ML20080Q349

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Second Interim Deficiency Rept,Items 95 & 72 & Part 21 Rept Re Shop Welding Deficiencies in Seismic I Pipe Hangers Supplied by Bergen-Paterson.Initially Reported on 820813 & 1105.All Active Hangers Corrected
ML20080Q349
Person / Time
Site: Harris  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/03/1983
From: Parsons R
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
CON-NRC-126, REF-PT21-83 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8310120367
Download: ML20080Q349 (5)


Text

r CD&L Carolina Power & Light Company 83 atf8=f3?ff===

P. O. Box 101, New Hill, N. C. 27562 October 3,1983 Mr. James P. O'Reilly NRC-126 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Northwest (Suite 2900)

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1986 900,000 KW - UNITS 1 & 2 SHOP WELDING DEFICIENCIES IN SEISMIC I PIPE HANGERS SUPPLIED BY BERGEN-PATERSON, ITEM 95 UNDERSIZE SKEWED TEE FILLET WELDS ON SEISMIC I PIPE HANGERS, ITEM 72

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Attached is our second interim report on the subject items which were deemed reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21, on August 13, 1982 (Item 95) and November 5,1982 (Item 72). Carolina Power and Light Company is pursuing this matter, and it is currently projected that corrective action and submission of the final report will be accomplished by December 1,1984.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Yours very truly,

W/

R. M. Parsons Project General Manager Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant RMP/sh Attachment ec: Messrs. G. Maxwell /R. Prevatte (NRC-SHNPP)

Mr. R. C. DeYoung (NRC) 8310120367 B31003 PDR ADOCK 05000400 OFFICI Ai> COPY S PDR ~

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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS NOS.1 AND 2 INTERIM REPORT NO. 2 SHOP WELDING DEFICIENCIES IN SEISMIC I PIPE HANGERS SUPPLIED BY BERGEN-PATERSGN ITEM 95 UNDERSIZE SKEWED TEE FILLET WELDS ON

, SEISMIC I PIPE HANGERS ITEM 72 i

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1983 l

l REPORTABLE UNDER IOCFR50.55(e)

REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR21 l

m

SUBJECT:

Deficient shop welds on pipe hangers previously accepted by Bergen-Paterson (B-P) and Ebasco Welding Inspectors.

ITEM: - Seismic Pipe Hangers SUPPLIED BY: Bergen-Paterson Pipe Support Corporation, Laconia, New Hampshire NATURE OF DEFICIENCY:

1. Missing and undersized welds
2. Cosmetic weld defects
3. Undersized skewed tee welds
4. Deficient welds accepted by B-P l inspectors and Ebasco Vendor Quality Assurance (VQA) inspectors DATE PROBLEM

-OCCURRED: Prior to October 1,1982 DATE PROBLEM REPORTED: On August 13,1982 CP&L (Mr. N. J. Chiangi) notified the NRC (Mr. A. Hardin) that this item (Item 95) was reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21. In our November 5,1982 letter, CP&L (Mr. R. M. Parsons) notified the NRC (Mr. J. P.

O'Reilly) that this item (Item 72) was reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21.

SCOPE OF PROBLEM: Seismic Category I pipe hangers which were inspected at the source of fabrication prior to October 1,1982.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS: Deficient welds could cause a safety-related pipe hanger to fail under seismic conditions. As a result, if not corrected, they could adversely affect the safe operation of this facility.

However, no hangers evaluated to date with the above type deficiencies have been found to adversely affect the safe operation of this facility.

1 REASON THE DEFICIENCY IS REPORTABLE: The conditions reported in Item 95 and Item 72 represent breakdowns in B-P and Ebasco QA programs which allowed supports to be shipped with welds which were not in accordance with design criteria. This incident was identified as reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21, due to the extensive evaluation required and the breakdown in the QA programs.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1. Hangers with shop weld deficiencies were identified during the following processes:

A. Receipt Inspection.

B. Inspection in the warehouse prior to hanger inssuance to the field.

C. Inspection in the field of installed hangers which had not been previously inspected by CP&L for shop weld deficiencies (does not include those hangers that were in Reinspection - See D).

_; CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont'd.):

D. Reinspection of pipe hangers that were installed or partially installed and inspected prior to June 26, 1982. This includes the 347 hangers which were ,

r previously reinspected as part of the Corrective Action to NRC Report 50-400/82-03. The June 26, 1982 date was selected because the QC weld inspection program was expanded to include shop welds. 346 hangers which had been installed and inspected prior to June 26,1982 were removed, voided, or declassified to non-seismic by a subsequent drawing revision and therefore were not reinspected.

2. 449 hangers with defective shop welds were identified by processes A and B (see above). '

1862 hangers were reinspected by Processes C and D. 728 were identified with shop weld deficiencies.

Deficiencies were resolved as follows:

Welds were cut out.

. Design drawing revisions were issued as a result of Engineering evaluation.

Welds were reworked and upgraded to meet the I

acceptance criteria of FCR-H-979.

Some hangers were on hold due to engineering problems which precluded rework at this time.

These hangers will be dispositioned in accordance with the appropriate drawing revision when the engineering holds are removed.

3. Instruction measures have been established to control pipe hangers which have not been installed but were received prior to October 1,1982. We have taken the option to inspect shop welds prior to issue from the warehouse or to inspect shop welds at the same time field welds are inspected. Defective welds will be identified on DDR's for control and evaluation.

I PREVENTIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER NONCOMPLIANCE: 1. Field Change Request (FCR) H-979 was developed and issued to provide weld inspection acceptance criteria for both field and shop welds based on the AWS Dl.1 code and B-P design criteria.

2. Ebasco VQA began performing in-process inspections and 100% inspection of hanger welds on October 1,1982. This is to be performed throughout the remainder of the B-P purchase order.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER NONCOMPLIANCE (cont'd.)

3. Ebasco VQA management regularly visits the B-P Laconia facility to confer with the Ebasco VQA representative and to witness the VQA inspector's activities.
4. B-P welders and inspectors and Ebasco VQA inspectors have received additional training in weld acceptance criteria.
5. 100% shop weld inspection is presently being performed on site for hangers received from B-P to ensure this problem does not reoccur.

FINAL REPORT: Corrective action has been completed on all active hangers.

Those hangers on engineering hold will be reinspected and reworked when they become active again, or they will be cancelled if they are voided. For this reason, we cannot close this item until December 1,1984.

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