ML20080L750
| ML20080L750 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Washington Public Power Supply System |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1983 |
| From: | BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080L742 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-TM BAW-1762, BAW-1762-R01, BAW-1762-R1, GL-82-14, NUDOCS 8310030306 | |
| Download: ML20080L750 (41) | |
Text
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BAW-1762, Rev.1 June 1983 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM RELIABILITY STUDY FOR THE WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM'S UNIT WNP-1 r
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BABC0CK & WILC0X Utility Power Generation Division P. O. Box 1260 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 8310030306 830923 Babcock &Wilcox PDR ADOCK 05000460
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
/ ABSTRACT I
This report summarizes the methods employed and the results obtained in the reliability analysis of the WNP-1 auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS) and its associated controls.
The report conclusions demonstrate that the WNP-1 AFWS is reliably designed. The study had three objectives:
1.
To perform a detailed reliability analysis of the AFWS and its controls.
2.
To identify dominant contributors to system unavailability.
3.
To ensure that the reliability analysis fulfills the require-ments of NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.1.
Two analytical methods were used - failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis.
The FMEA was used to determine the effects of single component failures on AFWS operation, while fault true analysis determined system failure probability.
The probabilities of the system failing to initiate when required and failing to properly control AFW flow after initia-tion were detennined.
In addressing the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.1, an evaluation was performed according to Standard Review Plan 10.4.9.
The SRP requires that 50%
of AFWS design fl ow (equival ent to one half-size motor-driven pump) be achi eved.
Although the SRP is not specific, it was assumed that this require-ment applied to the loss of main feedwater (LOFW) initiating event.
Using this definition of success, the unreliability of the AFWS was calculated to be 5.1 x 10-5 per demand.
This meets the goal of 10-4 to 10-5 set forth in SRP 10.4.9.
Other event scenarios were analyzed for initiation failure.
For these scenar-ios the success defintion was changed to 100% of design flow, a more restric-tive requi rement that is consistent with the assumptions used in previous safety analyses.
The failure probability was determined for five scenarios:
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l 1.
Loss of. In feedwater, all power assumed to be available -
4.0 x 10- per demand.
2.
Loss of main feedwater concurrent with a loss of offsite power - 5.2 x 10-4 per demand.
3.
Loss of main feedwater concurrent with a loss of all non-backed a-c power - 1.2 x 10-2 per demand.
4.
Fully autgmatic initiation, power distribution system modeled -
4.7 x 10-4 pc' demand.
tribution system modeled - 3.1 x 10 give actions, power dis-Initiation including operator correc 5.
per demand.
The probability of the AFWS failing to properly control the steam generator level after initiation was also evaluated.
Two scenarios were evaluated for control failure - totally automatic control and control allowing operator in-tervention.
The system failure probabilities were calculated to be 1.3 x 10-2 per AFW demand (automatic) and 2.5 x 10-6 per AFW demand (wi th operator intervention).
In conclusion, the results of this analysis have shown that the WNP-1 AFWS and associated controls are reliably designed.
Additionally, the results of this analysis have shown that the potential failures that could result from human errors, common causes, single-point vulnerabilities, and test and maintenance outages, as mentioned in Item II.E.1.1. of NUREG-0737, are acceptably small.
Babcock & Wilcox
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CONTENTS Page 1.
I NTR OD UCT I O N...........................
1 2.
DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS 2
2.1.
Syst ems Incl uded......................
2 2.2.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.............
2 2.3.
Fault Tree Analysis 2
2.4.
Human Rel i abil i ty Anal ys i s.................
3
- 2. 5.
Fa i l u re Da t a........................
3 2.6.
Assumptions 3
- 2. 7.
Mission Success Definition.................
4 2.8.
Event Scenarios Considered.................
4 3.
RESULTS 6
4.
CONCLUSIONS 8
5.
R EF E R E NC E S............................
13 APPENDIXES A.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis............
A-1 B.
Fault Trees B-1 C.
Huma n Rel i abil i ty Ana y r i s................
C-1 D.
Fa il u re Da t a.......................
D-1 List of Tables Tabl e 1.
Unavailabilities for WNP-1 AFW System 9
l List of Figures 4
Figure L
1.
Ef fect of SRP Definition of System Success...........
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I 1.
INTRODUCTION l
l Following the loss-of-coolant accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 f acil-ity, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requested upgrades to improve the.re-liability of auxiliary feedwater systems (AFWS).
These upgrades are primari-ly intended to improve the sensitivity of once-through steam generators to feedwater upsets.
The WNP-1 AFWC and its associated controls have been modified to meet these objectives.
The reliability of the upgraded system has been evaluated, and the methods and results are summarized in this report.
The objectives of the analysis were as follows:
1.
To perform a detailed evaluation of the reliability of the AFWS and associated control systems.
2.
To identify the dominant contributors to system unavailability.
3.
To ensure that the reliability analysis fulfills the require-ments of NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.1.
Two methods were used to evaluate the reliability of the AFWS - failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis.
The results of these analyses include the dominant contributors to system failure.
Section 2 de-scribes the analytical methods; sections 3 and 4 discuss results and conclu-sions.
l Babcock & Wilcox
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2.
DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSES 2.1.
Systems Included The reliability analysis was perfonned on the AFWS, the portion of the essen-tial controls and instrumentation (ECI) system that controls it, and the portion of the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) that inter-acts with the ECI system to properly control AFW.
The plant power distribu-tion buses feeding these systems are also included in the analysis.
Refer-ences 1 and 2 describe in detail the systems included in the analysis.
Figure 1 is a simplified drawing of the AFWS.
The actual hardware design of the improved AFW initiation and control system was not available at the time this analysis was prepared.
Design assumptions were made based on the func-tional logic criteria found in reference 2.
2.2.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis An FMEA was performed on the AFW and ECI systems described above.
Methods consistent with those found in references 3 and 4 were used in the analysis.
(The FMEA is included in Appendix A.)
Only general functional groups of com-ponents in the ECI system were considered.
2.3.
Fault Tree Analysis Fault tree analysis was used to evaluate the reliability of the AFWS and its associated controls.
The f ault trees were constructed and evaluated using methods consistent with those found in references 3 and 4.
The fault trees are included in Appendix B.
The fault trees were constructed to a sufficient level of detail so that all relevant common hardware was identified.
This analysis identified hardware that, if failed, would reduce design redundancy or cause other hardware to fail. No attempt was made to account for f ailures caused by such external l
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events as fires, floods, or earthquakes.
In addition to mechanical failures, those due to human actions and to test or maintenance activities were in-cluded.
The GRAP5 and FTAP6 computer codes were used to construct and evaluate the fault trees.
They were used to identify the minimum cut sets, quantify the fault trees, rank the basic event importance, and identify major contributors to system failure.
I 2.4.
Human Reliability Analysis The human reliability analysis was performed ace.ording to the methodology de-scribed in references 4 and 7.
The basic hunan error rates used in this anal-ysis are found in Chapter 20 of reference 7.
Probability tree diagrams were constructed for the human tasks of interest to the analysis (see Appendix C).
2.5.
Failure Data The component failure rates used in this analysis were obtained from various i ndustry sources.8-19 Repair times were obtained fran both plant personnel and the Babcock & Wilcox in-house data base, RADCAS16 A complete list of the data used to quantify the fault trees is shown in Appendix D.
2.6.
Assumptions The following assumptions were made in evaluating AFWS reliability:
1.
Degraded failures were not considered; that is components assumed to operate properly or were not considered.
2.
Mechanical failures of passive components (such as locked-open manual valves) were not considered due to their extremely low failure rates.
3.
All sensor / transmitter failures were assumed to be repaired as soon as discovered.
4.
No credit was taken and no penalties were assigned for steen, electric power, or AFW supplied from or diverted to other adja-cent plant (s).
5.
Lines with diameters of 1 inch or less, such as drain and vent piping, were ignored as possible flow diversion paths.
6.
Random operator errors of commission were not included in the fault tree, e.g., an operator accidentally opening or closing a val ve. Babcock & \\Nilcox e McDermott company
7.
Signals provided from outside the ECI system (RC pump status, flux /feedwater flow trip, etc.) were assumed to be correct at all times.
8.
Pumps will be tested monthly, with no two pumps out of service at one time.
2.7.
Mission Success Definition In order to evaluate the impact of component failures on system reliability, an explicit definition of mission success is required.
The AFWS reliability was evaluated for three different mission success definitions.
The first is found in the Standard Review Plan (SRP), 10.4.9.20 The second definition is consistent with the assumptions used in the Safety Analysis. The third is the definition of AFW control failure.
The definition of mission success presented in SRP 10.4.9 is establishing at least 50% of design flow to any one or both steam generators. This represents flow from the turbine-driven pump or either motor-driven pump.
The second definition of successful initiation is establishing 100% of design flow to at least one steam generator.
This represents flow fran either the turbine-driven pump or both motor-driven pumps.
The definition of successful AFW control applies if a successful initiation occurs.
Control failure is defined as all four control valves failing low, any one control valve failing high, or selecting the improper control mode.
For this analysis, a control valve failing high is defined as a failure that, if unchecked, would eventually lead to an overfilling or overcooling condi-tion.
The second definition of successful initiation is more conservative than that found in SRP 10.4.9.
The 100% flow definition of success is consistent with the historic design bases of the AFWS.
Therefore, defining a mission success that requires two 50%-capaci ty, motor-driven pumps or one 100%-capacity steam-driven pump is consistent with Safety Analysis assumptions.
2.8.
Event Scenarios Considered In order to provide consistency with previous AFW reliablity analyses, the mission success defintiions found in the previous section were applied to various event scenarios.
Five initiation scenarios and two contrrol scenarios were considered. The SRP 10.4.9 success definition was applied only to Babcock & Wilcox 1
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the first initiation scenario (LOFW).
The other mission success definitions were applied to all their respective scenarios.
Case 1 - The first initiation scenario was a loss of main feedwater (LOFW).
In this scenario, all a-c and d-c power was assumed to be available with a probability of 1.0.
Operator manual initiation of AFW within 5 minutes of the demand was also considered.
Case 2 - The second initiation scenario was an LOFW coincider.. with a loss of offsite power (LOFW/ LOOP).
All d-c power was assumed to be available with a l
probability of 1.0.
One diesel generator was assumed to be available with a i
probability of 1.0, and the other was assumed to be unavailable with a probability of 10-2 Operator manual initiation of AFW within 5 minutes of the demand was also considered.
Case 3 - The third scenario was an LOFW coincident with a loss of a-c power (LOFW/LOAC).
All d-c power and battery-backed a-c power were assumed to be available with a probability of 1.0.
All a-c power that is not battery-backed was assumed to be unavailable. Operator manual initiation of AFW with-in 5 minutes of the demand was also considered.
Case 4 - The fourth initiation was a totally automatic initiation of the AFWS.
No assumptions were made on the availability of the plant power systems.
Rather, a model of the power distribution system was included in the analysis.
No credit was taken for manual initiation of the AFWS by the operator.
Case 5 - The fifth initiation scenario was similar to Case 4 but allowed for operator intervention.
Manual initiation of the AFWS by the operator within 20 minutes of AFW demand was considered, as were other operator corrective ac-tions within 20 minutes of their need.
A model of the power distribution sys-tem replaced any power availability assumptions.
The two control scenarios are sirailar to initiation scenarios 4 and 5.
Both control scenarios assume successful initiation of the AFWS and include a model of the power distribution system in lieu of power availability assumptions.
The first control scenario considered only automatic control; no credit was taken for operator intervention.
The second control scenario included operator intervention to correct failures within 20 minutes of their occurrence. Babcock & Wilcox
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3.
RESULTS The FMEA was performed to detennine the effects of single failures on the AFWS.
This qualitative evaluation of. component failure effects was also use-ful ir performing the fault tree analysis.
The FMEA showed that there is no single component that, if failed, will disable the operation of the AFWS (see Appendix A).
Additionally, the results of this analysis have shown that the potential failures that could result from human errors, common causes, single-point vulnerabilities, and test and maintenance outages, as mentioned in Item II.E.1.1 of NUREG-0737, are acceptably small.
System availabilities were calculated using the definitions of mission success and the scenarios from section 2.
Table 1 gives the results obtained by apply-ing the 100% flow definition of initiation and control success.
Figure 2 11-lustrates the results obtained when the SRP 10.4.9 mission success definition is applied and compares the result to that obtained from the 100% flow defini-tion.
The SRP 10.4.9 definition of mission success was applied to Case 1.
The system failure probability was calculated to be 5.1 x 10-5 per demand.
Applying the 100% flow initiation success definition to Case 1 (LOFW) results in a calculated system failure probability of 4.0 x 10-4 per demand.
The dominant contributors to system failure are mechanical pump and/or val ve failures that disable both the turbine-driven pump train and one of the motor-driven pump trains.
Case 2 (LOFW/ LOOP) was analyzed using only the 100% flow definition of suc-cessful initiation.
The AFWS failure probability was calculated as 5.2 x 10-4 per demand.
This scenario has a higher failure probability since some a-c power may be unavailable.
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In Case 3, the motor-driven pump trains are completely disabled since a-c power is not available.
The AFWS will fail to initiate with a probability of 1.2 x 10-2 per demand.
The dominant contributor to system failure in this case is the turbine-driven pump.
The totally automatic initiation scenario analyzed a larger number of compo-f nents than the previous initiation scenarios.
Human intervention to correct i
system failures was not considered.
The probability that the AFWS would fail to automatically initiate was calculated to be 4.7 x 10-4 This is higher than the probability calculated for Case 1 because the power distribution sys-tem model was added and the possibility of human intervention was omit,ted.
Case 5 is felt to be the most complete scenario considered.
It includes a model of the power distribution system and allows for operator intervention and correction of component failures within 20 minutes of their occurrence.
The system failure probability for this case was calculated to be 3.1 x 10-4 per demand.
As with the previous cases, the dominant contributors to system failure are coincident mechanical failures of pumps and/or valves occurring in both the turbine-driven pump train and one of the motor-driven pump trains.
The first control scenario evaluated was fully automatic control.
The proba-bility that the AFW control system would fail was calculated to be 1.3 x 10-2 per AFW demand.
The dominant contributor to control system fail ure is miscalibration of the control setpoints.
The second control scenario takes into account the ability of the operator to correct system malfunctions.
For this case, the system failure probability was calculated to be 2.5 x 10-6 per AFW demand.
Again, setpoint miscalibra-tion is the dominant contributor to system failure.
The failure probability is much lower because of the ability of the operator to manually control the AFWS.
. Babcock s.Wilcox a McDermott company
4 CONCLUSIONS The results obtained in these analyses have shown that the WNP-1 AFWS meets the reliability requi rements set forth in NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.1.
SRP 10.4.9 sets forth a reliability goal of 10-4 to 10-5 per demand for AFW systems.
The WNP-1 AFWS reliability of 5.1 x 10-5 per demand meets the SRP goal.
Applying the 100% fl ow success definition covered a wide range of possible scenarios, the unavailability associated with each of these scenarios is presented in Table 1.
The results obtained indicate that the WNP-1 AFWS and its controls are reliably designed.
The third scenario, LOFW/LOAC, illustrates the fact that the AFWS is indepen-dent of a-c power.
The AFWS failure probability for this scenario was deter-mined to be 1.2 x 10-2 per demand. This demonstrates that the systen is suffi-ciently independent of a-c power.
Babcock s.Wilcox. uco....n c..,
Tabl e 1.
Unavailabilities for WNP-1 AFW System Unavailability Initiation Case 1 - LOFW (all power available) 4.0 x 10 4 Case 2 - LOFW/ LOOP 5.2 x 10-4 Case 3 - LOFW/LOAC 1.2 x 10-2 Case 4 - Fully automatic initiation 4.7 x 10-4 Case 5 - Includes operator corrective 3.1 x 10-4 action within 20 minutes l
Control l
Fully automatic control 1.3 x 10-2 l
Including operator corrective action 2.5 x 10-6 within 20 minutes l
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5 REFERENCES 1.
_SupplyJsten Nucip3r Projects 1 and 4 Final Safety Analysis Report, Washington Public Power Supply System.
2.
Field Change Authorization, Improved Auxiliary Feedwater Control (AFWC),
04-3480-00, Babccck & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia, May 1982.
3.
W. E. Vesely, et al., Fault Tree Handbook, NUREG-0492, United States Nu-clear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., January 1982.
4 PRA Procedures Guide, NUREG/CR-2300, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.,1982.
5.
M. A. Phillips and E. A. Owirodu, GRAP - Graphic Reliability Analysis Package, NPGD-TM-604, Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia, April 1982.
6.
R.
S. Enzinna (Coordinator), FTAP2 - Computer-Aided Fault Tree Analysis, NPGD-TM-536, Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia, Febnsary 1980.
7.
A.
D.
Swain and H.
E. Guttman, Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis With Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications, NUREG/CR-1278, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico (1980).
8.
"IEEE Guide to the Collection and Presentation of Electrical, Electronic, and Sensing Component Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Generatina Stations," IEEE Std 500-1977.
9.
Consolidated Library of Failure Data, 32-1132097-00, Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia, May 1982.
- 10. Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System,1980 Annual Report of Cumulative System and Component Reliabil i ty, NUREG/CR-2232, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., September 1981.
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- 11. Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014, Appendix III, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., October 1975
- 12. Military Standardization Handbook, Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment, MIL-HDBK-217C, Rome Air Development Center, Griffiss Air Force Base, Rome, New York, April 1979.
- 13. Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Diesel Generators at U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-1362, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 1980.
14.
Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Pumps at U.S. Commercial Nu-clear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-1205, United States Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission,. Washington, D.C., January 1980.
15.
Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Valves at U.S. Commercial Nu-clear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-1363, United States Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission, Washington, D.C., June 1980.
16 Reliability / Availability Data Collection and Analysis System (RADCAS),
Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia.
17.
J. W. Minarick and C. A. Kukielka, Precursors to Potential Severe Core Damage Accidents:
1969-1979, A Status Report, _NUREG/CR-2497, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., June 1982.
18.
W. W. Weaver and R. W. Donnan, Auxiliary Feedwater Systems Reliability Analyses, BAW-1584, Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia, December 1979.
19.
Reliability Program Report for Engineered Safety Features Actuation Sys-tem II, WNP Units 1 and 4, Automatic Industries, Inc., Vitro Laboratories Division, Silver Spring, Maryland.
20.
Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion, Washington, D.C., July 1981. Babcock & Wilcox
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1 APPENDIX A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis A-1 Babcock & Wilcox
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t Failure Modes 44 Effects Analysts - Austitary Feedwater $sstem item Jg;,
Component Function Failure mode Failure cause Failure effect Cossents 1
AFW Puu, Provide re.
Failure of pop Mechanical fail. Loss of flow Turbine driven pwp FWA-PpF-1A quired head or motor ure loss of from Pump 1A to and motor driven pap and flow power. control
$GA.
28 provide required circutt failure flow.
2 AF18 Pump Provide re-Failure of pap Mechanical fail-Loss of flow Turbine driven pump AdA-PMP-28 quired head or motor ure loss of from Puup 28 to and motor driven p op and flow power, control SG B.
IA provide required circutt fatture ficr.
3 AFW Pump Provide re.
Failure of p o p Mechanical f a11-Loss of flow Both motor driven FWA-PDF-3C quired head or turbine ure. loss of from pump 3C to pumps provide required and flow driver steen supply, both steam gen-flow.
control circuit erators failure 4
Deleted 5
Manual gate Maintenance Left closed Human error Loss of water Turbine driven pisap Valve V8-A Isolation following main-supply to MD and motor driven punp tenance pop 1A 28 provide required flow.
6 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed Human error loss of DMW Turbine driven pump Valve V1 Isolation following main-storage tank provides required flow.
terance water supply to CW system can provide motor driven water for actor artven pumps pump.
7 Check Valve Prevent re-Falls closed Mechanical fail. Loss of backup No effect on turbine V76-C verse flow ure water source to driven pup. DMW tank motor driven provides water source pumps for motor driven pumps.
Falls open Methanical fail-None ure 8
Motor oper-Isolate Cm Fails closed Mechanical f ail-Loss of backup No effect on turbine ated isola-system from ure loss of water source to driven pump. DMW tank tion valve AFW system motive power.
motor driven provides water source V74-C no signal to pups for motor drfven pump.
open Fails open Mechanical fail. Loss of redun-Check valve V76-C pre-ure. loss of dant isolation vents backflow from s'otive power of CW system AFW system to Clet sys-from AFW System tem.
9 Deleted I
I 10 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed H wan error Loss of water Turbine driven pump valve V4-8 Isolation after mainte-supply to le and motor driven pump nance pump 28 1A provide necessary flow.
11 Deleted l
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i 12 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed Haan error loss of water Motor driven paps l
valve V2-C Isolation following main-supply to tur-provide required flow tenance btne driven pump I
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Item
.h Cossonent Function Failure mode Failure cause Failure effect Cossae'it s 13 Manualgate Maintenance Left closed fol-haan error Loss of DW tank No effectYn setor driv-valve VII C Isolatten lowing mainte-as water source en pumps. CNM system nonce for turbine driv. can provide water for en pop turbine driven pump.
14 Check valve Prevent re.
Fails open Mechanical fail. Loss of rede.
No effect on motor driv.
V75-C verse flow are dent isolation en pumps. Use DW tank between C m and as water source.
AFW systems Fails closed Mechanical fat - 4.sof(CNM)back are up water source to turbine driven pop.
15 Isolation Isolation C m Falls closed Mechanical fail-Loss of backup No effect on motor Valve V73-C System from ure, loss of water source driven p ops. Use (motoroper-A N System motive poseer, for turbine driv-DMW tank as water ated) no signal i;o open en pop.
source.
Falls opei Mechanical fail. Loss of redun.
Check valve V75-C ure. loss of dont isolation prevents back, flow motive power between C m and from Afw system to AFW systems C M system.
16 Stop check Prevent re-Fails open Mechanical f all-None le p mp 28 provides Valve V12.A verse flow, ure flow to 5G8.
maintenance isolation Falls closed or Mechanical feil-Loss of flow from Turbine driven p o p left closed af-ure. Mean error 80 pump 1A to and motor driven pwp ter maintenance SGA 28 provide flow 17 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed fol Haan error Loss of flow from Turbine driven puse Valve V13-A isolation lowing mainte.
PC Pop 1A to $GA and motor driven p o p narca 28 provide necessary flow.
18 Level control Regulate flow Falls closed Mechanical fall-Loss of flow from Turbine driven pump valve V20A2 from setor ure. loss of 90 Pump 1A to SGA and motor driven p o p LCV-4025 driven pop air. contrul cir-28 provide necessary 1A to $G A cuit failure flow Falls open Mechanical f ail-Uncontrolled flow SG 8 flow uneffected, ure control to SGA from 90 operator can isolate circuit failure pump 1A loop and use turtijne driven pump to pro-vide flow to SGA.
Left in manual Human error Loss of flow Turbine driven pop following p op from MD p o p 1A and notor driven pop test (closed).
to SG A 28 provide necessary flow. Return valve to auto.
19 Motor Oper.
Isolate flow Falls open Mechanical fall-Inability to iso-Use level control valve ated Valve path from ure loss of late flow from to isolate. If not V21 A2 (V31-8) motor driven motive power.
motor driven isolated, may feed bad pop 1A to $G control circuit pump 1A to SG A generator, trip MD A
failures pump 1A Falls closed Mechanical fail-Loss of flow Turbine driven pump ure. Icss of from motor driv-and motor driven p o p motive power, en pop 1A to 28 provide necessary control circuit SG A flow.
failure 20 Check Valve Prevent re-Fatis open Mechanical fail.
None MV3A (V63-A) verse flow ure Falls closed Mechanical fat 1-Loss of all flow Turbine driven pop and ure to SG A motor driven puse 28
/
provide flow to SG 8.
21 Manual gate Maintenanew Left closed Human error Loss of flow Motor driven p ops pro-Valve V30-C isolation following from turbine vide necessary flow maintenance driven pump to both steam gen-erators.
A-3 Bancock & Wilcox
. wo
..a
..n
Item No.
Consonent Function Failure mode Failure cause Failure effect twenents 22 Check Valve prevent re.
Falls closed Mechanical fall. Less of flow Motor driven IA feeds V29-8 verse flow ure frca turbine SG A.
Turbine drivan driven ptsnp to pump and motor driven SG A punp provide necessary flow.
Fails open Mechanical fa11 None Motor driven pump 26 ure provides flow to SG B 23 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed Human error Loss of flow Motor driven pump 1A valve V72-8 1 solation following from turbine supplies flow to SG A.
maintenance driven pump to Turbine driven pop SG A.
and motor driven punp 28 provide flow to 5G 8.
24 Level control Regulate flow Fat 1s closed Mechanical fail-Loss of flow Motor driven pwp 1A Valve V20A1 from turbine ure, control from turbine provides flow to $G A.
(LCV-4026) driven pump circuit failure driven pump to Turtine driven punp and to SG A SG A.
motor driven puup 28 provide flow to SG 8.
Left in manual fiuman error No control of Motor drian pump 1A following pump flow possibly provides 110w to SG A.
test no flow from Turt he driven pump and turbine driven motor driven pump 28 p sep to SG A provide flow to SG8. Re-turn valve to auto.
Falls open Mechanical fail-Uncontrolled Operator can isolate ure. control flow from tur-flow path and use 2 circuit failure, bine driven pump to provide flow loss of air pump to $G A.
to SG A.
SG B flow unaffected 25 Motor Oper-Isolate flow fails closed Mechanical fall. Loss of flow Motor driven pump 1A sted Valve from turbine ure, control from turbine provides flow to SG A.
V21A1(V14 A) driven pump circuit failure, driven punp to Turbine driven pump and to SG A loss of motive SG A.
motor driven pump 28 power provide ficw to SG 8.
Fails open Mechanical fall-Inability to use LCV 4026 to fso-ure, control isolate flow from late flow. Nn effect circuit failure. turbine driven on $G 8.
loss of motive pump to SG A.
power May feed bad gen-erator.
26 Check valve prevent re-Falls closed Mechanical fall-Loss of flow from Motor driven pump 28 V35-4 verse flow ure turbine 6 riven provides flow to SG8.
punp to SG B.
Turbine driven pump and motor driven punp pro-vide flow to SG A.
Falls open Mechanical fall-None Motor driven ptsap 1A ure provides flow to SG A.
27 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed Hunan error Loss of flow from Motor driven punp 28 Valve V36-A isolation following turbine driven provides flow to $GB.
maintenance pump to SG 8.
Turbine driven pump and motor driven pump 1A provide flow to SG A.
I A-4 Babcock t.Wilcox
. me n
e.,
lten no.
Component Function Failure mode F111ure cause Failure effect Comuments 28 Level con-Regulate flow Fails closed Mechanical fall.. Loss of flow from Mrtor driven ptmp 28 trol valve from turbine ure, control turbine driven provides flow to SG B.
ISB1(LOMIB) driven pop circuit failure pop to SG 8.
Turbine driven ptmp and to SG 8.
motor driven pump pro-vide flow to SG A.
Left in manual Haan error No control of Motbr driven pop 28 following p op flow, possibly provides flow to SG 8.
test no flow from TD Turbine driven pop and p op to SG 8.
motor driven pop pro-vide flow to SG A.
Re-turn valve to auto.
Falls open Mechanical fall. Uncontrolled flow Operator can isolate flow ure, contml frts turbine dri-path. Use M0 pump 28 to circuit failure, von driven pop provide flow to SG 8.
loss of air to SG 8.
SG A flow unaffected 29 Motor oper-Isolate flow Fails closed Mechanical fail-Loss of flow frus Motor driven p op 28 ated Valve from turbine ure, control turbine driven provides flow to SG 8.
V2181 (V204) driven pop circuit failure, pop to SG 8.
Turbine driven pop and to SG 8 loss of motive motor driven p op 14 power provide flow to SG A.
Falls open Mechanical fall-Inability to iso-Use LCV 4009 to iso-ure control late flow from TD late flow, circuit failure, pump to SG 8.
May Loss of motive feed bad generator power 30 Check Valve Prevent re-Fails closed Mechanical fail-Loss of all flow Motor driven pump 1A MV38 (V218) verse flow ure to SG B and turbine driven pap provide necessary flow to SG A Fatis open Mechanical fall. None ure 31 Stop check Prevent re-Fails closed Mechanical fail-Loss of flow from Turbine driven ptse valve V24-8 verse flow.
ure motor driven and motor driven pump maintenance pop 28 1A provide necessary isolation flow.
Left closed H aan error Loss of flow from Turbine driven p op following main-motor driven pop and motor driven pump tenance 28 1A proue necessary flow Falls open Mechanical fail-None Motor driven pop 1A ure provides flow to SG A.
32 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed fol. Human error loss of flow from Turbine driven ptsp and Valve V66-8 1 solation lowing mainte-motor driven pop motor driven pump 1A nance 28 to SG 8.
provide necessary flow.
33 Level control Regulate flow Falls closed Mechanical fail-Loss of flow from Turbine driven pump and Valve V2182 from setor ure, control motor driven punp motor driven pop 1A pro-(LCV-4007) driven p op circuit fatlure. 28 and SG B provide necessary flow.
28 to SG 8 loss of air.
Left in manual Haan error No control of flow. Turbine driven pump and following flow possibly no flow motor driven rap 1A pro-test from motor driven vide necessary flow. Re-pep 28 to SG 8.
turn valve to auto.
Falls open Mechanica1 fall-Uncontrolled flow Operator can isolate i ure, control from motor driven flow path and use'TD circuit failure, pump 28 to SG 8.
pump to provide flow loss of air to SG 8.
SG A fiou una f fected.
I A-5 Babcock a.Wilcox e ticDermott company
Itan A. Component Function Failure mode Failure ceu l Failure ef'ect Comuments 34 Motor Oper-Isolate flow Fails closed Mechanical fall-Loss of fb from Turbine driven pump and ated Valve path from ure, control motor driven pump motor driven p o p 1A V2182 (V37-A) motor driven circuit failure. 28 to SG B provide necessary fh.
pune 25 to loss of motive SG 8.
Power Fatts open Mechanical fall-Inability to iso-Can isolate flow path ure, control late flow path with LCf 4007.
circuit failure, from motor driven loss of motive pump 28 to SGB.
Power May feed bad gen-erator 35 Dominerallred Provide water Any failure Mechanical fail-Primary AFW water Isolate, DW tank.
lMer Storage of sufficient causing water ure source unsweilable Use water from CW Tant quality to stored in tankto system or NSW system DMW-TK-1 AFW system be unavailable.
36 Flow control Regulate re-Fails closed Mechanical fail-Loss of recircula-Can damage po p if Valve FCW-400 circulation ure, controller tion flow on motor dead headed.
flow for motor fatture driven pump 1A.
driven pop 1A Falls open Mechanical fail-SG A may not get TD pump provides flow ure, controller enough flow from to SG A.
failure le pump 1A.
37 Check Valve Prevent re-Fails closed Mechanical fall. Loss of recircu-Can damage pap if dead V52-A verse flow ure lation flow on headed.
motor driven pump 1A Falls open Mechanical fall-None ure 38 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed H aan error loss of recircu.
Can damage pump if valve V53-A isolation following lation fh on dead headed.
maintenance motor driven pump 1A.
39 Pressure re. Provide con-Flow blockage Mechanical fall. Loss of recircu-Can damage pwup if dead duction ori-tinuous mint-ure lation flow for headed.
fice R0 1 mm recircu-turbine driven lation flow pump.
40 Check Valve Prevent re-Falls closed Mechanical fail. Loss of recircu-Can damage pop if dead V40-C verse flow ure lation flow for
- headed, turbine driven Pep.
Falls open Mechanical fail-None ure 41 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed fol-Human error Loss of recircu-Can damage papif dead
+alve V41-C isolation lowing mainte-lation flow for headed.
nonce turbine driven p*p.
l 42 Flow control Regulate re-Falls closed Mechanical tail-Loss of recircula-Can damage pump if dead Valve circulation wre, controller tion flow for headed.
FCV-4003 flow for notar failure motor driven
&fven pop 28 pump 28 Falls open Mechanical fail. SG B may not get TD pump provides l
ure enough flow from flow to SG 8.
fe pump 28.
l
(
)
1 i
l l
A-6 Babcock & Wilcox a mo n -
I i
Item 12-Coseonent Function Failure mode Failure cause Failure effect Cosmets 43 Check Valve Prevent re.
Falls closed Mechanical fall-Loss of reciscula-Can damage ptsup if dead V59-8 verse flow ure tion flow for
- headed, motor driven pisup 28.
Falls open Mechanical f411 None ure 44 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed Human error loss of recircula-Can damage pump if dead Valve V60-8 isolation following tion flow for headed.
maintenance motor driven pump 28.
45 Manual gate Maintenance Left closed Human error loss of recircula-Can cause puup damage Valve V42-C isolation following tion flow for all if any of the ptsps are maintenance AFW pumps dead-headed 46 Motor oper-
!solate steam Fails closed Mechanical fail-Loss of SGA as SGB provides steam sup-ated Valve supply from ure. control steam source fbr ply to TD AFW pump.
MSS-V41-A SG A to tuvirine circuit failure turbine driven driven AFW passo AFW pimp Falls open Mechanical fail. Cannot isolate May not isolate bad ure, control SG A (f needed generator circuit failure, loss of motive power 47 Check Valve Prevent re-Fails closed Mechanical fati-Loss of SG A as SG B provides steam MSS-1168 verse flow ure steam supply for supply to turbine driv-turbine driven en pump pump rafts open Mechanical fail-Cannot stop re-May not isolate bad ure.
verse flow. if generator. Close needed.
MSS-V41A 48 Motor oper-Isolate steam Falls closed Mechanical fall-Loss of SG B as SG A provides steam to ated Valve flow from SG ure, control a steam supply turbine drives ptop MSS-V4a-B B to turbine circuit failure for turbine driv-driven Afif Pung en pump Fails open Mechanical fall-Inability to May not isolate bad ure, control isolate SG B ff generator circuit failure, needed Icss of motive power 49 Check Valve Prevent re-Fatis closed Mechanical fail-Loss of SG B as SG A provides steam MSS-V169 verse flow ure steam supply to to turbine driven ptsup turbine driven Ptsup.
Fails open Mechanical fail-Cannot stop re-May not isolate bad ure verse flow, if generator. Close needed.
MSS-V448.
50 Steam line Isolate steam Falls closed Mechanical f ail-Loss of steam sup-Motor driven pumps to TD Ptsup flow to tur-ure, control ply to turbine provide necessary flow Valve FAI bine driven circuit failure driven puup MSS-CV-2872 pump Falls open Mechanical fall-None ure, control circuit failure 51 Steam 11ne to Isolate steam Falls closed Mechanical fall-Loss of steam Motor driven pumps TD Pump Valve flow to tur-ure. control supply to tur-provide necessary CV7938 bine driven circuit failure bine driven flow.
PL8EP.
pump Fatis open Mechanical fall. None Will start TD pump ure. Control which may require I
circuit failure operator action.
A-7 Babcock & Wilcox a McDermott compsay
Item Coroonent Function Fatture mode Falture cause Failure effect Comunents 52 Turbine con-Regulate Fails closed Mechanical fall-Loss of steam Motor driven pops pro-trol / govern-steam flow ure, control supply to tur-vide necessary flow ing valves to turbine circuit failure bine driven M554434 to maintain pump CV-4673 carstant speed Fatis opc-a Mechanic 31 fatt-Pump overspeed Pump trips on overspeed ure, controller failure 53 Check Valve Prevent re-Fails closed Mechanical fail. Loss of cross.
Turbine driven pump and VlB-8 verse flow ure connect path from motor driven pop 28 le pwp 1A to SGB provide flow to SG 8.
Fatts open Mechanical fall-leone ore 54 Control Valve Isolate cross Fails closed Mechanical f all-Loss of cross-Turbine driven pop and CV-3121 connect line ure, operator connect path motor driven pop 28 from motor falls to open, from motor provide flow to SG 8.
driven pop loss of air, driven pump 1A 1A to SG B control failure to SG B Fatis open Mechanical fail-Some of motor Turbine driven pump ute, control driven p op 1A provides flow to SG A.
failure flow may be di-Control valves compen-verted to SG B sate for difference in flow.
55 Check Valve Prevent re-Fails closed Mechanical fall-Loss of cross-Turbine driven pop and V27-A verse flow uva connect path motor driven pop 1A from motor dri-provide flow to SG A.
von pump 28 to SG A Fatis open Mechanical fall. None ure
$6 Contrel Valve Isolate cross Fails closed Mechanical fall. Loss of cross-Turbine drivon p;mp and CV-3122 connect line ure, operator connect path from motor driven pump 1A from motor falls to open.
motor driven provide flow to SG A.
driven po p loss of air.
pwp 28 to SG A.
28 to SG A control failure Fails open Mechanical fall. Some of motor Turbina driven pump ure, control driven pump 2B provides flow to SG 8.
failure flow may be di-Control valves compen-verted to SG A sate for difference in flow 57 ECI channel Provide power Loss of power Failure of cabi-Affected chan-Operator can isolate power for control net power s@ ply, nel will not any affected flow paths.
systemi loss of vital bus provide inttfa-Other ECI channel Pot l
tion signal its affected.
pays and valves.
t Control valve from turbine &1v-I en pwe to one l
steam generator fails open and control valve from motor driven pump to other steam generator falls closed.
\\
l 1
I l
1 l
l l
A-8 Babcock & Wilcox e McDeemett company I
L
I l
lten A Coeonent Function Fallure mode Failure cause
. Failure effect Coments 58 Steam gen.
Provide indt-Fails high Mtscalibrettop. Associated con-Redundant flow and con-erator Level cation of 1swel (giveshigher calib-ation trol string will trol string attempts to sensor (any to operator indication drift reduce flow to maintain proper level, of the level and control than actual maintain a level Operator can isolate sensors used system for level) lower than de-bad path. No effect on for AN con-flow adjusta stred other steam generator trol) ment Fatis low (gives Miscalibration. Associated con-Redundant flow and con-lower indication calibration trol string will trol string attempts to than actual drift increase flow to maintain proper level.
level) maintain a level Operator can isolate higher than de-bad path. No effect on stred other steam generator.
59 (CI control Open and close Fatis high(tries Miscalibration. Associated con.
Redundant control and string valves as to maintain a calibration trol valve opens flow string attempts needed to level higher drift, elec-in attempt to to compensate for the maintain pro-thandesired) tronics failure raise level in increased level. Oper-per level in steam generator tor can isolate bad steam genera-path. No effect on tor other steam generator Fails low (tries Mtscalibration. Associated con-Redundant control and to maintain a calibration trol valve flow string attempts to level lower than drif t, elec-closes in attempt cogensate to the de-desired) tronics failure to reduce level creased level. Operator in steam genera-can isolate bad path.
tor No effect on other steam generator 60 Mode select Choose proper Does not select Rela / failures. Steam generator Operator can manually logic AFW control mode 8 or C when failure of in-will control to control AFW to proper mode required put signals 3.5 ft rather than level 15 ft mode 8 or 40 ft mode C Improperly or Relay failures. Steam generator Operator can manually inadvertently failure of in-will fill to control AFW to proper selects mode B put signals improper level level.
or C 61 initiation Send AFW ini-Does not pwide Relay failures. AFW does not pro-May have initiation logic ttation signals initiation signal improper input vide flow to from one ECI channel to prtper pumps when required signals steam generators and not the other. Op.
and valves iden required.
perator can manually initiate AFW.
Inadvertent Relay failures.
AN flows to steam Operator can secure AFV.
initiation improer input generators when signal signals it is not desired.
Note: All valve nunters to be pref!aed by system symbol M. except as noted.
t A-9 Babcock & Wilcox
. m o.-.n...,
APPENDIX B Fault Trees i
B-1 Babcock & Wilcox
. uco..
a
4 1
1.
Initiation Fault Tree i
WP99 AFW IMITIATION FAULT TREE I
~ AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM IMITIATION FAILLRE AFUI I
~
l FAILURE TO INITIATE FAILURE TO INITIATE FLOW FROM TE FLOW FROM TE MOTOR DRIUEM AFU TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP puffs M100 tie 9 v
N I
I I
I FAILURE TO FEED FAILURE TO FEED FAILURE TO FEED FAILORE TO FEED STEAM GEERATOR A STEAM QEMERATOR 3 STEAM GENERATOR A STEAM GENERATGR 5 FROM MOTOR DRIVEN FROM MOTOR DRIVEN FROM THE TURSIE FROM TE TURRINE PLNF PtBF DRIUEN PUFF DRIVEN Puff r
ik 1 *E
- 6 3
t J
4 i
l t
i j
I I
FAILIAtE TO FEED FAILURE TO FEED i
STEdm GEERATOR A STEAM GEERATOR R FROM TE TURBINE FROM TE TURBINE DRIVEN PtmP DRIVEN PtDIP i
u T181 T192 cn a
l l
1 NO FLOU TO STEAM 990 FLOU TO STEAR GENERATOR A FR0g CECK GEERATOR R FRON dEd" L
MBIE MIMM N i
MU3A FAILS MjhEyIVEN ggg TO OPEN ON TO OPEN ON DEMAND DEMAND g
UCMU3AOD UCMV3 BOD 1
1 N
e t
F=
g*
~
.I y#
I o
.x
WPP96 MW IMITIATION FAULT TIIEE r
i i
\\
I I
FAIL M TO FEED FIAltNtE TO FED STEAM EEftATOR A STEM GEERATCat B I'
FROM MOT 0ft M1UEM FROM N070ft DetIVEN PM PunP M191 M198
?
4 i
I I
M0 FLOW TO STEAM NO FLOU 70 STEAM CK N
GEEftAT0ft A FROM EERATOR S FROM "M e h"g"I"" #U l MU ILS l
MI"" O I
MU34 AILS TO OPEN ON TO OPEN OM l
UCHU3AOD UCHV380D
]
i' f
I. k.
a*
I
- E g:
]
8 ax i
.m
4 I,
j f'
I 1
MO FLOW TO STEAM i
GEIERATOR A FROM J
TURSIE DRIW M pu mmp 1
Cae2 i
Y J
FAILURE OF N0 TOR FAIL ME OF AIR FAILLNE IN SUCTION i
OPERATED UALUE OPERATED CONTROL M
0F TURRINE [91utra U21A1 UALUE V20Ag UALUE UALUE pulp - NO UATER l
U29-3 l
U30-C AVAILARif TO PUNP l
M M
cOs l
UCHU290D q
UGTV30LC ho SIGNAL TO START FAILURE OF TURSIME TURRIDE BRIUEN Puff g
[
DRIVEN AFW PUfP i
I G112 G189 I
i I
l NO M W INITIATION
'O AFW INIT,IATION N
ho STEAR AVAILABLE SIGNAL FR0f ECI 70 DRIVE Pufp URBINE WEIN
,I, i
III SIGMAL F100R ECI fu CNAME L X CHANIEL y UE y j,N M
ILS PuNP g
4 NA D
4 r;
,f,Telo.,
,,, Tex,.
l
!M ente cen i
3,N
1 1
I I
j-MO FLOW TO STEAR GENERATOR A FROM 1
MOTOR DRIVEN M W Pm a G103 i
L 1
I I
I FAILURE OF MOTOR FAILLME OF AIR MO MW INITIATICH FAILURE IN SUCTION OPERATED UALUE OPEPATED CONTROL SIGNAL FROM ECI 0F MOTOR DRILTH W W U81A2 UALUE U2042 CHANNEL X UALUE PUMP A - No WATER U13-A AusitABLE TO PUMP 1
O
- l 7
UGTV13LC FAIListE OF $ TOP FAILLME OF MOTOR CM CC UALW U12-A DRIVEM MW Pur A a
C129 v
i TOP STOP CDECK CHECat UALUE U124
- [
UALUE FAILS TO 1
o U13-4 OPEN 4
o CLOSED a
E UCHU180D j
!g UcrU1ste s a 3N I
.A.
4 I
NO FLOW TO STEAM QENERATOR S FR0ft TURBINE DRIUEN AFu PunP 4
i G195
- N, I
I FAILLTE OF MOTOR FAILURE OF AIR FAILt.NIE OF TURBINE FAILURE IN SUCTION OPERATED UALUE U2131 OPERATED UALUE DRIVEN AFU Put1P OF TURBIFE DRIUEN U2001 PURP - NO WATER g iLABLE TO PUNP 4
r N
l MO SIGNAL TO START gy l
TLatBIPE DRIVEN PUFF NLUE V39-C U35-4 13'-
g w
UCHU350D UGTV30LC i,
.K
)
c8 e s-i se
$Y i
!E iN 4
N A
O II TC AE ITM
/*
I IO NRY IF L
E '$
L U
6 L YT A
6U GU B
OF W
9 A
W E
A 1
MMF NFR RN AOA G
UE OAE A
ER I
T LV TFN TMA II S E CEW AR BV UV lF D I
O I SIg TRR R
OD I
OAR R
LROP EO FETM RT 9OU UO OEMP LM MQ I
I AO FT l
A RE O
IU K
T D
AL CEB o
A EU g 4
I I
FU HL4 2
O CAEy H U D
UU EE2 0
r C
tT8 3
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B tA9 1
tR2 l
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UK O
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I FAILLME OF MOTOR DRIVEM AFU PUMP A G115 ch
==
g ===
l4=
lgra NA PUFF A PUMP A j
AGS l
W f
S T
CBAA66FT PfW991AFR Pf1M8iASD co E
PfWISIAPM I
i,k
! *E
- F.
3 4
J.x l
l 4
1 I
A, IFAILURE OF MOTOR W 1UEM Aru PunP 3 C125
==
!!="= =
4 N:
.,=
, @4 %. %.
i P.,
syTJue 4
l {P.,
s?E*r '
CBAA96FT Pnn018FR PN991DSD y
Pnnet Pn g
i t
. If nR ex i s=
I
.1. E.
3M i
l
1 FAILURE IM SUCTION OF TUR31E I4tIVEN PUMP - NO WATER AustLAnti TO PIM C110
/
N 1
NO WATER AVAILABLE TO TE IP9UT EADER OF THE TlatBIE UALW..
DRIVEN AFW PLNF U2-C INADVERT.
LEFT CL M D iG131 cs e
i
[
u UCTU2CLC l
l l
NO WATER AVAILASLE NO WATER AVAILABLE FROM DEMIfERALIZED FROM CNft SYSTEM WATER STORAGE TAMK i
C132 G133 I
i I
FAILURE OF MOTOR CE OPERATED UALUE U73-C l
g UALUE DALUE TO OPEN AND PROUIDE CNM V71-C DEMINERAL-V75-C coeM SYSTEM MATER SYSTEM i
- [
LEFT IZED WATER FAILS TO NOT CLOSED STomAGE OPEN g34
- )AILABLE Do ANE FAILS o
?*
UCNU7 sod a tof$
UCTU71LC TNEDMWAfl
$YSCfWWGA
!.E o
JM
'l i
I FAILtmE IN SUCTIOM OF MOTOR DRIUEN AFU Nr"an7e$o M G116 MO W TER AUAItatLE TO THE IMPUT MEADER l
0F THE MOTOR DRIVEN UALUE AFU PLMPS US-A IMADWRT.
IIFT G13S CMD
?5 g
UGTUGALC I
No UATER AUAILABLE NO WATER AVAILABLE FROM DEMIfERALIZED FROM Ctel SYSTEM UATER STORAGE Tate:
G136 G137 I
FAILURE OF MOTOR h0PE g
UALUE UA UE AND CMM UA-C DEMIPERAL-U76-C CMM SYSTEM MAfra SYSTEM LEFT IZED WATER FAILS 70 MOT CLOSED STORAGE OPEM 333 AVAILABLE n
ANK FAILS aE*
/
UCHU7609 1*
,(
UGTV1 C TretBRUAM SYSCMMMA 35 au
I I
FAIT.tAIE OF SUCTIOM TO ROTom DRIW N AFU PLNF 3 - NO WATER ApartantE 70 PLNF 1
C128
/
N M0 WATER AUAILABLE TO TE IMPUT HEADER OF TE MOTOR DRIVEN WlVE AFu Pl#FS V4-5 IMADUERT.
1 1
135 LEFT CLOSED l
t; ocTv4ste i
i i
5 1
l.,
?
.[
Ix 3P i
k a
' 8. o=
0 j
4M i
i l
l i
i i
i I
I FAILWE OF 190 TOR FAILLatE OF #90 TOR OPERATED UALUE OPERATED UALUE U2131 U2142 2
G113 G119 8
i I
I Y**
kW 1.SL.
0 ERA,.
CLOSES C0fteECTIVE CLOSES CORRECTItE ACTION ACTION FAILS FAILS
- 90U1A25C 190U181SC MOU1A20C 190U1810C h
ik r-gP
- E I:W in l
m OWNg R
TIOt C
ATIg 0
RCTa 1
EECr A
PRA 1
OR U
O O
7 C
M 9
1 R
O C
TE OU MLA L
g I
FU O D EE RT1 UAA LR1 IE2 APU YL FO 1SS C
AUE S
I 1OS 1
IO A
WRL 1
UC V
P O
S M
RE OVN TIOS C
ATIL 0
RCTI 2
EECA 9
PRAF 1
M OR 3
O 2
C 1
RO G
TW O
FM L
M I
1 O D EE2 WT8 A1 LR2 IEU AP FO YLS S
C EON U
S 2
i II 9
WRC 1
M U
PS 1
I f
hIRw
- siE U
i
. 5eI.!i w
1 10 D D
T 0M7NN 0-O l
OA 1
3 N 2 4
02S M A
1 AULNE G-S '.
C IED V
E AP 0
O 1 FO D A
' A F
1O L
I~
I ATL 9 A 2EC UUI DN N
E A EEU 2
UNH 4
A N
C VCN E
UTGG RVNS OIOL C
ONI TTII 0
DNIS E V ACTA 1
TSIN RECF A
I ERA 9
AEEO PR U
ROCI OO O
EDET P RA C
A O1 I
ANT R9OI I2PN AUUI 89 A
1 LO C
E RVN RR OIOS C
IT AN TTIL 0
O1 ACTI 1
RECA A
I FCA ERAF e
O 9 D2 N
PR v
4 EEV I
OO 0
4 RT PR C
A 1
UAC TMOT C
LRU FUTC IEL EPAE APA L RR FOU RER 1EPOL I
I ATOC 9F 2 ADO N
V NT O
LA II E
T EA TM FLGT l
IO EANS 1f NRY LU1E P
IF y N0T 1
L o1A0 4
ULE dAMLP 9
4 L U
fat 9 ANP 2NO O
GA UIF A
IH vE ID[$F t $EoM 3
o (I
- !FiE i.4 I
lll l
M
+
FAILupE OF AIR OPUleTED CONTROL UALUE USGA2 C114 I
NO AFU IMITIATION LOSS OF 125 UOLT AIR OPERATED UALUE SICMAL FROM ECI DC POWER UPN-DP-DC1 U24A2 DOES NOT OPEN CHAMPEL X UPON RECEIVING AFW INITIATION SIGNAL C148 e
I I
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I ECI CHAMMEL x POE R FAILURE Piet l
FAILURE OF 12e UOLT IA l
CAB T
POWER 4
SUPPLY FAILS I
PSUECXAM m
e
.l l
I too PouER AVAILABLE I
CIRCUIT UPS-UA
~
BREAKER l
J FAILS FAILS P192 CBAUS1SO UPSVAXAM k
3 l
l I
i
,,o A.. o0tf AC
,,0 1 s o0LT.c POWER A9AILABLE TO POWER AUAILABLE TO l
g UPS-UA UPS-UA r.3 t
?.8 A.k A~N
.Tx
\\
s*
- E i
'i I:: iifo 4x l
I MO 125 00LT DC POWER AVAILABLE TO UPS-UA P194 I
(C N
- iff",0rTna"'
SUITCHGEAR SWG-DA P195 CBDU44SO g
I NO POWER AVAILABLE NO POWER AVAILABLE FROM BATTERY BTT-DA THROUGH BATTEF?/
CHARGER STG-DA P196 P187 i
NO PCWER AVAILABLE h
l 3
ER
}
R BR airer fd FAILS FAILS FAILS BTO-DA FAILS g
f1A rax's gx CBDURGSO BAfDAZAM CBDU4250 BTCDAZAM CBAJ9150 5 Be I
IW in
i i
l i
I ECI CHAfGEL Y i
POWER FAILURE 1'
i P200 a
FAILURE OF 12e UOLT E ITR BW B CB T
POWER l
j SUPPty 1
FAILS PE01 PSUECYAM m
b i
I NO POWER AVAILABLE J
70 W-W CIRCUIT UPS-UB j
BREAKER l
FAILS
+
FAILS l
CBAUS250 UPSUBZan l
I I
I NO 484 UOLT AC NO 125 UOLT DC POWER AVAILABLE TO POWER AUAILABLE 70 i
UPS-UB UPS-US g
- J AA AA i
r-3 9' I
s i?
g aa wX i
l i
4 l
I NO 125 UOLT DC poler AWAILABLE TO LFS-US P204 1
NO PC4TR AUAILABLE CH 125 UOLT DC Og SWITCHGEAR SWG-DS FAILS 9805 CBDU4550 I
I HO POWER AVAILABLE NO POWER AUAILABLE FROM BATTERY PTT-DB FROM BATTERY CHARGER BTG-DB P206 P267
+
+
l NO POWER AVAILABLE 0
[
yN D
E C
R e
FAILS FAILS FAILS DTC-DB FAILS FAILS g
)y CsDua750 sATDBzAM C3Du4750 BTCBSZAM CBAJ11SO ip
.k
=
$4
- x
N0 480 UOLT AC N 489 WLT AC POWER AUAILABLE TO POWER AVAILABLE TO uPs.gn UPS-US
-l P103 P203 mb I
I e
i NO POWER AVAILABLE 40 POWER AVAILABLE i
ON 484 UOLT AC ON 488 UOLT AC CIRCUIT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER j
CIRCUIT MOTOR CONTROL CENTEp BREAKER nec_rasi 1
l BREAKER MCC-EA21 relts rAIts CBAJ42s0 CBAJ1250 j
.X u8
?x 4
je=
1 25
!E i
io
=M j
I 1
l I
4 1
1
(
I I
1 NO POWER AVAILABLE 7
OH 43e UOLT AC ROTOR CONTROL CENTER j
Rcc-EA21 1
Pile
+
?8 I
LOSS OF POWER ON 488 UOLT AC BUS EA2 CIRCUIT 9REMER FAILS i
f III l
CBA351SO t
[
H0 POWER AVAILABLE OH 4168 UOLT I
III f CIRCUIT CIRCUIT TRANS.
SWITCHGEAR EA b
l BREAKER BREAKER FORMER
,[
FAILS FAILS EA2 i
og AaN rar'5 p:s c-em c.AA m o
,, m,A.
!.E i
u 4M m
k e
i M0 POWER AVAILABLE CM 430 UOLT AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER MCC-ES21 P219 1
en s
{
I LOSS OF POWER ON 480 UOLT AC BUS EB CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILS CBAB5650 NO POWER AUAILABLE h
CIRCUIT CIRCUIT TRANS-g g
i g
3REAKER BREmeCER FORMER te FAILS FAILS E32
%A
- g CBAS4450 CBAA32SO TFLEB2AM y
- n-i a to k
$. n=O l
4M
YRC M
EDS A
I TL Z
TTI C
ATA D
3SF fAP 0
TR7 LIE T
1 EUKSE F
2 I
SCALS A
1 EREIO A
RO P
IIRAL 1
T CBFC A A
B R
C E
I NE ER 9
GU E
L 2
L LI A
1 B
P EA A
SF L
E I
A IA R
ATE DI O O L
LT T R
VL i
I EA F
AOR I
R E EEALU A
II1IR 1
EeG W6H E A N
O1C G F G
P4T D
IW S
bLoFO ET Z
S IR Z
S SE Z
OrFW ZP OP OO R O L
LO T D
ET T
S l
SA SR A
ERALA 4
IE1IT 1
I AS N
E F O
G D
U8
$[8y" EWE 1
. = yl* ii
i1 ll!
l x
YRDS M
EDL A
I TI I
TTA D
ATF D
BS TA B
O TRT LIE T
1 EUKSE F
SCALS B
I L
2 E
2 EREIO B
S P
IIRAL 1
E CBFC A
B I
D3 C
1 I
I FOR E
6 O
2 ET L
2 RA B
P UR A
LE L
IN I B AE R O ATE FG O T L
LT R
VL i
EA S F
I R E EE2IU B
E9G IN AR 1
f W6H E F i
O1C G
G P4T D
IW S
Ao,FFW ET Z
g IR Z
g SE ZZ gOFO P
0P O
R O
O O L
LT T D
EA T
S l
SR SR B
EE3LA P
If1IT 1
E AS N G F G
D
?8
[w6by gIEoM o
.
- yi 1ZJ lllll'l 1
ll
s APPENDIX C Human Reliability Analysis t
C-1 Babcock & Wilcox
. =co....a......,
Operator fails to manually initiate Auxiliary Feedwater.
a A
b B
e E
c C
c C
e E'
d D
e E
"A" = Operator fails to recognize need for AFW, low MFW pump head alarm.
"B" = Operator reads message incorrectly.
"C" = Operator fails to recognize need for AFW, low steam generator level. alarm.
"D" = Operator reads message incorrectly.
"E" = Operator fails to initiate task of manually actuating AFW once need is recognized.
4 C-2 Babcock & Wilcox
. = cum
..n
,,n--
s Operator corrective action for spuriously closed MOV/A0V fails, a
A b
B c
C d
D e
E "A" = Fails to detect incorrect status of an indicator lamp on initial audit.
"B" = Fails to respond to alarm.
"C"
= Incorrectly reads message.
"D" = Fails to resume attention.
"E" = Manipulates incorrect switch.
4 4
Babcock & Wilcox C-3
. m.o n
..n
, ~ -, - - - - - -.... -,,,. -. - -. -..
i
- Nomally open manual isolation valve is inadvertently left clcsed after mainte-nance. Valve is not in the flow path of monthly pump test.
a A
3 l
r c
1 b
B
+
c C
d D
d D
"A" = Procedures available but not used for main-tenance tasks.
"B"
= Fails to recall a given item.
"C" = Error of omission in use of written procedures, long list, no checkoff.
"D" = Failure of operator or second maintainer to detect an error of omission.
ts C-4 Babcock & Wilcox
. uc w n
~.
Operator inadvertently fails to return flow control valve to auto after pump test.
\\A a
f l
b B
c C
d D
d D
/
"A" = Procedures available but not used for test tasks.
"B" = Fails to recall a given item.
"C"
= Error of omission in use of written procedures, long list, no checkoff.
"D"
= Failure of checker to detect an error of omission.
C-5 Babcock s.Wilcox
. uco
..n c.....,
lu Operator corrective action for control valve inadvertently left in manual
- fails, a
A e
E b
B c
C d
D e
E "A"
= Fails to detect incorrect status of an indicator lamp on initial audit.
"B"
= Fails to respond to alarm.
"C"
= Incorrectly reads message.
"D"
= Fails to resume attention.
"E" = Manipulates incorrect switch.
C-6 Babcock & Wilcox co.,..n....,
b Operctor fails to switch pump suction from DWS1 to CNM system supply.
6 a
a A
b B
"a" = Pump automatic shutoff on low suction pressure fails.
i "A"
= Operator fails to correctly diagnose reason for pump trip.
"B" = Failure of operator to open suction valves and restart pump.
i f
C-7 Babcock & Wilcox
. uco....n
Normally open isolation valve is inadvertently left closed after maintenance.
Valve is in the flow path of monthly pump test.
a A
b B
c C
d D
d D
4 h
/
4
,.Q
\\
"A" = Procedurec available but not used for maintenance tasks.
"B" = Fails to recall a given item.
"C" = Error of omission in use of written procedures, long list, no checkoff.
"D" = Failure of the operato'r or second maintainer to detect an error of omission.
Q
= Pump flow test has not been performed since the last maintenance task.
(Assume monthly flow test and 18 month maintenance interval.)
C-8 Babcock & Wilcov:
. uco e m-,
One of two normally open manual isolation valves is inadvertently left closed after otrip maintenance. One valve is on suction side of pump and is in pump test flow path. The other valve is on discharge side of pump and is not in pump test flow path.
a A
b B
d D
i' e
E C
C d
D d
D e
E h
d D
h l
l Procedures available but not used for maintenance l
"A"
=
task.
Fails to recall a given item.
l "B"
=
l C-9 Babcock & Wilcox
. ec n..... y
(continued)
"C"
= Error of omission in use of written procedure, long list, no checkoff.
"D"
= Failure of the operator second maintainer to detect an error of emission.
"E" u Error of omission for second valve given succecs for the first valve, with high dependence.
= Pump flow test has not been performed since the last maintenance task.
(Assume monthly flow test and 18 month maintenance interval.)
s C-10 Babcock & Wilcox
. m e....n......,
T Operator fails to isolate open path, one control /two control valves have failed high.
a A
c C
d D
b B
c C
d D
\\
c C
l t
"A" = Operator fails to notice that a control valve has failed high, from it's position indication.
"B" = Operator fails to recognize the need for AFW control valve closure, fails to respond to high SG level alarm.
C-11 Babcock & Wilcox a McCormott company
(continued)
"C" = Operator attempts to close isolation valve to isolate path but manipulates wrong switch.
"D" = Operator fails to verify corrective action by checking SG level.
4 C-12 Babcock & Wilcox a McDermott tempany
Miscalibration of setpoints.
a A
l b
\\ B c
C "A" = Failure of maintenance technician to initiate calibration task.
"B"
= Failure of technician to properly adj ust calibration device, involves reading digital display.
"C"'= Fails to correctly adjust setpoint.
C-13 Babcock & Wilcox
. uco...
l l
l APPENDIX D Failure Data l
l D-1 Babcock & Wilcox
. veo....n e.
.451E-84 TM AXSFH TM.AYSFH TM.BXSFH TM.BYSFH TM.A M H TM.RYLFH
.4S1E-84 TM.BMH TM.BMH
.494E-84 TM.AXSFL TM_AYSFL TM.BXSFL TM.BYSFL TM.AML TM.AML
.494E-84 TM.BML TM.BML
.388E-81 LOOPZZZZ
.978E+88 NOLOOPZZ
.137E-83 PROAA2FH PRDAA1FH PROAB1FH PROAB2FH PROBA2FH PROBA1FH
.137E-83 PROBB1FH PROBB2FH
.648E-84 PROAA2FL PROARIFL PROAB1FL PROAB2FL PROBA2FL PROBA1FL
.64EE-84 PROBB1FL PROBB2FL
.137E-83 SUBAA2FH SU3AAIFH SUBAB1FH SUBAB2FH SUBBA2FH SUBBA1FH
.137E-83 SUBBB1FH SUBBB2FH INTCA2FH SUBCA2FH SUNCA2FH INTCA1FH
.137E-83 SUBCA1FH SUNCA1FH INTCB1FH SUBCB1FH SUNCB1FH INTCB2FH
.137E-83 SUBCB2FH SUNCB2FH
.648E-84 SUBAA2FL SUBAAIFL SUBAB1FL SUBAB2FL SUBBA2FL SUBBA1FL
.648E-04 SUBBB1FL SUBBB2FL INTCA2FL SUBCA2FL SUNCA2FL INTCA1FL
.648E-84 SUBCA1FL SUNCA1FL INTCB1FL SUBCB1FL SUNCB1FL INTCB2FL
.648E-84 SUBCB2FL SUNCB2FL
.260E-85 RLAXPBFT RLAXP1FT RLAXP2FT RLAW3FT RLAXP4FT RLA M FT
.260E-85 RLAYP1FT RLAYP2FT RLAYP3FT RLAW4FT
.189E-84 RLAXRCSO RLAXP1SO RLAXP2SO RLAXP3SO RLAXP4SO RLAYRCSO
.189E-84 RLAYPISO RLRYP2SO RLAYP350 RLAW4SO
.168E-83 MJLCA2FH MJLCA1FH MX.CB1FH MJLCB2FH
.169E-83 MJLCA2FL MJLCA1FL MJLCB1FL MJLCB2FL
.363E-85 BAMAXSFH BAMAYSFH BAPBXSFH BAPBYSFH BAMA M H BA M M H
.363E-85 BAPB M H BAPB M H TCPAXSFH TCPAYSFH TCPBXSFH TCPBYSFH
.363E-85 TCPA M H TCPA M H TCPB M H TCPB M H
.366E-85 BAMAYSFL BAPBXSFL BAMAXSFL Bate'rSFL BAMA M L BA M M L
.366E-05 BRtBML BAPB M L TCPAXSFL TCPAYSFL TCPBXSFL TCPBYSFL
.366E-8S TCPA M L TCPA M L TCPB M L TCPB M L
.1SOE-83 OPFISLOP
.280E-82 SPTAA2MC SPTAA1MC SPTAB1MC SPTAB2MC SPTBA2MC SPTBA1MC D-2 Babcock & Wilcox e McDermott company
.158E-83 OPFISLOP
.288E-02 SPTRA2MC SPTAAIMC SPTAB1MC SPTAB2MC SPTBA2MC SPTBA1MC
.280E-02 SPTBB1MC SPTBB2MC SPTCA2NC SPTCA1MC SPTCB1MC SPTCB2MC
.280E-02 SPTAA2NI SPTAA1tti SPTRBitti SPTAB2tti SPTBA2t11 SPTBA11tl
.280E-02 SPTBB1Mt SPTBB2tti SPTCA2tti SPTCAllti SPTCBilft SPTCB2Mi
.604E-08 RCFAXSFO RCFAYSFO RCFBXSFO P.CFBYSFO RCFAXLFO RCFAYLFO
.604E-08 RCFBXLFO RCFBWF0 RCFAXSSH RCFAYSSH RCFBXSSil RCFBYSSH
.604E-08 RCFAXUSH RCFA%ISH RCFBXUSH RCFBWISH
.108E-01 DGN1ARSD DGH1BBSD
.706E-01 DGNIAAFR DGN1BBFR
.47SE-03 CBA1AAFT CBA1BBFT
.688E-06 CBAV51SO CBAJ01SO CBAV52SO CBAJ11SO CBAJ0250 CBAJ12SD
.688E-06 CBAB51SO CBAB03SO CBAA75SO CBAB56SO CBAB04SO CBAA89SO
.300E-04 UPSVAXAM UPSUBZAM
. 82E-04 PSUECXAM PSUECYAM
.257E-04 BTCDAZAM BTCDBZAM
.608E-06 CBDU44SO CBDU26SO CBDU42SO CBDU45SO CBDU2750 CBDU47SD
.381E-03 BATDAZA" BATDRZAM BATirAM BATDDZAM
.240E-04 TFLEA2AM TFLEB2AM
.115E-03 SPTAA2FH SPTAA1FH SPTAB1FH SPTAB2FH SPTBA2FH SPTBA1FH
.115E-03 SPTBB1FH SPTBB2FH SPTCA2FH SPTCA1FH SPTCB1FH SFTCB2FH
.736E-04 SPTAA2FL SPTAA1FL SPTAB1FL SPTAB2FL SPTBA2FL SPTBA1FL
.736E-04 SPTBB1FL SPTBB2FL SPTCARFL SPTCA1FL SPTCB1FL SPTCB2FL
.120E-04 VOA19AFL VDA18AFL VOA18BFL VOA19BFL
.11?E-04 VOA19AFH VOA18AFH VOA18BFH VDA19BFH 7.50E-84 OPFISLTP
.830E-02 SPBKLOCA l
l I
l j
D-3 Babcock & Wilcox
. u co....n.....n
i
.321E-83 PM181AFR PttB1BFR
.530E-03 PitIB1ASD Ptt181BSD
.309E-03 MUV1A2SC POV1B1SC MDV182SC MOV1A1SC MOV434FC MOUV41SC
.309E-03 MOUV44SC
.801E-04 SYSCNPfiA
.475E-03 CBAA66FT CBAA96FT CBAL7CFT CBAL46FT CBA1AAFT CBA1BBFT
.688E-06 CBA651SO CBA661SO CBRA7?SO CBAB86SO CBAB01SO CBAA64SO
.688E-06 CBAB8?SO CBRA84SO CBAB06SO CBAB02SO CBAA93SO CBAB05SO
.688E-06 CBAA75SO C3AB03SO CBAB56SO CBAA89SO CBAB04SO CBAV51SO
.688E-06 CBAJ01SO CBAU52SO CBAJ1150 CBA351SO CBAJ02SO CBAJ1250
.688E-06 CBDV2950 CBDU53SO CBDU28SO CBDU52SO CBDV30SO CBDU42SO
.608E-06 CBDU4?SO CBDU58SO CBDU2950 CBDU57SO CBDU44SO CBDU26SO
.608E-06 CBDU2750 CBDU45SO
.182E-04 PSUECXAM PSUECYAM
.25?E-04 BTCDRZAM BTCDB2AM BTCDCZAM BTCDDZAM
.260E-05 RLAXBiCD RLAXB3CD RLAXB4CD RLA>B2CD RLAYB1CD RLAYB3CD
.260E-05 RLAYO2CD RLAYB4CD
.451E-04 TM.XSAFH TitXSBFH TtLYSAFH TM.YSBFH
.381E-03 BATDAZAM BATDBZAM BATDCZAM BATDDZAM
.240E-04 TFLEA2AM TFLEB2AM TFLEA3AM TFLEB3AM TFLEA1AM TFLEB1AM
.188E-01 DGN1AASD DGH1BBSD
.706E-01 DGNIAAFR DGN1BBFR
.300E-01 LOOPZZZZ
.168E-03 BAMXSAFH BAPDlSBFH BAPfr'SAFH BANYSBFH
.200E-02 MOW 3C00 POW 4 COD
.105E-03 VCH1680D VCH1690D UCHV3AOD VCHV3800 VCHV2900 UCHV120D
.105E-03 VCHU3500 UCHV2400 UCHW50D VCHW60D
.468E-04 THKDttlAM
.418E-82 PMT01CSD
.144E-82 PMT01CFR
~
.445E-03 A0VBA10D A0VOA200 ADV0B10D A0V0B20D
.139E-82 PMT01 CPM PttB1APM Pt981 BPM D-4 Babcock & Wilcox a McDermott company
.468E-84 TNKD!tlAM
.188E-82 AFUTRPOP
.180E+68 SYSCNPDA
.518E-82 POV1A20C DOV1B10C POU1820C mV1A10C A0VOA10C ROUBA20C
.518E-02 A0V0810C A0V0820C MOVU410C MOVU440C
.378E-02 A0VBA1PM ADVBA2PM ADWB1PM A0V082PM UCHV12LC UGTUSSLC
.370E-82 UCHU24LC UGTV38LC UGTV13LC l
.940E-04 UGTV2CLC UGTV8ALC UGTV4BLC
.218E-03 UGTU71LC VGTV12LC
.166E-05 CW9380D l
.214E-03 CV2872FC l
.300E-84 UPSUA2AM UPSUBZAM
.120E-84 CV4673FC t
l l
l l
l D-5 Babcock & Wilcox
. uco....n c.....,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.