ML20073Q012

Corrected RO 269/83-07:on 830303,during Insp of Manual Containment Isolation Valves,Valve CF-19 Discovered Open. Caused by Personnel Error.Valve Closed.Core Flood Procedure & Reactor Bldg Manual Checklist Changed

ML20073Q012
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	04/19/1983
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
RO-269-83-07, RO-269-83-7, NUDOCS 8304280069
Download: ML20073Q012 (2)

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DUKE POWER GOMPANY -

P.O. BOX 33189 -

CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242 HAL B. TUCKER rzurnows

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April 19, 1983 $, (704) 'M 373-4531 Q, Nh w xx

.Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator rc U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

" ". 73N Region II p ([

-101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 E5 I:g Atlanta, Georgia 30303 ..  :-

- C. ; ;

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station W 7-Docket No. 50-269

Dear Sir:

A March 22, 1983 letter submitted Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/83-07.

The report was found to have contained information errors. In the Description of Occurrence, the first sentence should read:

"On March 3, 1983 at about 1300, as a result of.a follow-up investigation performed due to the recent concern of the status of valves classified as manual containment isolation valves, it was discovered that valve CF-19 was required to be closed by Oconee Technical Specifications, but was open,'by procedure, on all three units.

A copy of the corrected page is attacl.ed.

Very truly yours, c u /d )a d w C-/

Hal B. Tucker JCP/php-Attachment' cc: Document Control Desk Mr. J. C. Bryant U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Resident Inspector Washington, D. C. 20555 Oconee Nuclear Station INPO Records Center Mr. E. L. Conner, Jr.

Suite 1500 Office of-Nuclear Reactor Regulation

< 1100 circle 75 Parkway U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Washington, D. C. 20555

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9 Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station

-Report Number: RO'-269/83-07

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Report D' ate:i-March 22, 1983 20ccurrence'Date: March 3, 1983 Facility: 0conee Units l', 2, . and 3, Seneca, South Carolina

' Identification of Occurrence: = Manual containment isolation valve CF-19~(Core LFlood) was found open on all_three units.

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Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 'Oconee 1: 100% Full Power Oconee 2: 100% Full' Power Oconee 3: 100% Full Fower Description of Occurrence: On March 3, 1983 at about 1300, as a result of a follow-up investigation performed duc to the recent concern of the status of l valves classified as manual containment isolation valves, it was discovered that valve CF-19 was required to be closed by Oconee Technical Specifications, j but-was'open, by procedure, on all three units. CF-19 is a manual containment isolation valve on the sample line f rom the Core Flood Tanks. All manual containment isolation valves are required by Technical Specifications to be

- closed!for containment integrity. Therefore, containment integrity was technically violated.

Apparent Cause of' Occurrence: Previously, a procedure' change was approved to

. allow CF-19 to remain open. The reason for the change was to provide for7

. easier. sampling of the Core Flood Tanks. The cause of this incident is classified as' personnel error since the Technical Specifications applications

of. opening the valve were overlooked during the usual review process for

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procedure approval.

Analysin of Occurrence: Valve CF-19 is'a 1" manual containment isolation valve. The redundant ' isolation valves, CF-3 and CF-4, are normally closed electric operator valves. During the time CF-3 and CF-4 were open for sampling,:

positive control was maintained on these valves from the ' Control Room. If an accident were to occur while these valves were open, the operator would have

' closed these valves from the Control Room. Additionally, the valves and the piping L tween the Reactor Building isolation valves are both safety related and seismic. Had an accident occurred, the integrity of'the piping,would not have been jeopardized and the containment would not'have been breached at this penetration. The health and safety of the public were not endangered.

. Corrective Action: Valve'CF-19 was closed on all three units. All designated manual containment isolation valves were verified as being closed. The Core-

{ Flood procedure and the Reactor Building manual check list have both been changed to include CF-19 as a closed valve. ' Additionally, when it is required to open CF-19 abovet 200 F and 30'J psig in the RCS, a man will be stationed at that valve. He will be in direct communication with the Control Room and will be' directed to close the valve should an accident occur. A task force has been

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formedito review all recent containment integrity incidents and to identify additional corrective actions. All qualified reviewers and superintendents will review this report.-

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