ML20079G964

Proposed Tech Spec 3/4.7.3 Re Svc Water Sys - Operating

ML20079G964
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	10/03/1991
From:	VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20079G953	List: ML20079G948 ML20079G964
References
NUDOCS 9110100043
Download: ML20079G964 (19)

Text

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Attachment 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change North Anna Unit 1 t

Virginia Electric and Power Company 9110100043 911003 f DR ADOCK 0500 3 I

P!MT SYSTEMS 3!4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 3!4.7 4.1 SERVICEWATER SYSTEM OPERATING UMITIMG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.1 Two service water loops (shared with Unit 2) shall be OPERABLE with each loop consisting of:

a. Two OPERABLE service water pumpri (excluding auxiliary service water pumps) with their associated normal and emergency power supplies, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of providing cooling for OFERABLE plar t components and transterring heat to the service water reservoir.

APPLICABILITY: Either Unit in MODES 1,2,3, or 4.

ACTION: a. With one service water pump inoporable, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> throttle component cooling water heat orchanger flows, in accordance with approved operating procedurea, to ensure the remaining service water pumps are capable of providing adequate flow to the recirculation spray hont exchangers.

b. With two service water pumps inoperable, perform ACTION 3.7.4.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and restore at least one serv'cq water pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or place both units in HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />,

c. With one service water loop inoperable, except as provided in ACTION 3.7.4.1.a.

restore the inoperable loop to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or place both units in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, d The allowable limo that one of the two service water loops can be inoperable as specified in ACTION 3.7.4.1.c may be extended beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> up to 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> as part of service water system upgrades

• provided 3 out of 4 service water pumps (the third pump does not require auto start capability) and 2 out of 2 auxiliary service water pumps have been OPERABLE since initial entry into the action statement and romain OPERABLE during the extended action statomont or

be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the

following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

isolation of one service water loop fcr up to 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> is permitted only as part of service water system upgrades. System upgrades include modification and maintenance l activities associated with the installation of now discharge headers and spray arrays,

! mechanical and chemical cleaning of service water piping and valves, pipe repair and I replacement, vane repair and replacement, installation of corrosion mitigation measures and inspections of and repairs to buried piping interior coatings and pump or l vaNo house components.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 3/4 7 18 l

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PLANT SYSTDAS 3'4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 3/4.7.4.1 SElWlCE WATER SYSTEM OPERATING UMITING CONDtTION FOR OPERATION

o. With two servico water loops inoperable for reasons other than described in ACTION 3.7.4.1.b place both units in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and within the following haur, initiato actions to place both units in COLD SHUTDOWN and continue actions until both units are in COLD SHUTDOWN.

SURVEllLANCE REQUIREMD4TS n-4.7.4.1 At least two service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least onco per 31 days by verifying that each valvo (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, souled, or othorwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b. At least onco por 6 months by measurement of the movement of the purnphouse and wing walls,

c. At least onco por 18 months during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valvo servicing safoty related equipment actuatos to its correct position on an actual or simulated safety injection signal.

2. Vorifying that each automatic service water valvo actuates to its correct pcsition on an actual or simulated containment high high signal.

d F.ach servico water pump will bo tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.5.

NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 3/4 7-18a f

PLANT SYSTDAS l'41AJ.ERVICE.WAIEllSYSlEM 3/4.74LSERVICE WATER SYSTEM S11UIRQWN UM1 TING CCJJDITION FORpPERATION 3.7.4.2 Ono servico water loop (shmed with Unit 2) shall be OPERABLE consisting of:

a Two OPERABLE servico water purnps (or auxiliary servico water purnps) with their associated normal and ornorgency power supplies, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path capablo of providing cooling for OPERABLE plant components and transferring heat to the servico water reservoir or, if using auxiliary service pornps, to the North Anna reservoir.

APPLICAQ!LlLY: Both Units in MODES 5 or G.

OQljQtt a With only one service water pump OPERA 0LE, rostoro an additional servico water pump to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or unmodsately suspend all oporutions involving an increase in the reactor decay heat toad or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant Systern.

b. With no servico water pumps OPERABLE, immediately suspend al' operations involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System.

SURVE LLNJCE REQUIREMENTS 4.'7.4.2 At least one service water loop shall be demonstrated opt:RABLE:

a. At least onco por 31 days by verifying that each valvo (rnanual, ;x) wor operated of automatic) servicing safoty related equipment that is not locked, scaled, or otherwisu secured in position, is in its correct position,

b. At least once per 6 rnonths by rneasutoment of the movement of the pump house and wing walls.

c. Each service water pump will be tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.5.

l NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 3/4 718b

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PLANT SYSTEMS WEE.S 3/f71.6 and 3'4.7.7.1.7 SIf;NLT.UHBINE and OVERSPEED PROTE,CT:ON  ;

1 The turbino gonorator at the North Anna facility is arranged in a nonponinsular 1 orientation Analysis has shown that this arrangoment is such that if a turbino failure occurs as l

a result of destructivo overspoed, potentially damaging misslos could impact the auxiliary l building, containment, control room and other structures housing safety related equipment. The l requiromonts of those two specifications provido additional assurance that the facility will not l bo operated with degradod valvo perforrnance and/or flawod turbino material which are the I major contributors to turbino failures, 3'4.7 2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE 4EMPERATURE UMITATION The limitation on stoan gonorator pressure and temperaturo ensures that the pressuro induced stressos in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits, The limitations of 70'F and 200 psig are based on averago steam generator impact values at 10'F and are sufficioni to provent brittle fracture, l'4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUBSYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water subsystem onsures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety tolated equipmerit during normal and accident conditions, 1

NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4 l

I PLANT SYSTEMS EMSES 3'4.7.4.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATING The OPERABILITY of the service water system onsures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for safety related equipment during normat and accident conditions. The system is designed to moet the assumption of a single failure. During a design basis accident, both loops of service water cross connect at the affected units recirculation spray host exchangers to create a single largo service water system. The affected units component cooling heat orchangers isolato co that sufficient flows are provided to both the non affected and affected units components.

With four noimal service water pumps OPERABLE, the unthrottled flow resistanco of the system is such that greater than design flows are achloved if a singlo pump or power supply failure occurs following an accident. When three normal servico water pumps are OPERADLE, the flow resistance of the system is adjusted to ensure that design flows are achieved if a single pump or power supply failure occurs following an accident. The required resistance is determined during periodic flow balance testing and is obtainod by throttling flow through the component cooling water heat oxchangers. Rather than marking and specifying exact component cooling water heat exchanger outlet throttle valvo postilons, oporuting proceduros have boon established to set system resistance at or greater than the required resistanco. When only two normal service water pumps or a single loop are OPERABLE, the design basis function can still be mot provided that the flow resistanco of the system is adjusted and no additional failures occur. The allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is consistent with other LCOs for loss of one train of ESF systems, and is based upon an industry accepted practico considering the low probability of an accident occuring.

If more than two normal service water pumps or both service water loops ato inoperable, the units are not prepared to respond to the design bases events for which the service water system is required. Both units must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWil within twolvo hours and actions initiated within one hour thoroafter to place the units in COLD SHUTDOWN.

Twelve hours is a reasonable time based on operating experience to place the units in HOT SHUTDOWN from full power without challonging safety systems or operators. The units may remain in HOT SHUTDOWN until a method to further cool the units becomes available. but actions to develop the method must be started within one hout aflor reaching HOT SHUTDOWN.

Auxiliary service water pumps are strictly a backup subsystem and are not taken credit for in a design basis accident. Howevor, those pumps are taken credit for in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. analysis. Thorofore, those pumps are maintained OPERABLE in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 to meet those requirements.

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NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 B 3/4 7 4a l

PLANT SYSTEMS MSES 3'4.7.4.2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM SHUTDOWN The OPERABILITY of the service water system when both units are in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING onsures that an adequate heat sink is maintained for the residual heat removal system. Requiring two service water pumps to be OPERABLE is consistent with the residual heat removal system requirements.

If only one service water pump is OPERABLE, an additional service water pump must be restored to an OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. ll an additional service water pump cannot be restored within the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> time frame, all operations involving an increar,9 in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System should be immediately suspended.

With no service water pumps OPERABLE, all operations involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System must be immediately suspended.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7 4b

Attachment 3 Proposed Technical Specification Change North Anna Unit 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company

l PLANT SYSTE)G 3!4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 3'4.7.4.1 SERVICEWAIER SYSTEM OPERAI!NG UMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.7.4.1 Two service water loops (shared with Unit 1) shall bo OPENABLE with each loop consisting of:

a. Two OPERABLE service water pumps (excluding auxiliary service water pumps) with their associated normal and omergency power supplies, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path capablo of providing cooling for OPERABLE plant components and transferring heat to the service water reservoir.

APPLICABILITY: Either Unit in MODES 1,2,3, or 4.

ACTDt a. With one service water pump inoperable, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> throttle component cooling water heat exchanger flows, in accordance with approved operating proceduros, to ensure the remaining service water pumps are capable of providing adequate flow to the recirculation spray heat exchangers,

b. With two service water pumps inoperable, perform ACTION 3.7.4.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and restore at least one service water pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or place both units in HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />,

c. With one service water loop inoperable, except as provided in ACTION 3.7.4.1.a.

restore the Inoperable loop to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or p'aco both units in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />,

d. The allowable time that one of the two service water loops can be inoperable as specified in ACTION 3.7.4.1.c may be extended beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> up to 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> as part of service water system upgrades' provided 3 out of 4 service water pumps (the third pump does not require auto start capability) and 2 out of 2 auxiliary service water pumps have been OPERABLE since initial entry into the action statement and remain OPERABLE during the extended action statement or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

lsolation of one service water loop for up to 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> is permitted only as part of service water system upgrades. System upgrados include rnodification and maintenance activities associated with the installation of now discharge headers and spray arrays, mechanical and chemical cleaning of service water piping and valves, pipe repair and replacement, valve repair and replacement, installation of corrosion mitigation measures and inspections of and repairs to buried piping interior coatings and purnp or vaVe house components.

NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 3/4 7-15

f PLNH SYSTEMS 314.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 3/4.7.4.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATitiG UMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

e. With two service water loops inoperable for reasons other than dawibed in ACTION 3.7.4.1.b place buth units in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and within the following hour,initia'e act;ons to place both units in COLD SHUTDOWi4 and continue actions until both units are in COLD SHUTDOWN.

SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMEffTS 4.7.4.1 At loast two service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a_ 'i seast once por 31 days by verifying that each valvo (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b. At least onco per 6 months by measurement of the movement of the pumphouse and wing walls,

c. At least once per 18 mor.ths during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuales to its correct position on an actuel or simulated safety injection signal.

2. Venfying that each automatic service water valve actuates to its correct position on an actual or simulated containment high high signal,

d. Eac;. service water pump will be tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.5.

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l NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 3/4 715a l

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PLANI SYSTEMS 3!4]f SERVICE WATEtt SYSTEM T4.7.4.2 SERVICE WATER. SYSTEM SHUTDOWN .

UMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.2 One service water loop (shared with Unit 1) shall be OPhRABLE consisting of:

a. Two OPERABLE service water pumps (or auxiliary service water pumps) with their associated normal and emergency power supplies, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of providing cooling for OPERABLE plant components and transferring heat to the service water reservoir or, if using auxiliary service pumps, to the North Anna reservoir.

APPLICABILITY: Both Units in MODES S or 6.

ACIIts a With only one service water pump OPERABLE, restore an additional service water pus,.f. tc OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or immediately suspend all opu ntN !nvolving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in bou.et germation of the Reactor Cootant System.

b, With no service water pumps OPERABLE, imrnediately suspend all operations hvvving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System.

CURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ur--

'4.7.4.2 At least one service water loop shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (mar.ual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position,

b. At least once per 6 months by measurement of the movement of the purnp house and wing walls,

c. Each service water pump will be tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.5.

NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 3/4 715b 1

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PLANT SYSTEMS BES - -

3/4.7.1 A and 3/4.7.7.1.7 STEAM TURDiNE and OVERSPEED PROTECTION The turbine generator at the North Anna facility is arranged in a nonponinsular 41 ti..M. Analys S has shown that this arrangement is such that if a turbino failure occurs as s s id y destructive overspood, potentially damaging rnissles could impact the auxiliary 1 fef yg A tainment, control room and other structures housing safety rotated equipment. The tww/%rh of thoso 'wo specifications provido additional assurance that the facility will not h A.Ow.) with degraded valvo performance and'or flawod turbino matorial which are the majof Mntrib.) ars to turbine failures.

3'4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE UMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperaturo ensures that the ger@re induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximam allowablo fracturc toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70'F and 200 psig are based on average steam generator impact values at 10'F and are sufficient to provent briitto fracture.

3'47.3 COMPONENT COOj,'NG WATER SUBSYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water subsystem onsures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safoty related equipment during normal and accident conditions.

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l NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-4 l

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PLANT SYSTEMS MSES T4.7.4.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATita The OPERABILITY of the service water system onsures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for safoty related oquipment during norrnal and accident condillons. The system is designed to moet the assumption of a single falturo. During a design basis accident, both loops of service water cross connect at the affectnd units tecirculation spra/ heat exchangers to create a single largo service water system. The affected units component cooling heat oxchangers isolato so that sufficlont flows are provided to both the non affected and affocied units "

components.

With tour normal service water pumps OPERABLE, the unthrottled flow resistance of the system is such that greator than design flows are achieved if a singlo pump or power supply failure occurs following an accident. When throo normal service water pumps are OPERABLE, the flow resistance of the system is adjusted to ensure that riosign flows are achloved ll a single pump or power supply failure occurs following an accident. The required resistance is dolormined during periodic flow balance testing and is obtained by throttling flow through the component cooling water heat exchangers. Rather than marking and specifying exact component cooling water heat schanger outlet throttle valvo positions, operating proceduros have boon established to set system resistanco at or greater than the required resistanco. When only two normal service water pumps or a single loop aro OPERABLE. the design basis function can still be mot provided that the flow resistance of the system is adjusted and no additional failures occur. The allowed outago time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is consistent with other LCOs for loss of one train of ESF systems, and is based upon an it dustry accepted practico considering the low probability of an accident occuring.

If more than two normal service water pumps or both service water loops are inoperable, the units are not prepared to respond to the design bases events for which the service water system is required. Both units must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within twelve hours and actions initiated within one hour thoroafter to place the units in COLD SHUTDOWN.

Twelve hours is a reasonable time based on operating experience to place the units in HOT SHUTDOWN from full power without challenging safety systems or operators. The units may remain in HOT SHUTDOWN until a method to further cool the units becomes avaltable, but actions to develop the method must be started within ono hour after reaching HOT SHUTDOWN.

Auxiliary service water pumps are strictly a backup subsystem and are not taken credit for in a design basis accident. However, those pumps are taken credit for in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, analysis. Therefore, those pumps are maintained OPERABLE in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 to meet these requirements.

NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 B 3/4 7 4a

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PLN# SYSTEMS W6ES - -

lL/4.7.4.2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM SHUTDQWbl The OPERADILITY of the service water system when both units are in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING ensures that an adequate heat sink is maintained for the residunt heat removal system. Requiring two service water pumps to be OPERAULE is consistent with the residual heat removat system requirements.

If only one service water pump is OPERABLE, an additional servico water pump must be restored to an OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. If an additional service water pemp cannot be rostored within the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> tirno framo, all operations involving an increaso in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System should bo immediately suspended.

With no service water pumps OPERABLE, all operations involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Cootant System must bo immediately suspended.

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NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 8 3/4 7-4b 1

Attachment 4 10 CFR 50.02, No Significant Hazards Consideration North Anna Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company

l No Significant Hazards Considerations Evaluation The proposed changes are being made as a result of an NRC violation regarding the servico water system, in iho Notification of Violation (dated February 1,1991) the NRC identified that the operating procedures for the service water system woro inadequato by not ensuring design basis flows to the recirculation spray heat exchangers during periods when a service water pump is inoperable, in our responso to the Notico of Violation (dated March 1 1991) we committed to changes to tho Technical Specifications to clarity the service water system operability requirements.

The proposed changes enhanco the availability of the service water system and ensuro design basis flows arc available to the recirculation spray heat exchangers, The proposed changes further ensure thG uvailability of shutdown cooling by requiring one OPERABLE service water loop when both units are in Modes 5 or 6.

The Limiting Condition for Operation of Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 is changed to defino what constitutes an operable service water loop. Each service water loop must contain two OPERABLE service water pumps (excluding auxiliary service water pumps) with their associated normal and omorgency power supplies, and an OPERABLE flow path capable of providing cooling for OPERABLE plant components and transferring heat to the service water reservoir to ensure design basis flows are achievable.

The Applicability statement of Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 is changed to clarify that this Technical Specification applies if either unit is in modo t through 4. This change will ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available for both units during power operation.

Action statcment 3.7.4.1.a is added to require that if one of the four required normal service water pumps becomes inoperable, that component cooling heat exchangor service water flows must bo throttled, witnin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, to ensure that the normal service water pumps remain capable of providing design basis flows to the recirculation spray heat exchangers. This allows design basis flows to be delivered by two normal service water pumps with the failure of the third OPERABLE normal service water pump.

Action statement 3.7.4.1.b is added to require that if two of the four required service water pumps become incporable Action 3.7.4.1.a must be performed within one hour.

Performing this action ensures the design basis flows can be met if no subsequent pump failures occur. In addition, at least one service water pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or both units shall be plac9 in HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Action statomont 3.7.4.1.c was modified to add the phrase "except as provided in 3.7.4.1.a" for clarification. In addition, this action statement was changed to clarify that the inoporable loop must bo returned to OPERABLE status within six hours or both units will be placed in HOT STANDBY. ,

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Action statement 3.7.4.1.d was modified to allow not having auto start capability on the third normal service water pump and requiro 2 out of 2 auxiliary service water pumps to be OPERABLE. Not requiring tho third normal service water pump to have an auto-stari capability is considered a clarification of the current Technical Specification and is needed to protect the normal service water pumps from a low flow condition when the three pumps are ali0ned to the same supply header. The probabilistic risk assessment that was performed for the orlDinal amendment only requhod that the r pump be available for servico. Requiring 2 out of 2 auxiliary service water pumps will arovide for a completo backup system to be available and will ensure that a manually nitiated backup system exists which can deliver design basis flows during an accident condition. In addition, the footnoto for this action statement was modified to include the service water valve house. ,

Action statement 3.7.4.1.e is added to require that if both service water loops becomo inoperable, that both units must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12.

hours and that actions be initiated to place both units in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next hour and continue to COLD SHUTDOWN. With two service water loops inoperable, the units are not prepared to respond to the design basis events for which the service water system is required. The units must be placed !n a modo in which the risk to the unit and to the environment is minimized. Depending on the actual stato of the service water system, the recirculation spray heat exchangers may not have a safety-grade heat sink and the unit should be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN, a condition ,

where decay heat can be removed by the steam generators.

The action to place both units in HOT SHUTDOWN and continue actions until both units are in COLD SHUTDOWN addresses the condition if the service water system is unavailable to perform its Intended function, in this situation, the unit may remain in HOT SHUTDOWN until a method to further cool the units becomes available.

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.4.1.c(2) was modified to clarify that the automatic ~

service water valves should be verified to be in the_ correct position on a actual or simulated containment high high signal.

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.4.1.d was added to specify surveillance testing for  ;

OPERABILITY determination of the service water pumps in accordance with Specification 4.0.5, the AMSE Section XI pmgram.

Technical Specificat% 1.7.4.2 was added to support the UFSAR design bases for  ;

both units in Modes C or 6 When both units are in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING -

the design basis requees ' hat the service water system bo OPERABLE. This is to ensure an adequate heat m ik is maintained for the residual heat removal system.

The requirements for Modes 5 and 6 diflor from Specification 3.7.4.1 by requiring that one service water loop be OPERABLE. Service water is required to provido a heat l

sink for the residual heat removal system to remove decay heat from the reactor coro.

However, there is a significant reduction in potential heat loading on the service water l . system. Therefore, only one service water loop is required to be OPERABLE. The components requirod for one loop to be OPERABLE are the same as defined in I

Specification 3.7.4.1 except that credit for the OPERABLE auxiliary service water pump

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may be taken to satisfy the OPERABILITY requiremont of the LCO. This allows removing the service water reservoir from service for maintenance and utilizing the Lako Anna resowolr as tho heat sink for coro heat tornoval. Requiring that two servico water pumps be OPERABLE allows for a singlo pump or power failure while still providing the heat sink for the residual heat removal system. This is consistent with the residual heat removal system requiremen4.

Action Statement 3.7.4.2.a requires that if there is only ono OPERABLE servico water pump, at least one inoperable service water pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This is consistent with the action requirements for a pertial loss of residual heat removal capability during shutdown cone .ons.

Action Statement 3.7.4.2.b requires that if no service water pumps are OPERABLE, all operations involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System must bo immediately suspended because a total loss of shutdown cooling may have occurred. This is consistent with the action requirements for a total loss of residual heat removal capability during shutdown conditions.

Surveillance requirements to domonstrate the OPERABILITY of one service water loop are proposed for Technical Specification 3.7.4.2.

The existing bases section (3/4.7.4) was expanded to provido a moro detailed description of the service water system. This bases section was also split to provide a description for operating and shutdown conditions (3/4.7.4.1 and 3/4.7.4.2, respectively).

It has been determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.02. This determination was based on the following points.

1. Accident Probability or Consequence Increase. The proposed changes have no adverse impact upon potential accident probability or consequence. The proposed changes enhance the availability of the service water system and ensure design basis flows are available to the recirculation spray heat exchangers. The proposed changes further ensure the availability of shutdov.n cooling by requiring one OPERABLE service water loop when both units are in Modes 5 or G. No new or unique accident procursors are introduced by these changes to the Technical Specification requirements. In fact, the clarification of the Technical Specifications to accurately portray the current design basis for the service water system will decrease any potential accident probability or consequence that may occur as a result of inaccurate or incomplete information that may be currently in the Technical Specifications.

Likewise, the consequences of the accidents will not increase as a result of of the proposed Technical Specification changes.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

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2. Accident Probability Croation. The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications constitutes additional limitations not presently included in the Technical Specifications thereby making the Technical Specificaticns more stringent. The propocod changes enhance the availability of the service water system and ensure design basis flows are availablo to the recirculation spray heat exchangers. The proposed changes further ensure the availability of shutdown cooling by requiring one OPERABLE service water loop when oath units are in Modes 5 or 6. Operation with those changes does not creato probability for any accident which has not already been ovaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). In fact, those changos are to modify the Technical Specifications to be consistent with the design basis. Thorofore, the proposed changes will not create the possibility of a now or difforent kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Safety Margin Reduction. The results of the UFSAR accident aralyses continuo to bour.d operation under the proposed changes. The proposed changes enhance the availability of the service water system and ensure design basis flows are available to the recircu!ation spray Mat exchangers. The proposed changes further onsure the availability of shutdown cooling by requiring one OPERABLE service water locp when both units are in Modes 5 or *

6. The proposed changos to the Technical Specifications ensure consistency with the UFSAR design basis and result in additional limitations not currently included in the Technical Specifications. Thorofore, the Margins of Safety are maintained without reduction.

Based on the above significant hazards consideration ovaluation, Virginia Electric and Power Company conclucos that tho activities associated with this proposed Technical Specification change satllfios the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified.

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