ML20072J130
| ML20072J130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1994 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18101A188 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9408260213 | |
| Download: ML20072J130 (12) | |
Text
.
61>
M TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)
Q e
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT
. ALLOWABLE VALUES
'3f "
l 9.c5N I9o l
>b&&& of narrow range instrument of narrow range Instrument 23 13.
Steam Generator Water Levet--Low-Low span-each steen generator span-esch steam generator y
D&
Ot]
14.
Steam /Feedwater Flow 1 40% of futt steem flow at RATED 1 42.5% of full steam flow at RATEp CO Xu Mismatch and Low Steam TMERNAL POWER coincident with steen THERMAL POWER coincident with steem senerator vetor to.ei generator water ie.et t of gener. tor water ie,ei
>_25.
of instrueenfspen--esch om narrow range instrument span--each narrow range kj steam generator steam generator OW 10.0 l9.oM ac~
t3 M so 23 15.
Undervottage-Reactor
> 2900 vetts-sech bus L 2850 volts-each bus Cootent Pumps i
16.
Underfrequency-Reactor
> 56.5 Na - each bus
> 56.4 Na-each bus Cootent Pumps l
l 17.
Turbine Trip 45 psig L 45 pois A.
Low Trip System l
Pressure 3.
Turbine Stop Vetve i 15% off futt open i 15% off futt open Closure 18.
Safety injection input Not Applicable Not Applicable from SSPS 19.
Reactor Coolant pump Not Applicable Not Applicable Breaker Position Trip
.6 2
?
W
LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS l
BASES reliability of the Reactor Protection System. This trip is redundant to the f
Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low trip. lThe Steam / Fee &ater Flow Mismatch portion of thig trip is activated when the steam flow exceeds the fee &ater flow h,h by 1 1.42 x 100 lbs/ hour. The Steam Generator Law Water level portion of the l
trip is activated when the water level drops below 25 percent, as indicated by the narrow range instrument. These trip values include suf ficient allowance in excess of normal operating values to) preclude spurious trips but will initiate a reactor trip before the steam gene ators are dry. Therefore, the required capacity and starting time requireme ts of the auxiliary fee &ater pumps are reduced and the resulting thermal tra sient on the Reactor Coolant System and steam generators is minimized.
Undervoltage and Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pump Busses The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pug bus trips provide reactor core protection against OP6 as a result of loss of voltage or underf requency to more than one reactor coolant pug. The specified set points assure a reactor trip signal is generated before the low flow trip set point is reached. Time delays are incorporated in the underfrequency and undervoltage trips to prevent spurious reactor trips from momentary electrical pcmer transients. For undervoltage, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to reach the reactor trip breakers following the sinultaneous trip of two or more reactor coolant pug bus circuit breakers shall not exceed 0.9 seconds.
For underfrequency, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to reach the reactor trip breakers after the underfrequency trip setpoint is reached shall not exceed 0.3 seconds.
Turbine Trip A Turbine Trip causes a direct reactor trip when operating above P-9.
Each l
of the turbine trips provide turbine protection and reduce the. severity of the ensuing transient. No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips. Their functional capability at the specified trip settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.
S A LEM - UNIT 1 B 2-7 Amendment No. 85
m
% )
2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETp0!NTS kE9
/
E Reactor Trip Setpoint Limits specified in Table 2.2-1 are values at wntch the Reactor Trips are set for each parame e Trip NN Setpoints have been'~ selected to ensure that the r acto core and reactor coolant system are prevented'Yrenutxceedingde r safety limits. Opera-Ng j tion with a trip set less conJs entde'th its Trip Setpoint but within its specified,AJ10wat3Te Value is accepta i the basis that each Allowable ValueArequal to or less than the drift allo ceassumed for eachjtripTthe safety analyses.
Manual Reactor Trip The Manual Reactor Trip is a redundant channel to ti,e autoiaatic protective instrune tation channels and provides manual reector trip capability.
ALJ Power Range, Neutron Flux The Power Range, Neutron Flux channel high setpoint provides reactor core protection against reactivity excursions which are too rapid to be protected by temperature and pressure protective circuitry. The low set point provides redundant protection in the power range for a power excursion beginning from low power. The trip associated with the low setpoint may be manually bypassed when P-10 is active (two of the four power range channels indicate a power level of above approximately 9 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER) and is automatically reinstated when P-10 becomes inactive (three of the four channels indicate a power 1
level below approximately 9 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER).
l Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Rates The Power Range Positive Rate trip provides protection against rapid flux increases which are characteristic of rod ejection events from any power level. Specifically, this trip complements the Power Range Neutron Flux High and Low trips to ensure that the criteria are met for rod ejection from partial power.
M f
. SALEM - UNIT 1 B 2-3
1 LIMYTXNG SAFET( SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES x
N through the pressurizer safety valves. No credit was taken fc-operation of this trip in the accident analyses; however, its functional capability at the specified trip setting is required by this specification to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.
- .oss of Flow The Loss of Flow trips provide core protection to prevent DNB in the event of a loss of one or more reactor coolant pumps.
Above 11 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, an automatic reactor trip will occur if the flow in any two loops drop baldw 90% of nominal full loop flow.
Above 36% (P-8) of RATED THERMAL POWER, automatic reactor trip will occur if the flow in any single loop drops below 90% of nominal full loop flow. This latter trip will prevent the minimum value of the DNBR from going below the design DNBR value during normal operational transients and anticipated
- ransients when 3 loops are in operation and the Overtemperature AT trip set point is adjusted to the value specified for all loops in operation. With the Overtemperature AT trip set point adjusted to the value specified for 3 loop operation, the P-8 trip at 76% RATED THERMAL POWER will prevent the minimum value of the DNBR from going below the design DNBR value during normal operational t.ransients and anticipated transian~ s with 3 loops in operation.
t Steam Generator Water Level The Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low trip provides core protection by preventing operation with the steam generator water level below the minimum volume required for adequate heat removal capacity. The specified setpoint provides allowance that there will be sufficient water inventory in the steam generators at the time of trip to allow for starting delays of the auxiliary feedwater system.
Steam /Feedwater Flow Mismatch and Low Steam Generator Water Level The Steam /Feedwater Flow Mismatch in coincidence with a Steam Generator Low Water Level trip is not used in the transient and accident analyses but is included in Table 2.2-1 to ensure the functional capability of the specified trip settings and thereby enhance the overall d
f*f '
'.S Amendment No. 96 SALEM - UNIT 1 B 2-6 l
/-
TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) s ENGINEERED BAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS
/
g M
FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP BETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES l'!
/
5.
TURBINE TRIF AND FREDWATER ISOLATION A.
Steam Generator Water Level --
5 67% of narrow range s /68% of narrow range Nigh-Nigh instrument open each 1p/strument span each steam generator pteam generator l
/
6.
SAFEOUARDS BOUIPMENT CONTROL Not Applicable
/ Not Applicable system (sec) 7.
UNDERVOLTAGE, VITAL BUS
{
a.
Lose of Voltage 2 70% of bue voltage 2 65% of bus voltage Y
b.
Sustained Degraded Voltage 2 91.6% of bus voltage for k 91% of bue voltage for M
$ 13 seconde 5 15 seconde 8.
AUKILIARY FERONATER a.
Autesnatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable b.
Manual Initiation f 075 Not Applicab1' Not Applicable c.
Steam Generator Water Level--
M of n crow range of narrow range Low-Low instrument span each instrument span each i
stease derator steam generator
{
d.
Undervoltage - RCP k 704'RCP bus voltage 2 65% RCP bus voltage o
e.
3.1.
See 1 above (All S.I.
setpoints) f.
Trip of+Nain Feedwater Pumps t Applicable Not Applicable 5
/
g.
station Blackout
/.See 6 and 7 above (SEC and Undervoltage, vital Bus) j o$
I O.
/
/
- L
~. -
e 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES O
3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESP)
INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and interlocks ensure that 1) the associated EsF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance consistent with maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection and Engineered safety Features instrumentation and, 3) sufficient system function capability is available from diverse parameters.
The OFERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the i
assumptions used in the accident analyses.
$srer /
7 The surveillance requirements specified for these systema ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance teste performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of surveillsace O
Frequencies and Out of service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation system," and supplements to that report.
surveillance intervals and out of service times were determined based on maintaining an i
appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection system and Engineered safety Features instrumentaticra.
i The measurmsent of response time at. the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.
No credit was taken in the analyses for those chanaals with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total cbmanal test measurements provided that such testa demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offaite test measurements or 2) utilising replacement sensors with certified response times.
3/4.3.3 EEMITORING INSTRUMENTATIQE 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATIM IE3NITMING INSTRIIMENTATIQN l
The OPERASILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that
- 1) the radiation levels are continually esasured in the areas served i
Amendment No.142 sALEN - UNIT 1 5 3/4 3-1 t
e 8
m TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) 8 REACTOR ftlP SYSTEN INSTRUNENTATION TRIP SETPolMTS ky FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETP0luf ALLOWABLE VALUES 9.O*/
19.0 %
u 13.
Steen Generator Water t
of narrow range Instrument t ++;95 of narrow range instrument l
Levet--Low-Low spen-each steen generator spen-esch steen generator 14.
Steam /Feedwater Flow L 601 of futt steem flow at RATED L 42.51 of futt steen flow at RATED Mismatch and Lew Stees TNERNAL POWER coincident with steen TMERNAL POWER coincident with steen Generator Water Levet generator water level L of generator water level L of narrow range instrument spen--each narrow range instrument spen--esch steen generator steen generator 15.
Undervottege-teactor t 2900 volts-each bus t 2850 volte-each bus Cootent Pumps 16.
Underfrequency-Reactor t 56.5 Na each bus t 56.4 Na - each bus Cootent Pumps 17.
Turbine Trip A.
Low Trip System E 45 psig L 45 pelg y
Pressure 8'
t.
Turbine stop Velve L 151 off futt open t 151 off futt open Closure 18.
Safety injection input Not Applicable Not Applicebte from SSPS 19.
Reactor Cootent Pump Not Applicable Not Applicebte Breaker Position Trip 5
3 Dn E
>-o O
c-o e
a
O
- 2. 2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS
+#p N
Rewa Thee ctor Trip Setpoint Lief ts specified in Table 2.2-1 are the at which the' Reactor Trips are set for. each parameter. The Tri ints Usfd have been selectMsure that the reactor core and ysac r coolant system j
INSFET j are prevented from exceeding-their safety limithdurin,g normal operation and design basis anticipated operatfdnalaccurrences and to assist the Engineering Safety Features Actuation Systes n-sitTgating the consequences of accidents.
conservative than its rip Setpoint but within Operation with a trip set,1its specified A11owable1alue is acceptable on the b {asit %
the difference between Trtp'Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to ss than the dri lowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
Manual Reactor Trip The Manual Reactor Trip is a redundant channel to the automatic protective O
instrumentation channels and provides manual reactor trip capability.
Power Range Neutron Flux The Power Range, Neutron Flux channel high setpoint provides reactor core protection against reactivity excursions which are too rapid to be protected by temperature and pressure protective circuitry. The low set point provides redundant protection in the power range for a power excursion beginning from low power. The trip associated with the low setpoint may be manually bypassed when P-10 is active (two of the four power range channels indicata a. power level of above approximately 9 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER) and is auto-natically reinstated when P-10 becomes inactive (three of the four channels indicate a power level below approximately 9 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER).
Power Range. Neutron Flux. High Rates The Power Range Positive Rate trip provides protection against rapid flux increases which are characteristic of rod ejection events from any power level.
Specifically, this trip complements the Power Range Neutron Flux High and Low trips to ensure that the criteria are met for rod ejection from partial power.
SALEM - UNIT 2 8 2-3
LIM! TING SAFETI SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES Less of Flow The Loss of Flow trips provide core protection to prevent DNB in the event of a loss of one or more reactor coolant pumps.
Above 11 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, an automatic reactor trip will occur if the flow in any two loops drop below 90% of nominal full loop flow.
Above 36% (P-8) of RATED THERMAL POWER, automatic reactor trip will occur if the flow in any single loop drops below 90% of nominal full loop flow. This latter trip will prevent the minimum value of the DNBR from going below the design DNBR value during normal operational' transients and anticipated transients when 3 loops are in operation and the Overtemperature delta T trip point is adjusted to the value specified for all loops in operation. With set the Overtemperature delta T trip set point adjusted to the value specified for 3 loop operation, the P-8 trip at 76% RATED THERMAL POWER will prevent the minimum value of the DNBR from going below the design DNBR value during normal operational transients and anticipated transients with 3 loops in operation.
Steam Generator Water Level The Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low trip provides core protection by preventing operation with the steam generator water level below the minimum volume required for adequate heat removal capacity. The specified setpoint provides allowance that there will be sufficient water inventory in the steam generators at the time of trip to allow for starting delays of the auxiliary feedwater system.
Steam /Feedwater Flow Mismatch and Low Steam Generator Water Level The Steam /Feedwater Flow Mismatch in coincidence with a Steam Generator Low Water Level trip is not used in the transient and accident analyses but is included in Table 2.2-1 to ensure the functional capability of the specified trip settings and thereby enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System. This trip is redundant to the Steam Generator Water Level
/
l Low-Lov trip.lThe Steam /Feedwater Flow Mismatch portion of this trip is activated when the steam flow exceeds de feedwater flow h greater thn or g[d.
6 equal to 1.42 it 10 lbs/ hour. The Steam Generator Low Water level portion of i
the trip is activated when the water level drops below 24 percent, ar indicated by the narrow ranse instrument. These rip values include sufficient allowance in excess of normal operating values t preclude spurious trips but will initiate a reactor trip before the steam gen rators are dry. Therefore, the required capacity and starting time requiremen s of the auxiliary feedwater pumps are reduced and the resulting the 1 transient on the Reactor Coolant System and steam generators is minimized.
~The SALEM - UNIT 2 B 2-6 Amendment No. 72
3.
TABL1 J
en ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUNENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS e
FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES d
7.
UNDERVOLTAGE, VITAL BUS u
a.
Loss of Voltage 2 70% of bus voltage 2 65% of bus voltage b.
Sustained Degraded Voltage 2 91.6% of bue voltage for 2 91% of bus voltage for 5 13 seconde
- C 15 seconde
- [
8.
a.
Automatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable b.
Manual Initiation Not Applicable Not Applicable 9.0k
$*0Y Steam Generator Mater Level--
2 of narrow range 2
.t." t of narrow range us c.
instrument open each instrument span each
^
Low-Low steam generator steam generator y
U 2 70% RCP bue voltage 2 65% RCP bus voltage d.
Undervoltage - RCP See 1 above (all S.I.
setpointe) e.
S.I.
f.
Trip of Main Feedwater Pump Not Applicable Not Applicable 4
s See 6 and 7 above (SEC and Undervoltage, Vital Bus)
Station Blackout g.
SEMIAUTOMATIC TRANSFER TO RECIRCULATION 9.
I 15.25 ft. above 15.25 + 1 ft, above RWST Low Level instrument tape f
a.
Instrument tape
- s I
b.
Automatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable e+
m
~
.. ~ -.
o 3/4.3 TMSTRUMENTmTION O
BASES
.=========...............me==
.============
............mme=====
3/4.3.1 madt 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENCTwn RED SAFETY FEAvURES (ESF1 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systee4 and interlocks ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be igitiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance consistent with maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features instrumentation and, 3) sufficient system function capability is available from diverse parameters.
g The OPERASILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
i The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the j
overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance teste perforised at the einimma frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. Specified O
surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been i
deterisined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the peactor Protection Surveillance Instrumentation System," and supplements to that report.
intervals and out of service times were determined based on maintaining an j
appropriate level of reliability of the Beactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features instrumentation.
The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and BSF action function associated with each channel is cospleted within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.
No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
I Reagesse time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapptes er total channel test measurements provided that such tests demometsene the total channel response time as detined. Sensor response time verifiamaamm may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilising replacement sensors with certified response times.
^- ;ITnsYum Tusen===vavrag 3/4.3.3 3/4.3.3.1 unf avios --iMYan Insvam.=vavIm The OPERASILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the J
individual channels and 2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded.
SALEN - UNIT 2 3 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 121
e d
Insert 1 The Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables are set.
Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as-left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION accuracy (i.e.,
rack calibration + comparator setting accuracy).
The Trip Setpoints used in the bistables are based on the analytical limits stated in the UFSAR.
The selection of these Trip Setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account.
To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those Reactor Protection System (RPS) channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49, the Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values specified in the Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits.
The methodology used to calculate the Trip Setpoints is consistent with Instrument Society of America standard ISA-S67.04-1982, which is endorsed via NRC Regulatory Guide 1.105, Rev.
2.
The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during the surveillance interval.
If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the bistable is considered OPERABLE.
l i
Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that the safety analyses which demonstrate that safety limits are not violated remain valid (provided the unit is operated within the LCO's at the onset of any design basis event and the equipment functions as designed)
The Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values listed in the LCO's incorporate all of the known uncertainties applicable for each j
channel.
The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each Trip Setpoint.
All field sensors and signal processing equipment for these channels are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.