ML20076M352

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Amends 113 & 102 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively, Revising TS 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate & TS 3.2.4, DNBR Margin
ML20076M352
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  
(NPF-10-A-113, NPF-15-A-102)
Issue date: 10/27/1994
From: Fields M
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20076M357 List:
References
NUDOCS 9411070221
Download: ML20076M352 (28)


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g.....[

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 0001 s

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY-l THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE. CALIFORNIA THE CITY OF ANAHEIM. CALIFORNIA DOCKET NO. 50-361 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNIT N0. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE 1

Amendment No. 113 License No. NPF-10 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amandment by Southern California Edison Company, et al. (SCE or the licensee) dated December 31, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and.the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; e

C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the-health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and t

E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 19 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

I 9411070221 941027 PDR ADOCK 05000361 P

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- l 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Speci-fications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A'and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment-No. 113, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

I 3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 30 days from the date of issuance.

j FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0 ISSION

  1. s/// F} #d Mel B. Fields, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 i

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications i

Date of Issuance:

October 27, 1994 l

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO.113TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10 DOCKET NO. 50-361 Revise Appendix' A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 2-1 3/4 2-1 3/4 2-5 3/4 2-5 3/4 2-6 3/4 2-6 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-6 B 3/4 2-1 B 3/4 2-1 B 3/4 2-la B 3/4 2-4 B 3/4,2-4 B 3/4 2-5 B 3/4 2-5 l

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3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS i

3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.2.1 The linear heat rate shall not exceed 13.9 kw/ft.

APPLICABILITY: MODE I above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

a.

With COLSS in service and the linear heat rate not being maintained as indicated by COLSS calculated core power exceeding the COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on linear heat rate (kw/ft):

i 1.

Restore the linear heat rate to within its limits within I hour, or j

2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With COLSS not in service and the linear heat rate not being maintained as indicated by any OPERABLE Local Power Density channel exceeding the linear heat rate limit:

l 1.

Within 15 minutes initiate surveillance requirements 4 3.1.3 and restore the linear heat rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or 2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.1.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.1.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within its limits when THERMAL POWER is above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> that the linear heat rate, as indicated on all OPERABLE Local Power Density channels, is within the limit of 13.9 kw/ft.

4.2.1.3 With COLSS not in service and the linear heat rate not being maintained as indicated by any OPERABLE Local Power Density Channel exceeding the linear heat rate limit, verify every 15 minutes that there is no adverse trend in the linear heat rate.

4.2.1.4 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified I

to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or equal to the core power operating limit based on kw/ft.

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 3/4 2-1 AMENDMENT N0. 113

  • I POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS d

3/4.2.2 PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS - F,y I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION J

3.2.2 The measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (F" Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and in the Cly) used#) sh equal to the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (F in the Core Operating ore Protection Calculators (CPC).

APPLICABILITY: MODE I above 20% of RATED THEPJtAL POWER.*

ACTION:

With a F"y exceedingacorrespondingFly, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> either:

a.

Adjust the CPC and COLSS addressable constants to increase the multiplier applied to PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS to a factor greater than or equal to (F"y/Fly); or b.

Adjust only the CPC addressable constants as in (a). Restrict subsequent operation so that a margin to the COLSS operating limits of at least [(Fly/Fly) - 1.0] x 100% is maintained; or Adjust the affected PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (Fly) used in the c.

COLSS and CPC to a value greater than or equal to the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (F"y) or d.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2 The measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (F" obtained by using the incore detection system, shall be determined to be l)ess than or equal to the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (Fly), used in the COLSS and CPC at the following intervals:

After each fuel loading with THERMAL POWER greater than 40% but a.

prior to operation above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and b.

At least once per 31 EFPD.

  • See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 3/4 2-2 AMENDMENT NO. 16

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

't 3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.4 The DNBR margin shall be maintained by one of following methods:

Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS a.

calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR (when COLSS is in service, and either one or both CEACs are operable); or b.-

Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less. than or equal to COLSS l

calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR decreased by 13.0% RATED THERMAL POWER (when COLSS is in service and neither CEAC-is operable): or a

Operating within the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-1 using c.

any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and either one or both CEACs are operable); or j

d.

Operating within the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-2 using

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any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and neither CEAC is operable).

APPLICABILITY: MODE I above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

a.

With COLSS in service and the DNBR limit not being maintained as indicated by COLSS calculated core power exceeding the COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR:

1.

Restore the DNBR to within its limits within I hour, or 2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to-20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With COLSS not in service and the DNBR limit not being maintained as indicated by operation outside the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-1 or 3.2-2 using any operable CPC channel, 1.

Within 15 minutes initiate surveillance requirement 4.2.4.3 and restore the DNBR to within its limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or i

2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

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-E SAN ON0FRE-UNIT 2 3/4 2-5 AMENDMENT NO. 47,113

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.4.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.4.2 The DNBR shall be determined to be within its limits when THERMAL POWER is above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> that the DNBR, as indicated on any OPERABLE-DNBR channel, is within the limit shown on Figures 3.2-1 or 3.2-2, as applicable.

4.2.4.3 With COLSS not in service and'the DNBR margin not being maintained as indicated by operation outside the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-1 or 3.2-2 using any operable CPC channel, verify every 15 minutes that there is no adverse trend in DNBR margin.

4.2.4.4 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified l

to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or equal to the core power operating limit based on DNBR.

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J SAN ON0FRE-UNIT 2 3/4 2-6 AMENDMENT N0.-49F 113

,o Revised by NRC letter dated: 10/27/94 EMERUCNCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) d.

By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

1.

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2.

Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

I e.

At least once per refueling interval by:

1.

Verifying automatic interlock action of the shutdown cooling i

system with the Reactor Coolant System by ensuring that when simulated RCS pressure is greater than or equal to 376 psia, the interlocks prevent opening the shutdown cooling system isolation valves.

2.

A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

f.

At least once per refueling interval, during shutdown, by:

l 1.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on SIAS and RAS test signals.

2.

'/erifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Test Signal:

a.

High-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

b.

Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

c.

Charging pump.

3.

Verifying that on a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open; and that on a RAS test signal coincident with a high-high containment sump test signal, all the recirculation valves to the refueling water tank close.

g.

By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated l

developed head and/or flow rate when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

1.

High-Pressure Safety Injection pumps developed head, at an indi-cated flow rate of 650 gpm, greater than or equal to 2142 feet for P017, 2101 feet for P018 and 2103 for P019 (see NOTE 1).

SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 AMENDMENT NO. 98

Revised _by'NRC letter' dated: 10/27/94 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) 2.

Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump developed head greater than or equal to 406.1 feet at miniflow.

3.

Charging pump flow rate greater than or equal to 40 gpm.

h.

By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following comple-I tion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying the following flow-rates:

1.

For High-Pressure Saf'ety Injection pump cold leg injection with a single pump running:

a.

The sum of the injection lines flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 657 gpm for-P017 running, 667 gpm for P018 running and 672 gpm for P019 running, and b.

The total. pump flow rate is greater than or equal to 900 gpm for P017 running, 913 gpm for P018 running and 918 gpm for P019 running.

2.

For a single High-Pressure Safety Injection pump hot / cold leg injection.

a.

The sum of the cold leg injection flow rates is greater than or equal to 385 gpm, and b.

The hot leg injection flow rate is greater than or equal to 385 gpm.

c.

The combined total hot / cold legs injection flow rate is greater than or equal to 896 gpm.

3.

For the Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump with a single pump running:

a.

The flow through each injection leg shall be greater than or equal to 3000 gpm when tested individually and correct--

ed to the same pump suction source and leg back pressure conditions. The difference between high and low flow legs shall be 'ess thaa or equal to 100 gpm.

b.

The total ECCS flow through 2 cold leg injection lines shall be greater than or equal to 4450 gpm when corrected for elevation head.

SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-6 AMENDMENT NO. 98

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3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES l

3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE The limitation on linear heat rate ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the peak temperature of the fuel cladding will not exceed 2200*F.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the Local Power Density channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the l

core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the linear heat rate does not exceed its limits. The COLSS. performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core power operating limit corresponding to the allowable peak linear heat rate.

Reactor operation at or below this calculated power level assures that the limits of 13.9 kw/ft are not exceeded.

1 The COLSS calculated core power and the COLSS calculated core power operating limits based on linear heat rate are continuously monitored and displayed to the operator. A COLSS alarm is annunciated in the event that the i

core power exceeds the core power operating limit. This provides adequate margin to the linear heat rate operating limit for normal steady state opera-tion. Normal reactor power transients or equipment failures which do not require a reactor trip may result in this core power operating limit being excee.ded.

In the event this occurs, COLSS alarms will be annunciated.

If the event which causes the COLSS limit to be exceeded results in conditions which approach the core safety limits, a reactor trip will be initiated by the Reactor Protective Instrumentation. The COLSS calculation of the linear heat rate includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability / confidence level, that the maximum linear heat rate calculated by COLSS is conservative with respect to the actual maximum linear heat rate existing in the core.

These penalty factors are determined from the uncer-tainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering design factors, axial densification, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow and core power measurement.

The core power distribution and a corresponding power operating limit based on Linear Hear Rate (LHR) are more accurately determined by the COLSS using the incore detector system. The CPCs determine LHR less accurately with the excore detectors. When COLSS is not available the TS LCOs are more restrictive due to the uncertainty of the CPCs.

However, when COLSS becomes inoperable the added margin associated with CPC uncertainty is not immediately required and a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ACTION is provided for appropriate corrective action.

Parameters required to maintain the operating limit power level based on linear heat rate, margin to DNB and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs assuming minimum core power of 20% RATED THERMAL POWER. The 20% Rated Thermal Power threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. Therefore, in the event that the COLSS is not being used, operation within the limits of Figure 3.2-2 can be maintained by utilizing a predetermined local power density margin and a total core power limit in the CPC trip channels.

The above listed uncertainty penalty factors plus those associated with startup test acceptance criteria are also included in the CPCs.

SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-1 AMENDMENT NO.113

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'3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE (Continued)

While operating with the COLSS out of service, the CPC calculated LHR is monitored every 15 minutes to ' identify any adverse trend in thermal margin.

The increased monitoring of LHR during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> action period ensures that adequate safety margin is maintained for anticipated operational occurrences and no postulated accident results in consequences more severe than those described in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR.

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SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-la AMENDMENT NO.113

.. 3 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 1

i AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - To (Continued)

T is the peak fractional tilt amplitude at the core periphery y

g is the radial normalizing factor 0 is the azimuthal core location 8, is the azimuthal core location of maximum tilt Pof3,/P is the ratio of the power at a core location in the presence atN3,tothepoweratthatlocationwithnotilt.

3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN The limitation on DNBR as a function of AXIAL SHAPE INDEX represents a conservative envelope of operating conditions consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and which have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain an acceptable minimum DNBR throughout all anticipated operational occurrences, of which the loss of flow transient is the most limiting. Opera-tion of the core with a DNBR at or above this limit provides assurance that an acceptable minimum DNBR will be maintained in the event of a loss of flow transient.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the DNBR channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the DNBR does not violate its limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core operating limit corresponding to the allowable minimum DNBR. The COLSS calculation of core power operating limit based on the minimum DNBR limit includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability / confidence level, that the core power limit calculated by COLSS (based on the minimum DNBR limit) is conservative with respect to the actual core power limit. These penalty factors are determined from the uncertainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering design factors, state parameter measurement, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow and core power measurement.

Parameters required to maintain the margin to DNB and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs.

In the event that the COLSS is not being used, the DNBR margin can be maintained by monitoring with any operable CPC channel so that the DNBR remains above the predetermined limit as a function of Axial Shape Index.

The above listed uncertainty penalty factors are also included in the CPCs, which assume a minimum of 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the excore neutron flux detector system being less accurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. The additional uncertainty terms taken into account in the CPCs for transient protection are removed from Figures 3.2-1 and 3.2-2 since the curves are intended to monitor the LCO only during steady state operation.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-3 AMENDMENT NO. 47

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES

-l DNBR Marcin (Continued)

The core power distribution and a corresponding power operating limit based on DNBR are more accurately determined by the COLSS using the incore detector system. The CPCs determine DNBR less accurately with the excore detectors.

In addition, the COLSS reserves a DNBR overpower margin to ensure that the specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded in the event of an anticipated operational occurrence. Therefore, the COLSS out of service TS LCOs are more restrictive due to the uncertainty of the CPCs and the overpower margin reserved for anticipated operational occurrences. However, when COLSS becomes inoperable the added margin associated with the CPCs is not immediately required and a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ACTION is provided for appropriate correc-tive action.

The DNBR penalty factors listed in section 4.2.4.4 are penalties used to accommodate the effects of rod bow. The amount of rod bow in each assembly is dependent upon the average burnup experienced by that assembly.

Fuel assem-blies that incur higher average burnup will experience a greater magnitude of l

rod bow. Conversely, lower burnup assemblies will experience less rod bow.

The penalty for each batch required to compensate for rod bow is determined from a batch's maximum average assembly burnup applied to the batch's maximum integrated planar-radial power peak. A single net penalty for COLSS and CPC is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch, accounting for the offsetting margins due to the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

While operating with the COLSS out of service, the CPC calculated DNBR is monitored every 15 minutes to identify any adverse trend in thermal margin.

The increased monitoring of DNBR during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> action period ensures that adequate safety margin is maintained for anticipated operational occurrences and no postulated accident results in consaquences more severe than those described in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR.

3/4.2.5 RCS FLOW RATE This specification is provided to ensure that the actual RCS total flow rate is maintained at or above the minimum value used in the LOCA safety analyses.

3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of reactor coolant cold leg temperature is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

2.4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX The Axial Shape Index (ASI) is a measure of the power ger.erated in the lower half of the core less the power generated in the upper half of the core divided by the sum of these powers. This specification is provided to ensure that the core average ASI is maintained within the range of values assumed as an initial condition in the safety analyses. This range is specified as

-0.3 s ASI s 0.3.

SA'N ON0FRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-4 AMENDMENT NO.-6f5 113

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 2.4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (Continued)

The ASI can be determined by utilizing either the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or any operable Core Protection Calculator (CPC) channel. The real time monitoring capability and accuracy of COLSS allows COLSS to monitor power limit margins closely. Consequently, the ASI limit is broader than it would be with the same core without COLSS. The COLSS con-tinuously calculates the ASI and compares the calculated value to the param-eter established for the COLSS ASI alarm limit.

In addition, there is an uncertainty associated with the COLSS calculated ASI, therefore the COLSS ASI alarm limit includes this uncertainty.

If the LCO is exceeded, COLSS alarms are initiated. The ASI safety setting is selected so that no safety limit will be exceeded as a result of an anticipated operational occurrence, and so that the consequence of a design basis accident will be acceptable.

With COLSS out of service, any operable CPC channel may be used to calcu-late the ASI (using three axially spaced excore detectors). The axial shape synthosis in the CPC's shows the relative power produced as a function of core height in each third of the core. Due to the uncertainty associated with the CPC estimate, the ASI is restricted to a smaller range than the range cal-l culated using the COLSS.

The 20% rated thermal power threshold is imposed due to the inaccuracy of the neutron flux detector below the threshold. Core noise level is too large to obtain usable detector readings.

3/4.2.8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of pressurizer pressure is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

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SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-5 AMENDMENT NO.-6A 113 1

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UNITED STATES 5

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e#

WASHINGTON, D.C. 205W0001 3,

. j SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDIS0N COMPANY SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE. CALIFORNIA THE CITY OF ANAHEIM. CALIFORNIA DOCKET NO. 50-362 SAN ON0FRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNIT NO. ~a AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.102 License No. NPF-15 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company, et al. (SCE or the licensee) dated December 31, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; j

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; 1

C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common

)

defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

i

s

. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Speci-fications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 102, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with tne Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mel B. Fields, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

October 27, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO. in? TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-15 DOCKET NO. 50-362 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 2-1 3/4 2-1 3/4 2-5 3/4 2-5 3/4 2-6 3/4 2-6 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-6 B 3/4 2-1 B 3/4 2-1 B 3/4 2-la B 3/4 2-4 B 3/4 2-4 B 3/4 2-5 B 3/4 2-5 l

3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.1 The linear heat rate shall not exceed 13.9 kw/ft.

APPLICABILITY: MODE I above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

.a.

With COLSS in service and the linear heat rate not being maintained as indicated by COLSS calculated core power exceeding the COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on linear heat rate (kw/ft):

1.

Restore the linear heat rate to within its limits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, or 2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With COLSS not in service and the linear heat rate not being maintained as indicated by any OPERABLE Local Power Density channel exceeding the linear heat rate limit:

1.

Within 15 minutes initiate surveillance requirement 4.2.1.3 and restore the linear heat rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or 2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL i

POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.2.1.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.1.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within its limits when THERMAL POWER is above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System j

(COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> that the linear heat rate, as indicated on all OPERABLE Local Power Density channels, is within the limit of 13.9 kw/ft.

4.2.1.3 With COLSS not in service and the linear heat rate not being maintained as indicated by any OPERABLE Local Power Density Channel exceeding the linear heat rate limit, verify every 15 minutes that there is no adverse trend in the linear heat rate.

4.2.1.4 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified l

to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or equal to the core power operating limit based on kw/ft.

I SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 3 3/4 2-1 AMENDMENT NO.102 1

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.2 PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS - Fxy LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.2 The measured PLANAR P.ADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (F" ) shall be less than or y

equal to the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (Fxy) used in the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and in the Core Protection Calculators (CPC).

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL Power."

ACTION:

With a F*

exceeding a corresponding F

, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> either:

c y

a.

Adjust the CPC and COLSS cddressable constants to increase the multiplier applied to PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS to a factor-greater ttan or equal to (F* /Fxy); or c

y b.

Adjust only the CPC addressable constants as in (a). Restrict subsequent operation so that a margin to the COLSS operating limits of at least [(F*y/Fc ) - 1.0] x 100% is maintained; nr Adjust the affected PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (Fc ) used in the c.

y COLSS and CPC to a value greater than or equal to the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (F*y) or d.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2 The measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (F* ) obtained by using y

the incore detection system, shall be determined to be less than or equal to the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS (FC ), used in the COLSS and CPC at the l

following intervals:

a.

After each fuel loading with THERMAL POWER greater than 40% but prior to operation above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and b.

At least once per 31 EFPD.

j See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 3 3/4 2-2

o POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMIIS 3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.4 The DNBR margin shall be maintained by one of following methods:

a.

Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR (when COLSS is in service, and either one or both CEACs are operable); or b.

Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR decreased by 13.0% RATED THERMAL POWER (when COLSS is in service and neitner CEAC is operable): or c.

Operating within the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-1 using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and either one or both CEACs are operable); or d.

Operating within the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-2 using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and neither CEAC is operable).

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APPLICABILITY: MODE I above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

a.

With COLSS in service and the DNBR limit not being maintained as indicated by COLSS calculated core power exceeding the COLSS calculated core power operating limit base on DNBR:

1.

Restore the DNBR to within its limits within I hour, or 2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With COLSS not in service and the DNBR limit not being maintained as indicated by operation outside the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-1 or 3.2-2 using any operable CPC channel; l

1.

Within 15 minutes initiate surveillance requirement 4.2.4.3 and resta :: the DNBR to within its limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or 2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

i SAN ON0FRE-UNIT 3 3/4 2-5 AMENDMENT NO. M,102

'j POWER DISTRIBUTION L'IMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j

4.2.4.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.4.2 The DNBR shall be determined to be within its limits when THERMAL POWER is above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> that the DNBR, as indicated on any OPERABLE DNBR channel, is within the limit shown on Figures 3.2-1 or 3.2-2, as applicable.

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4.2.4.3 With COLSS not'in service and the DNBR margin not being maintained as indicated by operation outside the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-1 or 3.2-2 using any operable CPC channel, verify every 15 minutes that there is no adverse trend in DNBR margin.

1 4.2.4.4 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified l

to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or equal to the core power operating limit based on DNBP.

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SAN.ONOFRE-UNIT 3 3/4 2-6 AMENDMENT NO. -3fr,102 1

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) d.

'By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris'(rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

1.

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2.

Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of containment entry when CONTAIPMEU INTEGRITY is established.

e.

At least once per refueling interval by:

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1.

Verifying automatic interlock action of the shutdown cooling system with the Reactor Coolant System by ensuring that when simulated RCS pressure is greater than or equal to 376 psia, the interlocks prevent opening the shutdown cooling system isolation valves.

2.

A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and

.i that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

f.

At least once per refueling interval, during shutdown, by:

[

1.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on SIAS and RAS test signals.

i 2.

Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety Injection Actuation Test Signal:

High-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

a.

b.

Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

j c.

Charging pump.

3.

Verifying that on a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open; and that on a RAS test signal coincident with a high-high containment sump test signal, all the recirculation valves to the refueling water tank close, g.

By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated l

developed head and/or flow rate when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

i 1.

High-Pressure Safety Injection pumps developed head, at an indi-cated flow rate of 650 gpe, greater than or equal to 2093 feet for P017, 2132 feet for P018 and'2099 for P019 (see NOTE 1).

SAN ONOFR'E - UNIT 3 3/4 5-5 AMENDMENT NO. 87

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.l Revised by NRC letter dated: 10/27/94 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) 2.

Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump developed head greater than or equal to 396 feet at miniflow.

3.

Charging pump flow rate greater than or equal to 40 gpm.

h.

By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following comple-l tion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying the following flow rates:

1.

For High-Pressure Safety Injection pump cold leg injection with a single pump running:

a.

The sum of the injection lines flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 647 gpm for P017 running, 656 gpm for P018 running and 661 gpm for P019 running, and 1

b.

The total pump flow rate is greater than or equal to 882 gpm for P017 running, 894 gpm for P018 running and 901 gpm for P019 running.

2.

For a single High-Pressure Safety Injection pump hot / cold leg injection.

a.

The sum of the cold leg injection flow rates is greater than or equal to 385 gpm, and b.

The hot leg injection flow rate is greater than or equal to 385 gpm.

c.

The combined total hot / cold legs injection flow rate is greater than or equal to 896 gpm.

l 3.

For the Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump with a single pump running:

a.

The flow through each injection leg shall be greater than or equal to 3000 gpm when tested individually and cor-rected to the same pump suction source and leg back pressure conditions. The difference between high and low flow legs shall be less than or equal to 100 gpm.

b.

The total ECCS flow through 2 cold leg injection lines shall be greater than or equal to 4450 gpm when corrected for elevation head.

SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 3 3/4 5-6 AMENDMENT NO. 87

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3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE The limitation on linear heat rate ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the peak temperature of the fuel cladding will not exceed 2200*F.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core 0)erating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the Local Power Density caannels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the linear heat rate does not exceed its limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core power operating limit corresponding to the allowable peak linear heat rate. Reactor operation at or below this calculated power level assures that the limits of 13.9 kw/ft are not exceeded.

The COLSS calculated core power and the COLSS calculated core power operating limits based on linear heat rate are continuously monitored and displayed to the operator. A COLSS alarm is annunciated in the event that the core power exceeds the core power operating limit. This provides adequate margin to the linear heat rate operating limit for normal steady state opera-tion. Normal reactor power transients or equipment failures which do not require a reactor trip may result in this core power operating limit being exceeded.

In the event this occurs, COLSS alarms will be annunciated.

If the event which causes the COLSS limit to be exceeded results in conditions which approach the core safety limits, a reactor trip will be initiated by the Reactor Protective Instrumentation. The COLSS calculation of the linear heat rate includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability / confidence level, that the maximum linear heat rate calculated by COLSS is conservative with respect to the actual maximum linear heat rate existing in the core. These penalty factors are determined from the uncer-tainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering design factors, axial densification, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow and core power measurement.

The core power distribution and a corresponding power operating limit based on Linear Heat Rate (LHR) are more accurately determined by the COLSS using the incore detector system. The CPCs determine LHR less accurately with the excore detectors. When COLSS is not available the TS LCOs are more-restrictive due to the uncertainty of the CPCs. However, when COLSS becomes inoperable the added margin associated with CPC uncertainty is not immediately required and a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ACTION is provided for appropriate corrective action.

Parameters required to maintain the operating limit power level based on linear heat rate, margin to DNB and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs assuming minimum core power of 20% RATED THERMAL POWER. The 20% Rated Thermal Power threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. Therefore, in the event that the COLSS is not being used, operation within the limits of Figure 3.2-2 can be maintained by utilizing a predetermined local power density margin and a total core power limit in the CPC trip channels. The above listed uncertainty penalty factors plus those associated with startup test acceptance criteria are also included in the CPCs.

SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 2-1 AMENDMENT NO.102

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3 /4. 2 DOWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

.)

BASES 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE (Continued)

While operating with the COLSS out of service, the CPC calculated LHR is monitored every 15 minutes to identify any adverse trend in thermal margin.

The increased monitoring of LHR during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> action period ensures that j

adequate safety margin is maintained for anticipated operational occurrences and no postulated accident results in consequences more severe than those described in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR.

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SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 2-la AMENDMENT NO. 102 l

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 4

BASES

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- AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - T (Continued) i T, is the peak fractional tilt amplitude at the core periphery g is the radial normalizing factor 6 is the azimuthal core location l

8, is the azimuthal core location of maximum tilt'

'f P

/P is the ratio of the power at a core location in the presence-I oY3a tN3,to the power at that location with' no' tilt.

't 3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN i

The limitation on DNBR as a function of AXIAL SHAPE INDEX represents a I

conservative envelope of operating conditions consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and which have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain an acceptable minimum DNBR throughout all anticipated operational i

occurrences, of which the loss of flow transient is the most limiting. Opera-I tion of the core with a DNBR at or above this limit provides assurance that an l

acceptable minimum DNBR will be maintained in the event of a loss of flow transient.

l Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core j

Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the DNBR channels in the Core l

Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the core power -

distribution and are capable of verifying that the DNBR does not violate its l

limits.

The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core operating limit corresponding to the l

allowable minimum DNBR. The COLSS calculation of core power operating limit based on the minimum DNBR limit includes appropriate penalty factors which -

i provide, with a 95/95 probability / confidence level, that the core power limit calculated by COLSS (based on the minunum DNBR limit) is conservative with i

respect to the actual core power limit.. These penalty factors are determined i

from the uncertainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, j

engineering design factors, state parameter measurement, software algorithm j

modelling, computer processing,. rod bow and core power measurement.

J Parameters required to maintain the. margin to DNB and total core power j

are also monitored by the CPCs. -In the event that the COLSS is not being used, the DNBR margin can be maintained by monitoring.with any, operable CPC channel so that the DNBR remains above the predetermined limit as a function 1

of Axial Shape Index. The above listed uncertainty penalty factors are also included in the CPCs, which assume a minimum of 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshhold is due to the excore neutron flux detector system being less accurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at.

low power is -too large to obtain usable detector readings. The additional-uncertainty terms taken into account in the CPCs of transient protection _are removed from Figures 3.2-1 and 3.2-2 since the curves are intended to monitor the LCO only during steady state operation.

SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 2-3 A'4ENDMENT NO. 36

,m POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES DNBR Marain (Continued)

The core power distribution and a corresponding power operating limit based on DNBR are more accurately determined by the COLSS using the incore detector system. The CPCs determined DNBR less accurately with the excore detectors.

In addition, the COLSS reserves a DNBR overpower margin to ensure that the specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded in the event of an anticipated operational occurrence. Therefore, the COLSS out of service TS LCOs are more restrictive due to the uncertainty of the CPCs and the overpower margin reserved for anticipated operational occurrences. However, when COLSS becomes inoperable the added' margin associated with the CPCs is not immediately required and a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ACTION is provided for appropriate corrective action.

A DNBR penalty factor has been included in the COLSS and CPC DNBR calculation to accommodate the effects of rod bow. The amount of rod bow in each assembly is dependent upon the average burnup experienced by that assembly.

Fuel assemblies that incur higher average burnup will experience a greater magnitude of rod bow. Conversely, lower burnup assemblies will experience less rod bow.

In design calculations, the penalty for each batch required to compensate for rod bow is determined from a batch's maximum average assembly burnup applied to the batch's maximum integrated planar-

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radial power peak. A single net penalty for COLSS and CPC is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch, accounting for the offsetting margins due to the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

While operating with the COLSS out of service, the CPC calculated DNBR is monitored every 15 minutes to identify any adverse trend in thermal margin.

The increased monitoring of DNBR during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> action period ensures that adeouate safety margin is maintained for anticipated operational occurrences and no postulated accident results in consequences more severe than those described in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR.

3/4.2.5 RCS FLOW RATE j

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual RCS total flow rate is maintained at or above the minimum value used in the LOCA safety j

analyses.

3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE j

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of reactor I

coolant cold leg temperature is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

2.4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX The Axial Shape Index (ASI) is a measure of the power g eerated in the lower half of the core less the power generated in the uppu half of the core divided by the sum of these powers. This specific &t br. is provided to ensure that the core average ASI is maintained within the range of values assumed as an initial condition in the safety analyses. This range is specified as

-0.3 s ASI s 0.3.

SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 2-4 AMENDMENT NO. 51,102

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 2.4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE IN')1X '(Continued)'

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The ASI can be determined by utilizing either the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or any operable Core Protection Calculator (CPC) channel. The real-time monitoring capability and accuracy of COLSS allows COLSS to monitor power limit margins closely. Consequently, the ASI limit is broader than it would be with the same core without COLSS. The COLSS con-tinuously calculates the ASI and compares the calculated value to the param-eter established for the COLSS ASI alarm limit.

In addition,.there is an uncertainty sssociated with the COLSS calculated ASI, therefore the COLSS ASI alarm-limit includes this. uncertainty.

If the LCO is exceeded..COLSS alarms-are initiated. The ASI safety setting is selected so that no safety limit i

w111 be exceeded as a result of an anticipated operational occurrence, and so that the consequence of a design basis accident will be acceptable.

With COLSS out of service, any operable CPC channel may be used to cal-culate the ASI-(using three axially spaced excore. detectors). The axial shape synthesis in the CPC's shows the relative power produced as a function of core height in each third of the core. Due to the uncertainty associated with the.

CPC estimate, the ASI is restricted to a smaller range than the range calcu-lated using the COLSS.

The 20% rated thermal power threshold is imposed due to the inaccuracy of the neutron flux detector below the threshold. Core noise level is too large i

to obtain usable detector readings.

3/4.2.8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of l

pressurizer pressure is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

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SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 2-5 AMENDMENT NO. -Hr 102 i

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