ML20077M288
| ML20077M288 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/06/1983 |
| From: | Hiatt S OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20077M285 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8309120296 | |
| Download: ML20077M288 (31) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- AFFIDAVIT I, Susan L. Hiatt, duly sworn, depose and say that:
- 1. the assertions -below are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief;
- 2. The Appeal Board has considered a determination of the need for ,
power from a nuclear facility to be central to NEPA's directives. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 mad 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33 (1977). If the electricity to be produced 3 i by a proposed project is genuinely needed, then the societal benefits achieved by having that electricity are immeasureable. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont ' Yankee Nuclear Power Station), AIAB-179, 7 AEC 159,173 (1974) . On the other hand, if there is no need for power, justification for a facility is problematical. Seabrook, supra, at 6 NRC 90. A need for power determination involves questioning "whether there exists a genuine need for the electricity to be pro-duced. This inquiry involves not only an analysis of existing generating capacity and of projections of expected growth . . . [butalso] appropriate attention must be given to energy conservation considera-tions, insofar as they affect the likelihood that predicted demand will in fact occur. At the same time, however, coEnizance can be taken of the effect which a shortage of fossil fuel, or a need to divert that fuel to other uses, might have upon demand for non-fossil generating sources." Vermont Yankee, supra _, at 7 AEC 175.
- 3. Beaver Valley 2 is owned jointly by 4 utilities (collectively known as the Central Area Power Coordinating Group, or CAPCO) in the Northern Ohio / Western Pennsylvania area, in the following '
proportion: 8309120296 030906 DR ADOCK 05000412 j ___ __!EK-_ ___ \
~
4 Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (CEI) 24.47% Duquesne Light 13.74% Ohio Edison 41.88% 4 Toledo Edison 19.91% 100.00% Tiras, to properly detennine the need for Beaver Valley .2, one must look at the CAPCO system as a whole, as has been done by the AEC/NRC ( e.g. , FES-OL for ' Beaver Valley 1, July 1973; NUREG-0884, DES-OL for.the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, March 1982.)
- 4. At the CP stage for Beaver . Valley 2 (CP issued May 3,1974) growth rate in electrical demand for. the CAPC0 service area was pro-jected at 6.3% per year. (See, e.g., FES-CP.for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, U.S. -AEC, April 1974,. p. 8-9; FES-OL for Beaver Valley 1, U.S. AEC, July 1973, p. 8-1. ) CAPCO's annual. projected peak demand and net energy demand for the years 1973 to 1982 are as follows:
(Taken from,CEI's Environmental Report for Perry, 1973, pp. 1.1-39a and 1 1-39b; for peak demand, the CAPC0 peak may not equal the sum of the individual company. peaks because they may not all occur at the same hour.) Annual Peak Demand Forecast (MW) DL OE TE CAPCO Year CEI 2230 3805 1249 10,347 l 1973~ 3090 10,998 3260 2355 4045 1353 1974 1453 11,678 1975 3470 2470 4300 3670 2585 4575 1557 12.3E' 1976 1664 13,2 t9 1977 3890 2705 4860 2835 5170 1779 13,5 0 1978 4120 14, ? ? J 4360 - 2975 5495 1900 1979 2027 1980 4620 3115 5845' 15.f J7 3255 6215 2164 16,324 1981 4890 17,493
-5170 3410 6605 2308 1982 J _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . . -
-3 Annual Net Energy Forecast (1000 MWh) ,
1973 18;079 " 13,020 22,013 7002 60,114 1974 18,830' 13,630 24,169 7537 64,166 1975 19.821 14,200 25,861 8144 68,026 1976 20,863 14,790 26,381 8718 70,752 1977 21,914 15,420 28,023 9300 74,657 1978 23,127 16,100 29,767 9980 78,974
'1979 24,591 16,820 31,614 10,738 83,763 1980 26,159 17,560 33,579 11,501 88,798 -
Ilis 3:s88 . 18:898 39:231 13:111 %9:389
- 5. Actual data for the years 1973 to 1982 is as follows:
(Sources: 1973-1979 data, CEI's Environmentai Report, OL Stage, for Perry, pp. 1.1-16 and 1.1-17; 1980-82 data, 1982 annual reports for DL, OE, and TE, and CEI's Long Term Forecast Report filed with the Ohio Department of Development, Division of Energy, June 1,1983 (for actual peak demand).) Actual Peak Demand (MW) Year CEI DL CE TE CAPCO 1973 3119 2296 3796 1246 10,432 1974 2934 2158 3648 1249 10,014 1975 2937 2230 3623 1256 9,906 1976 3065 2260 2757 1340 10,345 1977 3350 2371 4088 1393 11,164 1978 3249 2374 3987 1386 10,897 1979 3097 2296 4020 1395 10,435 1980 3304 2474 4210 1310 11,298 1981 3362 2522 4148 1315 11,347 1982 3078 2158 4073 1355 10,664 Note: for the years 1980-82, the CAPCO total is the sum of the individual company peaks. Also, OE peak load data from the annual report did not agree with data from CEI's EH-OL for Perry: 1977: 4134; 1978: 4038; 1979: 4105 are annual report figures.
- u-
-4 Net Energy Supplied (1000 MWh)
Year CEI DL OE TE CAPCO 1973 18,176 13,315 22,101 7028 60,620 1974 17,818 13,365 21,942 6967 60,092 1975 17,271 12,929 21,217 7105 58,522 1976 18,331 13,228 22,524 7805 61,888
~1977 19,098 13,673 23,539 8077 64,387 .
1978 19,255 13,341 23,469 8144 64,208 1979 19,645 .14,010 24,215 8157 66,027 The data above was taken from CEI's Perry Environmental Report (OL). The table below was taken from the 1978-82 " Sales of Electricity" data in the annual reports, and is presented separately to illustrate, It can be seen that the annual report the differences in the data. data is about 95% of. the IIL data;_for subsequent analyses, the 1980-82 CAPCO totals have been adjusted to match the 1973-79 data, and are presented below the following table. 1978 18,364 12,649 22,309 7685 61,007 1979 19,030 13,325 22,960 7709 63,024 1980 18,160 13,301 22,394 7388 61,243 1981 17,508 13,634 24,662 7151 62,955 1982 16,165 11,038 24,025 6918 58,146 Adjusted CAPC0 totals: 1980: 64,466 1981: 66,268 1982: 61,206
- 6. Comparing actual data with the 1973 projections, one finds that the actual peak demand an?d net energy have been only a fraction of the 1973 projected amounts: (using CAPCO totals)
%= actual / projected x 100%
Year Peak Demand Net Energy 1973 100.G% 100.8% 1974 91.0% 93.7% 1975 84.8% 86.0% 1976 83.5% 87.5%
-S-1977 85.1% 86.2%
1978 78.4% 81.34 1979 70.8% 78.8 1980 72.4% 72.6 1981 68.7% 70.6 1982 61.0% 61.6%
- 7. From the data e.bove the percent annual change in peak demand and net energy can be calculated (from CAPCO totals).
Year Peak Demand Net Encrgy 73-74 -4.0 -0.9 74-75 -1.1 -2.6 75-76 +4.4% +5.7 76-77 +7.9% +4.0% 77-78 -2.4% -0.3% 76-79 -4.2% +2.8% 79-80 +8.3% -2.4% 80-81 +0.4% +2.8% 81-82 -6.0% -5.1% averages +0.3%/ year +0.4%/ year
- 8. It is also useful to compare CAPCO's more recent projections for peak demand and net anergy for the years 1980-82 with reality.
(Projections taken from CEI's ER-OL for Perry.) Projections actual % difference Peak. Demand Year CEI DL OE TE CAPCO CAPCO 1980 3450 2395 4135 1352 11,327 11,298 -O.3% 1981 3600 2485 4300 1497 11,877 11,347 -4.5% 1982 3750 2525 4465 1599 12,344 10,664 -13.C% Net Energy 1980 19,643 14,300 25,529 8352 67,823 64,466 - 4.9% 1981 20,069 14,750 26,368 8966 70,153 66,268 - 5.5% 1982 21,134 15,070 27,262 9346 72,811 61,206 -15.9%
.d
. ~
~6-
- 9. It is obvious that both CAPC0 projections (1973 and 1980) have severely overestimated the need for the Beaver Valloy 2 facility.
CAPC08 a current projections are likewise unrealistic. CAPCO's 1980 projections call for a 4.1% annual increase in peak demand and a 3.1% annual increase for net energy (NUREG-0884, p. 2.4). CAPC08s , current es.timate is for an annual growth rate in demand of 2% (CEI 1982 annual report, p. 7).
- 10. It is also useful to examine the reserve margin over peak load:
(Sources: 1982 annual reports and CEI Long Term Forecast) Generating Capacity / Reserve Margin Over Peak Load Year CEI DL OE TE CAPCO 1978 3289/38% 5704/ 1813/ 15,263/ 4462/37% 15,339/ 1979 4511/45.6% 3294/43.5% 5709/ ! 1825/ 1980 4353/32% 3179/ 5688/ 1760/ 14,980/ . 1981 3177/ 5686/ , 1773/ I 15,303/ 1982 4667/394'.7% 3144/ 5637/ 1790/ 15,270/43 4699/52 For actual peak demand, see Item # 5 above. Compare the CAPCO reserve margins with the recommended 20% figure (see, e.g. , FES-OL for Beaver Valley 1, p. 8-4).
- 11. The addition of the Beaver Valley 2 generating capacity will only ,
cdd to the alrsady more than ample reserve margin, even assuming a 0.4% annual growth in peak demand, as might be projected from recent oxperience. , It can be shown that no additional capacity will be needed by CAPCO for 40 years beyond 1986, the assumed on-line date for Beaver Valley 2. Using 1982 peak load data as a baseline, and' assuming a 0.4% annual growth rate in demand, the peak demand in 44 years is given by:
-7 Pn = Po (1 + r)"
where Pn= peak demand in 44 years Po= 1982 peak demand,10,664 MW r = 0.004 n = 44 . Pn = 12,712 MW Assuming the 1982 generating capacity to remain constant, (15270 MW) this gives a reserve margin of 20% in 44 years. This calculation, of coursc, does not account for the decommissioning of generating facilities. - It is likely that the 0.4% assumed annual growth rate in demand can be reduced to zero by providing incentive's 'for conservation, e.g., time -of-day rates. Electricity usage is very sensitive to price. See " Nuclear Fizzle" Barronts, August 24, 1981. If there is no growth in demand, only 12,797 MW of generating capacity is needed to maintain a 20% reserve margin over the 1982 peak load. This permits the retirement of 2473 MW. Even if there is a slight growth in demand, it would be far cheaper for CAPC0 to purchase power from other utilities than to continue building Beaver Valley 2. Other utilities have excess power to sell; see "American Electric Power, Long Protected, Finally Suffers From a Decline in Demand", Wall Street Journal, December 15, 1982 (attached), and also the attached sheet entitled " Operating Statistics for CAPCO Companies Compared with Those of Surrounding Electric Utilities" which shows that many utilities have excess capacity and charge less than do the CAPCO companies.
. ~
-e.
l
- 12. That it is likely that the decline in electrical demand is a result of deep-seated social sud econemic changes in the CAPC0 service area, rather than temporary effects of fluctuations in the oconomy, is shown by the following population figures for Standard Metropolitan Stastical Areas (includes suburbs) in the CAPCO region.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. SMSA 1970 1980 change Akron 679,000 660,000 - 19,000 Cleveland 2,063,000 1,898,000 -165,000 Pittsburgh 2,401,000 2,263,0;0 -138,000 Toledo 762,000 791,000 + 29,000 Warren-Youngstown 537,000 531,000 - 6,000 total change -299,000 Note: in the FES-CP for the Perry plant, it was estimated that pop-ulation in the CAPCO service area "is expected to be well above average" in growth. (p. 8-1)
- 13. It is fair to state that the entire justification developed at the CP stage for Beaver Valley 2 has eroded away to nothing. It is therefore appropriate to re-examine the need for power at the OL stage.
- 14. In 1980 Dr. Richard Rosen of Energy Systems Research Group testified before the Pennsylvania PUC (Direct Testimony of Richard A. Rosen on behalf of the Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate in the Investigation upon the Ocmmission's Own Motion into the Delay in the CAPC0 Construction Schedule, #I-79070315, "Rosen Testimony")
that Beaver Valley 2, along with the 2 Perry units in Ohio, should be cancelled because the CAPC0 system is over baseloaded and the nuclear l 1
---____--___-_-_--_- _ l
e %
.g.
construction program is not cost-effective. The Beaver Valley 2 Station, being the most expensive of the 3 units, especially cannot be justified economically (Rosen Testimony at 25). Rosen stated that CAPCO's own planning data showed that Beaver Valley 2 should have been cancelled along with the Erie 1 and 2 and Davis-Besse 2 and 3 , nuclear units, the cancellation or which was announced in January 1980. (Rosen Testimony at 38) These conclusions were based on maintaining a 20% minimum reserve margin and using CAPCO's 1979 forecast of 3.4% annual peak demand growth.
- 15. One of the CAPC0 investors has publicly stated that the need for Beaver Valley 2 should be re-evaluated. See " Toledo Edison Plight Could Delay Perry Unit", Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 24, 1983, attached.
- 16. The rule being challenged herein has as its stated purpose the avoidance of " unnecessary consideration of issues that are not likely 1
l to tilt the cost / benefit balance" at the OL stage. Final Rule, 47 FR 12940,. March 26, 1982. The Commission's reasoning is that, at the time of the OL proceeding, "the plant would be needed to either meet increased energy needs or to replace older, less economical l generating capacity and that no viable alternatives to the completed l l nuclear plant are likely 'to exist which could tip the NEPA cost / benefit balance against the issuance of the operating license. Past experience has shown this to se the case. In addition, this conclusion l 1s unlikely to change even if an alternative is shown to be marginally l cnvironmentally superior to operation of a nuclear facility because of I the economic advantage which operation of nuclear power plants has over fossil generating plants. An exception to the rule would be
~~~
. 1 made if, in a particular case, special circumstances are shown in accordance with 10 CFR 2.758 of the Commission's regulations." Id. .
- 17. The rule is vulnerable to challenge on several grounds, as may have been anticipated by the Commission in the final sentence above. First, the assertions en the economic advantages of nuclear See, e.g., "The Lousy power have increasingly come under attack.
Economics of Nuclear Power", Wall Street Journal, August 2,1983, attached. The assumptions used to justify the rule are simply no longer valid. Secondly, need for power is not an issue that can be generically determined through rulemaking. Each power system, having unique characteristics, needs to be examined' separately (Rosen Testimony at 9). Finally, the rule ignores the massive subsidies which the federal government has given to suppcrt the development of nuclear power. A Oeneral Accounting Report,
" Nuclear Power Costs and Subsidies," 13 June 1979, EMD-75-52, p.
12, has estimated that 12.1 billion taxpayer dollars have been used to subsidize the commercial nuclear industry since _1950. A true cost / benefit ratio would include these subsidies.
- 16. Certain statements.in the proposed rule also deserve comment.
The Commission states that NEPA review at the OL stage hbed not duplicate that at the CP stage, abs'ent new developments or new information
~
( 46 FR 39441, August 3,1981, emphasis added). That is precisely the case here. As shown above, the assumptions used at the CP stage to justify Beaver Valley 2 have turned out to be erroneous.
- 19. Among these erroneous assumptions is the use of an 60% capacity factor in estimating the performance of nuclear facilities. (see,
( - -- c.g. , FES-OL for Beaver Valley 1, p. 3-11; FES-CP for Perry 1 and 2,
- p. 8-16.) The Commission appears to perpetuate this error by claiming that "(e)xperience shows that completed nuclear plants are in fact used to their maximum availability . . . " (46 FR 39441)
The fact is that only one nuclear plant in the United States has , achieved an 80% capacity factor (cumulative): Farley 2 (81.2%). (Source: NUREG-0020, Vol. 7, No. 3, " Licensed Operating Reactors Status Summary Report" (" Gray Book") March 1983.) The average cumulative capacity factor (DER net) for the 72 reactors listed therein is 58.8%.
- 20. The proposed rule also claims, as grounds for excluding need issues at the OL stage, that " construction related impacts have already occurred at the site." 46 FR 39441. This ign.o.res the fact that the most severe environmental impacts result from the operation of nuclear facilities, not from their construction. The construction impacts of nuclear plants are comparable to those of coal plants or any other large construction project.
- 21. The proposed rul'e states that "(u)nless the nuclear plant has enyironmental disadvantages in comparison to reasonable alternatives, differences in financial cost do not enter into the NEPA process."
46 FR 39441. The nuclear plant has definite environmental dis-advan.tages in comparison to fossil generation, notably the risk of catastrophic accidents. Environmental disadvantages of fossil plants (air pollution, sulfur. dioxide and particu lates) can be removed by installing scrubbers and precipitators. Economic analyses thus become relevant to the NEPA process.
^
12
- 22. The proposed rule then cites reports supposedly demonstrating that operational costs of nuclear plants have been less than those of fossil baseload plants. There is, however, information to the contrary. See, e.g., "The Lousy Economics of Nuclear Power", wherein the authors describe a number of factors making nuclear power more oxpensive. Also cited therein is a study by Exxon Corp. showing nuclear power to be 70-89% costlier per kwh than coal. See also "A Comparison of Nuclear and Coal Costs" by Charles Kr;manoff, October 9, 1978, presented as testimony before the State of New Jersey Board of Public Utilities on behalf of the New Jersey Department of Public Advocate, Division of Hate Counsel, In the Matter of the Board's Order of Inquiry into the Reasonableness of Electric Utilities Construction Program, Docket No. 762-194 ("Komanoff Testimony"),
particularly pp. 158-160, where coal station operating and maintenance costs are shown to be less than those for nuclear plants.
- 23. Before applying these principles to the present case, one must examine the CAPCO system. CAPC0 is highly dependent on coal.
95% of CAPCO electricity is generated from coal (NUREG-0884, p. 2-1) It should be noted that there are vast reserves of coal in the Midwest region. CAPCO is almost totally independent of oil, for either baseload or peaking (Rosen Testimony at 27).
- 24. Since it has been shown above that there will be little, if any, growth in the demand for electricity in the CAPCO system, the Commission's "suostitution theory" becomes relevant. The question is: would it be more economical for CAPC0 to operate Beaver Valley 2 than to operate' older coal plants, thereby substituting Beaver Valley 2 for coal capacity? Rosen has unequivocally answered
i this question N0; it will always be cheaper for CAPCO to operate its older coal plants (which were built at lower capital costs and lower interest rates) more (up to their technical limits), even if
-the need for baseload capacity were to grow. Rcsen Testimony at 28.
~
- 25. The operation of older, smaller. coal plants will always be beneficial to CAPCO. Coal plants have higher capacity factors, or could have, were it not for the effect of nuclear capacity in the system reducinE the efficiency of coal units (Komanoff Testimony at 103). This effect is at work in the CAPCO system, as the 4' Mansfield 2 coal plant, which should be baseload, is operated as a peaking plant (Rosen Testimony at 48-50). Furthenmore, the reliability of a utility system is greater if it relies on a larger number of smaller plants than on a 'maller s number of large units (Komanoff Testimony at 150-152).
, 26. .The special circumstances of this proceeding can be demonstrated in yet another way. It has been shown that capacity factor is a 4 crucial dcterminant of the comparative costs of coal and nuclear power. See " Nuclear Power Plant Reliability" by David Comey (attached), wherein a 55% capacity factor is shown to be the break-even point between coal and nuclear. If both coal and nuclear plants exceed the 55% capacity factor, nuclear will be cheaper. If both operate at less than 55%, coal will be cheaper. Since coal capacity factors are (or can be) well above 55% (Komanoff has , estimated 70%), nuclear economics depends on the nuclear capacity factor. . The crucial question becomes: what is the likelihood that Beaver Valley 2 will operate at.or above 55% capacity? An examination of
~
the Gray Book indicates that fully 1/3 of the 72 plants listed therein - have failed to achieve a cumulative capacity factor (DER net) of 55%. Even more important is the relationship of the abysmal performance of Beaver Valley 1 (cumulative capacity factor of 35.1%) to the expected performance of Beaver Valley 2. Twenty multi-unit - nu'elear sites and their cumulative c.apacity factors (taken ,from the Gray Book) are listed._below.
~
~~
Oconee 1 58.5%
~
Arkansas Nuclear 1 57.4% l Oconec 2 59.1% Arkansas Nuclear 2 52. 5f., i Browns Ferry 1 54.1% Browns Ferry 2 52.0% Browns Ferry 3 64.2% Brunswick 1 47.2% Brunswick 2 41.3% Calvert Cliffs 1 70.5% Calvert Cliffs 2 74.8% Quad Cities 1 60.1% Quad Cities 2 59.5%
- I Salem 1 45.4%
Dresden 2 56.2% 72.7% Salem 2 Drseden 3 57.1% Sequoyah 1 49.8% Farley 1 54.2% Sequoyah 2 71.8% Farley 2 81.2% surry 1 54.3% Hatch 1 53.1% Surry 2 56.6% Hatch 2 60.5% Turkey Point 3 60.3% Millstone 1 62.8% Turkey Point 4 63.5% Millstone 2 65.6% Zion 1 58.6% North Anna 1 54.57, Zion 2 58.6% North Anna 2 63.1%
s It can be seen that, with the exception of 3 sites, Farley, Salem, and Sequoyah, the cumulative capacity factor at one unit will be about that of the other( s ), i 10. Thus, Beaver Valley 2 has only a 3/20 or 15% chance of attaining a cumulative capacity factor much greater than 45%, which means that electricity produced from Beaver - Valley 2 will be more expensive than that from coal. Note: not included were the Indian Point 2 and 3 plants and the Fitz-patrick and Nine Mile Point 1 plants, similar plants on same sites, but operated by different utilities. These, however, do follow the pattern, cnd their inclusion would reduce Beaver Valley's chances of exceeding a 45% capacity factor to 3/22, or 13.6%.
- 27. Finally, some mention should be made of the future of the uranium market, as the price difference between coal and uranium has been said to be the main advantage of nuclear power. A recent article in Science (" Uranium Enrichment: Eending for the Abyss"'
19 August 1983, Vol. 221, pp. 730-733, attached) indicates that prices will probably rise for U.S. enriched uranium, so much so that the United States might be priced out of the uranium enrichment business. While low-cost uranium will be available from foreign cources, a dependence on these sources will be disadvantageous to the United States in the same way that dependence on foreigh oil is vulnerable to political and economic manipulation. The importance of uranium to national defense complicates the matter further. Congress has expressed concern over the viability of the domestic uranium industry and the vulnerability of our energy supply to disruption due to dependence on foreign uranium. See Public Law 97-416, new section 170b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 USC 2210b). This
situation favors the abandonment of Beaver Valley 2 in favor of using domestic coal.
- 28. Based on all of the above, it must be concluded that a prima facie showing has made that 10 CFR 51.53(c) does not serve the purpose for which it was adopted, that that regulation should be waived, -
that the need for Beaver . Valley 2 should be litigated in this proceeding, and, that suchaltigatien.will have as its outcome a ruling denying the operation of Beaver Valley 2. This determination should be made quickly, before further money is uselessly spent on that facility. 2 Susan L. Hiatt Sworn to and subscribed before me this ~h' day of September, 1983. k4 '~ Notary..P%blic MAR EY FORD E/t ER. Attorr.ey At Law Notary Pgec. State of Ohio hty commission has no expiratioti data. Section 147.03 R. C.
?. I' ir- .
FA.merican Eu. , .. ;. . . : g..l'ecmePower, z,rongPro::ec:ec. FinaEy Suf"ershm a De~c_ine in Deinanc. d " =- 0l hy Y ".
.cr .,.
4 - By pat't. INoRASSIA . '^ ' "The ability to make wholesale'sa!es had electric utilities are expected to have a bet- '
- b. [suff n eporre r ef 'rsuc wd stnEr 'Jo'vned, been providing considerable relief frcm the , terSales crystal ball than anyone else."
to other utilities passed industrial 's.
';."I COLIJMBUS, Ohio - The slowdown in' burden of carrying surplus generating ca.
electricity use growth over the last decade pacity," says Abraham Gerber, a fonner'. sales as the ccmpany s top category in 19SD. ,. has hurt many electric util!!!es, but for AEP official who now works for Nationa! .Last year the gap widened: 35% of total [ - li "I"' years d . Economic Research Associates, a New York sales went to other utilities, while .t% went , Amencan Electric Power Co. had a safety net: selling to other ut!!ities. consulting firm. "Now that relief isn't as to industry. But this year the " wholesale" . . . market has plunged. Some AEP customers AEP Ienerates.more power than 'any availab!e as it once was." have increased their own generating capa. ., on g, other electric company, and it has long been AEP, a holding company, has eight oper* bility even while their own demind has been ' ~, f i4 3 regarded as a particularly efficient operator ating ut!!ity subsidlaries. They're located on s l y of its mostly coal-hred plant network. As the .a diagonal line that runs through the indus- scft'Last' " year.we cut t ack 'substantially on (^ l company's sales to industnal, residential ( trial heartland from southwestern Virginia! power ! purchased from the outs!de, and now' and commercial customers inched up over to southwestern Mich!gan. In 1980 AEP ac ,. we've become a net seller" to other utilitiesc a h ' +I ' m the last five years, its wholesale ,' sales to " says Joseph Fitzgerald, system operations
- et other utilities nearly doubled. Neighboring -'
ic utilities could often buy peak period power - American Electr'ic Power - * ' manager for Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. AEP had been Cleveland Electric's big, U' / ~ D- from AEP more cheaply than they could.: Power Producing Capacity.Used Jj . gest Outside suppl!erIb'ub thifyehr'the .- e produce the power themselves. -
- Cleveland utility.is.getting results.from a / U But this year the Midwest's ' deep reces " " ' '
*'N " program to reduce' idle time!at'lts owd
"~~ '"'""' I sion has caused area utilities to sharply re- -
g,,,,,, ' .; t plants..Its power; load is downfas'wel! 1,. g duce outside power purchases. And that p. is' f. More Cost Cutting l .;; - . . <W ~ 5 hurting AEP. Its third quarter. earnings
..".C
'70 - '
% " ' .' V' , :. "Most Midwest . iltilities' a ' ^'e ar going: .W . l :.
dmpped 384 it recently cut the salaries of . W ' through a period now when they'll have rela , n, p. Its top 140 cificials by 5% and froze all other, i 09" PacW b Tenn to Gen, .
};;
salarics, and it announced plans to close its ~ 68- -
^ y'^: - , f' ' loads,
- says David E. Jones, an energy ex-
. j
' ' New York City engineering cffice next year,' >. , eliminating about 300 jobs. Besidcs scrap. ' 67- .
, , pert at Battelle, Memorial Institute,,a re , 4, . jh '
ping or deferring additional plants, AEP is ,$ yeam
. , .~. . ;
on studying whether existing plants.;can:i be' 66-p; :!:if!: u AEP's capacitycincluding the first unit of N"ly c. en c!csed for extended periods.
~
' '65- ".0;+ ':. a new coal-fired plant in Rockport, Ind., to .,
re Decline. Expected be finished in late 1984, will carry. the com- 5.- 64-y .. 'lWe're tightening everything we. know i,'.t .jj [f pany "through the mid to late 1980s" and 'R (. ~
;f 63- , . . perhap: even the early 1990s, Mr. White con - .; *s how to tighten," says W.S. White Jr., chair.
cedes. Meanwf.ile, the company is taking in) M' ..p tu-man and chief executive officer. "We might 0 62M : - f- .. creasingly stringent. cost cutting . steps. ' s. ' 8p or have to take more cost-cutting steps,. 'A gj. Our people have to realize that." too, J 61- - AEP has closed six of its 32 coal mines. [.! Id Ion < Other electric utilities are suffering, too.! P60 '75 .'7 6 '77 '78 '79 ,'80 M and partially' shut.down three others, laying. Y ,i[ W off about 1,500 employees..It.has also elimi . ... Electne power generation dropped 2% La. '81, ('82 1h m.:t ' - Esaic.nated, some management-deve!opment pro- I"- lce LionMdc in the first nine months of this year. ' grams. As for the dividend ."J .certainly. 3 L te. to 1.77 trillion k!!owatt hours, says the Edi '. i , son Electric Institute, a trade group. The' . quired Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric don't want to think about.a dividend de - 3'. I
!ve Co. and moved its headquarters from New crease, but I'm uncomfortable that our divi- /, ' ; I; in group is forecasting the first natienwide *.
- er yeat to-year decline in electric power gener.' York City to Columbus, the geographic cen ' dend level is currently above our earnings. ,'
alica since 1937; ter of its system as well as the largest city it . level,". Mr.'. White says. (The- company .
' serves, earned $2.15 a share in the 12 months ended .
re i The steepest drops are coming in the in- ,.
. An engineering innovator, AEP, was a; Sept 30: the dividend is $2 26 a year.)
ailI dustrial M!dFCs1 and the Pacific Northwest.~ Another problem is AEP,s 28.5% interest , ,l .l to " Sorne utility employees there are.fmding ' leader- in developing " super critJcal pres. in the troubled Zimmer nuclear power plan., their jobs no longer carry virtual lifetime sure" generating plants, which flash water ,s 4 1ce s;curity. Illinois Power Co.of Decatur, !!!.. . into the steam needed to turn electric tur.. C which 8f is being built by Cincinnati Gas & we recently eliminated 121 jobs. and deferred .. bines without boi!!ng the water first. It has a i'
, ,re rr o ok ul- pay increases for salaried employees for at s nuclear plant in Bridgman, Mich;, but Plant halted last month, the Public Utilities i ia least six months. In June, Dayton Power & mostly re!!es on 19 coal fired plants in East , . Commission of Ohio said it would reconsider. .' '.' :9
.ed Light Co. said it would cut 1ts work force by Jtial ern coal fields. As a result, AEP's residen. 314 million of a 341.6 million rate increase it customers paid 4.75 cents for each kj.
- 600 employees, or 16% qf the total, by the t q';,
! end of this year' lowatt hour used last year, compared with, recently granted to an AEP unit.
There are some bright spots for the com . J 71 a- nationwide average of more than six e, But AEP is absort$1ng double punish- pany. In October it agreed to two long term 4 mtnt. Its overall electricity sales were off .C" g- contracts to sell power to other ut!!! ties. One '! r 12% in the first nine months of the year, Growth . Forecasts was a 10-year accord with General Pub!!c !, a even though sales to homeowners and to . But AEP's plant building expertise may Uti!ities Corp., which needs to replace ca . .
; commercial users (schools, offices and the have hurt its ability to respond quickly to its pacity lost in the .Three Mlle Island acci-
' hj
. .' i 3 > like) rase slightly. The reasons: Sales to in- reduced load growth in recent years. Mr. dent. AEP will a!so benefit as its construc- .
4 dustrial users dropped more than 18%, and White says the company's growth forecasts t!an' out:ays taper off over the next few
' sales to other ut!!ities, which now surpass in- were too high but t' it that was unavoldable. years. "We're going to !!ck our problems," i destrial sa!es as AEP's biggest. market, "We've cut our Juad forecasts each year Mr. White says. "We'll be in a gcod position ' , ,e' '
,. i plunged 20% since 1973," he says. "Sometimes I think . when things turn around." ""
^ , g -
( ,, ej h 6 L.i.b f .. UlYkl .y . . N *$ . , ,,f ,
OPERATING STATISTICS FOR CAPCO COMPANISS, COMPARED WITH j
\
Net plant,1982, Capacity, Peak load, I
' Utility & Area covered $ m it MW MW Cleveland Electric Illuminating * -$ 3,350 4,624 3,362 Duquesne . Light (Pittsburgh)* $ 2,550 3,118 2,522 Ohio Edison *
$ 4,425 5,686 -
1,148 l j Toledo Edison * - $ 1,860 1,773 1,315
; De:roit Edison $ 6,.875 8,458 7,171 S)uthe rn Indiana Gas & Electric $ -335 1,012 779
; Consume r,e Powe r (lowe r Mich. ) $ 6,450 6,176 4,703
; Cincinnati Gas & Electric $ 2,335 4,110 3,140 i Dayton Power & Light $ 1,840 2,659 2,122 V n l American Elect. Power k'$y,ged),
$ 10,250 22,407 20,762 ;
, A11egh my Elect. (Pa, Oh, Va , W Va, Myld) $ .2,975 7,568 5,564 j Pennsylvania Power & Light $ 5,150 6,546 5,207 1 I-dianapolis Power & Light $ 1,043 2,528 1,89o Comm ,nwealth Edison (Chicago) $ 11,975 17,185 13,299 Kentucky Utilities $ 1,115- 2,870 2,143 i Louisville Gas & Etectric $ 1,27'5 2,258 1,857 i North. Indiana Public Service $ 2,600 3,086 2,183
! Public Service Co. of Indiana $ 3,300 5,222 3,942 I D1inois Power _ $ 2,825 -
3,815 3,100' ' Niagara Mohawk $ 3,970 7,619 5,543 New Y ark State Gas & Electric . $ 2,450 2,775 2,193 Rochester Gas & Electric $ 1,145 1,507 1,048 - Philadelphia Electric $ 6,315 7,574 5,731
- { Baltimore Gas & Electric $ 3,075 5,025 3,871 ,
i f Potomac Elect ric Power (Wash. ,D. C. ) $ 2,200 5,037 4,152 j Virginia Electric Power ~
$ 6,140 10,076 8,636 Delmarva (Delaware, Maryland,Va. ) $ .1,300 2,273 1,575
'JIisconsin Electric Powe r $ 1,830 4,342 3,290
, Nisconsin Power & Light $ 705 1,623 1,262 l TVA (eight states in Tenn. Valley)I^) $. - - -
. . .-v - .
rJ
=
g O=
.. a ,
THOSE OF SURR UNDING ELE CT RIC UTILITIES (a) . N *g 3 "g *; o Major construction -
- Pr :sent fuels mix,%(c) Average revenue '.
d work in progress (b) Oil per resid .itial ;3yj(y [ k g Nuke,MW Fos sil,MW Coal & Gas Nuke Hydro kw-hr, f $'d
'ii. g * % {. S $
.D ~~ '
81 12 7. If * (d) . d 3,243 79 1 .17 7. 8f * "yN%*] 5
$ ,[o 98 1 1 6. 6f
- 3 8
."-- du o un5 .o c s 71 29 7. 2p
- a u> -
o
= .o .m. n.
yxO o , . " .e 1,100 1,350 84 2 6. O f u 250 98 1 4. 8f .
$."{fg
~3 0 y f
- 5. 4f { O' g 1,357 60 ,. 7 14 g d, 800 99 1 4.69 =.5 0oW .u u
1,200 98 2 5. 3f >u -* e a ,c0~- t . ,c
~
5,200 85 10 5 3. 6f u E$ =14 g Tg 2,010 99 3. 6f A$ou
$"3 $ -
G Mu 1,165 82 99 16 2 4. 9f
- 4. 0 f U%z o. d g o9 o u-a
.o o,
og 1 l 6,636 45 10 45 6. I f y, $ g .5 5 .g 5 ._, g j.j i 1,150 99 4. I f O Eo t g 's g*g j "{gc 1,435 93 2 5 4. l f
- o y 8, 688 98 2 5.51 . d u) egy O j$
2,260 650 98 2 3. 8f - y.j .yu eo $ k.g y g 950 99 5. 6f ::~ .3 OO o c
~E o a. u o (r 17 38 10 31 5. 7p # .", q 3 x .2 .o y .o@*
g , l.080 625 62 31 47 38 5.34
- 5. 6f 83*
a.-" 4 3'g 8,g a m g3
- 3
- Ej 2,'110 1,220 20 17 14 33 26 33
. 3 7. If
- 5. 3f hh*
. 'g 3 gj*
g' '-* S. ,$ J j "
- g 88 12 6. Zf 2 " 'y. j$$>.cE $ s y"
], 934 (1,900 hydro) 31 8 41 20 5. 2f j,o"y j. g .E % c, C oge
; 53 29 14 6. 8f t A>N 3M , co~
j 580 54 2 33 3 4.'9f }' g jgg .
< > 15 '5
..o.
- 6. Of e d, 5
9.679 380 74 . 23 j Njo 4 [2 o> I u, y ,f .*- .E c
e l Toledo Edison . plight i cou d delay Perry unit : By James Lawless The speculation also has come-fr m critics of transmissionlines, ,. Toledo Edison Co. chairman who argue that the setond unit ( John P. Williamson said yesterday win n ; ried f Sars after its 1983 scheduled completion be-i whPerry construction nuclear power planton Unit may 2 of the cause the utilities have much ex-W have to be extended to help his ceu eletr.icity.
! company which announced a ,
4
- major cos,t cutting effort. "The first unit at Perry has to M. be completed as quickly as possi-1 Toledo Edison, which is part ble," Williamson said, "but the j owner of Perry, announced $11 ~
second unit is the subject of some
; million in cuts in its operational discussion."
3 and maintenance budget, on top W liiam King, a CEI spokes-
- 3 of $18 million in cuts m 1982. man, said his company had no i Toledo Williamson said as a result of plans to extend Perry 2 Edison's financial prob. construction.
lems, Unit 2 of the Perry plant Williamson said yeste-day as
, and . Beaver Valley nuclear plant many as 100 Toledo Edison em-1 in Pennsylvania should be re- ployes might lose their jobs, the
! examined to see if they need to utility has frozen salaries for all i be built as quickly as scheduled. management employes and cut 12 "
top executives' salaries 5%. l The twin reactor $5.2 billion Its unionized employes will'get l) Perry plant is being built by .no pay raise this year, he said. Cleveland Electric Illuminating
- 1 Co., which shares ownership with Toledo Edisori has asked for a l Toledo Edison, Ohio Edison Co. '.$79 million rate hike from PUCO 7 and two Pennsylvania utilities. but the PUCO staff has recom-Rumors surfaced during the mended less than half of that be
' granted. Further, the utility may
. past several weeks that the second i
Perry reactor might be' canceled, . lose its, request for- costs from Perry construction, because the but that was denied flatly by both PUC0 staff says- Unit I is not I ToledoEdisonandCE1 spokesman 75% complete. .
. yesterday. However, Public Utili.
Roger Buehrer,a Toledo Edison ties Commission of Ohio Com-i missioner Alan R. Schriber said spokesman, refused to speculate I about an emergency rate hike
}
l he was asked this week about apotentialcancellation bytwoWall.. before the PUC l
' Street investors. utility's pending rate hike.
v/ > , I __. --
Tf f E WAf.f. STHMT JOUnrul., TulcDAY, AUGUq' 2,19t13, _ m The m.,ousy dconomics or N, uc, ear .. can cost as much as the entfre " original clear capacity factor because nuclear By CAnuuNE J.C. Hru. MAN unit. power is used whenever aval!able, while A fourth unquantif!able cost factor is se-And RrnAxo Hsu.wAN coal power is "!oad fo!!owing." or used af- nescence of nuclear units, or the degrada-What are the economfes of nuclear i er t nuclear and hydro power.) power? Should cost be a legal test og Assumed unit life is a fourth factor. The tion of performance witn age.In contrast, American Electric Power states that its 1.3 chether public ut!!!t!e's build nuclear industry generally assumes a 30-year life mi!! ion kilowatt coa! units are expected to power plants? These questions have been insufficiently anajyred even though U.S. , for nuclear clear Regdatory units. U.S. Commission alsoutilities have and the Nu-perform at steady high capacity factors for at least 30 years. utilities had committed, at the peak, about spoken of a 40 year life. This recently was Lastly, radioactive-waste d!sposal and .
$400 billion to nuclear power, Only this trumped by the high priest of Oak Ridge, the decommissioning of retired p! ants are past April 20, when the Supreme Court Alvin Weinberg, who suggests an 80 year so problematic that cost projections ruled that states can forbid a future nu.
clear plant on the basis of cost, did due eco.to life for existing corrosion and otherunits. But are problems, nuclear plants, rently are impractical. What then is the bottom !!ne for the nomic viability
- fina!Jy become a legt! unlikely to last beyond 25 years. This has costs of nuclear power and coal power
' test. . been recognized by several industry - Nuclear power, once exposed to valid * , economic analysis, flunks the test. It is ' hard to believe that as late as 1973, when . Electricity from a nuclear plant ordered today would ,
well over $100 billion had been committed . be at leaSt twice as expensive as from coal. The tecnnol-to building nuclear plants, and some 18 L';r',ly[j',t%%',i',*y' f*sk"* c ogy was rushed into premature mass commercialization. p sources to a greater or lesser degree. n. units ordered tod.ay? Our numbers are - a\" I o e tia ac American Electric Power assumes 25 pbased on a private study by Exxon C in a consistent pattem of underestimating years, Arthur D. L!ttle Co. 22 years and . top management to estab!ish a posture to-the costs of nuclear power p;&nts and, to a West European utilities 20 years. In con- ward future investments in nuclear indus-try. Even using assumptions favorable to lesser extent, overestimating the costs of trast to this uncertainty, the !!fe span fo'r nuclear power, Exxon found coa] to be coal power plants, the only rea!!stic after- coa! units is an enthallenged 30 years. native source of electricity for the next 20 somewhat cheaper. When the quantifiable A fifth factor, non fuel operating and factors we have cited are applied to tl.e mahnance costs, has almost invariably to 30 years'n" "Sufflatio is one reason. It is the es- been projected to be much lower for nu- h Exxon numbers, nuclear power becomes calation of origmal capita! cost estimates clear power plants than for coal fired V E9% cost!!er per kilowatt hour than low-su!- due to techno!cgical problems, as distinct units. Historica!!y, the opposite has been fur bituminous coal with FGD, Nuclear _ from general inflaticn of prices. Sufflation true. , power is 70% costlier than high-sulfur.bitu-has been substantial for nuclear plants minous coal with FGD. Since these projec-A sixth factor is the industry's unneces- tions are for New England, which has the while coalplant costs have been close to sary assumption that nuclear power must highest coal costs bt the country, coaf onginal estimates, b& d6mpared exclusively with high-sulfur vantage wou]d be even greater on a na-coal with flue-gas desulfurization. For *.he Construct! ort Tim'e tional basis. The factors that coujdn't be Construction time is another factor. The next 15 to 20 years, there is an adequate industry commonly projects eight to 10 supp!y of low-sulfur Eastem and Midwest-power's relative cost. quantifled
. would years from the time a 7uclear crder is ern bitumlnous coal which, because it re- In sum, electricity from a nuclear placed to commercial operation. Experi- out quires lesssuffur of low FGD,is cheaper.coal, bituminous Before new we run power plant ordered today wou]d be at ence suggests that 12 years is more accu- technologies like fluidized bed enmi t stion least twice as expensive as from coal.
rate. Conversely, the consttuction time for Nuclear power's poor prognos3 is iffu-coal fired units generally has been overes- will permit an econornic use of a undant minated by the industry's zero or. negative timated at six or more years, when 4% high sulfur fuel without FGD. learning. I.4gical!y, in rep!! cations or near-Add!tiona! factors cannot be quantified years is consistent with experience. The 'because of uncertalnty. A!! ralse nuclear replications of a unit, the newer unit corrections increase construction costs for should incorporate thngs learned from the interest and inflation for nuclear p! ants, costs relative to coal costs. older unit and should perform better. But and decrease them for coal plants. The so ca!!ed yo-yo factor refers to the this hasn't been the case in the majority of Capacity f actor, which is defined as the frequent, involuntary and unpredictable such nuclear power plants. We have made rato rif actual to maximum possible en- rise and fall of nuclear power aval! ability, ergy production, is another element. Every nuclear unit operating in the U.S. today To compensate for this unre!!ab!!!ty, ut!!! b,.163 co pfleaming criteria. Performance improved was designed to achieve an 80% capacity serve capacity, Psignificantly in 39% of the comparisons, ' factor. Not one has come close. Since 1960 High-cost distress replacement power is ishowed no. improvement in 23% and deteri- ~ g the industry has averaged only 55%; in necessitated by the yo yo factor. For Threef/ orated _.significtntlys.ny- t m 1932 it averaged 53%. Even the seven best. perforrning large nuclear units have power in theaver. year of-M1!e Is!and's the accident rose owners, and economic the cost failure of purchased be expiamed? Pre v Ho aged cnly 59%. By contrast, few of the best, 237% ccmpared with a 16% rise for the matunty is the answer. The techno!ogy was rusned into mass commerciahzation 1.3 country,million kilowatt operated coal fired by the American E!ec-unitsAnother in the unquantiffable U S. factor, major without enough study, testing and costing, tric Power Co. in Appalachia and the up- Durtng 1962-67, when the size of nuclear
- repalrs for urexpected corrosion, embrit-per Midwest, have averaged $5% avalf abt!- t!ement and other technologica! probunits ems,ordered escalated to 1.170.C00 kifo-ity, tCoal availap!!ty is compared with nu-
. .-- - -- +-
)
_. ower 7 watts, the largest nuclear unit in operation - was 285.000 kilowatts. Moreover, these~ large nuc! ear units exceeded the dlme,n-stons of equalcapactty fossil fuel units. Piping, valves and turbo generators had to be much bigger for nuclear units because, they operate at ha!! the temperature.:a quarter of the steam pressure and half thi{. turbine speed. The volume of orders alsi rose prematurely-2% units at the pear in! 1975, costing about $400 biiiion. TJ., Prematurity has created unprecedentid' , technological, safety and . cost prob! ems that are exacerbated by a shortage of scin ,. entlfic and engtnetring talent. PersonneLto" construct, operate and maintain nucleh.: units also have been in short supply angl2 poorly tralned. Utility managemerits have, been overwhelmed by the comp!exity asy!.
- novelty of their nuclear operations.
A fundamental explanation for the pe!!-} mel! development of civi!!an nuclear,, . power is that it has been designed, pro-i moted and regulated, ultimately, by the, bomb makers. They have applied risk? - standards used for,mi!!!ary surviya! calcui"
!ations to civi!!an nuclear pofer des!gn,,}
construction and operation. ..j The Industry's Desperat!on . .va Based on prophecles of plentiful, cheap energy, the ut!!!tles r'2shed into nuclear power. They thought the gamble was risk-free because of the safety net afforded by'* cost plus regu!at!,n. But the economics have deteriorated so much that such co:t-plus rates may exceed the pub!!c's abi!!!y. - to pay. A measure of the industry's desperm ation is its proposal that the government: - buy all existtng and nuture plants, ard-lease them br.ck to industry for a rent that, might even be negative. . y.g The technological and econom!c desigm of nuclear power has been the biggest fail.c ure of any civi!!an industry in history. Noi private risk taker would ever have b,u!!t to; day's nuclearpower industry without un; limited cost plus provisions and governe; ment tubsidies. <, c The industry has been its own worst en-emy in refusing to recogn!ze that nuclear; power 3 uneconomic and getting worse. To. this day, the Te!!ers, the Weinbergs, the . Atomic Industrial Forum and.the'Edigh[/ Electric Institute are leading the industry , doyn a path of fool's go!d.
-{Q ,
M.1,s Hellman is a research assistanfl professor in energy economics af the Uni:- versity of Rhode Island. Mr. Helhnan, m professor of economics at that school, hat: worked for severa! !!.S. agencies, includ.: ing the Federal Power Commission. Theyc n 1 are the authors of "The Competiln;e Eca-J ' nomics of Nuclear and Coal Power" (Lez~-Q ' ington Books,19m. .; ,i,,; e
Nuclear Power Plant Reliability: The 1973-74 Record DAVID DINSMORE COMEy will have to be built to produce the same amount of electricity as would have been pro-Althoegh I know of only one published rebut-duced had the plants operated at the 80 percent tal' to my earlier report on nuclear power plant capac ty factor on which the AEC's cost-reliability,' I have been apprised of several benefit calculations were predicated. This unpublished memoranda in circulation within means twice as many capital dollars expended, the nuclear industry. While I would prefer to not to speak of additional operating costs. - answer rebuttals that have withstood the test of I see no difference between this situation publication, the 1974 nuclear plant operating and a weapons system that only produces half data have just been made available and offer the " bang for the buck" originally projected an opportunity for answering some of the al- by the Pentagon. We call the latter " cost over-leged criticisms levelled against my report. runs"; I see no reason not to apply the same De six most frequemly made criticisms terminology here. seem to be the following. ---
- 3. Data front one year (1973) are not a
- 1. The 80 percent design capacity factor ,yf;;,;,,,y,,,j,,g,,,,,;,,,,,;;gg,,,g, used by Comey is a " straw man"; no one y ,,y ,,; ,,gy , ,,7;;,7 g p3 7,p ,g ,,,p7,.
ever crpeered nuclear plcnts to reach such pared, the only full year for which nuclear levels ofreliability, plant capacity factor data were available was De 80 percent design capacity factor was 1973. Data for all of 1974 are now availak.. not created by me, but came from nuclear in- In the following analyses of the 1973-74 dustry sources. data, I have excluded plants less than 100 The basic source was the final Environ. MWe in size for the same reasons identified in menra/ Statements prepared by the US Atomic the earlier report. [Mr. Correy's original re-Energy Commission for the currently operat- port excluded smaller plants because the ing commercial nuclear power plants. In every AEC's principal report on capacity factors one of the more than 20 such documents I excluded all but one, because data on smaller examined, the cost-benefit calculations as. Plants are not available, becaus: smaller plants sumed an 80 percent capacity factor over the much older, not typical of present reactor entire life of the plant. if this assumption is as des.ign;. often not base-loaded. and tend to invalid as industry criticism conten'ds, then the such numerous outages that they would have,0#8ntly
8*
!ower his statistics. -1.#.] I have analyses done by the AEC pursuant to the legal requirements of the National Environ- also l.imite. d the data those nucicar plants at were m cornmemal opuadon for be en-mental Policy Act may be invalid, and there may possibly be a legal basis for challenging t e year @, so as to exch plants in start.up, testing or l,m,ted i i corr.mercial opera-the valid.ity of the operating licenses for each tion. I emphasize this point, because some of these nuclear plants.
. criticisms of the cariier BP1 report mistakenly it may be of interest to note m th.is connex-
, allege that it included plants not in commercial son that a General Electric advertisement in the ratin September issue of Power Engmeermg bore The data for the 28 plants that operated the headline,"The goal: 90% BWR availat>ili- commercially for all of 1974 are set forth in ty. De payoff: lower energy costs." Capacity Table 1, and their average capacity factors are factors have traditiona!!y averaged about 10 set forth in Table 2.*
percent below availability factors. The 1974 data indicate a lower average capacity factor than was achieved in 1973, and
- 2. Comey's use of the phrase " cost over- the cumulative-to-date weighted average
- is run" is misleading; the concept of " cost only $4.6 percent. De average for the two overrun" related to a differentialbetween ac* years taken together is $$.2 percent. These are tual and design capacityfactors has no mean- qu;te close to the $4 percent capacity factor ing in evaluating the cost of nuclear power figure derived from earlier data und used for plants. purposes of analysis in my previous report.
It may be helpful to consider a specific eaample. Commonwealth Edisort is viewed as 4. The biphasic curve showing a decline the leading nuclear utility, with seven operat- in capacityfactors with increased plant age ing nuc! car plants. In 1974, there seven plants had as few as two plants in some age had an average capacity factor of 39.5 per- categories, thus making the curve highly cen. cent.* If their record turns out to be a norm for tingent on the operation of a singleplant dur-the industry, then twice as many nuc! car plants ing a single year.
.s +
9 -- e 7 -.y. , .p- -, - - 7 ..- - -
TABLE 1 Commercial Plants That Operated For All of 1974 Net Date 1974 c ,m. Design Commen tial Net Capacity To Reactor t%wer Operation Unit MWHR Tactors Date Type MWe started Name 1974 1973 4,350,932 86.4 48 78.8 575 1/01/68 Connecticut Yankee PWR 352,939 20.1 35 49.5 BWR 200 7104/60 Dresden-l 3,379,588 47,7 74 47.4 BWR 809 @lD0 Dresden.2 3.200,269 45.2 55 53.7 BWR 609 11/16D1 - Dresden.3 2,097,216 48.9 87 66.0 PWR 490 3fotD0 R.E. Ginna 1.229,060 52.9 0 44.7 265 10/01/62 Indian Point.1 PWR 43.5 NA 33.2 8101D3 3,324,048 PWR 873 Indian Point.2 3,574.301 51.6 52 49.6 PWR 790 12/28D2 Maine Yankee 3,604,240 59.6 35 52.6 BWR 690~ 3/01DI Millstone Point-1 2.923,836 61.2 68 66.2 BWR 545 7/04D1 Monticello 3,296,654 61,7 66 53.9 6!0 12/01/69 Nine Mile Point.1 BWR 51.5 43 53.3 7/15D3 3,998.488 PWR 886 Oconce.1 3,673,489 64.5 66 74.0 650 12/01169 Oyster Creek BWR 78,298 1.1 41 27.9 PWR 821 12/31DI Palisades I,973,033 33.6 73 52.3 BWR 670 12/01D2 Pilgrim.) 3,142,055 72.2 67 70.1 497 12/21DO Point Beach-1 PWR 3,178,408 73.0 73 63.9 497 4/20/73 Point Beach-2 PWR 50.3 73 48.9 2/18D3 3,562,941 BWR 809 i Quad Cities.1 4,469,705 63.1 78 53.2 BWR 809 3/10/73 Quad Cities 2 4,813,207 77,7 65 70.1 ! PWR 707 3/07DI H.B. Robinson 2 3,145,109 79.8 60 70.0 . 450 1101/68 ~ San Onofre.1 PWR 53 49.5 12/22D2 3.318.073 46.0 PWR 823 49.4 Surry-I 2.634,573 36.5 63 PWR 823 5/01D3 Surry 2 55.5 58 59.2 745 12/14/72 3.623.905 Turkey Point 3 PWR 4.292,374 65.8 45 73.1 PWR 745 9/07D3 Turkey Point.4 55.1 43 46.9 II/29D2 2,482,564 BWR 514 68.2 Vermont Yankee 911,452 59.5 68
,PWR 175 7/01/61 Yankee Rowe \477,561 37.8 NA 45.0 PWR 10/02/73 Zion-1 TABLE 2 1973-74 Nuclear Plant Capacity Factor Averages 142,699,040 MWHR 1973 Commercial Capacity - 26 piants 83,976,864 MWHR 1973 Net Electricity Generated 58.4 %
1973 Average Capacity Factor Weighted By MWe Capacity 160,544,520 MWHR 1974 Commercial Capacity - 28 pfants 84,108,318 MWHR 1974 Net Electricity Generated 52.4 % 1974 Average Capacity Factor Weighted by MWe Capacity 304,243,560 MWHR 1973 74 Total Commercial Capscity 160,544,520 MWHR 1973 74 Net E1cetticity Generated 55.2 % , 1973 74 Average Capacity Factor Weighted by MWe Capacity Cumulative.to-date Average C pacity Fa: tor 54.6 % Weighted by MWe Capacity
s - Nor hian Apart To meet this criticism, I have restricted the factors in the 54.6 - 55.2 percent range com. age categories to those containing three plants pare with the capacity factors for base load or more, andcovering the two-year period coal fired plants? 1973-74. Again, we do not have sufficiently specific Figure 1, showing the biphasic curve, indi- data to make an exact comparison because the cafes that nuclear plants reach their peak only fossil-fired data published come from the capacity factors at the age of about six years of Edison Electric Institute, whose compilations commercial operation and decline thereafter to do not separate out base load coal fired plants 39 percent. as such. The latter figure is not markecly different The closest data for purposes of comparison from the 38 percent figure derived from earlier indicate, according to the most recent EE! re-data and used for purposes of analysis in my port,' that the yearly average capacity factor for 894 fossil fired power plants between 1964 previous report, and 1973 was 68.9 percent. De cumulative. '
- 5. Comey makes capacityfactors the only to-date average capacity factor for the 158 of true criterion of nuclear plant performance, these plants larger than 390 MWe (presumably whereas availability factors are equally or the base loaded ones) was 63.2 percent.
more important as a performance index- In view of this apparent differentialin aver. Since my earlier report explained in detail age capacity factors between nuclear plants my reasons for considering capacity factors as and coal plants, which type of plant is the a more valid index of nuclear plant perfor* rational choice for an electric utility to order to mance than availability factors,I see no reason provide the cheapest electricity over the near-to recapitulate that argument here. It stands on term (1980-1990)7 its own feet. The most thorough and probative existine ' An analys.is of availability factor averages analysis of nuclear and coal-fired plant costs is shows that even on this basis nuclear plants (he IRRC report entitled The Nuclear Power have not performed up to expectations he Meretin.' 1RRC's report projects that for a 1973-74 weighted average is only 65.5 per. 1,000-MWe plant whose construction com-cent, and the cumulative to date weighted av-mences in 1975, a nuclear plant would cost erage is only 65.6 percent.' Dis is far short of $811.1 million and a coal fired plant would the 90 percent figure advertised by General cost $638.4 mi!! ion. Dese are the capital Electric. costs of constructing the plants, in order to How do these averages compare with the assign these capital costs to the per kilowatt-availability factor averages of base load coal- hour cost of generating electricity at the fired plants? plants, IRRC prepared a table which refleets he answer is nobody knows. De Edison the fact that as the capacity. factors decline. Electric Institute compilations, the only avail- and the plants produ:e less electricity, the cap-able published source of capacity and avaita- ital cost share per kilowatt-hour co'st tises bility factor data for non nuclear power plants, rapidly. By adding fuel costs and operating do not give breakdowns for base loaded coal
- and maintenance costs to the capital cost per fired p! ants or even coal fired plants alone. kilowatt hour, we can get a projection of the ne closest data for purposes of companson total 1982 per kilow att-hour costs of electricity are as follows. According to the most recent from a 1,000 MWe nuclear plant and 'a eel report,' the 894 fossil fired units surveyed 1,000 MWe coal-fired plant (see Table 3).
had a ygarly average of 86.9 percent availabil- Table 4 shows how the cost of electricity in 5 ity dunng the 10 year penod from 1964 to ,;;;, , g g y 1973, and 'he cumulative to dete average av. g ailability factor for the 158 plants larger than The per kilowatt cost curves between nuclear 390 MWe (presumably the base loaded ones) i and coal-fired plants cross at a capacity factor was 77.1 percent.' It is highly probable the f 55 percent. In other words, if nuclear and Preponderate maJ'ority of those 158 !arge coal fired plants each average more than 55 fossil fired plants are fueled by coal rather i fa N & ri@ h than gas or oil. - the nuclear plants will be cheaper than the These figures would seem to indicate that g; g g g,g g base load coal fired plants have a higher aver- versely, if they each operate at capacity factors age availability factor - and are thus more less than 55 percent, the electricity from the likely to be available to support god reliability gg gg
- then nustear plants. electricity from the coal fired plants.
If one assumes that the average capacity fac.
- 6. If Comey's allegation that nuclear tors for nuc1 car and coa 1 fired plants continue plants waste billions of dollars in idle capac-iry is true, it is important to ask - compared into the future at their historicallevels of 55.2 with what? percent and 63.2 percent respectively, then the As I indicated in an earlier rebuttal,' the coal fired plants will produce electricity at a answer is: " Compared with coal-fired plants, cost of 30.0 mills per kilowatt. hour, compared since that is our cheapest domestic source of with the more expensive 32.9 mills per kilowatt. hour cost from nucicar plants.
fossil fuel." How do nuclear plants' average capacity Even making the arbitrary assurnption that
Not Man' Apart References nuclear plant capacity factors will increase by 20 percent above their present level, and coal. 1. Dennis J. Chase, " Clouding the Neelear fired pants will increase by orily 10 percent Reactor Debate", Bullerin of she Atomic Scientists, over their present level, the per kilowatt hour February 1975, pp.39 40. cost would still be lower for coal-fired plants 2. David Dinsrnore Comey, " Nuclear Power than for nuclear plants: 27.8 versus 28) mills Plant Re!iability: A Report to the Federal Energy per kilowatt hour. Administration" (BPI 7444). Testimony pretented Unless nuclear plants dramatically increase September 10, 1974 at the FEA Project Indepec. their capacity factor record, the economic dence hearing on Nuclear Power and Advanced benefits claimed for them by their proponents Energy Systems. The repon was published in the - are not likely to materialize. November issue of the Bulleti n ofthe Atom /c Scita. . Is it reasonable to expect that nuclear plants siris under the tinte of "Will Idle Capacity Kill No. will be able to sustain such a 20 percent in- cicar Power?", pp. 23 28. crease in their average capacity factor? One factor, at least, suggests not. Because of the radioactivity of reactor and primary 3. D,as ,s their average, weighted by Mw e i coolant systems in light-water reactors, repairs C8Pacity; an unweighted average is 39.8 percent. , on these systems take more time and more workers than similar repairs on coal-fired 4. The sources of the data in Table I are as fol. lows: plants. In order to avoid exceeding cach work. The 1973 capacity factor data are taken from Nu. er's maximum permissible radiation exposure, , clear Power Plant A rcilability and Capacity Storis. a large number of men must work sequentially siesfor 1973. US Atomic Energy Commission Of. within a confined space to make repairs on fice of Operations Evaluation. Report No. 00E.0S. nuclear reactor systems. For example, at 002, May 1974. They evidently wcre rounded off to Commonwealth Edison's Dresden Nuclear the ricarest percent. Power Station, a recent prolonged outage took The cumulative-to-daic capacity fae: ors are taken 350 men to make repairs that 12 men could from the January 1975 " grey book," Operarig have done quickly on a foss,l. i fired plant. Uni's Status Report, US Nuclear Regulatory Com. (Similarly, a repair operation m ,1973 at the mission, January 24,1975. There is good reason to Indian Point reactor in New York required believe that these capacity factors may be higher 2,000 welders to perform a job m six months than they should be (because of the use of that would have taken flightly over a week to
" maximum dependable capacity" ~ rather than de.
perform in a fossil fuel fired plant. The recru,it. sign capacity -in calculating capacity factors). See ing campaign scoured a large portion of the Blowdown, March 1975, in th radioactivity of these plant sys. whi ! eu 4F f tor data, tems increases with plant age, repairs are data filed by each of the utili les iin the likely to becorae ever more time. consuming E"' ^'*" as the plant gets older, leading to longer out. nuni- -i n pursuant to Regulatory Guide
,,I6.
ages and decreased capacity factors. It is therefore likely that we will see a de. Until the NRC converts back to a less biased crease in plant capacity facto.s as these plants method of acputing capacity factors, the grey age. In fact, the 1974 data already indicate books st.ould be used with caution. this: the same 26 nuclear plants that produced "'"'I'd"d'"dc 'Verdfc cePacity facter 83,976,864 megawatt hours in 1973 produced , ' "' . e average capacity factor for the entire time Pc' only 77,306,709 megawatt. hours in 1974 "r e*eh P18nt since it went into commercial. when they were a year older, a 7.9 percent operation. ne cumulative.to-date capacity and av.
~
decrease from the previous year. alfability facior data in Tables I and 5 are taken from Some critics believe that for reasons of the January 1975 grey book, and I find some of them safety alone, nuclear power plants should not dubious. For example, the cumuledve-to-date be built. Others argue that it is unethical for capacity data for Oconee.1, Surry.2, and Turkey two or three generations to consume electricity Point.4 are higher than the two yearly averages re. by producing radion:tive wastes that present a corded since they went into commercial operation, hazard for 20,000 future generations. and Tuacy Point.3 could have achieved its I have tried to restrict discussion in my pre. cumurative-to.dare capacity factor only ifit operated sent analysis to the economic costs. On this at 164 percent or capacity in 1972. basis alone, nuclear power plants seem to be at Thus the red eumutative-to.date capreity factor a disadvantage compared with coal fired average figure for these 28 plants may be fom er than plants. the 54.6 percent computed uvng grey bonk d ia,
Page 1.'t FIGURE 2 FIGURE 1 1982 Busbar Costs Nuclear Plant Capacity Factors Vs. Age of Plant Vs. Capacity Factor 1973-74 50 li . Nuclear 70 67% (4)
.g 64% (5) g .
;y N j Coal J . 60 61% (3) 3 54% (8)' 3 35 55%
'G g = Nuclear / Coal <
50 .e Breakeven Point 51% (5) 40 . 39g ($) 25 Tg\ em i g
- Number ofplants in age category 2
N
<N $E so 35 40 45 50 55 -60 65 70 75 60 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Capacity factor in percent Years of commercial service of plants
. = Data points for nuclear plaats o = Data points for coal fired plants TABLE 3 TABLE 4 i982 susbar Cosis Projected 1982 Busbar Vs. Capacity Fa: tor Costs in Mills Per Kilowatt. Hour Cap' acity ' Cost - MillslKWHR Factor To Nuclear Coal Nuclect Coal Capacity Factor - % 55 55 35 48.4 45.5 Capital Costs 25.2 19.8 40 43.2 41.5 Fuel Costs 5.6 10.0 45 39.0 38.1 Operation & Maintenance 2.2 3.2 35.3
, 50 35.7 55 33.0 33.0 Total Costs - Mills / KWHR 33.0 33.0 60 30.7 31.1
) , 65 28.7 29.4 70 27.0 27.9 75 25.5 26.6
- 6. The 1973 and 1974 availability factor data 80 24.3 25.6 were calculated by myself using the original plant data filed by each utility pursvut to Regulatory Guide 1.16. The cumulative.to-date availability data - --
were taken from the January 1975 grey book and are an li. vestment advisory service. (De report is et-subject to the same cavear expressed in the previous pensive to purchase. Readers interested in viewing a I80f"0 copy should write Friends of the Earth in San Fram
- 7. Report on Equipment Availability for. she ;,gg Ten. Year Period 19641971, (EEI Publication No. 10. To compute capital costs, I used the tab!c 74 57), issued by the Edison Electrie Institute, New from p. 94 of the IRRC repcrt, which is based on York, NY, December 1974 AEC estimates and an Arthur D. little, Inc. report
- 8. David Dinsmore Comey," Chasing Down the prepared for Northeast Utilities.
Facts," Butlerin of the Atomic Scientists. February To compute the fuel costs,I used the 5.6 mills per 1975, pp. 40-42. Lilowatt.hout figure for nuc! car fuel projected by the o The Nuclear Power Alternative, (Special Re. AEC and multiplied it by the 1.78 differential factor port 1975.A lanuary 1975). 7he 103 page report is between nuclear and coal fuel cosis esperienced bs~ available from IRRC, lac., Suite 806,1522 K St.' Commonwealth Edison (see footnote 8). NW Washington DC 20005. It draws no conclu- To compute the operating and rna!ntenance costs, sions about nuclear power, merely presenting the 1 projected Commonwealth Edison's present opera-proponents
- and critics' positions objectively. It is tion and maintenance costs for their nuclear and coal not only the best sing!c document in existence on the p! ants at an annual rate ofincrease of 9 percent.
nuclear power debate, but it is perhaps the finest II. Radio TV Reports, Inc. transcript of CBS piece of institutional research I have eser seen from Evening News,hnuary 16,1975. E
- Uranium nurienment Heaumg 1or m noyss A financial and political crunch is in store as DOE tries to build a i.
S10-billion enrichment plant amid a worldwide surplus of rea'c tor fuel The federal government's 52.3 billion Gettir.g GCEF built in the face of
- Ten years ago, the United States grcwing opposition and dwindling de- held a worldwide monopoly on sales of D a year business enriching uranium for f' nuclear power plants is heading toward a ' mand for enriched uranium is not the enriched uraniur.i. but its share of the only problem facing the program. non-U.S. market has now slumped to 'i msjor crisis. A victim of the plummeting fortunes of the nuclear industry and ~* The government's three existing en- about one-third and DOE's prices are some disastrous miscalculations by the richment plants have recently undergone being undercut by its foreign ccmpeti-Department of Energy (DOE), it is a major overhaul, costing 51.5 billion, to tors. This price differential could worsen czught with billions of dollars of con. increase their capacity by 60 percent and in the next few years as DOE tries to struction in progress just as projected improve their performance. Yet demand raine revenues to pay for GCEP.
demind for enriched uranium is sinking is so depressed that these expensively How DOE got itself into this mess is j. like a stone. As a result, the enrichment refurbished plants are now being operat- relatively straightforward: in the 1970's i. program will soon have a mass of red ink ed at only about 35 percent capacity and it grossly overestimated the demand for l on its books and a big fight with Con- one may soon have to be shut down. enriched uranium and made a number of !
- A huge " secondary market" has re- decisions it later came to regret. At the .
gress on its hands. At the center of the mounting contro- cently eme*ged as utilities, saddled with time, the policies seemed sensible, but ' versy is a mammoth $10-billion enrich. surplus uranium they ordered several "Wth 20/20 hindsight, the decisions ment p' ant that is now rising on the years ago under fixed contracts, are un- wue wrong," says Shelby T Brewer, . head of nuc! ear power programs at DOE. i A decade ago, the most pressing prob-
- lem facing the enrichment program was ,
how to build capacity fast enough to j y-s 1-y p -p g.Tfm.MMMrCE":M~ keep up with soaring demand for reactor !
~
_ % jf, MJ - hh ig h[ =. --
^~
g fuel. The federal government began en-riching uranium for the fledgling nuclear _ m,-.Jd Q f power industry in the late 1960's, using 7,,h three massive plants that were built in wgn-.v. ~; . - *-' c- hc-, m--'-- yv ,. m. thc 1940's and early 1950's to oroduce
~
Hghly enri;hed uranium for ' nuclear hy"1* C g 'j. k e IE r P [d. - ' weapons.* The Atomic Energy Commis-c h~. Q-f._ %[ Q K
' " 4 sion (AEC), which built and operated the .f3'yy 5 ~ # ' c .;, . ,,
plants, essentia!!y ran a service business, gg , g,, g ] g j ggg "T
@g;'
,.w.y g g.- enriching uranium for both domes *ic and foreign utilities and charging enough to hy-M.-ac5 4; cover costs. By 1974, so many nuclear
. _:g
~\.W, w- ,4ha -
R -4et.: plants were under construction or on The Portsratouth centrifuge plant order worldwide that the AEC calculated The nation's biggest const uction project-ifit is all built. that demand for enriched uranium would industrial landscape of Portsmouth, loading the material to other utiliti;s at exceed capacity by the early 1980's. The Ohio. Known as the Gas Centrifuge En- substantialdiscounts. Accordingto DOE AEC then made the first of several deci-richment Plant, or GCEP (pronounced estimates, there may be enough enriched sions that would come back to haunt the gee sep), it is the biggest construction uranium slopping around in the second- enrichment program: it announced that it l project in the nation-a behemoth that ary market to meet worldwide demand would accept no mere new orders. The will cost more than twice as much as the for 2 or 3 years. The surplus is expected order books remained closed until 1978. ~ Clinch River Breeder Reactor, to grow in the next few years and will not Because the United States was then The Department of Energy, which be worked off until the early 1990's, the sole commercial supplier of enriched manages the enrichment program, ar- which means that demand and prices will urarium in the non-Communist world, c AEC's abrupt moratorium had far-reach-gues that GCEP represents the best hope rema'in depressed for the oreseeable fu-ing repercussions. One consequence was for getting the enrichment business onto ture. a more stable economic footing in the
- DOE is currently paying more than a major boost to Europe's enrichment 199C's. But to its critics, the plant is a $100 million a year in penalties to the business; With no competition for new boondoggle whose capacity is not need. Tenressee Valley Authority (TVA) for orders, two groups which built enrich-ed and whose construction will drive up electricity it had contracted to buy to ment plants in the 1970's--Eurodif, a the price of enriched uranium in the near operate enrichment plants but which is consortium of French, Spanish, Belgian, term. They claim that GCEP will be ' no longer needed. Next year, these pen- 2nd Italian government and private inter-obsolete before it is completed, and ar- alties will be more than $200 million and gue that it should at least be put on hold by 1992, the accumulated payments will ' About o.7 percent or naruraf uranium
- is the assae i
until new technologies-based on lasers total a staggering $1.23 bilhon, accordhg u7eI*a 7E"$fr ahEr.tOan *u"$:$ffin I or advanced centrifuges-are available to a recent estimate by the General Ac- mye, ,, mylfgaf'cheQagufyg"j; I m the early 1990's. counting Oflice (GAO). um.us. SCIENCE V01 22t 30 i
u.s. suppu e %cio , power c.,... ww p . , , - , , _ , , ests, and Urenco, a conm.m.... m mn-ish, West Grrmin, and Dutch interests-- 3,,, .
, , , ,, , , , , , . richment pragram wc!! above revenues b
. pickId up two-thirds cf the enrichm:nt im 15 5 from sales cf enriched uranium. In 1987 alone, according to DOE estimates, the
[] b. busiatss ortside the United States by the end cf the decade. 3,,, _
,, program will be about 5500 million in the red. This means that either Congress and h
pC The United . States, meanwhile, was sono - the Office of Management and Budget
- l. -
scrambling to increase its own capacity, g A 10-year effort to expand output from a anos - must approve a departure from the cur-rent pay-as-you go policy, under which [ Li the three existing plants-located in Oak I Ridge. Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; jisso DOE balances costs and revenues on an d
- annual basis, or DOE will have to raise ' ' 50 4 snd Portsmouth, Ohio-was already un .
der way. But evu. O this expansion, 1888 - its prices drastically. The former would %' sm make the program highly vulnerable po- p$' the AEC estimated in 1975 that as many soo - P,5 litically, and the latter would certainly i!- as 8 to 12 new plants would be needed by thz end of the century. Congress was ___ , , q isu price the United States out of the enrich- % 4 ment business. fl ,' isso ises im ises anos _ duly. persuaded to give the go-phead for Yar As for the plant's long-term econom-
. imr.udiate construction of onc nr. v facil- . ics, they depend on whether all or only
- ~
ity. . Irl 1977, the Carter Administration an-Enrichment's suking fortunes
. part of tl e plan: is built, how rapidly the hl d
N' j nounced that the plant, to be built along- No matter; DOE now says that al- state of the art in centrifuge technology D side the existing cc.richment facility at though GCEP rnay not be justified sim- advances, and how much further project-P:rtsmouth. would use a new technolo- ply to meet rising demand,it is needed to ed demand for enriched uranium sinks. sy.The three postwar plants all employ a stabilize the cost of enrichment and review within DOE, is to build GCEP in The current plan, which is now under Q i process called gaseous diffusion in which stave off foreign competition. Without it, uranium hexafluoride gas is forced "the United States would price itself out eight modules, each of which is a mas- Q' g l sive process building housing thousands Q through thousands of porous barriers. of the enrichment business," claims ) Btcause lighter molecules containing the Brewer. In essence, DOE is saying that of centrifuges. The first two buildings are under construction, and their centrifuges h4 fissile uranium-235 isotope tend to dif- enrichment is no different from, say, fuse through the barriers more quickly steelmaking:in spite of worldwide over-are expected to be installed and running hi than those containing uranium-238, the capacity,.the-United States must build by 1988. The other buildings would be 27 i concentration of fissile material in- new, more efficient plants and retire its added in stages, with final completion of the entire plant scheduled for 1994. DOE h p: cretses as the uranium hexaf!uoride old ones if it is to stay competitive. There 'is certainly good evidence that anticipates that centrifuge technology d passes through the plant. The process ? has a major drawback: it is a voracious the United States is losing enrichmentmachines will advance as GCEP is built so that the d-censumer of electricity.' Since electricity business and that it may lose a lot more. installed in the final buildings $ will be two to three times more efficient F prices were going through the rcofin the For one thing, thanks in part to those 1970's, the Carter Administration decid- penalties DOE is paying TVA and to the than those in the earlier modules. d P-rise of the dollar against European cur- By the end of this fiscal year, DOE - ! ed that the new Portsmouth facility would use gas centrifuges, a novel but rencies, the substantial price advantage will have spent some 51.8 billion on l potentia!!y much less energy-intensive enjoyed by the United States in the GCEP and, by the time the first two Q h enrichment technology. In this process 1970's has disappeared. It is now being process buildings are completed, it will uranium hexafluoride is spun at high undercut by Eurodif, Urenco, and the have gone through half the projected y speeds in a series of massive centrifuges. Soviet Union (which is now selling some capital cost of the entire eight-module h k ' The new plant-GCEP-was originally enriched uranium on the international plant. (The total plant cost is now put at P,y scheduled to be in full production by market). Then there is the secondary some 59 billion, in 1984 do!!ars.) The market. According to DOE estimates, high initial capital cost is explained in 4 1986.
.While all this was going on, however, some two-thirds of the material in the part by the fact that DOE decided to fiW the bottom fell out of the nuclear power secondary market is of European origin construct central facilities capable of business as utilities, faced with escalat- and it is being offered in the United handling the work of all eight modules.
This, of course, provides a built in incen-Q 1 ing construction costs ' and declining . States at substantial discounts. ka The first indication of a shift in the tive to finish the plant once'the initial growth in electricity consumption, can- f.E celed or deferred scores of power plants. market came in August 1982, when Flori- buildings are completed: later modules 4
- The impact on uranium enrichnent has da Power and Light bought some Euro- will be cheaper to build and, because h p
F . been dramatic. Since 1975, when Con- pean uranium on the secondary market. they will employ more efficient ma- d gress gave the go. ahead for GCEP, the Four months later South Carolina DOE's Gas chines, theyfor will be far more p projected demand for U.S. enriched ura- and Electric became the first U.S. utility current justification build-fr nis.m in the year 2000 has dropped by to sign a contract directly with Eurodif ing GCEPis that because it willuse only about 5 percent of the electricity con- k] more than a factor of 10 (see c!' art). As a rather than DOE.however, whether sumed by a gaseous diffusion plant to It is debatable, ? 1. result, the GAO and the Congressional J { ' Research Service both concluded last , building GCEP is the best way tn shore produce a given quantity of enriched y i. l
. year that DOE's existing gaseous diffu. up the U.S. enrichment business in the uranium, it will help reduce the i lo long term, and the pirnt will certainly term price of er.richment. But last year,
! sion plants have more than enough ca- iL
- pacity to meet demand until the end of add to the economic and political sam DOE prob.
was GAO questioned sti;i using that claimp unrealistica!!y be the cc-tury and beyond. In other words, tems in the short term. The immediate difficulty is that the high estimates of demand; at lower ds- .- i the . original justification for building ?. construction costs of GCEP in the next mand lev:Is, GCEP's cost advantage dis-GCEP has evaporate <!. m b( se Aucusi ass) .T
. - _ ~ - , ,., -, - , . , , _ , . _ . ,_ _,__,mm ._ ._,___.__.,,._._____,_.._,_,.__..,__.,.___,,.m., _ _
I
..ppe n, u. v . v. . . . : vun p . .m . w p. m th.a of ...e cat ty Ivr e.u.a , . .nu.icted anythin, to be> published by the Congressional IWO's was also ready to be scaled up. like the attentiun devoted to the much !
Dudget Ollice, however, will argue that For reasons that h. tee never been ade- less expensive Clinch River Breeder Re-GCEP will be cost effective if the ad- quately explained, DOE turned down the actor. But that may change in the coming vanced centrifuges now scheduled for Avco Everett/ Exxon proposal and, in months as the program's problems be-only the final buildings were insta!!cd in April last year, announced that it would come more widely known. Later this the entire plant. This would mean ripping build a demonstration plant based on the year, for example. Senator Gordon out the less efficient machines a few Livermore process. (Avco Everett dis- Humphrey (R-N.H.), a critic of GCEP, years after they are installed and replac- banded its enrichment team, but has plans to hold hearings with a subcommit-ing them with the advanced centrifuges. managed to salvage some of the work:it tee he chairs that has jurisdiction over In essence, this would require building is now using the lasers in a Defense TVA, to look into the massive penalties pan of the plant twice. That may reduce Department program to develop faser DOE is forking over to the utility. And costs in the long term, but it would communications with submarines.) next year, Ottinger, who chairs a key increase outlays in the short term and When it selected Livermore DOE House energy subcommittee, will get a aggravate the political prob!cm of getting planned to have a demonstration laser crack at the program when it comes up Congress to come through with the mon. facility in operation by 1990, but it his for authorization. ey. It also invites the question, why Already, the House Committee on Sci-install the less efficient machines at all? _ ence and Technology and the appropria-Why not put the whole thing on hold p q]g. p gg;[,-g q sg.gq6 M ^ tions committees have put DOE on no-tice that there cou!d be rough times until the advanced machines are avail- c3.%g i
- 1 able? That, in fact, is precisely what ; Y g ahead. They have approved funds for Representative Richard Ottinger (D- gd@.
'qyi.sglgf,.{
; wkhj only the first two modules c'GCEP and N.Y.), a critic of GCEP, proposed last 1 r, demanded a study of what should be year, MQ-%u . , , done beyond that. DOE, ruanwhile, has in this regard, it should be noted that <fg centrifuge development is proceeding so .: fr g7 ;
p@gj shake gram,n up thein management bringing to head it John R. of the pro-
?% Longenecker, a 34-year old engineer rapidly that the advanced machines cc,uld be ready much earlier than orig- Q,%g,3r 7 jp'
/
f who formerly managed DOE's Clinch inally expected. According to Richard Grant, who is heading the centrifuge jW;4h f k'MM. MAM .4'dY
/ River program. Longenecker said in an program for Boeing, key c!cments of the $h j ( E h,- l.
Jhh Q interview that the whole program-in-cluding stopping GCEP-is under exami-machines are already under test and Mi ;V,Z f. p@.%yg6, nation, and a new plan will be formulated commercial production could come as M'f yy early as 1988-1989-some 3 to 4 years W - '- 4
- h by the end of the year.
The options facing DOE and Congress ahead of schedule. Shelby Brewer are complicated and painful. To cancel There is, however, another factor that Counting on GCEP to lower prices. GCEP now would mean writing off the ; should play a crucial role in deciding 51.8 billion already spent plus some 5350 what to do with GCEP: the development recently brought forward the target date million in cancellation charges. It would of a technology based on lasers that may to 1987. (The speedup will be achieved also run the risk of seeing the operating offer substantial cost advantages over by use oflasers being built at Livermore costs of the gaseous diffusion plants even advanced centrifuges. DOE, urged to separate isotopes of plutonium in a climb steadily, with no reliefif the laser on by Congress, is now pumping about defense program.; As it happens, that is process does not live up to expectations. 5100 million a year into the development about the time when the advanced cen- But to continue with GCEP will require . of laser enrichment, trifuges are expected to be ready for some major infusions of cash in the next The process, first developed by scien- commercial development. few years from a Congress concerned tists working for the Avco Everett Re. This has led supporters of the laser about budget d:ficits and about hidden search Laboratory. involves subjecting a program to argue that no firm commit- subsidies to the nuclear industry. Build-stream of atomic uranium vapor to a ment should be made to complete GCEP ing GCEP now, moreover, may welt series of very finely tuned laser beams. until both the laser process and the ad- preclude building a laser plant in the Energy is absorbed only by atoms of vanced centrifuges have been properly 1990's, even iflaser technology ultir. tate- - uranium-235, which eventually lose.an evaluated. DOE "should put everything ly turns out to be superior. The alterna- - electron. The resulting uranium-235 ions (at GCEP] on hold as best they can and tive, putting GCEP on hold to wait for are then collected by passing the vapor then compare the two processes " says advanced centrifuges or lasers, would - stream through a magnetic field, which James Davis, who is heading the Liver- incur considerable costs if the plant is i deflects the ions while the neutral urani- more effort. Davis has no doubts about later reactivated. Finally, if construction ! um-238 atoms pass straight through. which would win. The laser process at were halted after only two modules, the l Avco Everett, in partnership with an present promises to be much less capital- plant will be of dubious economic value Exxon subsidiary, spent some 577 mil- intensive than centrifuge technology, because of those hge capital expendi. j lion of their own funds developing the and its operating ccsts, although still tures DOE has already sunk into central technology during the 1970's. But in 1980 somewhat uncertain, are expected to at facilities for the entire eight-module op- . they decided that the time was not ripe to 'least match those of advanced centri. eration. , build a private enrichment plant and pro- fuges. One potentially attractive solution to posed ajoint venture with DOE to com- So far, the cnrichment program has all this is to turn the whole business over ; . raercialize the technology. In the mean- attracted little interest on Capitol Hill to private industry. Getting enrichment j time, however, the Lawrence Livermore beyond the committees that oversee out of the federal appropriations process l National Laboratory was working on a DOE and appropriate the funds. GCEP, would mean that new construction could j U2 SCIENCE. VOL. 221 w
that the lederal governmem u.. .u n- c-
-be financed by borrowmg i s. u waat nance any more construction after the future plants, in any case, given the huge .
markets rather than from current reve- first two modules of GCEP. That would uncertainties facing the enrichment busi-f- nues. Decisions would also be made on a at least focus attention on how future ness, private industry is not leaping at strictly business basis, and industry, capacity should be financed, but it would the investment opportunity. f}) which stands to benefit from lower en- For DOE, the immediate problem is rich;nent prices, would bear the risks. do little to help avert the budget crunch c.. The Rcagan Administration, which is in the next few years. A more radical how to get through the ( ideol:gica!!y committed to getting the ides, put forward by market the conservative depressing demand especially and prices. in viewl ~ - of federal government out of running busi- Heritage Foundation, would be to turn "Somehow," says Brewer, "we must nesses, would very much like to turn over management of existing plants to a cnrichment over to the private sector, group consisting of utilities that current-this secondary get through market problem-and the valle but it is not at all clear how it cou!d be ly have contracts to purchase enriched emerge with the best technology." Bil-f-done. uranium from DOE. This management lions of dollars are riding on how DOE One proposal, under consideration in corporation would essentially lease the b [4 chooses to do it.-CouN NORMAN the White House,is simply to announce plants for a fee to pay off their depreciat- Fo^3 D A Stucy of Atomic Veterans Fueis Controversy :- Criticism of a study of U.S. soldiers in Hiroshima and Nagasakiillustrates the 0 pitfalls of dressing up a political study as purely a scientific investigation f .s "We're in a world of pressures-from U The National Research Council (NRC) compiled by his organization. "If thethe veterans on one side and of course I3 people who were ignored or are dead recently fired another salvo in an ongo- from the disease are counted, we're deal- from the government on the other." Jab-lon is unwilling to describe the report as i(. ing battle between several veterans orga- ing here with an epidemic ", he says. nizations and the scientific community p Although there seems to be broad sound science. "I don't think I want to (% over the merits of conducting in epide- answer that question," he says. miological study of U.S. soldiers who agreement that Alcalay is wrong about Thea idea for the report came from an K were in Japan shortly after the end of cancer epidemic, several independent NRC study in 1981 on the feasibility of h, scientists agree with him that the NRC E World War 11. The veterans, led by a retired mail carrier from Oregon, claim report has some serious shortcomings. conducting a i' "The NRC is probably correct in its investigation. A panel chaired by Brian fu
.I that an unusual number of soldiers who conclusions, but I think their methodolo- MacMahon of the Harvard School of passed through Hiroshima and Nagasaki Public Health had been formed at the (j
have developed multiple myeloma, a gy is slovenly," says Bernard Green-berg, a biostatistician who is dean emeri- request of the Pentagon for the purpose !J bone cancer, as a result of exposure to tus at the University of North Carolina of deflecting growing congressionai in- f' residual radiation after the bomb blasts School of Public Health. Similarly. Ed- terest in such an investigation, JaMen ts in 1945. ward Radford, a radiation epidemiologist says. "The Pentagon was searching for a The NRC, in a controversial report way to resist what they saw as an unwar- N released on 16 July, suggested that the. at the University of Pittsburgh, says "I f veterans' claims are unwarranted and would doubt very much if there was a ranted demand fortia that an epidemiological study would significant exposure to Theradiation panel listenedby the taking. to testimony from And so b.
- U.S. occupation force, but I think that i' probably be a waste of time. Specifical. the study adds nothing to a discussion of veterans organizations, the Defe e ly,it said that only nine cases of multiple whether there real'y is more mveloma clear Agency, and the National Cancer*i myeloma had been confirmed among than one would expect." He and Green- Institute and concluded that the potentia!.l ,
members of the occupation force "sta- berg agree with the veterans organiza- benefit of an epidemiological investiga- ~ e tioned in or near Hiroshima and Nagasa- tions that the NRC failed tolook diligent- tion was not worth the " formidable" - ki." This, said the NRC, constitutes an ly for myeloma victims, and that it may cost, The par.:t reasoned that radiat
~ l incidence no greater than that in the have used an inappropriate control group doses received by the soldiers were sim-general population, to' estimate whether the occupation force ply too low to cause any detectabic ex- [;
Although the report has been wel. cess cancers, unless existing assump-comed by the Department of Defense,it members suffer from excess cancers. 5 The respons- of the NRC. which is the tions about the effect of radiation on E has outraged the veterans and attracted human health are incorrect.' pointed criticism from several outside operating arm of the National Academy In what MacMahon describes as a sop [ scientists. The National Association of of Sciences. is essentially to acknowl- to the veterans, the NRC panel did rec- A Atomic Veterans, a lobby organized to edge the presence of shortcomings in the ommend closer scrutiny of a list of al- 7. ; report and to explain that it was intended win fi,ancial compensation for veterans, from the outset to serve a primarily Icged myeloma victims compiled by Vic-
,j e
who blame their ailments on radiation political, not scientific, purpose. "We're ?TN other panebsts mere Robert Anderson or the exposure, has denounced the report as i " medically criminal." Glenn Alca!ay, an not in a purelv scientific world here," E"$,'%I,oIai$Na$'oIy',Mfn"r^nS*o'r Ne'rI i' of!icial of the group, says that the NRC says Seymour Jablon, a radiation expert r who coordinated the study as director of {a y Q ,Tl"c/,0n**,da. abCAR er N ignored some victims of myeloma on a the NRC's Medical Follow.up Agency. New York Unscruy stedical center. list of U.S. occupation force members 733 19 AUGUST 198) S}}