Text

Amends 153 & 133 to Licenses DPR-53 & DPR-69,respectively, Changing Tech Specs for Unit 2 to Require That Safety Injection Tanks Be Operable Throughout Mode 3
	ML20073L016
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	05/06/1991
From:	Capra R; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20073L021	List: ML20073L016; ML20073L031;
References
	NUDOCS 9105130166
	Download: ML20073L016 (23)
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8 UNITED STATES

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i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D C. 20665 y ~.

y BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-317 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.153 License No. DPR-53 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application fu amendment by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated March 7, 1991, comolies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8.

The facilfty will operate in' conformity with the application, the prov';sions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the nublic, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-53 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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2 (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and 9, as revised through Amendment No.153, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the f acility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall he implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4] U CL. { &

Robert A. Capra, Director Project Directorate 1 1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: Bby 6, 1991

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UNITED STATES 1

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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WASHINGTON. D C. 20%6 gf BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKE1 NO. 50-318 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.133 License No. OPR-69 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated March 7, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2 of Facility Operating License No.

DPR-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

I 1

2 (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.133, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION S U 0- W Robert A. Capra, Director Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 6, 1991 l

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ATTACliPEtiT TO LICEt4SE APEt4DMEt4TS At4Et4DPEt4T f40.153 FACILITY OPEPATiliC LICEllSE f40. DPR-53 AfiE t;DtiE;1TJh,13_3 F AC l l i,T,Y,0P E R AT,l pG, L I C E N S E, yp., p P R - 69, 99CFEJ,ypS,_Sp:311_AyD50-318 Pevise Appendix A as follows:

Ptmove Paaes insert Pages V

V Vl*

Vl*

3/4 5-1**

3/4 5-2 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-6 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 3-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2a (DPR 53 oniv)

B 3/4 5-2a (DPR 53 only)

B3/453(DPR69only)

B 3/4 5-2 (DPR 69 only) e' ages that did not change, but are overlief.

Changes on DPR-09 only.

This page is overlief for DPR-53 with no changes.

1KULL LIMLIlliLCOND1110XLE0fLDfffBUDLMLSVRYULLAELREQUIRMMIS SECTION EAGE 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIIER........................................

3/4 4-5 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS...................................

3/4 4 6 1

3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Leakage Detection Systems..........................

3/4 4-13 Reactor Coolant System Leakage...................

3/4 4 14 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY..........................................

3/4 4-16 3/4.4.8 SPEClfl0 ACTIVITY................................

3/4 4-19 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERA 1 MITS Reactor Coolant System.............................

3/4 4-23 P r e s s t! r i z e r........................................

3/ 4 4 2 6 Overpressure Protection Systems....................

3/4 4-26a 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components.............

3/4 4-27 3/4.4.11 CORE BARRE L M0VEMENT...............................

3/4 4 - 29 3/4.4.12 LETDOWN LINE EXCESS FL0W...........................

3/4 4-31 3/4.4.13 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS.......................

3/4 4-32 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS.............

3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 1, 2, and 3 (2 1750 PSIA)..

3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 3 (< 1750 PSIA) and 4......

3/4 5-6 3/4.5.4 REfVELING WATER TANK...............................

3/4 5-7 CALVERT Cliffs - UNIT 1 V

Amerdment No J//JJ9/ 153

lhDl1 UMIT1NG CONDITIONS FOR OPERAUQ!LMQJURYf1LLAELBEDVIREMINTS SECTION BJif J/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT l

Containment Integrity..............................

3/4 6 1 Containment Leakage................................

3/4 6-2 Containment Air Locks..............................

3/4 6 4 Internal Pressure..................................

3/4 6-6 Air Temperature....................................

3/4 6 7 Containment Structural Integrity...................

3/4 6 8 Containment Purge System...........................

3/4 6 9d

)

Containment Vent System............................

3/4 6 9e 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Containment Spray System...........................

3/4 6-10 Containment Cooling System.........................

3/4 6-12 3/4.6.3 IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM..............................

3/4 6 13 3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.......................

3/4 6-17 3/4.6.5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen An alyzers.................................

3/4 6 26 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners H..................

3/4 6-27 3/4.6.6 PENETRATION ROOM EXHAUST AIR FILTRATION SYSTEM.....

3/4 6-28 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Valves......................................

3/4 7-1 A"xil i ary feedwa ter Sys tem.........................

3/4 7-S Condensate Storage Tank........................... 3/4 7 6 Activity...........................................

3/4 7-7 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves...................

3/4 7-9 I

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 VI Amendment No. 38153 lE

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCjil SAFETY INJECTION TANKS LIMITING CORDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system safety injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

The isolation valve open, b.

A contained borated water volume of between 1113 and 1179 cubic feet of borated water (equivalent to tank levels of between 187 and 199 inches, respectively),

c.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 ppm, and d.

A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 200 and 250 psig.

APPLICABillTY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTIO!l:

a.

With one safety injection tank inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in 110T SilUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

With one safety injection tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in 110T STANDBY witisin one hour and be in 110T SilUIDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

XVRyL1LLA!!CE RE0VIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each safety injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by:

1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure in the tanks, and 2.

Verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve is open.

I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. /E45E,y46 153

-..n-EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SMHVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying the boron wentnt s:-

of the safety injection tank solution, c.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig, by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator

1. removed by maintaining the feeder breaker open under administrative control.

d.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to entering MODE 3 from HODE 4 by l

verifyir-v'a local indication at the valve, that the tank isolation n ive is open.

c.

At least once per refueling interval by verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:

1.

When the RCS pressure exceeds 300 psia, and 1

2.

Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal, f.

Within one hour prior to each increase in solution volume of 21% of nonnal tank volume by verifying the boron concentration at the operating high pressure safety injection pump discharge is between 2300 and 2700 ppm.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. Af#NJ/E,.153

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g EMERGENCY CORE C00Lif[G SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - H0 DES 1, 2, AND 3 ( 2 1750 PSIA)

LIM 111NG C0!{DH10N FOR OPERAT10t{

3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a.

One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, b.

One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and c.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the 3

refueling water tank on a Safety injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICABILITY:

HODES 1, 2 and 3*,

ACTION:

a.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT SHUIDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

With pressurizer pressure 2 1750 psia.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 153

4 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 3 (< 1750 PSI Al AND 4 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One# OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, and b.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Re irculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICABillL1: MODES 3* and 4.

K110!j:

a.

With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months , b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

LURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2, With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia, 0

0 Between 350 F and 327 F, a transition region exist: where the OPERABLE HPSI pump will be placed in pull to lock on a cooldown and 0

i restored to automatic status on a heatup. At 327 F and less, the i

required OPERABLE HPSI pump shal1 be in pull-to-lock and will not 0

start automatically. At 327 F and less, HPSI pump use will be conducted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5 6 Amendment No. J//J/9/J/J///E,lS3

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE C00llNG SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS safety injection tanks ensures l

that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS l

pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.

This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps are restricted in use during low temperature overpressure potential conditions, and may not be available to automatically start.

Therefore, the safety injection tanks are required to provide immediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for operator action to manually start a HPSI pump.

The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.

The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be " operating by) asses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that aypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met, in addition, as these safety injection tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with a safety Mjection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed.ri.. timizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurt,1t with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with

(

the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward, in addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. Jph/AB,153

4

[MERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SASES Portions of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) system flowpath are common to both subsystems.

This includes the low pressure safety injection flow control valve, CV-306, the flow orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four low pressure safety injection loop isolation valves.

Although the portions of the flowpath are common, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI system operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant incident prior to recirculation.

The LPS! system design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.

The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during i

operation of the ECCS following a LOCA.

The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to 2 7.0.

The requirement to dissolve a rearesentative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance taat the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABIL11Y is maintained.

The surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow salit between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in tie ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3)' provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS LOCA analyses. Minimum HPSI flow requirements for temperatures above 327 F are based upon small 0

break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following a SIAS.

l Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system i

leakage uncertainties.

The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage.

The OPERABillTY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Specification l

3/4.1.2.

Specification of safety injection pump total developed head l

ensures pump performance is consistent with safety analysis assumptions.

0 At temperatures of 327 F and less, HPSI injection flow is limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm except in response to excessive reactor l

coolant leakage. With excessive RCS leakage (LOCA), make up requirements i

could exceed a HPSI flow of 210 gpm. Overpressurization is prevented by l

controlling other parameters, such as RCS pressure and subcooling.

This g

provides overpressure protection in the low temperature region. An analysis has been performed which shows this flow rate is more than CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. JU///,5,153

4 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES (Coatinued) adequate to meet core cooling safety analysis assum)tions. HPSI pumps are not required to auto start when the RCS is in t1e MPT enable condition.

The Safety injection Tanks provide immediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for an operator to take action to start a HPS! pump.

Surveillance testing of HPSI pumps is required to ensure pump operability.

Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow to the RCS.

To allow this testing to be done without increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS, either the RWT must be isolated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm or an RCS vent greater than or equal to 2.6 square inches must be provided.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING _ WATER TANK (RWT)

The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.

These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

1he contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not 1

usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2a Amendment No. JN##,153

BQLX LIMUINLCMQll10NLf0lLDPLIB110GN0JiURK1LLMCLRLOUIRDRKI S SECTION

!LAGE 3/4.4.4 PRES $UR12ER.........................................

3/4 4-5 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS....................................

3/4 4 6 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Leakage Detection Systems...........................

3/4 4 13 Reactor Coolant System Leakage......................

3/4 4-14 3/4.4.7 CHEHi"ov...........................................

3/4 4-16 3/4.4.8 SPEClf!C ACTIVITY...................................

3/4 4-19

,/4.4.9 PRESSURE /TfMPERATURE LIMI15 t

Reactor Coolant System..............................

3/4 4 23 1

Pre,surizer.........................................

3/4 4 27

$[

Overpressure Protection Systems.....................

3/4 4 27a 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY l

I ASME Code Class 1. 2, and 3 Components..............

3/4 4 28 3/4.4.11 CORE BARREL H0VEMENT................................

3/4 4-30 3/4.4.12 LETDOWN LINE EXCESS FL0W............................

3/4 4-32 3/4.4.13 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS........................

3/4 4 33 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE CQ0 LING SYSTEMS (ECCH 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS..............................

3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS MODES 1, 2, AND 3 (;t 1750 PSI A)...

3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS MODES 3 (< 1750 PSIA):AND 4.......

3/4 5 6 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK................................

3/4 5 7 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 V

Amendment No. E/JE//pJ, 133

.INDEX llH111MLC.0M0111mS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEllLANI[EM[RBINIS SECTION PEE 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIHARY CONTAINMENT Containment Integrity...............................

3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage.................................

3/4 6 2 Containment Air Locks...............................

3/4 6 4 Internal Pressure...................................

3/4 6 6 l

Ai r Te mp e r a t u re.....................................

3/4 6-7 Containment Structural Integrity....................

3/4 6-8 Containment Purge System............................

3/4 6 9a Containment Vent System.............................

3/4 6-9b 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Containment Spray System............................

3/4 6-10 j

Containment Cooling System..........................

3/4 6 3/4.6.3 IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM...............................

3/4 6-13 3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES........................

3/4 6-17 3/4.6.5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Analyzers..................................

3/4 6-26 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners - W...................

3/4 6 27 1

3/4.6.6 PENETRATION ROOM EXHAUST AIR FILTRATION SYSTEM......

3/4 6 28 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Va1ves.......................................

3/4 7-1 Auxiliary Feedwater System..........................

3/4 7-5 Condensate Storage Tank.............................

3/4 7-6 Activity............................................ -3/4 7-7 Main Steam Line Isol ation Valves.................... - 3/4 7-9 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 VI Amendment No. /J/9/;t04133

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

SArETY INJECTION TANKS llHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system safety injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

The isolation valve open, b.

A contained borated water volume of between 1113 and 1179 cubic feet of borated water (equivalent to tank levels of between 187 and 199 inches, respectively),

c.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 ppm, and d.

A nitrogen cover pressure of between 200 and 250 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

l b.C11D!):

a.

With one safety injection tank inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in 110T SilVIDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

With one safety injection tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in fl0T STANDBY within one hour and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SJ)ByfIllANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each safety injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERADLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by:

1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and 2.

Verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve is open.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5 1 Amendment No. JJ/JE/Jgg,133

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM SURVElllANCE RE0VIREMENTS JContinued) b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying the boron concentration I

of the safety injection tank solution.-

c.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig, by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is removed by maintaining the feeder breaker open under administrative control, d.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to entering MODE 3 from MODE 4 by verifying, via local indication at the valve, that the tank isolation valve is open, e.

At least once per refueling interval by verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:

1.

When the RCS pressure exceeds 300 psia, and 2.

Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.

f.

Within one hour prior to each increase in solution volume of 21% of normal tank volume by verifying the boron concentration at the operating high pressure safety injection pump discharge is between 2300 and 2700 ppm.

4h>

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l CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. /J/JE/JJ#////,133

4 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTLB1

(([i SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 1. 2. AND 3 (> 1750 PSIA)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR JPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a.

One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, b.

One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and c.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

ACTION:

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable a.

subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT SHU1DOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

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With pressurizer pressure 2 1750 psia.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 133

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{tifRGENCY CORE C00llNG SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS MODEL3 (< 1750 PSIAl AND_1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPfRATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

One' OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, and a.

b.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 3* and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in COLD SilV100WN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months , b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification b.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

S])RYIlLLaRCLREQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.5.2.

l With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia.

0 0

Between 350 F and 305 F, a transition region exists where the OPERABLE HPSI pump will be placed in pull to lock on a cooldown and 0

restored to automatic status on a heatup. At 305 F and less, the requiredOPERABLEHPSIpumpghallbeinpullto-lockandwillnot start automatically. At 305 F and less, llPSI pump use will be conducted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. JE/J)/,133

I 3/4.5 EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)

MSES 3/4.5.1 SAFETYINItCTIONTANKS lhe OPERABILITY of each of the RCS safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.

This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps are restricted in use during low temperature overpressure potential conditions, and may not be available to automatically start. Therefore, the safety injection tanks are required to provide immediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for operator 1

action to manually start a HPSI pump.

The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentratien and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.

The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be " operating by) asses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279 1971, which requires that.)ypasses of a protection function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as those safety injection tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate ECCS subsystems ensure that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling-to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward, in addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5 1 Amendment No. EE,133

EMERGENCY E RE COOLING SYSTEMS MILS Portions of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) system flowpath are common to both subsystems.

This includes the low pressure safety injection flow control valve, CV 306, the flow orifice downstream of CV 306, and_the four low pressure safety injection loop isolation valves.

Although the portions of the flowpath are common, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI system operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant incident prior to recirculation, The LPSI system desi p is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.

The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in oissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA.

The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to 2 7.0, The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance t1st the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures.

i The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimurr, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABIL11Y is maintained, lhe surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintaincd in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECC3 flow to all injection points equal to.or above that assumed in the ECCS LOCA analyses, Minimum 0

HPSI flow requirements for temperatures above 305 f are based upon small break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following a SIAS.

Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system l

leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage, The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Specifications 3/4.1.2, Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump performance is consistent with safety anclysis assumptions.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5 2 Amendment No. JE/ES# S/JU, 133 w-T wr--#N---

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 0

At temperatures of 305 f and less, HPSI injection flow is limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm except in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage.

With excessive RCS leakage (LOCA), make up requirements l

could exceed a HPSI flow of 210 gpm. Overpressurization is prevented by controlling other parameters, such as RCS pressure and subcooling.

This provides over)ressure protection in the low temperature region.

An analysis has seen performed which shows this flow rate is more than adequate to meet core cooling safety analysis assum)tions. HPSI pumps are not required to auto start when the RCS is in t1e HPT enable condition. The Safety Injection Tanks provide immediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for an operator to take action to start a HPSI pump.

Surveillance testing of HPS! pumps is required to ensure pump l

operability.

Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow to the RCS.

To allow this testing to be done without t

increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS, either the RWT must be isolated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm or an RCS vent greater than or equal to 2.6 square inches must be provided.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TAkK (RWT)

The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron l

concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within I

containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not r

usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. JJ/J7/JJ/JJJ,133

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