light Responses to Amended Petition to Intervene" have been served on the following parties by deposit in the United States Mail, first class, this eighth of March, 1984.
Dr. Robert M. Lazo, Chairman Norman A. Coll, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Steel, Hector & Davis U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 100 S. Biscayne Blvd.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Miami, F1. 33131 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Harold F. Reis. Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing _ Board Lowenstein, Newman, Reis &
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Axlerod Washington, D.C.
20555 1025 Connecticut Ave. NW Washington, D.C. 20036 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
\\
Colleen Woodhead, Esq.
f U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 l
(-
V Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary Martin H. Hodder U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attorney for Center for Nuclear Washington, D.C.
20555 Responsibility and Joette Lorion
.