ML20078G460

Second Interim Deficiency Rept,Item 96 Re Seismic Pipe Hangers Previously Accepted by QC Inspector & Item 72 Re Undersize Skewed Tee Fillet Welds on Seismic Pipe Hangers. Initially Reported on 820813 & 1105,respectively

ML20078G460
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	10/03/1983
From:	Parsons R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
CON-NRC-127 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8310120246
Download: ML20078G460 (5)

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CA&L Carolina Power & Light Comp 89 BC T 6 wm m- 48 3g P. O. Box 101, New Hill, N. C. 27562 October 3,1983 Mr. James P. O'Reilly NRC-127 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Northwest (Suite 2900)

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1986 900,000 KW - UNITS 1 & 2 SEISMIC PIPE HANGERS PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED BY QC WELDING INSPECTOR -ITEM 96 UNDERSIZE SKEWED TEE FILLET WELDS ON SEISMIC I PIPE H ANGERS -ITEM 72 1

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Attached is our second interim report on the subject items which were deemed reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), on August 13,1982 (Item 96) and November 5,1982 (Item 72). Carolina Power and Light Company is pursuing this matter, and it is currently projected that corrective action and submission of the final report will be acecmplished by December 1,1984.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Yours very truly, T

R. M. Parsons 4

Project General Manager

, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant RMP/sh Attachment ec: Messrs. G. Maxwell /R. Prevatte (NRC-SHNPP)

Mr. R. C. DeYoung (NRC) i O

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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO.1 INTERIM REPORT NO. 2 PIPE HANGERS PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED BY QC WELDING INSPECTORS ITEM 96 UNDERSIZED SKEWED TEE FILLET WELDS ON SEISMIC I PIPE HANGERS ITEM 72 1983 i

l REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR50.55(e) i l

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SUBJECT:

Deficient field welds on pipe hangers previously accepted by QC welding inspectors.

ITEMS: Seismic Pipe Hangers SUPPLIED BY: N/A - Hangers furnished by Bergen-Paterson, but problem deals with field welds.

NATURE OF DEFICIENCY: 1. Missing and undersized welds

2. Cosmetic weld defects

3. Inaccurate and incomplete QC documentation

4. QC inspections performed by personnel whose work was suspect

5. Undersized skewed-tee field wclds

_DATE PROBLEROCCURRED: Prior to July 29,1982 DATE PROBLEM REPORTED: August 13,1982 - CP&L (N. J. Chiangi) notified the NRC (A.

Hardin) that this item (Item 96) was reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). In our November 5,1982 letter, CP&L (R. M. Parsons) notified the NRC (J. P. O'Reilly) that this item (Item 72) was reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).

SCOPE OF PROBLEM: 3749 Seismic Category I pipe hangers that were installed or partly installed and inspected prior to June 26,1982 were identified and reinspected. This includes the 349 hangers which were previously reinspected as part of the corrective action to NRC Report 50-400/82-03.

The June 26,1982 date was selected because the QC weld inspection program was expanded to include shop welds on installed hangers (refer to Item 95). Inspector training was conducted prior to June 26,1982 to ensure satisfactory inspector performance.

347 hangers which had been installed and inspected prior to June 26,1982 were removed, voided, or declassified to non-seismic by a subsequent drawing revision and therefore were not reinspected.

SAFETY IMPLICATION: Deficient welds could cause a safety-related pipe hanger to fail under seismic conditions. As a result, if not corrected, they l

could adversely affect the safe operation of this facility.

l However, no hangers evaluated to date with the above type l

deficiencies have been found to adversely affect the safe operation of this facility.

i REASON THE DEFICIENCY j IS REPORTABLE: The conditions reported in Item 96 and Item 72 were identified l as reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) due to the extensive evaluation required and the breakdown in the QA program.

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' CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1329 hangers were identified with deficient field welds as a result of the reinspection effort. Deficiencies were resolved as follows:

Welds were cut out.

Design drawing revisions were issued as a result of ,

Engineering evaluation.

Welds were reworked and upgraded to meet the acceptance criteria of FCR-H-979.

2 Some hangers were on hold due to engineering problem which precluded rework at this time. These hangers will be dispositioned in accordance with the appropriate drawing revision when the holds are removed.

To ensure that hangers requiring reinspection were not overlooked, QCI19.3 requires that during the final review process all SWDR's in the hanger work package will be checked to ensure that inspections performed prior to June 26,1982 have been reinspected and accepted. Any hangers inadvertently missed during the reinspection effort will be reinspected and appropriately dispositioned.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

.TAKEN TO AVOID

! FURTHER NON-COMPLIANCE: 1. A pipe hanger inspection documentation instruction (QCI)

19.3 was developed and issued.

2. Additional training classes were held with required attendance for both craft and QC weld inspection personr.el involved in pipe hanger inspection. Training classes covered items such as measurement of skewed-tee welds, visual acceptance criteria, proper documentation, l applicable work procedures, etc.

3. . New QC weld inspector candidates are interviewed by the QA/QC Specialist in addition to passing a written examination to ensure they are aware of project requirements pertinent to their assignments.

4. Each inspector's doeurnentation of weld inspections is i

reviewed after each phase of inspection to ensure i completeness and correctness.

5. Supervisory audits are routinely performed in accordance with Quality Assurance Instruction (QAI)1.3 on each QC inspector's field work to ensure his satisfactory performance and to ensure that the work complies with i the design documents.

6. A system was developed to aid in the resolution of technical inquiries that inspector supervision is unable to resolve. Technical inquiries are stated on a Request for Information (RFI) form and forwarded to the QA engineering unit which was established on site to provide engineering support for inspection activities.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER NONCOMPLIANCE (cont'd.):

7. Field Change Request (FCR) H-979 was developed and issued to provide weld inspection acceptance criteria for both field and shop welds based on AWS DI.1 code and Bergen-Paterson design criteria. Procedure NDEP-605 wcs issued to address the specific conditions governing pipe hanger weld inspections.

FINAL REPORT: Corrective action has been completed on all active hangers.

Those hangers on engineering hold will be reinspected and reworked when they become active again, or they will be cancelled if they are voided. For this reason, we cannot close this item until December 1,1984.

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