ML20072H726

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Deposition of CC Faust on 810821 in New York,Ny.Pp 413-566
ML20072H726
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/21/1981
From: Faust C
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
References
TASK-*, TASK-01, TASK-02, TASK-04, TASK-07, TASK-08, TASK-1, TASK-10, TASK-2, TASK-4, TASK-7, TASK-8, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290701
Download: ML20072H726 (153)


Text

i pk UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 413 I

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

_ _ _x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, 1

~

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, a

Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683 (R.O.)

-against-THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J.

RAY McDEF.MOTT &

CO.,

INC.,

Defendants.

-x s

Continued deposition of METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY by CRAIG C.

FAUST, taken by Defendants pursuant to adjournment, at the offices of Davis Polk & Wardwell, Esgs.,

One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York, on Friday, August 21, 1981 at 9:45 o' clock in the forenoon, before Joseph R.

Danyo, a Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York.

l 8306290701 010821 PDR ADOCK 0500028 DOYLE REPORTING. INC.

CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTERS 369 LaxlNSTON AVENUE WALTER SHAPIRO. C.S-R.

NEw Yonx. N.Y.

10o17 CHARLE3 SHAPIRO. C.S.R.

Tai.rpMo n s 212 - 467-8220

1 414 2

Appearance s:

3 4

KdYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs h

5

42) Park Avenue New York, New York 6

BY:

ANDREW MacDONALD, ESQ.

7

-and-RICHARD C.

SELTZER, ESQ.,

8 of Counsel 9

10 KILLIAN & GEPHART, ESQS.

11 Attorneys for the Witness Box 886 12 216-218 Pine Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 Os 13 BY:

JANE G.

PENNY, ESQ.,

14 of Counsel 15

-and-16 LeBOEUF LAMB LEIBY & MacRAE, ESQS.

17 1333 New Hadpshire Avenue, N.

W.

Washington, D.

C.

20036 18 BY:

KEVIN M.

WALSH, ESQ.,

19 of Counsel 20 21 (continued) 22 23

(

24 f3 l

C 25

1 415 0

2 Appearances (continued) 3 4

DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.

Attorneys for Defendants lll 5

One chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 6

BY:

ROBERT B.

FISKE, ESQ.

7 RODMAN W.

BENEDICT, ESQ.

-and-8 WILLIAM E.

WURTZ, ESQ.,

9 of Counsel 10 11 Also Presents 12 ROBERT P.

CANNON 13 14

-ooo-15 16 CRA I G C.

F AUS T,

having been 17 previously duly sworn, resumed and was examined 18 and testified further as follows:

19 EXAMINATION (continued) 20 BY MR. FISKE:

21 Q

You realize you are still under oath?

22 A

Yes.

23 Q

When we left off yesterday, I believe you r%

f T

24 just told us that you had started an additional makeup

'd 25 pump or tried to start it, which I believe you said was

1 Faust 416 O

2 makeup pump A.

3 A

Yes.

4 Q

It is correct, is it not, that there are lll 5

three pumps, A,

B and C, whi-ch are sometimes referred 6

to as makeup pumps?

7 A

Yes.

8 Q

And pumps A and C also serve, do they not, 9

as the high-pressure injection pumps?

10 A

Yes.

B can, too.

11 Q

Any one of them can?

12 A

Yes.

O 13 Q

But I think we established yesterday that 14 when HPI is automatic' ally initiated, everything is 15 working correctly, the A and C pumps serve as the 16 high-pressure injection pumps?

17 A

Yes.

18 Q

And if the B pump happens to be running as 19 a makeup pump, when the automatic HPI is initiated, 20 B is shut off and A and C serve as the HPI injection 21 pumps, correct?

22 A

Yes.

23 Q

Is it correct that once high pressure

()

24 injection has been initiated, it is possible from the 25 control room to shut off either or both of the pumps?

1 Faust 437 Iv) 2 A

You can shut the pumps down, yes.

3 Q

So that no water is flowing from that pump 4

at all, is that correct?

lll 5

A Yes.

You can do that from the control room.

6 Q

In other words, shut it off completely?

7 A

Yes.

8 Q

Is it also possible from the control room 9

to throttle back the flow?

10 A

Yes, it is.

11 Q

And if the flow from the HPI pumps is on 12 full, what is the flow in terms of gallons per minute?

13 MR. MacDONALD:

You are talking about as it 14 operated prior to the accident?

15 Q

As you understood it worked prior to the 16 accident.

17 A

It was usually in excess of a thousand GPM total 18 on the pumps,and part of our procedure was to' throttle 19 back the high pressure injection in reference to either 20 the pressurizer level, I think initially to establish 21 the thousand total into the plant from the two dll 22 high-pressure injection pumps.

23 Q

Under ordinary circumstances, that would be

(

24 500 gallons per minute from each of the two pumps that 25 were running?

1 Faust 418 l

2 A

Right.

3 Q

Was it possible to throttle the flow down 4

below 500 gallons per minute from any pump?

lll 5

A Yes, it was.

6 Q

How did you do that?

7 A

The same valves I used to throttle normally, or 8

that you would use to throttle high-pressure injection 9

flow.

That would be the 16 valves A through D.

10 Q

Is it correct there were four 16 valves, 11 A,

B, C and D?

12 A

Yes.

13 Q

And we re A and B the valves for pump A and 14 C and D the valves for pump C7 15 A

once again, it depends, but yes, that is the normal 16 lineup.

17 Q

Is it correct that right after the makeup 18 pump A was started, you then moved over to a point in the 19 control room in front of the steam generator instruments?

20 MR. MacDONALD:

From yesterday?

21 MR. FISKE:

I am trying to put him back where 22 we were.

23 A

over into the area of the.amergency feed pumps.

(~T 24 Q

Just showing you once again Exhibit 263 we b

25 marked yesterday, could you take the black pen and just

/

}

1 Faust 419

/3

\\v/

2 make an X on that to show us where you were standing 3

at the point in time you just described.

Put an F.

4 A

Over in this area?

g 5

Q Put a CF for Craig Faust.

6 At that point in time, where was Mr.

7 Fredericks?

8 MR. MacDONALD:

At what point in time?

9 Exactly the point in time when he arrived at this 10 spot?

11 Q

How soon --

12 A

I can tell you where he was at that point.

He O

V 13

-was ever to my left.

14 Q

How far?

IS A

When I left him and went around him, he was over 16?.

in the area of the pressurizer control station.

17,,r'

f. p.

In other words, while you were trying to 1

1 (6

', start theume.keup pump, he came over to help you with

/

., 19 th"at, is that correct, as you described earlier?

z.-

,,j' I

A 20 V. '

  • I don't think he came over specifically to help
  • j v

21 me..He watr finishing up what he was doing, I guess.

h f

./

22 Q

.Nc was there and helped you start the pump, l

?

1 i

W,.,

I f

23 cor(4ct?

h 24 MR.. SELTZER:

I don't think that is the

-.a y<I' 25

.-e pricg testimony.

j.

[,

e

/

}.J J

vs ;;

m g

7 I'

Li

\\

y

1 Faust 420

[(_\\

j

/

2 A

I don't know if I realized what I thought at that 3

point.

He reached down and grabbed the makeup pump 4

and it came on at that point and stayed on.

I just ggg 5

kept going then.

6 Q

At that one moment in time when he grabbed 7

the makeup pump, the two of you were standing side by 8

side, is that correct?

9 A

Actually I was falling behind him.

10 Q

Then you moved over to the place that you 11 just designated on the chart as CF, is that correct?

12 A

Yes.

O)

(,

13 Q

At that point in time, what did Mr.

14 Fredericks do?

15 A

Are you talking factual to me or what I heard 16 later?

17 Q'

I am not interested in what you may have 18 learned later, but what you now remember.

Did Mr.

19 Fredericks stay for a period of time in the same place 20 that he was when he helped start the makeup pump?

21 A

I don't know at this time.

I don't know how long O

22 he stayed in that area because I was focusing my 23 attention on the steam generators.

s 24 Q

You said Mr. Fredericks went to look at the w-25 p ressurizer instrumentation?

l l

l I

1 Faust 421 GT

(

2 A

He was over in the area.

I don't know what he 1

j 3

was looking at.

4 Q

Could you just mark with an EF where that lll 5

area is.

6 From what you just marked on the chart, that 7

would indicate, would it not, at this point in time, 8

you and Mr. Fredericks are both standing in front of 9

control room panel No. 47 10 A

To the best I recall, yes.

Actually standing on 11 the ends of it.

12 (Discussion off the record between the 13 witness and his counsel.)

14 Q

You described that before as a panel that 15 was approximately 12 feet long, is that correct?

16 A

Approximately.

17 Q

When you were standing in the spot that you 18 marked as CF on that chart, what instrumentation did you 19 have in front of you with respect to the steam 20 generator?

21 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking for what he 9

22 recollects he was looking at at that time?

23 Q

what instrumentation was on the control 24 room panel in front of the place where you were standing 25 that you marked as CF on that chart?

1 Faust 422

(~')N R-A The steam generator level indications, the steam 3

generator pressure, downcomer temperatures, upper 4

downcomer temperatures.

Just the steam generator, right?

lll 5

Q Yes, that is all I have asked you about so 6

far.

7 A

As far as levels and pressures and the temperatures 8

on the generator, that is what was in front of me that 9

I recall.

10 Q

what was in front of you that would show 11 you the temperature in the steam generator?

12 A

The downcomer temperature on the steam generator.

13 Q

You referred previously to a' T-avg.

meter?

14 A

Yes.

15 Q

Could you see that from the point where you 16 were standing at that point in time?

17 A

I could see the meter readings.

18 Q

Is it correct that under ordinary operations 19 of the plant at full power the TC temperature, that is, 20 the temperature on the cold leg of the primary system, l

21 is equivalent to the steam generator temperatures?

O 22 MR. MacDONALD:

Equivalent, you mean --

23 MR. FISKE:

The same.

24 MR. MacDONALD:

Exactly the same?

25 A

Not exactly the same, but it is a good indication

1 Faust 423 O

V 2

or it.

3 Q

After a trip, is the T-avg.

temperature 4

a good indication of the steam generator temperatures?

lll 5

A They come pretty close.

G Q

If you wanted to find out what the T-avg.

7 temperature was in the steam generator other than at the 8

upper and downcomer, would you look at the T-avg.

meter?

9 A

If I wanted to find out the temperature?

10 Q

In the steam generators was.

11 MR. MacDONALD:

From the position where he 12 was standing?

13 A

i look at the downcomer temperature on the 14 generator at that point.

You have to sort of clarify 15 at -- how you mean it.

At what time.

Is this e v e ry.d ay,

16 common operation or something like that that you want?

17 Q

No, I am talking about in terms of your 18 understanding as to what the conditions would be after 19 there had been a reactor trip, and I am saying at that 20 point in time after a reactor trip, if you wanted to 21 determine what the temperatures were in the steam O

22 generator, would you look at the T-avg.

meter?

~

23 MR. MacDONALD:

Are you asking whether he N

24 over did that or not?

Ask him what his knowledge

~)

25 and reco11*(tion was.

l

i 1

1 Fcuot 424

(~

2 A

What I looked at that day?

b}

3 Q

We'll get to that.

I l

4 A

I am not sure.

It depends at the time what I was 5

thinking, where I would go look at temperatures in the gg 6

steam generator.

7 Q

We'll move along then.

8 When you were looking at the instrumentation 9

that was in front of you, did you notice a sharp 10 decline in the steam generator levels?

11 MR. MacDONALD:

What do you mean by " sharp 12 decline"?

13 Q

If you don't understand what a sharp b

14 decline is 15 A

When I came across the panels, I was moving at 16 that point, an'd I paused there long enough to determine 17 that the steam generator levels were falling at that 18 time, and the numbers, I remember they were in the 19 range of 50 to 100 inches and dropping.

Right now that 20 is what I remember about it.

21 Q

Is it true that after a reactor trip, the O

22 steam generator level normally goes to 30 inches in the 23 startup range?

24 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking if he has b

\\_/

25 seen this?

1 Fouct.

425 f

2 MR. FISKE:

I am asking if he can answer

(

3 the question.

4 A

It is true after a reactor trip the steam ggg 5

generators, the system is supposed to regulate for 30 6

inches in the steam generator, yes.

7 Q

Isn't it a fact on March 28, 1979 the steam 8

generator level dropped all the way down to ten inches?

9 A

Yes, I can recall that, yes.

10 Q

That indicated --

11 A

At what point?

You just asked me a question where 12 they go, and you also, when I was looking at it, I (a~T 13 just stated it was coming down right a,t this point 14 when I was looking at it.

Later on, when I came back 15 there, there were ten inches in the steam generator.

16 Q

There came a time when you learned that the 17 level in the steam generator was down to ten inches?

18 A

Yes.

19 Q

I show you an exhibit which we will mark 20 as Exhibit 266, which is a chart submitted by GPU to 21 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission --

0 22 (Chart submitted by GPU to the Nuclear 23 Regulatory Commission was marked B&W Exhibit 266 24 for identification, as of this date.)

O) i

  • \\~

25 Q

'-- reflecting steam generator level and i

1 Faust 426

_/

2 steam generator pressure for generators A and B for the 3

time period 30 minutes after the turbine trip.

4 I ask you if you have ever seen that chart ggg 5

before, that graph before.

6 A

A graph like this was presented to me sometime 7

before, yes.

8 Q

That indicates, does it not, that the level 9

in the steam generator A and B was in the vicinity of 10 ten inches within slightly over a minute after the 11 turbine trip?

12 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking him to read 13 the graph?

14 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

15 A

That is what this graph indicates.

It is around 16 the area of ten inches.

One is a little higher than the 17 other one.

18 Q

one is about ten inches and the other may 19 be slightly above that?

20 A

You are reading in between tha lines there, yes.

21 According to this, it is around that area.

O 22 Q

within 1.2 minutes, is that correct?

23 A

Looking at this graph, yes.

24 Q

And did that indicate to you that the steam 25 generators

i 1

Faust 427 O(_j 2

MR. MacDONALD:

At what time?

3 Q

When you learned --

4 A

I wasn't looking at the graph at the time.

ggg 5

Q When you learned that the steam generator 6

levels were about ten inches, did that indicate to you 7

that the steam generators had boiled dry?

8 A

It was an indication that they had boiled dry.

9 I wasn't positive at the time, when I first came back 10 and relooked at them.

I continued on to continue the 11 rest of the trip procedure.

When I.came back and saw 12 ten inches approximately on the generators, I assumed

(

13 they were dry, and'I took steps to try to'begin feeding.

14 Q

Did you understand on the day of the 15 accident that if the steam generators boiled dry, there 16 will be less heat removal from the steam generator?

17 MR. MacDONALD:

This is his recollection 18 during the time 19 MR. FISKE:

I am asking if he understood 20 that principle on the day of the accident.

21 MR. MacDONALD:

We are talking here of what O

22 his recollection was during the day.

Now you'are 23 jumping back and forth.

24 MR. FISKE:

Please, I am asking on the day

,'/T

(_J 25 of the accident, did he have an understanding that

1 Faust 428 O

2 if the steam generators boiled dry, that would 3

result in a decrease in heat withdrawal from the 4

primary system.

lll 5

A I had an understanding that removal of heat would 6

be impaired, yes, by boiling steam in the generator dry.

7 Q

Did you understand that if that happened, 8

that temperature in the reactor caolant system would 9

go up?

10 A

That is I believe the way I stated it in testimony 11 I have given of what I observed.

12 Q

In fact, you did see reactor coolant 13 temperature go up, did you not?

14 MR. MacDONALD:

What point in time?

We are 15 dealing with a long day of the accident.

Let's 16 be a little more precise.

17 MR. FISKE:

It couldn't be very much more 18 obvious.

We are talking of the point in time 19 where he learned that the steam generators had 20 boiled dry.

i 21 MR. MacDONALD:

Thank you.

22 MR. FISKE:

I don't think it needed any 23 c1'arification.

(7) 24 Q

oo you uneerstane the muestion?

1 25 A

Yes.

l 1

Faust 429 O~-

2 Q

What is the answer?

3 A

Around the point in time, one of the things I 4

looked at was the T-avg.

meter that was to my left, lll 5

and I noticed the numbers, I remember it was up 6

around -- I believe it was at that point in time.

The

)

l 7

last numbers I remember on the T-avg.

meter, I think 8

it was right around that area when I assumed that the i

9 generators had boiled dry or I was assuming that the 10 generators boiled dry, was I thought I saw 594 or 596.

11 Mr. MacDONALD:

Do you know where Exhibit i

l l

12 266 came from?

j I~h l

i k._s/

13 MR. FISKE:

Yes, it comes from the licensee l

14 event report GPU filed with the Nuclear Regulatory 15 Commission.

I 16 Q

I think you said earlier that under normal 17 operating conditions the hot leg in the primary system l

18 is at a temperature slightly in excess of 600 degrees?

1 l

19 A

605, about.

I believe that is what I said.

604.

l 20 Q

And th; cold leg is at a temperature slightly 21 in excess of 550 degrees?

l l

22 A

556.

The'best numbers I recall right now.

23 Q

Based on your prior experience, did you l

(-}

24 expect to see the T-avg.

temperature as high as 594

\\._/

25 degrees?

1 Faust 430

(#

2 MR. MacDONALD:

Object to the form.

When 3

he was standing where he was at the point in time?

4 MR. FISKE:

At the time when he saw it.

ggg 5

A Based on my prior experience?

6 Q

Yes.

7 A

I didn't have any prior experience to see a 8

T-avg. temperature at that point after a trip normally.

9 Q

You had been familiar with other situations 10 in which there had been a reactor trip, had you not?

11 A

Yes, definitely, but I don't remember ever seeing 12 596 od it, 594.

O' 13 Q

Wasn't it your experience from those other 14 trips that the T-avg.

temperature.right after the trip 15 came down to the cold leg temperature and then decreased 16 from there?

17 MR. MacDONALD:

Can I hear the question 18 again?

19 (Question read by the reporter.)

20 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking him if he ever 21 saw that before in a reactor trip where O

22 the T-avg.went down to the temperature of the 23 cold leg?

A) 24 MR. FISKE:

Following the trip.

Wasn't that

(

25 his experience with prior reactor trips?

l 1

Faust 431 O

\\' '/

2 A

The thing I remember mainly about prior reactor 3

trips was from the point I expected to be at, and I 4

can't say I honestly looked at TH and TC during the lll 5

trip.

I was actually concentrating on T-avg. and 6

what I wanted it to settle at after the trip, and I was 7

looking for a number around 547, actually looking at it, 8

seeing TC was maybe two degrees below that or TH a 9

little bit above that to give you a very small T-avg.

10 I can't say I actually looked in my training on the 11 B&W simulator or trips at Three Mile Island.

12 Q

But you were looking for a T-avg. of about 13 547 degrees?

14 A

I was looking to head in that direction.

I 15 didn't expect to see it right away.

16 Q

And that 547 is slightly below the 17 temperature of the cold leg under ordinary operating 18 conditions, right?

19 A

something I need to state here,too, I hope you are 20 not missing.

21 The numbers I am throwing out right now 22 as far as 594, 596, are numbers I remember that day.

l 23 I am not sure abcolutely at what point in time I saw l

(~)

24 those numbers on the T-avg. meter.

Fhat I have been V

25 doing is to an extent saying I believe I saw it at that i

I

i f

1 Faust 432 i

nis,)

2 point in time.

I am not absolutely sure of that.

3 Q

I understand.

4 Did you take any steps to try to get the lll 5

T-avg. temperature down below 594?

6 MR. MacDONALD:

At what point in time?

7 MR. FISKE:

Anytime.

8 MR. MacDONALD:

Now you are jumping around 9

again.

10 MR. FISKE:

I am talking of the time when

~

11 he saw the temperature of 594 degrees.

12 Q

I am asking, did you take any steps then

()

13 to try to bring it down?

14 A

The main thing I was having a problem with at 15 that point was after I came back now from over on the 16 other part of the secondary side and I saw initially 17 the ten inches in the st'eam generator, that is when I 18 looked over and saw T-avg. going up.

One of the other 19 things I was looking at was, I looked down and I noticed 20 at that point, I can't actually recall everything I 21 noticed right now, but the main thing that I remember 22 really honing in on at that point was, I should have 23 been at 30 inches in the steam generator, and T-avg. was 24 increasing.

So I attempted to take control of 25 increasing the demand I believe it was on the 11 valves l

i

1 Faust 433 O(_

2 and in response to that, I thought for some reason maybe l

3 they weren' t positioning; right. Maybe I wasn't getting 4

flow into the generator.

gg 5

I remember moving, increasing the demand on 6

the elevens.

I didn't go all the way on it at that 7

point.

I stopped and I watched the steam generator 8

level to try to determine if I was getting an increase.

9 I don't know how long I stopped and watched 10 it the first time.

I just remember looking at it, 11 trying to see a level change on the startup range for 12 the steam generator.

()

13 Q

Just to put this in elementary terms, when 14 you saw that the steam generator had reached a condition 15 which led you to believe that it had boiled dry, you 16 took steps to try to initiate 17 A

I wasn't sure at that point.

18 Q

But you were assuming it was?

19 A

I made assumptions and I also at the same time 20 voiced an opinion that I wasn't sure, but it looked 21 like they were dry.

They were at ten inches.

I went O

22 to the 11 valves to try to increase demand on them.

23 Q

By increasing demand, what you were trying 24 to do was initiate a flow of emergency feedwater into

,/~]

NJ 25 the steam generators to correct the condition that had

}

I Faust 434 2

resulted in the level being down at ten inches?

3 A

I didn't know at the time if it had been totally 4

terminated or not.

I thought at that time, I thought lll 5

maybe the 11 valves were miscontrolling and they just 6

weren't opening far enough.

I went to increase them.

7 Q

At this point you didn't know that the levels 8

were closed?

9 A

No, I didn't.

10 Q

so what you were trying to do was open up 11 the elevens more, thinking that would increase the flow

~

12 of emergency feedwater into the steam generator to

()

13 correct this low-level condition?

' 14 A

Yes.I missed a part earlier.

When I came across, 15 one of the things I noticed was both feed pumps were 16 off, had tripped.

One of the things I looked at was the 17 emergency feed pumps had come on, so I already knew they 18 were on and I knew that nhe elevens were the ones I was 19 looking for to maintain 30 inches in the generator.

20 Q

To go back and take this step by step, 21 when you saw that the level in the generator was down 22 around ten inches, you determined that you wanted to 23 increase the flow of emergency feedwater into the 24 generator, is that correct?

25 A

Yes.

1 Faust 435 O

2 Q

To bring that level up?

3 A

Right.

4 Q

And the first thing you did to try to do 5

that was to check the feed pumps to see if they were g

6

' working?

The first thing you did was when you said you 7

checked the feed pumps 0

A No, the first thing I did when I made my first 9

pass across the panel, I had to walk front, and when I 10 first came over from the makeup pumps, I had gone and 11 I noticed that the I don't know what made me 12 look over there, but I looked and saw that the feed Ox 13 pumps had tripped off.

14 The next thing I looked at was sort of 15 this could be either way on this.

I looked at the 16 steal generator levels to see they were dropping the 30 17 inches and I looked down and saw the emergency feed 18 pumps were on and up the pressure.

19 Q

Let's go back again.

To get the sequence 20 A

I am not sure of the sequence.

21 MR. MacDONALD:

I think he has given you O

22 everything.

I don't know why you need to say 23 it in your own words.

(']J 24 MR. FISKE:

He is testifying here.

~-

25 Q

When you said you checked and saw that the

1 Fount 436

()

2 feed pumps had tripped, you meant by that the main 3

feedwater pumps, right?

4 A

Yes, ggg 5

Q so you knew that there wasn't any main 6

feedwater flow going into the steam generator?

7 A

Yes.

8 Q

So then you turned to tne emergency 9

feedwater, system, is that correct?

10 A

That's right.

11 Q

And you looked to see whether those pumps 12 were working?

13 A

Yes.

14 Q

And you concluded they were?

15 A

Yes.

16 Q

So the next thing you looked at was the 11 17 valves to see whether they were open?

18 (Mr. Benedict entered the deposition room.)

19 A

I don't remember if I was looking to see that 20 they would be throttling, and I think this is what I am 21 not sure of exactly what I saw.

I had determined on O

22 that first pass that levels were coming down and the 23 generators were going to 30 inches and the emergency 24 feed pumps were on, and I can't actually recall if I O

25 saw the 11 valves throttling at that point.

At that

1 Faust 436 2

feed pumps had tripped, you meant by that the main 3

feedwater pumps, right?

4 A

Yes.

ggg 5

Q So you knew that there wasn't any main 6

feedwater flow going into the steam generator?

7 A

Yes.

8 Q

So then you turned to the emergency 9

feedwater, system, is that correct?

10 A

That's right.

11 Q

And you looked to see whether those pumps 12 were working?

~

13 A

Yes.

14 Q

And you concluded they were?

15 A

Yes.

16 Q

So the next thing you looked at was the 11 17 valves to see whether they were open?

18 (Mr. Benedict entered the deposition room.)

19 A

I don't remember if I was looking to see that 20 they would be throttling, and I think this is what I am 21 not sure of exactly what I saw.

I had determined on O

22 that first pass that levels were coming down and the 23 generators were going to 30 inches and the emergency j

(~T 24 feed pumps were on, and I can't actually recall if I

\\~)

25 saw the 11 valves throttling at that point.

At that

1 Fauct 437

()

2 moment in time I don't think I thought about it right 3

up the front on it, because I made the assumption that 4

I kept going to finish off the turbine trip procedure, gg 5

and I was going to get back over to the feed station.

6 Q

Then when you came back after you had done 7

that, did you look at the 11 valves again?

8 A

I looked, the first thing I looked at was the 9

steam generator level.

10 Q

It was still down around ten inches?

11 A

'No, that was the first time I noticed it was at 12 ten inches.

amhust trying to gdt the sequence of

,}

13 Q

I 14 this.

I thought we had it.

15 MR. MacDONALD:

I think he told you he was 16 looking at it when it was coming down and you 17 just asked the qudstion and he gave you the 18 answer.

19 You want to back up for the third time and 20 go through it again?

21 MR. FISKE:

I am trying to put this in some O

22 kind of sequence.

23 MR. MacDONALD:

That is exactly what he is 24 doing.

O 25 MR. FISKE:

Let's keep going.

1 Fount 438

(

2 A

I made a first pass.

I call it a pass.

I was 3

coming across.

After I le f t the makeup station, I 4

looked at the steam generator levels, and the setup on gg) 5 the emergency feed pumps and the main pumps I had caught 6

at that time had tripped.

That is what directed my 7

attention to the emergency feed pumps.

To make sure 8

they had come on.

9 When I looked back up, I can't say how many 10 times I looked back up and down or what, but 'I noticed 11 or noted that the steam generator levels were still 12 falling from, they were around 50 and 100 inches on the

{

13 startup range.

Startup, steam generator level 14 indication.

15 That is when I continued on over.

I assumed 16 the station was performing what it was supposed to do 17 in that situation, and I was leaving that station to 18 finish up the turbine trip.

19 Q

At the time you went over to carry out your 20 procedure with respect to the turbine trip, you had nc 21 reason to believe that there was any problem with the O

22 emergency feedwater system?

23 A

Not at that time, no.

24 Q

Then you came back and you saw that the O)

\\-

25 steam generator level was down around ten inches?

1

1 Faust 439 O

'(_)

2 A

It was a little hard to read.

3 Q

But it was way down?

4 A

It was down below 30 inches, definitely.

5 Q

And then you looked at the 11 valves?

g 6

A You mean in exact sequence?

7 Q

At or about that time.

8 A

Somewhere in there I looked at the emergency 9

feed valves.

10 Q

You had no reason to believe, looking at 11 them, that they were not functioning properly, did you?

12 A

That is what I wasn't sure.

()

13 Q

After you looked at them, did you come to 14 any conclusion as to whether they were functioning 15 properly?

16 A

I didn't just stop.

I looked at the generator 17 levels.

I went through that.

What I was trying to 18 f o rmula te in my mind, that maybe we're not feeding or 19 they weren't feeding far enough.

20 Those are the first stations I went to, the 21 11 valves.

I don't recall exactly what position, I 22 remember taking manual control of them and going open l

23 on the demands on them.

I thought they were shut.

Now 24 I am not sure.

I was wondering what was keying me or o'

25 why.

Now I am --

1 Faust 440 2

Q This is the elevens you are talking about?

3 A

Yes.

4 Q

And you took manual control and put them 5

on open?

6 A

No.

I didn't just put them on open.

7 Q

You opened them as far as they would open?

8 A

I throttled them slightly at that point.

9 "Slightly" is a poor term to use.

I put 10 some demand on the Baileys.

You are asking me something 11 I really don't recall exactly how it happened.

12 MR. MacDONALD:

Just what your recollection

.13 is.

14 A

What I saw at that point.

Something keyed me to 15 the 11 valves.

16 Q

Whatever you did with the 11 valves, did.it 17 produce any significant' change in the steam generator 18 level?

19 A

You mean just like that?

20 Q

After you --

21 A

I spent some time at the 11 valves.

22 Q

What was the next thing that happened after 23 you took the action you have just described with

/^%

24 respect to the 11's?

O 25 A

I spent time at that point, especially at the

1 Faust 441 n

s~/

2 time I didn't realize how long or how short a time 3

period I was spending with it, but I"was trying to 4

determine if I was feeding the generators, and that is lll 5

what I am saying, I don't know at what point in time I 6

saw that temperature on T-avg., because when I was 7

trying to reason out if I was feeding the generators, 8

some of the things that were going through my mind that 9

I can recall were things that I was looking at to try 10 to determine if I actually had a dry generator or if I 11 was feeding it or not.

I can't fully bring out what 12 you are,trying to do right now, because I can't C\\

(_)

13 remember.

14 Q

When you saw the temperature, the T-avg.

15 temperature of 594 degrees, did you conclude from that 16 that you were not feeding the steam generator?

17 MR. MacDONALD:

Solely from that?

18 A

I didn't 19 Q

Did that indicate to you that you were not 20 feeding the steam generators?

l 21 A

It was an indication to me that it wasn't feeding 22 the generators, but I didn't take it as the sole thing 23 at that time.

It was where I didn' t want it to be.

24 I didn't expect it to bc there at that point.

25 MR. FISKE:

Let me mark as Exhibit 267

1 l

1 Faust 442 O)

(_

2 another graph prepared by GPU, submitted by 3

GPU to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which 4

reflects temperatures in the steam generators ggg 5

for the time period up to 30 minutes after the 6

trip.

7 (Graph prepared by GPU reflecting 8

temperatures in the steam generators for the time 9

period up to 30 minutes after the trip was 10 marked B&W Exhibit 267 for identification, as 11 of this "date.)

12 Mr. MacDONALD:

Doesn't it say on the O)

(

13 left-hand side " Reactor Coolant I c op*

14 Temperatures"?

15 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

16 Let's just say that it is the T-avg.

17 temperatures.

18 MR. MacDONALD:

You can ask the witness 19 what he understands by looking at it.

Does this 20 come from the same LER?

21 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

O 22 BY MR. FISKE:

23 Q

Do you have Exhibit 267 in front of you?

24 A

Yee.

25 Q

Do you understand that the lines on that 1

l

1 Fouct 443 2

exhibit reflect temperatures in reactor coolant loop 3

A and B?

4 A

They look like TH and TC.

ggg 5

MR. MacDONALD:

Just so the record is clear, 6

could you ask him if he has ever seen the 7

document?

8 Q

Have you ever seen this before?

9 A

I have seen a lot of documents.

I think I have 10 seen this one before.

11 Q

These four lines represent TH and TC, is that 12 correct?

(

13 A

It looks like they represent TH and TC.

14 Q

You said before that T-avg. is the average 15 between TH and TC, is that correct?

16 A

somewhere in there, yes.

17 Q

Did there come a time in the first few 18 minutes after the accident when you took some action 19 with respect to the turbine bypass valve?

20 A

That was part of my response sometime in there 21 to insure to myself that I had dry steam generators.

O 22 Q

What exactly did you do with respect to the 23 turbine bypass valve?

24 A

I think that is when I saw -- one of the things 25 I was doing, TH seemed to be increasing definitely,

1 Faust 444

(,)

2 but steam generator pressure was holding, and if I 3

had a dry steam generator at the time, I thought I 4

should have seen that drop off, so one of the things I llg 5

was reasoning, I looked over at the turbine bypass 6

valves.

I moved over a little bit, and I noticed they 7

had closed.

8 I figured one way that I will make they 9

shouldn't be shut right now.

I have about six or seven 10 percant power I am removing here.

I should be dragging 11 oft team by the turbine bypass valves from the steam 12 generator.

~

()

13 MR. MacDONALD:

What you recall.

14 A

What I did at that time, right around that time, 15 was to take both those stations in manual, and I 16 cracked them open slightly.

When I cracked them open 17 slightly, I looked back at the steam generator 18 pressure and noticed the sharp decline.

Anything other 19 than straight line, it was a fairly rapid drop on the 20 steam generator, pressure, on the generator.

21 I don't remember what T-avg. was doing now.

O 22 I don't remember if I looked back at it or not at that 23 point in time.

I am not sure when this was.

24 When I did that, I had already gone through Ov 25 about three steps on the 11 valves where I had an open

1 Fauot 445

/~S 2

indication, a wide-open indication.

one of our U

3 procedures calls out that you have to watch steam 4

generator level to verify how fast you are refilling 5

a dry steam generator by level change.

I was looking g

6 for that level change.

7 Anyway, I cracked them open and I got a 8

decrease in pressure.

9 Q

Did there come a time after that when you 10 noticed anything with respect to the 12's?

11 A

once again, that is when I believe I definitely --

12 in my mind, the generators were dry.

I don't know if I 13 voiced it again at that point to the other people in g-)g

(_

14 the control room.

15 Q

voiced what?

16 MR. MacDONALD:

He just said he didn't know.

17 A

I don't know 18 Q

Let's-stop here for a second and let me 19 cover this aspect of it for a minute.

20 During this period of time that we have 21 been talking about up to now, except for the time you e

22 went to perform your required actions with respect to the 23 turbine trip procedures, were you in front of the control 24 room panel 47 25 A

Right then?

I movad across.

s-

  • i i

's

,/

f

-se l'

1 Faust 446

/4

('M s-2 MR. MacDONALD:

The point in time he moved e

r~,

3, acrosa?

]

- 4 Q

You said at one point you went to perform r

r-

/

5 certain procedures that were callad for by the l

~. '

..,,,.. ' ~~ I

2 6"

turbine trip procedures, correct?

..v "1,

A Yes.

~~y 8

.hers did you go to do that?

Where in the W

j g-Q

.i

~

9 control ro'om?

) s

'l-.

10 A

I moved over along panel 5 and also I got to 11 a b e,u t, the corner of panel 6.

i

, 12 One of the things you are supposed to do is

(_)

,13 verify the electrical panels.

I looked down the 7

j, j,.- -

" Linel4 t r,

14 the set of lights and looked for any that would A

/

/

thave been extinguished to tell me that my buses 15 J

<If pere O.K.

at that point.

/

('.-

/

t' e

i fl h [ ' T '

Q Then you came back after you had done that s-r

33

'a'nd resumed th's position that you had in front of

)

it 19

.. control room panel 47

>J 1/

,7

20 MR. MacDONALD:

You are talking of where 21 the CF is located here?

j,22 Q

In front of control room panel 4 in that i

r /,-

.13 12-foot area?

(~T i 24 A

I had a problem on the 5 panel with the turbine

\\_).

', 25

' throttle valves, governor valves.

One of them was

/,

r v.,

h

-,,p

  • I,. q '

/

1 Fcuot 447 O()

2 open.

They were all supposed to be shut.

I don't 3

know how long I looked at that.

4 Q

What did you have to do with respect to lll 5

turbine valves?

6 A

At that point all I did was I tried initiating 7

a trip again on the turbine just so as to make sure 8

that the trip was in on the turbine.

9 Somewhere in here I looked back over at the 10 T-avg. meter.

I think it was still cooling down at 11 that point.

I looked over at the T-avg. meter because 12 somewhere I made a determination in my mind that I 13 wasn't cooling down successfully.

I wasn't dragging 14 off a lot of steam.

I don't know if I moved over and 15 looked at the meter itself or came back to the turbine 16 panel.

17 Q

The time period I am talking about now is the 18 time period before you discovered that the 12's were 19 closed, o.K.?

20 A

That is what I sm trying to fall in.

21 Q

During this time, period we have been 22 discussing, except for the time you went over to panel 5, 23 you were is it correct that you were in front of 4

24 control panel 47

/'N

~

25 MR. MacDONALD:

Object to that.,What do you

I Faust 448 7~

(_

2 mean by "in front of"?

He gave you the 3

indication where he was standing.

4 Q

Did you stand in the same place in front of (gg 5

panel 4 during this whole period of time?

6 A

Pretty much.

I ended up bending over the panel, 7

trying to see a level change on the steam generator 8

startup range.

I was looking for any indication that I

9 I was actually feeding.

10 Q

During this period of time that we have

(

11 been talking about up to now, was Mr. Fredericks in 12 front of panel 47

( ).

13 A

'I c7uldn't tell you.

I couldn't tell you. In 14 prior testimony, I 'was telling what I thought where he 15 was, but I don't know where Ed was at that point.

16 Q

Is it your testimony that as you sit here 17 now, you can't tell us whether during this period of 18 time we have been talking about up to now, prior to 19 the time that you discovered that the block valves were 20 closed for the emergency feedwater, you didn't know 21 where -

you don't know where Mr. Fredericks was?

O 22 MR. MacDONALD:

At all times where he was?

23 At every instance?

f3 24 A

I can tell you where I believe he was.

(

)

v 25 MR. MacDONALD:

Where you recall.

I

1 Faust 449 2

Q If your belief is based on your best 3

recollection, give us that.

4 MR. MacDONALD:

If you have a recollection.

(l) 5 A

I wasn't looking at Ed.

6 Q

I understand.

7 MR. MacDONALD:

Ask him what his recollection 8

is.

9 MR. FISKE:

I am.

10 Q

When you were standing there and doing what 11 you were doing in front of control room panel 4, were 12 you conscious that Mr. Fredericks was also standing a

()

13 few feet away in front of panel 47 14 MR. MacDONALD:

Your recollection.

Do you 15 have a recollection on this?

IG A

I really don't know if he was at that point.

I

~

17 was looking pretty hard right at the gauges in front 18 of me.

19 Q

Is it your testimony now that up to the 20 time that you discovered that the emergency feedwater 21 12 valves were closed, Mr. Fredericks was not in front 22 of panel 4 at any point during that time?

23 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

He r3 24 just told you what his recollection was.

He also b

25 told you earlier when they began this procedure, l

1 Fouct 450

()

2 they were both over by panel 3.

You are trying to muddle the record.

3 4

MR. FISKE:

Believe me.

The record is very 5

clear.

g 6

Q When you discovered that the steam 7

generator level was down to ten inches, was that an 8

important fact to you then?

9 A

I already stated it was.

10 Q

Did you feel that it was important for 11 any other operator that was trying to diagnose this 12 accident in the control room to know that fact?

(

13 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking whether he 14 recalls thinking of that at the time?

15 MR. FISKE:

Read the question back.

16 (Question read by the reporter.)

17 A

You are saying did I keep it to myself?

18 Q

Yes.

19 A

I did not keep it to myself.

20 Q

Did you tell it to anybody?

21 A

I think I yelled it out.

I know I was not keeping O

22 it to myself, though.

23 Q

I gather it was important to you that 24 anybody else that was working on this accident should

' D wJ 25 know that fact.

I Faust 451 s_/

2 A

This accident?

I didn't know it was an accident 3

at that point.

4 Q

This transient?

gg) 5 A

That is the best I can state it.

6 Q

when you shouted it out, did you make any 7

effort to find out who was within shouting range?

8 A

I didn't go over and shake his hand, if that is 9

what you mean.

10 Q

I am just saying when you shouted it out, 11 did you look around to see who would be listening to 12 what you were shouting?

()

13 A

No, I don't recall looking around, making sure 14 everybody was in a circle around me when I yelled it 15 out.

16 Q

Did you make any effort at the time you 17 shouted it out to find out who else was around?

18 MR. MacDONALD:

Objection.

I think he just 19 gave you the answer to it.

20 MR. FISKE:

No, he didn't.

21 A

I didn't?

22 MR. MacDONALO:

You don't like the answer.

23 MR. FISKE:

I didn't ask him whether he l

S 24 convened everyone in a circle.

I simply asked j

w) 25 whether at the time he shouted the fact that the

i 1

Fouct 452

)

2 steam generator was dry, did you look around 3

just to see who might be hearing what you were 4

shouting.

lll 5

MR. MacDONALD:

Objection.

He gave you the 6

answer.

7 A

I thought I gave you the answer the best I could, p'

8 Q

Are you telling us now that you can't 9

remember whether anybody heard what you shouted?

10 MR. MacDONALD:

Are you asking whether he 11 asked somebody had he heard him so he would know?

12 MR. FISKE:

Read the question.

(G~}

13 (Question read by the reporter.)

14 A

Nobody came over and told me that.

Nobody denied 15 that they didn't hear it to me at that point.

16 Q

And you were aware that there were people 17 within shouting distance at the time you shouted it out?

18 That is all I am asking.

19 A

Yes.

20 Q

At the time you were communicating the 21 findings that you were seeing on the steam generator 22 side of the system, were you also getting information 23 from anyone else about anything that might be 24 happening, anything that was happening on the primary p

25 side?

I 1

Fcuot 453

()

2 A

At that point in time?

3 Q

This is all up to the time when you 4

discovered that the emergency feedwater block valves ggg 5

were closed.

6 A

I don't recall, no.

I just don't recall.

7 Q

Is it your testimony that you don't recall 8

anybody telling you about anything that they saw that 9

was unusual on the primary side?

10 A

I don't recall.

11 MR. MacDONALD:

He just told you he doesn't 12 recall.

g 13 A

I don't recall when I may have been receiving

{d 14 information on different parts of the plant, 15 unfortunately, during the day.

I don't recall a lot 16 of positioning in time for it.

This was our 17 understanding of the accident.

You just realized at 18 that time.

Afterwards I learned this, that even what 19 you are talking about was a big difference from what 20 we thought time was doing at that point.

21 MR. FISKE:

I move to strike the answer as 22 nonresponsive, a,nd we'll move on.

23 A

It is what I felt at the time.

i 24 MR. MacDONALD:

It is responsive.

Don't

/~T l

25 worry about what Mr. Fiske thinks.

You have l

l V

1 Fouot 454

()

2 given the answer.

As you recall.

3 Q

can.you tell us now when you first learned 4

that there was a drop in pressure on the primary side?

ggg 5

MR. MacDONALD:

Any drop at all?

6 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

7 A

I can't tell you at what point, no.

8 Q

When you saw the conditions that you were 9

seeing on the secondary side in these first few 10 minutes 11 A

I didn't know it was a few minutes at the time.

12 You are.asking me stuff that I know now but I didn't

'T 13

'know then.

(O 14 Q

I am asking you about the time period 15 during which you saw the conditions that you have 16 been testifying about this morning.

17 All I am asking you now is whether during 18 this period of time th.at we have been talking about 19 when you were seeing.these. conditions that you have

)

20 described of steam generator -down around ten inches 21 and a T-avg. temperature as high as 594 degrees, did 22 it occur to you at that time that it might be good for 23 you to know what was happening on the primary side?

24 Might be helpful for you to know?

OV 25 A

You are. making it so clear.

1 Fcuot 455 t

l r

(~))

2 Q

All I am asking you, whether when you saw 3

these unusual conditions on the secondary side, did 4

you think at the time that it might be helpful to you (ll 5

to know what was happening on the primary side?

6 A

I don't know if I thought of it in those terms.

7 That is what I am getting at.

8

' Recess taken.)

9 BY MR. FISKE:

10 g

still talking about this period of time 11 before you discovered that the emergency feedwater 12 12 valves were closed, while you were i,n the process of

/~~

13 doing the various things that you have described, did b) 14 you learn that the engineered safety features actuation 15 system had gone on?

16 A

Once again, I don't recall at what point in time 17 it went off, high-pressure injection initiated.

I 18 don't recall what time it went off.

19 Q

I am not asking you about when it went off.

20 I am trying to find out whether during this period of 21 time before you discovered thet the I; were closed, 22 whether you looked up at the board to see whether the 23 engineered safety features actuation system had been 24 activated.

25 A

I don't recall.

l

1 Faust 456 2

Q Is there any part of that system that 3

relates to the steam generator side of the system?

4 A

The high-pressure injection?

ll) 5 Q

Yes.

Withdrawn.

Let me start again.

6 Did it occur to you during this same period 7

of time that we are talking about that it might be 8

important to know whether or not the emergency safety 9

features actuation system had gone on?

10 A

I don't realize if I knew it then or not.

If it 11 had gone off, yes, I would like to know if it went off, 12 but the way you are phrasing it doesn't sound right to

()

13 me.

I may have known it went off at that time.

I don.'t 14 know.

Sometime in that period.

Right now I don't 15 know when it had initiated.

16 If you are asking me just would I have 17 liked to have known as an operator, yes, I would have 18 liked to have known.

As far as the day of the accident 19 whether I knew at that point whether it went off, I am 20 not sure what time I heard that high pressure injection 21 initiated.

O 22 Q

You did learn it at some point during the 23 course of the transient?

t 24

.A I learned that high-pressure injection actuated,

%J t

25 yes, or I knew that HPI actuated, yes, I became e.v a r e

1 Fouct 457

()

2 that HPI actuated some time, and I am not sure when.

3 Q

can you tell us how you learned that HPI 4

had been actuated?

gg 5

A I can't tell you how.

I don't remember how I 6

became aware of it.

7 Q

There did come a time when you learned 8

er discovered that the 12's were closed, right?

9 A

There came a time, yes.

10 Q

Can you tell us how you discovered that 11 they were closed?

12 A

It fell in with what I was describing earlier 13 about determining whether I was feeding or not.

After j

14 some point in time I had gotten to the point where 15 the 11's--once again, I am not sure how this happened

)

16 I got to the point where I felt the 11's were i

17 open.

That wasn't my pr'blem.

o i

18 When I started looking further for other f

19 problems, I remember making a scan of the panel below l

l 20 me because I had been leaning over the panel, so I had l

21 been looking at the startup range indicator on the 6

22 steam generator.

I was looking for, I explained 23 earlier, a change in level.

24 I didn't back off from the panel.

I was r~S

(

I 25 still leaning over when I just looked below me when I

1 Fouct 458

()

2 checked on the feed pumps and I looked down and as I 3

was scanning across the valves located beneath me and 4

the control for the emergency feed pumps, since I was gg 5

leaning over the right-hand corner of the %anel 4,

I 6

was leaning more_over 7

feed pump control, which was a little off to my left,and 8

I saw, I finally saw one of the lights on the 12 valves 9

shut.

10 Q

You saw it green?

11 A

Green.

12 You are not asking all the motions I went

(~T 13 through, because I don't remember them all at that point.

d 14 Q

I gather those were pretty quick motions, 15 once you learned that it was green.

16 A

That is when I remember shouting "The 12's are l'7 shut," because it was sort of in that combination.

18 There was a tag from the steam generator recire.

19 valve above tha't had been hanging down over the 20 lights on the upper valve, and when I saw them on, I 21 reached up and flipped the tag off because I couldn't see 9

22 the lights at that point on the upper valve.

I was 23 reaching down to open and I yelled out about it.

24 I don't know exactly -- Bill yelled 25 something out, maybe at the same time after I finished

1 Faust 459

{s)h 2

saying that.

I opened the 12's back up at th at point, 3

or right around that point.

4 Q

You said that the tags had hung down and lll 5

covered --

6 A

The indicating lights on the upper valve.

There 7

was a caution tag on 16, main feed pump recire.

8 valve on the 16 valve I believe it was.

It obscured the 9

vision of the upper valve indication.

10 Q

obscuring the indication for the 127 11 A

~ Yes.

12 Q

At the time you saw the light was green, S

13 you considered that a significant event?

14 A

Yes.

I don't know how many times I breathed at 15 that point, but I definitely realized the main feedwater 16 was isolated by the blocks at that point.

Not the 17 main feedwater, but the emergency feedwater.

18 Q

Did that indicate to you that that had been 19 the cause of the steam generator level dropping?

20 A

Yes.

When I opened them up, it definitely started 21 feeding.

l 22 Q

The level started coming up?

23 A

Not immediately.

It took some time.

How long,

(~}

24 I don't know.

\\_/

25 I learned something else at that point.

1 Faust 460 p) q_

2 Q

we will come back to that in just a second.

3 The chronology indicates that the emergency 4

feedwater 12 valves were open approximately eight lll 5

minutes after the turbine tripped.

6 I would like to ask you, can you tell us why 7

it was that it took eight minutes to find out that 8

those valves were closed?

9 MR. MacDONALD:

Objection.

I think he just 10 told you what happened for the period 6f time, 11 whether it be eight minutes or whatever.

He told 12 what his recollection is.

He's been testifying

()

13 to it in the last hour on this subject.

He has 14 given you all his recollection up to this time.

15 Do you want him to go back and retestify?

16 A

You are just looking at me as an operator.

That 17 is what I looked at and how long it took me to find 18 that was the problem on the emergency feed system.

19 (Discussion off the record between witness 20 and counsel.)

21 Q

Is there something called a low alarm for 9

22 steam generator level?

23 MR. MacDONALD At this time?

g3 24 MR. FISKE:

At the date of the accident.

N-25 A

There is a low-level alarm on the steam generator.

1 Fount 461 2

Q That indicates when the level has gone 3

down below the alarm point, is that correct?

4 A

Yes.

ggg 5

Q Do you remember what the setpoint for that 6

alarm is?

i 7

A Right now I don't remember.

8 Q

Exhibit 266 that we marked first shows both 9

steam generator level and steam generator pressure.

10 After you opened the emergency feedwater 11 12 valves, did you see a pressure increase in the steam 12 generators?

13 A

Yes.

Well, I opened them and I noticed steam 14 pressure coming back up at the time.

That is one of 15 the things I was looking for also to continue on with l

16 what I was using to figure out whether I was dry or 17 not in the generators. -

18 Q

Did there come a time --

19 A

I should rephrase that.

20 Q

Go ahead.

21 A

It was actually whether I was refeeding at this 22 point.

, 23 Q

Did the increase in the pressure indicate 24 to you that you were refeeding?

b)

\\/

25 A

It was an indication that I was feeding, yes.

1 Faust 462

/~N

(_)

2 Q

Did the increase in the level of the steam 3

generators also indicate that you were refeeding?

4 A

At the time I didn't have a level increase at (gg 5

that point.

What I heard, another thing I learned that 6

day -- you want me to expound on that?

7 Q

You did learn at some point -- did it come 8

to your attention that the steam generator level came 9

back up to the vicinity of 30 inches, is that correct?

10 A

Yes.

i 11 Q

I take it that after you opened these 12 12 valves, you were watching the instrumentation for the

()

13 pressure and the levels to see what happened, right?

14 A

Yes.

The first one I noticed was pressure coming 15 back.

16 Q

Then you noticed the level come up, although 17 somewhat more slowly?

18 A

Not noticed.

That is what I was looking for.

19 Q

There came a time when pressure for the steam 20 generators was up around 1,000 PSI and the steam 21 generator levels were around 30 inches, is that right?

O 22 A

I was having problems with one of the generators 23 with feeding after I got th'e level back to 30.

One of 24 them, I believe it was the B generator, I was having

's) 25 problems with controlling level on it.

1 Faust 463

()

2 Q

Looking at Exhibit 266, that reflects, does 3

it not, at or about 30 minutes into the accident the 4

level of steam generator B was in excess of 40 inches?

gg) 5 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking what the 6

document shows?

7 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

6 ER. MacDONALD:

The document shows what it 9

shows.

10 A

Say it again.

11 Q

This exhibit 266 reflects, d'oes it not, that 12 at or about 30 minutes after the turbine tiip, the level

' 13 of staan generator B was at or about 40 inches?

14 A

B?

15 Q

Yes.

16 A

Yes.

17 Q

And the A ge'nerator was somewhere around 30 18 inches?

19 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking him what the 20 document says, you are not asking him to verify it?

21 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

O 22 A

Around 30 inches on this document.

i 23 Q

At or about that same period of time, this 24 document reflects, does it not, that pressure for the 25 steam generators was in the vicinity of 1,000 PSI?

i l

1 Faust 464 2

A According to this, yes.

3 Q

Do you recall also that after you had 4

opened the emergency feedwater valves, that the T avg.

ggg 5

began to come down?

6 A

when I opened the emergency feedwater valves, 7

T-avg. was one of the things I looked at to see a 8

decreasing trend on it.

9 Q

And you did see such a decreasing trend, 10 didn't you?

11 A

Yes.

12 Q

And if you look at Exhibit 267, that

()

13 reflects, does it not, that again by 30 minutes after 14 the turbine trip, T-avg. was in the vicinity of 540 to 15 550 degrees?

16 MR. MacDONALD:

Again you are just asking 17 him to read the document?

18 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

19 A

That is what it says.

20 Q

I think you said before you would like to 21 see T-avg. around 5477 O'

22 A

That is what I said.

23 Q

Isn't it correct that at or about this i

24 period of time when you saw those indications, you gS

'd 25 concluded that the steam generator at that point was i

)

1 Faust 465 O)

\\v 2

behaving in a fairly normal manner?

3 MR. MacDONALD:

Saw what indications?

4 The indications on the charts?

Because he said llg 5

he didn't necessarily see the same indications that 6

are on the charts.

7 MR. FISKE:

He hasn't said that.

8 A

What I am saying is these charts were not in 9

front of me.

You are showing me more information here 10 than what I saw at the time.

11 MR. MacDONALD:

You said "this information."

12 I am talking of his recollection at the time.

~

13 MR. FISKE:

Mr. Faust testified he was 14 looming at the instrumentation.

These are charts 15 that GPU has submitted to the NRC that reflect 16 what the actual conditions were at those times, 17 and I think I am entitled to assume that the 18 instrumentation that Mr. Faust looked at reflected 19 the conditions that GPU has submitted.

20 MR. MacDONALD:

You are entitled to assume 21 whatever you want.

I am objecting in the sense O

22 that we are talking of what he recalls.

You are 23 trying to imply that he knew everything that was 24 on these charts and I object to that.

(~]%

\\_

25 Q

Isn't it a fact that there came a time

1 Fouct 466 i

)

2 during the course of the transient when you learned 3

that level in the steam generators was approximately 30 4

inches or higher, pressure in the steam generators was lll 5

approximately 1,000 pounds per square inch, and T-avg.

6 was approximately 545 degrees?

7 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking him a time 8

when he learned all three of those things at the 9

same time?

10 MR. FISKE:

Watching the three instruments 11 that were right in front of him on panel 4.

12 A

I tell you what I recall.

(~}

13 Q

My question is, isn't it a fact U

14 MR. MacDONALD:

He is telling you?what he 15 recalls.

16 A

What I recall is that there was a point during 17 that day that the secondary side of the plant from the 18 point I was at on it looked like things were steadying 19 out.

Conditions were becoming normal, with the exception 20 taat we still had not regained normal feed path, and that 21 was my next point of interest at that point, because O

22 I was going from a condition of just what I considered 23 at the time of no feed at all to getting back to l

24 emergency feed, and I was going to try to restore the 25 normal feed path by our procedures.

1 Faust 467 2

Q If I understand that answer, you had the 3

emergency feedwater flow on once you opened the 12 4

valves, right?

lll 5

A once again, time wa s n '-t totally clear at that 6

point.

7 Q

But you understood --

8 A

You are naming eight minutes into it now and you l

t 9

are asking how I recalled at the time.

I wasn't making 10 a distinction on time periods.

11 Q

All I am saying is, you knew once you opened 12 the 12 valves that emergency feedwater was flowing into

()

13 the steam generator?

l l

14 A

I knew I was refeeding the generators when I 15 opened the 12's, yes.

16 Q

And you knew that that emergency feedwater 17 flow had brought the plant back to the conditions that l

18 you have. just been testifying about?

I 19 A

is took some time to get there, but we were 20 working towards there, yes.

21 Q

The charts indicate it was about 30 minutes.

22 MR. MacDONALD:

They indicate what they 23 indicate.

24 Q

All I am trying to do is, taking this just 25 one step at a time, is just get your recollection as

1 Faust 468

)

2 to whether at or about that period of time, that is, 3

about 30 minutes into the accident, when these 4

conditions existed, you believed that the emergency lll 5

feedwater had restored the plant to a fairly normal 6

condition.

7 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to that.

Hold it.

8 (Discussion off the record.)

9 (Record read by the reporter.)

10 MR. MacDONALD:

I object.

I think he 11 testified he didn't recall specifically the time 12 intervals and also whether or not this time in

()

13 30 minutes the plant is back to stable Would only 14 be indicated if we went out further on the graphs, l

15 and he has no after-picture after 30 minutes, 16 and he doesn't recall the time period. He gave 17 you what he recalls.

I think you are unfairly 18 putting it back in the graphs which he obviously 19 didn't have in front of him.

20 MR. FISKE:

We will be happy to show Mr.

21 Faust the comparable graphs for the time period 22 for the next hour.

4 23 Let's mark them in sequence.

Could we mark 24 as Exhibit 268 another graph submitted by GPU O

25 to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as part of

i l

1 Faust 469 n

2 its LER which indicates steam generator pressure 3

for the period of time two hours into the 4

accident.

lh 5

(Graph submitted by GPU to the Nuclear 6

Regulatory Commission as part of its LER,.which 7

indicates steam generator pressure for the period 8

of time two hours into the accident, was marked 9

B&W Exhibit 268 for identification, as of this 10 date.)

~

l1 MR. FISKE:

Exhibit 269 we will mark as 12 another graph submitted by GPU to the Nuclear

(~)h

(,

13 Regulatory Commission reflecting steam generator 14 levels for the period two hours into the accident.

15 (Graph submitted by wPU to the Nuclear 16 Regulatory Commission, reflecting steam generator 17 levels for the period two hours into the accident, 18 was marked B&W Exhibit 269 for identification, as 19 of this date.)

20 MR. FISKE:

We will mark as Exhibit 270 21 a graph submitted by GPU to the NRC, reflecting 22 reactor coolant loop temperatures for the period 23 two hours into the accident.

(^)]

24 (Graph submitted by GPU to the NRC, k.

25 reflecting reactor coolant loop temperatures for i

l l

I Faust 470 2

the period two hours into the accident, was marked 3

B&W Exhibit 270 for identification, as of this 4

date.)

lll 5

BY MR. FISKE:

6 Q

Have you had a chance to look at all those 7

exhibits that were just ma.rked?

8 MR. MacDONALD:

I think you had a question 9

pending.

10 (Record read by the reporter.)

11 MR. MacDONALD:

My objection is, I don't 12 think he testified he recalled what time conditions (n),

13 were reached and that these conditions you had on 14 Exhibits 266 and 267 were necessarily the conditions 15 that he recalled.

16 MR. FISKE:

Are you suggesting that the 17 instrumentation at the plant on that day did not 18 produce the readings that are reflected on these 19 exhibits?

20 MR. MacDONALD:

I am not saying anything 21 about the graphs.

I am suggesting what the 22 testimony is about his recollection.

You are 23 trying to tie it into graphs that he is now 24 looking at, but we are here to deal wi h his

)

~j 25 recollection, and he gave you that, anu 4t?n't

1 Fcuct 471

()

2 recall what the timo period specifically was, and 3

now you are trying to tie it to 30 minutes because 4

it says so.

You tried to do it before wi th the ll) 5 eight minutes, and he said he didn't recall with 6

the eight minutes.

7 BY MR. FISKE:

8 Q

I am trying to get you to tell me, which I 9

believe you have, as you were watching the 10 instrumentation on that day, there came a time when 11 you recognized from the instrumentation that the steam 12 generator levels had come up in the vicinity of 30 e

13 inches or above, T-avg. had dropped below 550 degrees, 14 and pressure was about 1,000 pounds per square inch.

15 Was there a time when you were aware of all 16 three of those parameters?

17 MR. MacDONALD:

Existing at one time?

18 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

19 A

There was a point during the day in the morning 20 that I remember making a statement that from my -- from 21 the secondary side, things looked good.

It looked like 22 we stabled out with the exception of normal feed was 23 lost.

24 Q

Was that point in time the time when you O

25 were seeing the parameters that I have just described,

1 Faust 472 f3

(_)

2 whatever that time may be, on the charts?

3 A

What I was looking at when I made that, I looked 4

ct the steam generator pressure Bailey readouts, T-avg.

llh 5

meter, and I was looking at the level in the startup 6

range off the meters on the panel.

7 Q

This condition you described as a stabilized 8

condition was a condition that had parameters with 9

pressure about a thousand, level 30 inches or above, 10 and T-avg. around 550 or below.

Is that fair to say?

11 A

It wasn't refined, but it was looking better than 12 it had, yes.

()

13 Q

But at the time you saw, based on those 14 parameters?

15 A

We still had other problems going on.

That is 16 why we were trying to get to a point to step back and i

17 look at them.

18 Q

All I am trying to develop is that there 19 was a time after you restored emergency feedwater by 20 opening the 12's when the pressure in the generators 21 came up to about a thousand pounds, the level was at 30 0

22 inches or above,'and the T-avg. was down around 550.

23 And from those conditions you concluded that i

24 at that point the plant was in the secondary side in a V

25 fairly stable condition?

I Fouct 473

()

2 A

It seemed like I could try to move forward now 3

further and see if we could restore feed at that point, 4

yes.

lll 5

Q But except for the problem or the question 6

of restoring feed, the parameters as you saw them at i

7 that point indicated that the secondary side was in a 8

stabilized conditior?

9 MR. MacDONALD:

By " stabilized," you mean 10 the parameters you were bringing out before?

11 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

12 Q

Did those parameters indicate to you at that

("i 13 point that you had a stabilized condition in the

(-)

j 14 l

secondary system?

15 A

I remember saying something about, "It looks 16 0.K.

on the secondary side."

I said, "I

am fairly 17 well back into where I should be."

18 Q

All I,am trying to say is that statement was 19 made on the basis of learning that pressure was at or 20 about a thousand pounds and T-avg. had dropped dc'<n 21 around 5507 22 MR.'MacDONALD:

Yoc are asking if'that is 23 his recollection?

j 24 MR. FISKE:

Y e s'.'

O

\\\\ ')

25 A

You are going to give me another question?

l 1

,./

+

r i f

1 Faust 474 y

A~/ '

2 Q

I didn't hear the answer to the last one.

A I thought I answered it.

3 4

MR. FISKE:

Could you read back the answer?

lll 5

(Record read as requested.)

6 MR. MacDONALD:

He just answered the question 7

before.

8 MR. FISKE:

I know he made the statement.

9 I am just trying to --

10 A

That is what my answer was.

11 MR. FISKE:

I will move on if you 12 understand --

13 A

I feel like I have answered it.

14 MR. FISKE:

I will move on if we all 15 understand that Mr. Faust has said that his 16 statement that the secondary side was in a 17 stabilized condition was made in light of the 18 Parameters that we described.

19 MR. MacDONALD:

He said what he said.

20 MR. FISKE:

Then I would like to ask the 21 question again.

If you tell me he said that 22 A

I am saying it in my own words.

23 MR. MacDONALD:

You asked the question and N

24 he gave his answer.

You are asking it a third k]

25 time.

l l

l l

1 Fount 475 I

(O) 2 MR. FISKE:

I am trying to find out the answer to the question that I just asked.

3 4

MR. MacDONALD:

You just heard it read back.

MR. FISKE:

I have heard Mr. Faust say that lll 5

6 there was a time when he came to the conclusion 7

that the secondary side of the plant was in a' 8

stabilized condition.

MR. MacDONALD:

You heard what you heard.

g 10 MR. FISKE:

I am asking him simply whether 11 at the time he came to that conclusion the 12 parameters that we have been discussing we're a

()

13 thousand pounds pressure, 30 inches of level and 14 550 degrees T-avg.

15 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form because 16 you are mischaracterizing'what he said.

17 MR. FISKE:

I am asking him.

18 MR. MacDONALD:

You are running back on what 19 he said before and trying to put it in the form of 20 a question now.

He testified as to what ho 21 testified to.

O 22 MR. FISKE:

Are you instructing him not to 23 answer that question?

94 MR. MacDONALD:

He did answer it.

O(~h 25 A

I did answer it.

1 Faust 476 2

BY MR. FISKE:

3 Q

D y u remember being questioned by Mr.

4 Madden and Mr. Rogers of the Nuclear Regulatory h

5 Commission shortly after the accident of April 1979?

6 A

I remember being questioned by Mr. Madison.

I 7

remember being questioned by the NRC after the accident.

8 Q

On more than one occasion, is that right?

9 A

Yes.

1 10 Q

When you were questioned by.Mr. Madden, 11 vhere did that take place?

12 MR. MacDONALD:

I don't think he said "Mr.

13 Madden."

14 A

I was questioned enough that I don't know which i

15 one or where.

16 Q

Do you remember being questioned by two

(

17 gentlemen from the NRC in early April 1979 at a time l

18 when they had a tape recorder recording the questions 19 and the answers?

t

{

20 A

I have been talking to people with tape recorders, 21 Y

22 Q

I would like to ask you whether or not in an 23 interview with Mr. Madden and Mr. Rogers on April 3,

)

24 1979, you made the following statements, and I will be

,/

25 happy to give you a copy of the transcript so you can 1

l l

1 Faust 477 2

follow along.

MR. MacDONALD:

Let's do that so we can look 3

4 and see what it is.

llh MR. FISKE:

Page 22.

6 MR. MacDONALD:

Are you going to mark this?

7 MR. FISKE:

Fine, we will mark it as 8

Exhibit 271.

9 (Document was marked B&W Exhibit 271 for 10 identification, as of this date.)

11 Q

I would like you to turn to page 22.

12 MR. MacDONALD:

You want to ask him 13 whether he has ever seen a copy of this before?

14 Q

Have you seen a copy of Exhibit 271 before?

15 It is not necessary to read the whole document.

Just 16 look through it and tell us whether you recall seeing 17 it before.

18 A

You are asking me for specific documents?

19 Q

Yes, do you remember seeing that particular 20 one before?

  • 1 A

I can't tell which ones I have seen any more.

22 Q

Is your answer you don't remember now 23 A

I don't remember which ones I have seen.

You 24 can put another document in front of me.

25 Q

On any of the occasions when you were

1 FcuGt 478 (G_)

2 interviewed by the NRC, did you see a transcript of 3

the interview?

4 A

On any of the occasions?

llh 5

Q Yes.

Following any of the interviews with 6

the NRC, did you see a transcript of the in te rview?

7 A

I have seen transcripts of the interview, yes.

8 sometimes it took quite a while to get one, but I have 9

seen transcripts of interviews with the NRC.

10 Q

Did anyone ask you to review the transcript 11 to determine whether it was accurate?

12 MR. MacDONALD:

Which transcript?

()

13 MR. FISKE:

Any.of the transcripts.

14 A

Did they put a cover sheet on this one or what?

15 What I don't remember is if I reviewed everything.

All 16 the transcripts.

I have been asked to review 17 tranacripts.

18 Q

As you look at Exhibit 271, can you tell us i

19 whether you reviewed that transcript after you were l

20 interviewed by the NRC?

21 MR. MacDONALD:

He just told you he didn't 22 recall whether he ever saw it before.

Didn't 23 you get that answer just two minutes ago?

24 A

I don't recall the transcript, all that is in it.

25 Q

Let me direct your attention to page 22.

I I

D 1

Fcuat 479 l

()

2 would like to read you two statements that appear on 3

that page following the word " Faust."

The top of the 4

page, "F au s t '. "

llh 5

"I would like to point out that some of the 6

things I was seeing at the time,now that I established 7

flow in the generator,was that T-avg. was dropping. T-avg.

t 8

came down from around 575 where it was hanging, dropped I

g down to the range of 540."

l

/

10 Following a statement by Mr. Zewe, " Faust:

11 Apparently I didn't catch the lower T-ayg. and it must 12 have drifted up and stayed around 540 degrees and

(}

13 pressure in the steam generators were holding at around 14 a thousand pounds at this time.

What I am saying,I was 15 seeing fairly normal indication on that side of the 16 plant that we were removing heat and we were steadying 17 down after the reactor trip where we wanted it as if 18 things were balancing out.

Things were settling out for 19 us where we wanted to be at as far as T-avg. goes and eyen 20 were concerned and pressure in the generator."

21, Did you make those statements to anyone at l

l 22 the NRC on April 3, 19797 23 MR. MacDONALD:

If you recall.

24 A

I recall talking to the NRC.

I don't recall what (3l 25 I said.

1 Faust 480 Nj 2

Q Do the statements that I have just read 3

reflect what your analysis of the situation was at the 4

time you saw pressure at about a thousand and T-avg.

l 5

d wn around 540?

6 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking for his 7

recollection now?

8 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

A That is what I just gave you, my recollection now.

9 10 MR. MacDONALD:

He gave you that.

11 A

That is what I have been giving you, my 12 recollection of it now.

As far as what was stated

()

}3 earlier by me.

14 Q

Your recollection of it now is the same 15 as what you stated in those two statements that I just 16 read?

17 A

Not really.

18 Q

What do you recall now that is different?

19 A

Just reading that it talked about T-avg., like 20 I missed T-avg. dropping lower and coming back up.

I ni don't recall that.

22 MR. MacDONALD:

In front of this document, This. is a working document.

The information 23 7S 24 presented is as initially received.

Further U

25 verification and evaluation might be necessary.

Fouct 481 1

2 It is not to be disseminated or considered in any

'C) condition as complete and accurate information."

3 4

MR. FISKEt And we will verify that Mr.

h 5

Faust did in fact make the statements.

We can 6

do that independently of this proceeding.

7 BY MR. FISKE:

8 Q

There came a time at some point during the 9

transient on March 28, 1979 when you came to believe 10 that there might be a steam leak from the B generator?

31 A

Yes.

12 g

That belief on your part, did that re s tilt from the fact that there was a decrease in 13 14 pressure in the steam generator?

15 MR. MacDONALD:

Solely on the basis of that 16 and nothing else?

}7 A

No.

18 Q

Are you testifying that the fact that there 19 was a decrease -- do you recall a time during the 20 transient when there was a decrease in pressure in the 21 steam generator B?

A I just went over that.

22 23 MR. MacDONALD:

He already testified to that.

24

)

L'/

25 Q

Do you recall a time after you had opened

1 Fauct 482 2

the 12 emergency feedwater valves and had restored 3

Pressure in both generators to a level about a thousand 4

pcunds when sometime after that there was a decrease in lll 5

Pressure in the steam generator B?

6 A

I don't recall when, but there was a decrease in 7

the steam generator pressures.

8 Q

Particularly with respect to the B generator?

9 A

Both generators, the way I recall it right now.

10 Q

Isn't it a fact that it was that drop in 11 Pressure which led you to believe that you had a steam 12 leak in t_he B generator?

()

13 MR. MacDONALD:

Exclusively that?

I think 14 he gave you his answer.

15 A

No, that is not the only thing,I was trying to 16 look for.

17 Q

Based on your training and experience as an 18 Operator, is a level of over 30 inches in the steam 19 generator consistent with a steam leak?

20 MR. MacDONALD:

His understanding when?

21 MR. FISKE:

The day of the accident.

22 Q

If you see a level --

23 A

I started believing at some point during the day 24 that I possibly had a primary-secondary leak in the 25 generator.

1 Faust 483

()

2 Q

You mean a tube leak?

A That is what I was thinking at the time, I 3

4 believe.

llh 5

Q Then maybe we are talking about two 6

different things.

Is that what you thought I was asking 7

you about in the last two or three questions?

8 A

Yes.

9 Q

Then we were talking about two different 10 things.

11 was there a time when you came to think 12 that there might be a tube leak?

b)

I 13 MR. MacDONALD:

You are, talking about 14 primary to secondary?

15 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

16 A

Yes.

17 Q

What does a primary to secondary tube leak 18 consist of?

In MR. MacDONALD:

What was his understanding 20 at the time of the accident?

21 Q

Yes, what happens when a primary to 22 secondary tube leaks?

23 A

You have water pushing from the primary side into 24 the secondary side of the plant through the tube, n

25 Q

Did you understand that that resulted in a

1 Faust 484 (3(-)

loss of coolant from the primary system?

2 A

What I looked at it as was a primary to secondary 3

4 tube leak.

ll 5

Q Did YO" 6

A You have an EP for that.

I don't know whether it is an AP or EP.

7 8

Q Did you have a procedure that was designed 9

to help you determine whether or not you had a primary 10 to secondary tube leak?

11 A

Yes.

12 Q

Was that procedure Emergency Procedure 13 2102-1.3, Loss of Reactor Coolant, Reactor Coolant 14 System Pressure 15 MR. FISKE:

-- which we will mark as

~

16 Exhibit 272.

17 (Emergency Procedure 2101-1.3, Loss of 18 Reactor Coolant, Reactor Coolant System Pressure, 19 was marked B&W Exhibit 272 for identification, as 20 of this date.)

A Isn't there another ons?

I don't remember right 21 G

22 now, but I feel like there was another procedure.

23 g

Let-me show you that Exhibit 272, which is the 24 one you have in front of you Let me ask you whether 25 you recognize that as an emergency procedure for Unit 2

1 Fount 485

[

at Three Mile Island.

V 2

A It looks like a loss of reactor coolant system 3

4 pressure EP.

llh 5

Q Just looking at the first page of that, the 6

cover sheet, do you see on the cover sheet at the 7

bottom a number of boxes?

It says " Staff Recommends 8

Approval, PORC Recommends Approval, Superintendent l

l 9

Approval, Unit 2 Staff Recommends Approval, Unit 2 10 PORC Recommends Approval, Unit 2 Superintendent 11 Approval."

12 Do you see those six boxes with signatures

(~)

13 or initials in them?

\\_)

A Yes.

14 15 Q

Did you understand those were employees of 16 Met Ed or GPU?

17 MR. MacDONALD:

All the signatures?

I 18 don't know what necessarily all the signatures 19 mean.

20 MR. SELTZER:

They may not be anybody's 21 signature.

22 Q

What was your understanding?

23 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking if he had an 24 understanding when he saw this procedure?

25 Q

You were familiar with this procedure on the

1 Faust 486 2

day of the accident, were you not?

A Loss of reactor coolant, reactor coolant system 3

4 pressure, yes.

lll 5

MR. MacDONALD:

You are referring to this 6

specific procedure?

7 MR. FISKE:

I am referring to document 272.

8 MR. MacDONALD:

Which is revision 11 of 9

this procedure?

10 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

~

11 jut. MacDONALD:

You are asking whether this 12 was the one in effect on the day of the accident?

I\\s) 13 Your question seems to imply that.

14 Q

Do you understand?

15 A

I am not sure I do.

You are asking me what my 16 understanding of this cover sheet was?

17 Q

Let's start with the cover sheet.

18 Did you understand that the cover sheet was 19 signed by employees of Met Ed or GPU?

20 A

I thought -- I don't know if I gave it thought at 21 that point.

22 Q

You testified earlier that as part of Met 23 Ed's retraining program, there was training on emergency 24 procedures.

Do you remember giving that testimony?

V 25 A

As far as the emergency procedure, I gave

I 1

Faust 487 O

'\\/

2 testimony, yes.

3 Q

Did y u understand that it was part of your 4

responsibility as an operator to be f amiliar with the lll S

emergency procedures?

6 A

Familiar, yes.

7 Q

Directing your attention to page 6 of the 8

document that you have in front of you, do you see near 9

the bottom of the page the note that says, "The operator 10 may distinguish between a loss of coolant inside 11 containment and OTSG tube rupture and a steam line 12 break by the following symptoms which are unique to 13 the aforementioned accidents"?

14 Do you see that portion of page 6?

15 A

Yes.

16 Q

Under that No.

2, it says, "OTSG tube 17 rupture - gas monitor alarm on VA-R-748."

Do you see 18 that?

19 A

There is another procedure, isn't there, on once 20 through steam generator tube rupture, I believe?

21 Q

Let's just stick with this one.

22 A

I see it is a symptom.

23 Q

And you were aware on the day of the 1

(

24 accident, you were familiar with this procedure?

25 MR. MacDONALD:

I object.

1 Faust 488 2

I want to make sure he knows that this procedure, r recalls that this procedure that you have put 3

4 in front of him, which you haven't asked him yet, lh 5

was the one in effect on the day of the accident, 6

revision 11 and all the subsequent page s.

7 MR. FISKE:

We can move on.

8 Q

It is very simple.

Did you on the day of the accident get a gas monitor alarm on VA-R-7487 g

10 A

Sometime.

11 Q

What time?

12 A

I don't know exactly.what time it came in.

()

13 Q

Where was that alarm?

14 A

748 was on the RMS panel.

15 Q

Do you know now that that alarm came in on 16 or about 7:00 o' clock in the morning?

17 A

Now?

18 Q

Yes.

l 19 A

Today?

~

20 Q

Let's put it this way.

On the day of the accident were you aware of that alarm when it came in?

21

\\

22 MR.*MacDONALD:

Immediately, as soon as it l

l 23 sounded, was he aware of it?

24 Q

Let's start with that.

Withdrawn.

Put it l

25 simpler.

l l

1 Faust 489 l

l r~%

(-)

Do you remember how long after the alarm 2

(

l 3

went. off on the day of the accident you became aware of i

4 the fact that that alarm had gone off?

llh A

The way I understand it, I wasn't aware of the 5

6 alarm being in when I was looking for our primary to 7

secondary tube sheet leak, because that was one of the 8

things I was looking for to help verify that.

9 Q

Maybe we can save time then.

At the time 10 you were looking to verify whether there was a primary 11 to secondary tube leak, you were not aware of any alarm, l

12 this alarm, having gone off?

O)

(_

13 A

This particular alarm, whenever that was, yes.

14 Q

In other words, you were not aware that this 15 alarm had gone off while you were looking to determine 16 whether there was a primary to secondary tube leak?

17 MR. MacDONALD:

You are implying it had 18 gone off at the time?

19 MR. FISKE:

No.

A As far as I can recall, it hadn't gone off while 20 I was looking for the primary to secondary tube sheet 21 22 leak at that point.

23 Q

Earlier I was asking you about whether or not

("N 24 you thought at some point there might have been a steam L) 25 line break.

v 1

Faust 490 O

2 A

Somewhere I had anticipated a possible steam 3

line break s o m'e w h e r e.

A leak more than anything.

4 Q

Now I am asking you, was the decrease in lh 5

pressure in steam generator B which is reflected on 6

Exhibit --

7 A

I think there is another procedure for this.

Exhibit 268, did the drop in pressura 8

Q 9

for steam generator B on Exhibit 268 lead you to 10 believe that you might have a suaam leak, the one 11 following the time that you had opened the emergency 12 feedwater valve?

(

13 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

Ask 14 him what he recalls.

The graph is what the 15 graph says.

16 MR. FISKE:

I think he already said he 17 recalls a decrease in pressure in the steam 18 generator after he opened the emergency feedwater 19 block valves.

l 20 MR. MacDONALD:

His recollection may not be 21 when it occurred on the time of the graph.

22 Q

After you learned on the day of the accident 23 that there was a decrease in pressure in the steam 24 generator B after you had opened the emergency feedwater 25 block valves, did that fact lead you to believe that you

1 Fouct 491

)

2 might have a steam line leak?

3 MR. MacDONALD:

Solely that fact.

4 Q

Steam generator leak?

h 5

A Just from that event?

6 MR. MacDONALD:

Just from that fact alone.

7 A

There were different things occurring during the 8

day that I can't recall, but I remember one of the 9

things I was looking for during the day was a decrease 10 in generator pressure for what I described earlier.

11 At that point I thought I had produced that 12 effect.

Is that clear?

13 Q

Are you saying that you thought,that by 14 opening the 12's and allowing feedwater to rush into a 15 dry generator, you might have caused the decrease in 16 pressure?

17 A

What I was saying -was that the point at which I 18 had taken manual control of the turbine bypass valves, 19 I was looking for a decrease in steam generator level, 20 and that was with regard to earlier when I was trying l

21 to figure out whether I had a dry generator or not.

I 22 was trying to research my generator to figure out what 23 was going on with it.

24 Q

I would just like to talk about the time O(-)

25 period that we were talking about earlier when steam

1 Faust 492 s

2 generator level was 30 inches or above, pressure was about a thousand, and the T-avg. was down around 545?

3 4

A I don't remember when that was.

lh 5

Q But just there was a time during the morning 6

when those conditions all were occurring at the same 7

time, isn't that correct?

8 A

My best recollection is that things got a little muddled as far as what point in time these things 9

10 occurred.

11 Q

I am not asking for the moment, for exactly 12 when this point in time was.

All I am asking you is, 13 isn't it a fact that there was a point in time, 14 someplace, during the course of the accident, when 15 pressure was about a thousand, T-avg. was around 550, 16 and the levels were 30 inches or above?

This time 17 period I think you testified about earlier when you said 18 the conditions on the secondary side were stabilized.

39 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to that.

He testified as to what he testified to.

20 MR. FISKE:

O.K.

21 22 A

Yes, I already answered that.

l 23 Q

At the time those conditions were 24 existing, that pressure was 1,000 PSI and staying 25 stable, isn't it true that that is inconsistent with

1 Fount 493

(

2 a steam generator leak?

3 MR. MacDONALD:

You are talking about at 4

the point in time where he realized at some point llh 5

in time that they were all about as you described 6

them and then some other time that the pressure 7

stabilized?

8 MR. FISKE:

Let's take them one at a time.

9 A

It is different from the way I have heard it 10 before.

11 Q

It is not intended to be.

I think it is 12 fairly simple.

I) 13 Based on your experience and training and

(/

14 understanding of conditions as they existed on the day 15 of the accident, would you expect if there was a steam 16 generator leak that that would cause some kind of a 17 decrease in pressure?

18 A

Can I give you what I was thinking?

19 Q

Yes, at the day of the accident.

20 MR. MacDONALD:

He is asking for your 21 recollection.

22 A

I don't recall what I was thinking at that point 23 or at that time totally.

24 Q

Just in terms of the training that you had

(~)

~

25 had or experience that you had had as an operator over

1 Faust 494 f(_h) 2 a period of time.

3 A

We were trying to figure out where we were at.

4 Q

In looking to determine what possibly was llh 5

wrong and trying to determine whether or not you had a 6

steam generator leak, wouldn't one of the things you 7

would look at be pressure in the steam generator?

8 MR. MacDONALD:

Objection.

Are you asking 9

based on his experience that he has had and 10 training or any time in transients along the lines 11 of what he was seeing that day?

That is what 12 you are basing it on.

You said " experience" and ~

()

13 saying what he was looking at that day.

14 A

Lo'oking for a symptom of pressure for the steam 15 generators to blow dry.

16 Q

But if you were trying to determine 17 A

It depends on the size of the leak.

That is what 18 was confusing me that day.

One of the things I 19 suspected was a steam genera' tor leak, but I wasn't 20 seeing necessarily a large leak.

I wasn't sure I had a 21 leak in the reactor building and not external to it O

22 where the pressure might have been caused because some 23 of the things I heard at that time was that building

^

24 pressure was going up.

I thought t.)

25 Q

what conditions did you see on the secondary

1 Faust 495 h

2 side of the plant that led you o believe that there 3

was a steam leak, steam genera *.or leak?

4 A

I don't know if it was totally just that.

I am h

5 trying to remember what I was hearing from others.

6 Trying to give reasons for what I was doing that time.

7 There was a lot of things flying around that morning 8

on reasoning.

I am not sure what I based it on.

9 Q

I am trying to take it one at a time and 10 find it out what you based it on.

11 A

We had a point sometime in that day when steam 12 generator pressure started bleeding off.

We had a leak 13 there, but we were reasonisg otherwise than that.

14 Q

There was a time during the day when steam 15 generator pressures dropped after the block valves and l

16 the 12's had been opened, right?

I 17 A

Yes.

18 MR. MacDONALD:

He is asking for your 19 recollection.

20 A

I recall pressure decreasing at another time in 31 the generator _that day.

I was watching.

22 Q

So in terms of the symptoms that you saw 23 that led you to believe there might be a steam generator

)

24 leak, one of the symptoms was a decrease in pressure, is 25 that correct?

l 1

Faust 496 2

A I don't know that for a fact, no.

That is what I am trying to explain.

You are asking me where I come 3

4 up with these.

I am not sure I based it all on what I h

5 was looking at.

6 Q

Just so we can make this real simple, I am 7

asking you now to tell us what conditions on the 8

secondary side of the system you were aware of that led g

you to believe you might have a steam generator leak.

10 A

It had something to do we were having a large 11 problem with a hot well.

It was flooding out on us.

I 12 observed the hot well level.

I wasn't standing right

.13 in that corner.

I was also working the secondary side 14 of the panel.

I was involved in trying to figure out 15 j ust what our problem was on the steam generator when 16 we were thinking along the lines of a leak in it.

We 17 had the hot well flooding out.

18 Q

Isn't it a fact that the hot well alarm, 19 high level alarm, did you know that the hot well high 9

20 level alarm had gone off within the first two minutes 21 aftor the trip?

22 A

I don't know.

What I was watching was level 23 increasing above the upper end of the band sometime.

Q 24 Q

What other conditions on the secondary side b

25 of the system did you see that led you to believe you

1 Faust 497 O

\\~/

2 might have a steam generator leak?

A I didn't necessarily mean that led to that.

I am 3

4 saying it was one of the things that was distracting me that day as far as when I was trying to get the plant 5

6 back.

You are indicating we stabilized out.

We 7

steadied out from what I was saying or indicating, 8

but it is not as if the plant just sat there then.

I g

was then immediately involved also in more than one 10 thing as far as the secondary side of the plant went.

11 Part of it was trying to restore the secondary side 12 which I was concerned about dropping.

()

13 You are losing the hot well, losing the 14 condenser mainly because one of the things, I was also 15 trying to get pumps back on to get normal feed.back.

16 That is what I am saying.

I don't know if 17 I based it all on what I specifically was looking at 18 there, because I remember becoming concerned about a 19 possible leak in the generator inside the building 20 possibly.

I was trying to figure out if I had things 21 to show me that.

22 I was also involved with trying to isolate 23 the generator.

That is what I am saying.

I can't

-}

24 remember what I was doing altogether there.

V 25 Q

There was a time when you isolated the B

1 Faust 498 2

generator, wasn't there?

A what I recall, I isolated the B generator.

I 3

l 4

was involved with it, yes.

5 Q

wasn't that right about the time there was 6

a sharp decrease in pressure in the steam generator, 7

B generator?

8 A

I am at a point where I don't recall how it went.

9 Q

I think we can take the chart that has been 10 marked as an exhibit, 268, which shows that there wa<s 11 a sharp drop in pressure in steam generator B somewhere

'12 75 minutes or so after the turbine trip.

13 All I am asking you is whether you saw any 14 symptom on the secondary side of the plant before that 15 drop in pressure which indicated to you that you might 16 have a steam generator leak.

17 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form of that 18 question.

He hasn't testified that he recalled l

19 the pressure dropped then.

Just because you are 20 refsrring to a chart doesn't necessarily refresh i

21 his recollection as to when it happened.

I think 22 he told you what he knows on that.

You keep 23 referencing back to a chart.

It doesn't help l

24 him at all.

I 25 MR. FISKE:

It may help him.

1 Faust 499 2

A I remember pressure dropping in the steam 3

generator.

I don't remember how many times I saw it 4

drop or at what point I was looking at it when it was h

5 dropping.

I was also concerned with maintaining my 6

steam generator level.

I was also fighting a rising 7

level on the B generator some point in time there, 8

trying to figure out why it was going up.

9 Q

I understand you were doing a lot of 10 things on the morning of the accident.

All I am trying 11 to do now is deal with this question of the steam 12 generator leak, and I am simply asking you --

13 A

It wasn't that plain then.

That is what I am 14 getting at.

15 Q

whether there was any symptom on the 16 secondary side that led you to think you might have a 17 steam generator leak other than a drop in pressure.

18 A

That is what I am trying to say.

19 Q

can you just tell me that, yes or no?

20 A

I don't remember exactly how I came upon that.

I 21 remember I was thinking along the lines of a steam 22 generator leak.

I also thought I had a primary to 23 secondary tube leak, and I was trying to figure I

l 24 actually thought at one point thinking that I possibly O

25 had both of them at the same time.

I wasn't sure.

l

1 Faust 500

('T

()

2 Q

I am just trying to get your testimony today 3

as you sit here now as to whether you can tell us today 4

of any symptom you saw on the secondary side other than llh 5

a drop in pressure which indicated to you that you 6

might have a steam generator leak.

7 A

Symptoms that I saw?

i l

8 Q

Yes, or knew about.

9 MR. MacDONALD:

He already gave you some 10 testimony on this.

11 MR. FISKE He has, I know.

I want to know l

. 12 if there is anything else, j

(

I'T 13 MR. MacDONALD:

Other than pressure.

I 1

14 think he gave you testimony on that.

I 15 A

I don't recall what I was thinking.

I don't 16 recall what I was thinking at that point about it.

17 Q

As you sit here now, is it correct that you 18 cannot today think of another symptom that you knew of 19 on the day of the accident on the secondary side that 20 indicated a steam generator leak other than the drop l

j 21 in pressure and,which you testified to, about a rising 22 hot well?

23 MR. MacDONALD:

And building pressure?

24 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

25

'MR.

MacDONALD:

I think he testified to that.

i

1 Faust 501 Ok-2 A

All the ones that were just mentioned in addition?

MR. MacDONALD:

Mr. Fiske wanted to limit 3

4 it to just pressure, but I think there were more k

than that.

5 6

Q You mentioned a building pressure and rising 7

hot well.

8 A

227 might have led to that, but I shouldn't have g

seen it on it.

I was looking to see 227 go off.

That 10 is another indication of a possible primary to 11 secondary tube leak.

When I was thinking it would be 12 in the building,.I should have had 227 going off.

I 13 don't remember that happening.

14 Q

We will come back to that in a minute.

I 15 am still talking about the steam generator leak.

16 A

I understand what you are talking about.

I am 17 talking of size of leak I was thinking about in the 18 steam generator, how I could be getting the symptoms gg I was getting at.

It was not totally to one procedure.

20 Q

Can you tell us now of any symptom on the 21 secondary side other than what you already told us 22 about which indicated to you that you might have a 23 steam generator leak?

/~T 24 A

Somsbody outside yelling at me that they were

\\)

~

25 getting burned, maybe.

That is an indication of a steam l

t l

1 Faust 502 m

)

2 leak on the secondary side.

That is one of the symptoms on it.

Is that what you mean?

3 4

Q I am talking of plant parameters within the llh 5

secondary side.

6 A

Makeup and excessive feed rate might do it.

7 Q

Did you see that?

8 A

I don't recall.

9 Q

Is there anything you recall today other 10 than what you told us about?

11 A

No.

12 Q

Turning back to this Exhibit 272, the loss O

(_/

13 of coolant reactor coolant system pressure, and the 14 same note we referred to before, does that note 15 indicate that on page 6 and page 7 that a symptom which 16 is unique to a steam break inside the reactor building 17 is a low condensate storage tank level alarm and/or 18 a low hot well level alarm?

19 A

Yes.

20 Q

And --

A I just didn't recall it right now.

Is that what 21 22 you are getting at?

23 Q

You didn't recall that procedure on the day

/~)

24 of the accident?

v 25 MR. MacDONALD:

He didn't say that.

1 Faust 503 O

q,/

2 A

I didn't recall what you just pointed out right 3

4 Q

I don't understand.

h A

It is a symptom.

5 6

Q In other words, you don't A

I don't recall the whole procedure right now.

7 g

Q Is it a fact that you do not A

I haven't been studying them for about two years 9

10 now.

These procedures.

We don't have needs for them 1g right now.

12 Q

I am just asking you about your understanding 13 on the day of the accident, and I believe you testified 14 that on the day of the accident you understood that you 15 were supposed to be familiar with these procedures.

16 A

I already testified to that.

17 Q

On the morning of the accident on the 18 secondary side, did you see a low hot well level alarm?

19 A

I am talking about the alarm itself.

I was 1

king at the actual level.

20 21 Q

on the hot well you saw that the hot well was flooding?

"2 4

A Yes.

Which gave me a pretty good concern at the 23 time.

I am trying to split things now.

24 25 Q

But is it fair to say that the hot well,

1 Fauct 504 2

the fact that the hot well was flooding did not lead 3

y u to think that there was a steam generator leak?

4 MR. MacDONALD:

All by itself?

h 5

MR. FISKE:

Yes.

6 A

Hot well level, what I was looking at that I can 7

recall was hot well level flooding.

That is what g

significantly stands out to me right now.

I had a 9

1C" 10 Q

Didn't you understand on the day of the 11 accident that a high hot well level was inconsistent 12 with a steam generator leak?

/")

13 A

That is what I was saying.

I don't recal*1

\\/

14 everything I was looking at at that point or 15 understanding at that point.

16 (Lunch recess taken at 12:40 p.m.)

17 18 19 20 lh 22 23 25

1 505 2

AF TE RNOON S ES S I ON 3

2:00 p.m.

4 CRAIG C.

FAUS T resumed and h

5 testified further as follows:

6 EXAMINATION (continued) 7 BY MR. FISKE:

8 Q

You realize you are still under oath?

9 A

Yes.

10' MR. FISKE:

I would like to go to 4:30 or so if we can.

11 12 MR. MacDONALD:

If the witness is able, yes.

()

13 Q

There has*been some testimony earlier about 14 reactor coolant pumps.

Do you recall testifying 15 various times during this deposition about reactor 16 coolant pumps?

17 A

Yes, I talked about reactor coolant pumps during 18 my depositions.

19 Q

What did you understand the purpose of the 20 reactor coolant pumps to be?

I 21 A

At the time?

I 22 Q

What did you understand their purpose?

l 23 A

The purpose was to provide a mode of movement l

24 moving the fluid through the primary loop from the l

[D

~

25 core to the steam generator and back.

l

1 Faust 506 O!

k' 2

Q tha you recall that there came a time during the accident when the reactor coolant pumps for the 3

4 A loop were turned off?

A There was a point in time where we tarned the 5

6 pumps off in the A loop, yes.

7 Q

Do you recall there was a point in time g

after that when you turned the reactor coolant pumps off in the B loop?

9 10 A

I think it was just -- y e s, there was a point in 11 time when that occurred, yes.

12 Q

I think the chronology indicates that the A 13 pumps were turned off at approximately 73 minutes after 14 the the B pumps were turned off approximately 73 15 minutes after the turbine tripped and the A pumps were 16 turned off approximately 100 minutes after the turbine 17 tripped.

18 MR. MacDONALD:

Is that a question?

19 MR. FISKE:

Just a statement.

20 MR. SELTZER:

Is that reversed, because that l

is a different order than what the witness 21 22 testified.

23 THE WITNESS:

He was asking me points in

(~

24 time.

u 25 Q

It is a fact, is it not, that the B pumps

1 Faust 507 p

k-J 2

were turned off first and then the A pumps were turned l

3 off after that?

4 A

What I recall, yes.

h 5

Q So that as of the time the A pumps were 6

turned off, there were no reactor coolant pumps running?

7 A

Yes.

8 Q

What mode of circulating the fluid in the 9

primary system were you trying to achieve at or about 10 the time you turned off the A reactor coolant pumps?

11 MR. MacDONALD:

You are talking of Mr.

12 Faust, what he understands?

o 13 MR. FISKE:

His operation --

14 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking for his 15 recollection?

16 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

17 A

I understood the mode was natural circulation.

18 Q

There were discussions, were there not, 19 among you and others about the fact that when you turned 20 off the second set of pumps, you would try to achieve 21 natural circulation?

22 A

I don't know which way the discussions went, if 23 it was before we turned of f the second set of pumps or 24 before we turned off the first set of pumps.

l 25 Q

But you did have discussions on the general

1 Faust 508 2

subject if you were to turn off the reactor coolant 3

pumps, you ought to try to achieve natural circulation?

4 A

What I remember on that was that we were --

lh 5

there was talk on the reactor coolant pumps being turned 6

off to achieve na'tural circulation was the aim.

I was 7

busy on the panel, too, at the same time, so I wasn't 8

just standing around talking about it.

9 Q

At some time before the reactor coolant 10 pumps were turned off, had you become aware that there 11 was a reduced flow through the pumps?

- 12 A

I recall a flow decrease in the primary.

\\-

13 Q

Do you also recall that there were vibration 14 alarms that went off for the reactor coolant pumps?

15 MR. MacDONALD:

At what point in time?

16 MR. FISKE:

Prior to the time that they 17 were turned off.

18 A

I became aware of the reactor coolant pump 19 vibration alarms going off, yes.

20 Another thing, when you are talking about 21 alarms, what I did was look up in the panel and I saw 22 the alarm lights in on them.

I didn't hear an alarm 23 at that point.

The alarm was already in.

()

24 Q

But at some point before the pumps were 25 turned off, you became aware that the vibration alarms

1 Faust 509

/9 2

for the pumps had been activated?

A Yes.

3 4

Q And that was for all four pumps?

A What I could see, yes.

5 6

Q Directing your attention to page 3 of Exhibit 258 which has been previously marked, which is 7

8 your statement to Mr. Long and Mr. Reppert on March 9

30, 1979, I would just like to direct your attention 10 to the first sentence in the third paragraph on page 3.

11 I believe you had an opportunity to read that entire

~

document at the time it was marked.

12 s

L/

13 MR. MacDONALD:

If you will direct his 14 attention --

15 Q

I would like to direct your attention to the 16 last paragraph on page 3,

but specifically to the 17 first sentence.

I am really only talking about one 18 sentence on page 3.

I don't think it is probably going 19 to be necessary to reread the entire document.

MR. MacDONALD:

He is just reading page 3.

20 21 The question and the answer.

G 22 Q

I would just like to read this one sentence 23 to you in the first paragraph on page 3.

The first sentence in the third paragraph of page 3,

which reads:

y 25 "Later I looked over and I saw flow in the reactor

1 Faust 510 coolant pumps hEd come down -- it looked like it had 2

come down about 80 percent.

we had alarms on all four 3

4 pumps.up there, vibration alarms, which I figured 5

indicated that we were going through a pretty good 6

transient here."

7 Did you make that statement to Mr. Long and 8

Mr. Reppert on March 30, 1979?

MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

I 9

10 think he told you what he recalls about what he 11 made-- what he recalled about this statement.

12 He told you he doesn't recall.

O 13 A

I don't re, member the exact statement, no.

14 Q

You didn't make any correction in that 15 sentence before you put your signature on the last page 16 of this document, did you?

17 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

I 18 don't know whether he was asked.

He testified 19 he doesn't recall putting his signature there.

MR. FISKE:

The signature is on the last 20 21 P"98*

22 MR. MacDONALD:

You are implying he read it 23 and signed it.

()

24 Q

The question is, before you put your 25

' signature on the last page of this document, did you make 1

1 Faust 511 r~

(_)s 2

any changes in the sentence I just read?

MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

3 4

A It doesn't mean it is absolute.

l llk 5

Q Just answer my question yes or no.

i 6

A I don't recall making any changes to it.

I don't 7

recall the document totally.

8 Q

Does that sentence I just read refresh your recollection as to the extent of the reduction of the g

10 flow that was reflected on the instrumentation that you lookin'g at for the reactor coolant pumps?

11 were 12 A

You mean to an exact value, no.

[)

13 Q

During the period of time before the reactor

%j 14 coolant pumps were turned off?

I know I looked at flow on it.

15 A

I am not sure 16 I don't remember the value on it now.

I remember flow coming down is what'I seem to remember at this 17 was 18 time.

I don't remember the exact value.

19 Q

Does the fact that you told Mr. Long on l

l l

20 March 30, two days after the accident, that it looked 1

l l

21 like it had come down 80 percent, it had come down 22 about 80 percent?

23 A

I said about.

24 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form of the O

25 question.

Just because he told you he doesn't

1 Fouet 512

'I

)

2 recall making the statement, you treat it as a kJ fact.

3 4

MR. FISKE:

Yes, I am treating it as a fact.

lll 5

I am entitled to.

It is a document with his 6

signature on it.

That is the predicate for my 7

question, and I would like to proceed.

8 MR. MacDONALD:

I would just like to object.

9 MR. FISKE:

You are obstructing at this 10

point, when we have a document with his signature 11 on it, and you are pretending --

12 MR. MacDONALD:

I am not pretending anything.

(~')

13 MR. FISKE:

I am entitled to assume.

%/

14 MR. MacDONALD:

You are entitled to assume 15 anything you want.

I am entitled to object.

16 MR. FISKE:

You are not entitled to obstruct.

17 The record will be very clear to anyone who reads 18 this record exactly what goes on in this 19 deposition.

20 BY "R.

FISKE:

21 Q

Does the fact that you told Mr. Long in 22 this statement which bears your signature that it looked 23 like the flow had come down about 80 percent refresh 24 your recollection that that was your understanding on e

\\/

25 the day of the accident?

1 Faust 513 t

2 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form again.

I d n't think Mr. Faust has told you -- let me 3

4 finish my objection -- that he recalled making h

that statement.

You are treating it ae a fact.

5 6

The witness can answer.

7 MR. FISKE:

You made that objection the last 8

time.

9 MR. MacDONALD:

That is fine.

You restated 10 the question.

11 A

You are asking me if I remembered that as a fact?

12 No.

7-(_/

13 Q

Does the fact 14 MR. MacDONALD:

Let him answer.

15' MR. FISKE:

He put a question to me about 16 what I am asking.

17 Q

Does the fact that you told that to Mr. Long 18 on March 30 indicate to you that that was your 19 understanding the day of the accident?

20 MR. MacDONALD:

I object again.

I don't g

21 think it is a fact that he told him.

22 Q

Go ahead.

23 A

I thought I indicated the way it sounded in that f~)

24 statement that I just read that I thought that is what it l

25 was about, but it wasn't certain.

1

g Faust 514 iV 2

Q I tA11nk we developed earlier in the 3

deposition that one cause of pump vibration can be the 4

formation of steam at the pump inlet, is that correct?

5 A

That's correct.

l 6

Q And would an 80 percent reduction in flow 7

be an indication that you might have steam in the 8

reactor coolant system?

9 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

It 10 is hypothetical.

11 MR. FISKE:

It is hardly hypothetical.

.12 MR. MacDONALD:

What are you basing it on?

13 MR. FISKE:

On what is in this statement 14 that he signed.

15 MR. MacDONALD:

That he said he didn't 16 recall.

1 17 MR. FISKE:

It is not hypothetical.

It is 18 based on a statement he signed.

If you want to 19 object later on that this is not a valid 20 document, you can do that.

21 MR. MacDONALD:

The question is hypothetical.

22 It assumes a fact not known.

23 MR. FISKE: I am entitled to proceed with O

24 this examination on the basis of the statements N

25 contained in this document, Exhibit 258, which the

1 Faust 515 (N

2 witness has signed, and you can preserve 3

whatever objections you want to preserve later on 4

for the trial based on any argument you want to 5

make with a straight face that this document is 6

not a statement by Mr. Faust, but I am entitled to 7

proceed with my examination, and you are not 8

entitled to obstruct it.

9 MR. MacDONALD:

I am not obstructing it.

10 I am objecting to it.

11 can I have the question again?

.12 MR. FISKE:

I will put it again.

BY MR. FISKE:

13, 14 Q

Based on your understanding of the way the 15 reactor coolant pumps work and the training that you 16 have had, the experience that you have had starting with 17 the Navy and going right through up to the day of the 18 accident, did you understand on the day of the accident 19 that a reduction in flow rate could be an indication 20 that there might be steam forming somewhere in the 21 reactor coolant system?

MR.'MacDONALD:

Outside of the head of the 22 23 pump?

[^h 24 MR. FIS KE :

Including the head.

V 25 A

My understanding what I can remember?

'1 Faust 516

~

%_J 2

Q Yes, based on all of your experience up 3

to the day of the accident.

4 A

The possibility r.ight have been the pump could llh 5

have been cavitating.

6 Q

Cavitation involves, among other things, 7

the formation of steam, correct?

8 A

It involves what I was understanding at the point, g

like I explained before, it might have been cavitating 10 at the pump.

11 Q

But cavitating in the pump, as you described

~12 it, involves the formation of steam?

O 13 A

That is very local, what I was saying, localized 14 to the pump itself.

15 Q

Does the fact that the flow rate has been 16 reduced by as much as 80 percent indicate that there is 17 a significant chance that there is steam forming in the 18 reactor coolant system?

19 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

If 20 he ever had a recollection or thought of that or understood it.

21 22 A

I don't recall thinking that, no.

23 Q

In your analysis of whether or not steam O)

(_

24 might be forming at the pump inlet, did it make any 25 difference to you on the day of the accident whether the

1 Faust 517 2

reduction in flow rate was ten percent, as opposed to 3

90 percent?

4 MR. MacDONALD:

You are assuming he made an 5

analysis?

Have you asked him that?

I object to 6

the form.

7 A

I didn't make any comparison like that that I can 8

recall.

9 Q

In trying to figure out what might be 10 causing the vibration?

11 A

That wasn't the only thing I was thinking about.

12 Q

To the extent you did think about this?

\\/

13 A

I was trying to think about where I was going at 14 that point with 'what I had.

15 Q

one of the things you were trying to figure 16 out was what was making the pumps vibrate, isn't that 17 correct?

18 A

I was trying to figure out why the vibrations 19 were that high, yes.

20 Q

In trying to answer that question in your 21 mind, was it a fact that you would consider that the 22 reduction in the flow rate was as high as 80 percent?

23 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

You C) 24 are asking if he did consider?

What is your recollection?

25 w

i Faust 518 1

A N,

2 A

I wasn't thinking about it the way you are talking about it.

3 4

Q Are you saying that on the day of the accident in determining what the cause of the vibration 5

6 was, it didn't make any difference to you what the reduction in flow was?

7 8

A If it didn't make any difference to me, I wouldn't have been concerned about it.

g 10 Q

At some time before the second group of 11 pumps was turned off, didn't you and Mr. Fredericks 12 have before you the net positive suction head curve (O

_)

13 that we have discussed earlier in this deposition?

MR. MacDONALDs You are asking if they were 14 15 both looking at it together at some point in time?

MR. FISKE:

Yes, exactly.

16 17 A

I was not looking 'at net positive suction head 18 curve, no.

I didn't look at a net positive suction head f

curve all day.

19 20 Q

Do you know whether before the reactor lant pumps were turned off, Mr. Fredericks looked at lll e

21 22 a not positive suction head curve?

23 A

I couldn't answer that.

(~

Q In other words, you don't know?

(s) 24 A

I don't know.

25

i 519 Faust 1

f1

%I any steam tables before Did you look at I.W' Q

2 turned off?

the reactor coolant pumps were R$

3 Faust?

"You" meaning Mr.

MR. MacDONALD:

N'S 4

MR. FISKE:

Yes.

L 5

A Myself, no, I did not.

6 Fredericks look at Do you know whether Mr.

b Q

7 reactor coolant pumps were the any steam tables before g

e, turned off?

9 Fredericks was doing A

I don't remember what Mr.

b 10 right now.

gi Q

The answer to that is no?

t

(")N 12-A

  • No.

e 13 any discussion with Mr.

Q Did you have 3

14 Fredericks before the reactor coolant pumps were turned f

15 causing the vibration?

off on the question of what was 16 A

You are saying -- you are just naming one person?

17 Q

Yes, I am.

18 I don't recall having a conversation with Mr.

A 19 alone, on reactor Fredericks,specifically Mr. Fredericks 20 coolant pumps.

21 Did you discuss with any other operator Q

22 pumps were turned off the net Prior to the time the 23 or steam tables?

()

Positive suction head curve

~'

24 A

Myself?

25

1 520 Faust 1

O Q

Yes.

~

rf$.

2 A

N t there, no.

3 with either --

Did you discuss saturation

..pg Q

turned off?

4 the pumps were with Mr. Fredericks before p.

5 Saturation where?

MR. MacDONALD:

e 6

MR. FISKE:

Anywhere.

7 I was also involved on the steam A

As I said, g

too.

I controlling them at this time,

.e generator, 9

term, no.

a discussion on that

i..

didn't have 10 In other words, your testimony is, you did Q

11 the Fredericks before saturation with Mr.

1. '"~

(~h 12 not discuss N/

pumps were turned off?

i 13 l

I A

Not that I recall.

L 14 read you from testimony given by Q

Let me 15 ition Mr. Fredericks to the Kemeny Commission in a depos 16 after hearing this testimony and ask you whether or not t

17 let me just read you the questions and answers.

18 113 and 114, this is to Mr. Fredericks.

Starting on page

}g think you indicated before you

" Question:

I 20 supplied with steam tables during training?

were 21

" Answer:

Yes.

22 steam tables available

" Question:

Are those 23 O

in the control room?

24

" Answer:

No.

25 i

521 Faust 1

[J L

" Question:

Before March 287 k.

2 in the We did have a steam table p-

" Answer:

3 control room, yes.

4

" Question:

Where was it?

r 5

of the bookshelves.

" Answer:

It was on one 6

it out during

" Question:

Did you ever get t-7 g

the accident?

" Answer:

Yes.

We actually had a Xerox of 9

10 the steam table at my desk."

)

Moving on to page 114, line 13, 11

" Question:

At what point did you pull that

('N 12 steam table on the 28th?

Do you have any ide a of wh'at

\\-

13 time it was?

14 Prior to our securing the fuel

" Answer:

15 we were examining the suction head curve of the 16

Pumps, the running pumps and we wanted to further examine 17 in the system that we pressure / temperature relationship 18 were looking at.

This is the first time I remember 19 looking at it.

20

/

" Question:

Before securing first the RC 21 22 pumps?

" Answer:

Yes.

23 Something under 72 minutes?

" Question:

\\/

24

" Answer:

Yes.

25

522 Faust

[~D L.J l

" Question:

Who pulled it out?

f:

2

" Answer:

I don't know.

Craig Faust and (1

3 in to George Kunder and somewhere myself were talking 4

i the conversation we just pulled it out."

V 5

I would like to go now to page 374 of the

)

6 and continue with further deposition of Mr. Fredericks 7

g questions.

Reading from page 374:

first Reaching way back to the

" Question:

i g

I think we were on a line of

?

day of your deposition, 10 out of inquiry in which you had pulled a steam table 11

(~)

12 the drawer.

Remember, you were telling me that you had N) out of the drawer because there pulled a steam table 13 happened to be one in the control room?

14

" Answer Yes.

15

" Question:

And you pulled it for reference?

16

" Answer:

Yes.

17 Let's go back and pick up that

" Questions 18 line of inquiry.

19 steam table "Why was it that you pulled the 20 out?

21

" Answer:

I don't remember.

22 it being referred to at

" Question:

Why was 23 r~N I

\\'#

that point?

24

" Answer:

I think it was because we were 25

1 Faust 523 O

V 2

approaching the net positive suction head limit for the 3

reactor coolant pumps.

We were trying to evaluate 4

whether or not cavitation was taking place and that is h

5 why we were getting the high vibration readings and 6

the flow degradation.

7

" Question:

So you were concerned that you 8

were going to saturation and seeing some steam voids?

9

" Answer:

At the suction pump, yes.

10

" Question:

And you were referring to that 11 table to see whether the data on your control board in 12 comparison to the steam table would show that you were V

13 in saturation conditions?

14

" Answer:

Yes.

15

" Question:

And what did you discover?

16

" Answer:

We discovered that there was a 17 possibility that that was causing the alarm conditions on 18 the pumps.

I believe that entered into our decision to 19 secure the reactor coolant pump.

20

" Question:

So you found that you were 21 either extremely close or you were in fact in saturation?

22

" Answer:

Yes.

We were not discussing 23 saturation conditions.

We were discussing net positive 24 suction, which in effect was the same thing."

G 25 Having read you those questions and answers l

4 1

Faust 524

(~h

\\~

from Mr. Fredericks' deposition to the Kemeny 2

Commission, does that refresh your recollection that 3

4 you and Mr. Fredericks discussed the subject of 5

saturation before the reactor coolant pumps were turned 6

off?

A No.

7 g

Q Does it refresh your recollection that Mr.

A You want an understanding of why?

9 10 MR. MacDONALD:

Just answer his question.

11 A

Go ahead with yours.

12 Q

Is it still your testimony after listening 13 to what I just read from Mr. Fredericks' deposition that 14 you didn't know that Mr. Fredericks was looking at steam 15 tables?

16 A

I don't remcmber if he was or not. because I was 17 involved with the steam generators also at that point.

18 Q

You don't 19 A

I wasn't exactly just standing there with Mr.

20 Fredericks and, as that statement says, Mr. Kunder 21 talking in a social gathering of what we were going to 22 do on the pumps.

I was listening to an extent from the 23 side while watching the levels on the steam generators.

/~')

24 Q

Isn't it a fact that about the time the

(_/

25 second reactor coolant pumps were turned off,

1 l

1 Faust 525 O

2 high-pressure injection was reinitiated on full?

MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking for his 3

4 recollection?

5 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

6 Q

Isn't it a fact, just before or about the 7

same time that the second set of reactor coolant pumps a

were turned off, high-pressure injection was started 9

at full?

10 A

What I recollect on that was, high-pressure 11 injection was put on, the way I seem to remember, before 12 the pumps were taken off.

13 Q

Just before the 14 A

Is that a fact?

15 Q

Just before the second set of pumps 16 A

That is the way I recall it.

t 17 Q

Isn't it a fact that you. agreed with that 18 decision at the time, that is, the decision to start up 19 the high-pressure injection pumps on full just before 20 turning off the second set of reactor coolant pumps?

MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

He gg 21 never said they were started up on full.

He said 22 23 he had some recollection that HPI may have been

()

24 reactivated before turning off the reactor coolant 25 pumps.

You are assuming things in your question

1 Faust 526 O

2 that have not been testified to.

Q Wasn't high-pressure injection reinitiated 3

4 at full?

A I didn't do it, if that is what you mean.

5 6

Q I am not suggesting you did it.

I am just 7

asking, didn't you know at the time that high-pressure 8

injection was being reinitiated at a thousand gallons 9

per minute just before the reactor coolant pumps were 10 turned off?

11 A

I just remember it the way I said it.

I don't remember if it was at a thousand GPM or what.

I seem 12 13 to remember in time that sometime before we took the 14 pumps off, we were initiating high pressure injection.

15 That isn't something I physically did.

It is something 16 I remember hearing as being done or going to be done.

17 I don't know if it was or wasn't, actually.

18 Q

Isn't it a fact that you knew that it was 19 being done at the time?

A I didn't do it.

20 21 Q

I am not saying you turned it on.

Isn't it a fact that you knew that somebody was turning on HPI 22 23 at that point in time?

()

A why does it have to be that way?

It is the way 24 I said it.

l 25

527 FauDt 1

e

/~N MR. SELTZER:

He said he heard it was b

k 2

g ing to be done.

P 3

asking you whether you yourself did Q

I am not t

4 e

am simply asking you whether you knew b

that it had it.

I 5

been done, and by "had been done," I mean knew that HPI 6

a thousand gallons per minute.

had been turned on at I

7 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking whether he 8

the went over and checked the pump or 9

instrumentation?

10 Q

From any source whatever, did you know that 11 a thousand gallons per minute HPI had been initiated at 12 o

\\-

.13 just before the second set of reactor coolant pumps were secured?

14 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

A 15 thousand gallons, he never said he heard.

l 16 MR. FISKE:

I'am asking did he.

17 (Record read by the reporter.)

18 MR. MacDONALD:

The objection still stands.

19 A

I just remember before the pumps were turned off 20 something about high-pressure injection was initiated.

lh 21 MR. MacDONALD:

That is the fourth time.

22 You want to hear it again?

23 MR. FISKE :

I do.

I am asking a question.

[/)

24 Q

Isn't it a fact that before the second set 25

Faust 528 g

of reactor coolant pumps were turne'd off, you knew that 2

HPI had been resumed at a thousand gallons per minute, 3

and you believed that that was a good decision, the 4

reason being that you knew there was voiding in the 5

6 loops?

You were trying to achieve natural circulation, and you felt that since you were removing the coolant 7

8 flow path by turning off the reactor coolant pumps, it was important to get water into the system?

9 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

He 10 answered, and I instruct him not to answer.

You 11 asked him that question four times.

He told you 12 what he knew and what he* heard.

13 MR. FISKE:

Before you seriously persist in 14 this objection--

15 Would you read the question again?

16 MR. MacDONALD:

Break it down and go one at 17 18 a time.

You have gotten the answer to your first one.

19 MR. FISKE:

No.

20 MR. MacDONALD:

You have.

You had about 21 five questions in there and you have the answer 22 to the first one.

23 BY MR. FISKE:

D 24 (V

Q Isn't it a fact that you believed at the time 25

529 Faust 1

m injection turned on the high-pressure the pumps were 2

pumps were turned on?

n.

3 MR. FISKE:

Withdrawn.

h?

4 A

Did I state that somewhere?

e 5

MR. MacDONALD:

No, you haven't.

He is

?,

6 building in enough assumptions.

P 7

g Q

Isn't it a fact that at the time the reactor f

coolant pumps, the second set, were turned off, you knew r

9 a thousand gallons per that HPI had been initiated at 10 minute?

11 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to that and instruct 12' G(~S him not to answer.

You have that question four 13 times on the record.

You got four answers, and g4 they were all the same.

Move on to the next gg question.

16 MR. FISKE:

When we read this record, you 17 will see he never answered that question.

18 MR. MacDONALD:

He hasn't?

19 MR. FISKE:

No.

i 20 I never answered it?

lll 21 A

to whether you knew it was on at a

Q As 22 thousand gallons per minute?

23 A

Y u are saying what I recall now.

What I remember O

(,,/

24 injection being initiated now, I remember high-pressure 25

530 Fcuot 1

Prior to the pumps being shut off.

(i; 2

it was at a thousand And do you remember that

!Q-Q 3

gallons per minute?

3 4

We'll go back.

O MR. MacDONALD:

Objection.

Y' MR. FISKE:

Let him answer.

6 MR. MacDONALD:

No.

Because we are going to i

7 the answer to that.

go back, and you know you got i

8 MR. FISKE:

Tell me what it is and we'll se 9

save some time.

Is it yes or no?

\\-

10 We'll read it.

MR. MacDONALD:

11 MR. FISKE:

You tell me.

k 12 MR. MacDONALD:

If you want to ask the (h

\\'

13 question so many times, we'll go back to it.

14 MR. FISKE:

Tell me what the answer is.

15 MR. MacDONALD:

He told you he didn't recall.

16 BY MR. FISKE:

17 Is that your answer?

Q 18 told you what I did recall.

A I

19 a fact you knew or you believed Q

Isn't it 20 turned off at the time the reactor coolant pumps were 21 there was vdiding in the loops?

that 22 A

I don't remember saying that or thinking it right 23 "0"*

24 Q

Isn't it a fact that you knew at the time 25

1 Faust 531

/

2 the reactor coolant pumps were turned off that you were trying to achieve natural circulation?

3 4

A We were supposed to go on natural circulation, 5

yes.

6 Q

Isn't it a fact that you were concerned that 7

you might not achieve natural circulation because of 8

voiding in the loops and therefore felt that it was a 9

good idea to turn on HPI?

10 MR. MacDONALD:

I object to the form.

11 A

This all occurred at once?

12 MR. MacDONALD:

It is the assumption he 13 builds into the question.

14 Q

Isn't it a fact that was your state of mind 15 at the time the reactor coolant pumps were turned off?

MR. MacDONALD:

Are you asking whether he 16 17 voiced that to anyone or not, or just had some 18 cloudy thought?

19 MR. SELTZER:

This is the point we had with womack's deposition, where state of mind is 20 not something we are allowed to inquire into in 21 g

this case.

If it is not something he said to 22 23 somebody or wrote down under the Fiske rule, he is not allowed to answer.

p y

MR. FISKE:

I am trying to find out what 25

1 Faust 532

/~N 2

athis operator, who was trying to diagnose the

~

3 transient, had in his mind at the time he tried to 4

diagnose it.

Are you suggesting I can't ask him lll 5

that?

6 A

I don't remember all of what you are saying right 7

"0"-

8 BY MR. FISKE:

9 Q

Is the answer you just don't remember?

10 MR. MacDONALD:

That is what he just said.

11 A

I don't recall that.

.12 Q

Isn't it a fact that you told representatives 13 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 'in an interview 14 on April 21st that HPI was started just before the 15 second set of reactor coolant pumps were turned off and 16 started at a thousand gallons per minute?

17 MR. MacDONALD:

He is asking if you recall 18 ever giving such testimony.

19 MR. FISKE:

I am asking right now does he 20 remember doing that.

21 MR. MacDONALD:

You can show him his 22 testimony.

23 MR. FISKE:

Every time I show him his

'~N 24 testimony, he says he can't remember giving the (d

25 testimony.

1 Faust 533 O

Y 2

A Whether I specifically told the NRC that?

3 Q

Yes.

4 MR. MacDONALD:

If you can recall without 5

looking at any testimony.

6 A

I recall saying I started a pump, but I don't know 7

if it was to the NRC now.

Not that I started the pump, 8

but that the high pressure injection was initiated 9

prior to turning the RC pumps off.

10 Q

Do you remember telling anybody at any time 11 after the accident that you believed that there was 12 voiding in the loops at about the time the reactor

(

\\

13 coolant pumps were turned off?

14 A

After the accident?

15 Q

Yes.

16 A

Do I remember telling anybody that?

17 Q

Yes.

18 A

I remember telling somebody that I didn't know 10 what to think at the time.

What I meant by that, when 20 they were asking me the question, I didn't know whether 21 to separate what I was hearing after the accident or if 9

22 I was separating it, building it back into the accident.

f l

23 Q

I am referring specificall,y now to an 24 interview that you had with Mr. Robert Marsh, Mr. Dorwin O(~%

l 25 Hunter, and Mr. Larry Jackson of the Nuclear Regulatory

1 Faust 534

(~h V

2 Commission on April 21, 1979, in trailer 203 of the 3

NRC investigation site, TMI nuclear power plant, 4

Middletown, Pennsylvania.

5 MR. MacDONALD:

Do you recall?

6 A

I recall interviews with the NRC.

I don't recall 7

the specific one.

I know there are various trailers; 8

various places.

9 MR. MacDONALD:

Show us the t'estimony you 10 are referring to.

11 Q

Do you remember there was a tape recorder 12 at that interview?

O(-)

13 MR. MacDONALD:

He didn't remember the 14 interview.

At that specific interview that he told 15 you he didn't remember, you are asking if there 16 was a tape recorder?

17 Q

Do you remember tape recorders being 18 present at interviews you had with the NRC?

19 A

I remember tape recorders being present, yes.

20 Q

At this point I would like to play to Mr.

21 Faust portions of the tape of the interview of April 22 21, 1979, and I would like to mark --

23 MR. MacDONALD:

Do you have a transcript we l

l ()

24 can read along?

l 25 MR. FISK8:

I will give you a transcript of

1 1

Faust 535 I

2 the full interview, and we will mark that as the next exhibit.

g 4

(Transcript of interview of April 21, 1979 5

was marked B&W Exhibit 273 for identification, 6

as of this date.)

7 MR. FISKE:

I would like to mark as Exhibit 8

274 a tape cassette which contains an excerpt 9

from the tape recording of that interview which l

10 cov(rs pages 46 through the middle of page 51.

11 At this point, I would like the record to 12 indicate that that portion of the full tape as 13 represent,ed by Exhibit 274 is being played to 14 Mr. Faust.

15 (Tape cassette which contains an excerpt 16 from the tape recording of the interview of 17 April 21, 1979, covering pages 46 through the 18 middle of page 51 of the transcript, was marked 19 B&W Exhibit 274 for identification, as of this

)

20 date.)

21 (Tape being played.)

gg 22 BY MR. FISKE:

23 Q

Were you asked those questions and did you

/~b)/

24 give those answe rs that we just heard on the tape that 25 was played?

1 Faust 536 O

ty 2

MR. MacDONALD:

He is asking for your 3

recollection.

4 A

I recall being asked questions about the RC pumps, 5

Y***

6 Q

My specific question is, were you asked the 7

questions and did you give the answers that we just g

heard on that tape?

g MR. MacDONALD:

He just told you what his 10 recollection was.

11 MR. FISKE:

Please.

12 A

I don't recall giving the answers in that form, 7-t 13 no.

I don't recall everything I said 'about this whole 14 incident.

15 Q

Do you have any reason as you sit here to 16 believe that that tape does not accurately reflect what 17 you said to Mr. Marsh and Mr. Hunter of the NRC on the l

18 day that tape was made?

l 19 A

I have reason to believe that statements that I 20 had made earlier could very possibly be, how do you want 21 to say, my ideas,of how I was trying to tell them at 22 that time could have been influenced by things I was 23 hearing after the accident.

(O_)

24 Q

That is not the question.

25 MR. FISKE:

I move to strike it.

1 Faust 537 q-)

2 MR. MacDONALD:

You don't have to raise your 3

v ice to strike.

Just ask the question.

4 MR. FISKE:

I am trying to get an answer.

lll 5

MR. MacDONALD:

You don't have to raise 6

your voice to intimidate the witness.

7 MR. FISKE:

I am hardly trying to 8

intimidate the witness.

I am getting exasperated g

by your instruction.

10 BY MR. FISKE:

11 Q

My question is simply, do you have any 12 reason to believe that the tape that you just heard did 13 not accurately reflect what you said to Mr. Marsh and g4 Mr. Hunter on that day?

15 A

That it accurately reflected what I was thinking 16 that day?

17 Q

What you said.

18 A

There is a difference.

19 Q

I know.

I would like an answer to my 20 question.

21 MR. FISKE:

I move to strike the answer that 22 I just received, and I will put the question again.

l l

23 Q

Do you have any reason to believe as you sit l

(~h 24 here now that that tape we just heard does not accurately O

25 reflect what you said to Mr. Marsh and Mr. Hunter that

i 1

Faust 538 O

2 day?

3 A

Not outright like you are stating it.

4 Q

The answer is no?

%lh 5

MR. MacDONALD:

The answer is what he said.

6 A

It is more than a yes or no answer.

7 Q

I think you can tell us, do you have any 8

basis as you sit there for tel ing u? that that tape 9

does not accurately reflect what you said to Mr. Marsh 10 and Mr. Hunter on that day?

11 MR. MacDONALD:

Objection.

I think he gave 12 the answer twice.

~

,,)

's_

13 MR. FISKE':

I think it is a very easy 14 question to answer yes or no.

15 MR. MacDONALD:

He answers it the way he is 16 going to answer it.

17 MR. FISKE:

I am entitled to a responsive 18 answer.

j 19 MR. MacDONALD:

He gave you the answer.

20 Could you repeat the answer he gave to the 21 question?

22 (Record read by tha reporter.)

23 A

That is my answer.

f'))

g4 (Recess taken.)

%s 25

1 Faust 539 l

2 BY MR. FISKE:

3 Q

Going back to this period of time that we 4

have just been talking about before the break, that is, h

5 the period of time when the second set of reactor 6

coolant pumps were turned off, it is a fact, is it not, 7

that after, at some point after HPI had been initiated, 8

you received instructions to reduce the flow?

9 MR. MacDONALD:

Mr. Faust himself received 10 instructions?

11 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

12 A

I did not receive those instructions, no.

13 Q

Do you know for a fact that at some point 14 after HPI was initiated during this period of time we 15 are talking about, instructions were given to reduce the 16 flow?

17 A

You are talking about when we were involved with 18 the RC pumps?

19 Q

Yes.

Starting at the time period around 20 5:40 when the second set of reactor coolant pumps were 21 turned off and just before that HPI was initiated.

O 22 Now'I am asking you whether you know that 23 sometime after that, instructions were given to reduce

/Q 24 the flow on HPI.

wl 25 A

I don't recall instructions like that myself.

I

1 Faust 540

(

2 didn't do it, if that is what occurred at that point.

3 Q

Do y u know that the flow of HPI was 4

reduced?

5 A

sometime prior to the RC pumps being turned off?

6 Q

No.

7 A

Or just after they were turned off?

g Q

Sometime after the RC pumps were turned off, g

isn't it a fact that the flow of HPI was reduced?

10 MR. MacDONALD:

Some point in time throughout 11 the day?

At any time throughout the day?

12 A

Anytime through the day, yes, it was reduced.

I 13 don't know if it was right at that time period that it 14 was reduced right after the RC pumps had been turned 15 off.

I am not sure of the time when it was reduced, 16 when it fits in.

17 Q

You were aware at the time the flow was 18 reduced that that was happening, were you not?

19 A

I was involved with the secondary side of the plant 20 at that point.

I was feeding the steam generators up, 21 increasing the level of the g

steam generators.

We had 22 isolated the B generator which we isolated prior to 23 that.

I was given word to unisolate it.

24 Q

Isn't it a fact that you knew that the HPI s_/

25 flow had been reduced and that you disagreed with that

1 Faust 541 m

2 action?

3 MR. MacDONALD:

At what point in time?

4 MR. FISKE:

The point in time after the llh 5

high-pressure injection was initiated at or about 6

the time the reactor coolant pumps were turned off.

7 MR. MacDONALD:

At any time after that?

8 MR. FISKE:

Yes, let's start with that.

g A

There was a point in time after the reactor 10 coolant pumps, there was a point in time after the RC 11 pumps had been turned off that I disagreed with 12 throttling back on the makeup flow.

At what point that

()

13 was, I don't recall.

14 Q

Were you operating the makeup flow?

15 A

Right at that point?

16 Q

Yes.

17 A

No.

18 Q

Was there 19 A

We are talking about right after the RC pumps got 20 turned off.

I wasn't on makeup.

21 Q

was there a time during the day while you O

22 were on makeup --

23 A

Yes.

'N 24 Q

-- when you were told to reduce the flow?

l 25 A

Yes.

1 Faust 542 2

Q Did you disagree with that decision?

A I d n't remember if it was just one decision on 3

4 it.

I remember disagreeing with the decision to cut l

5 back on RCS flow.

6 Q

At the time you were manning the pumps, the 7

fl0W7 8

A I believe, yes.

This is where I have a problem 9

with my testimony, because I have given previous testimony 10 on things and talked about it, and the frame of mind 11 they asked me what I thought had happened, and I was 12 giving my recollection not only on my own, but what I 13 thought other people were doing at that time, and it 14 became fairly common to start talking along that line 15 when I was talking about testimony or just talking to 16 a group of the NRC because they were asking me that way.

17 Q

Let's get one thing straight.

Going back 18 to the tape that we heard just before the break in 19 which the next to last question and answer were:

l 20 "What was the reasoning behind initiating 21 safety injection?

g f

22

" Faust:

You are taking off your main coolant i

23 flow path now, so our trend of thought was, at least gN 24 mine was, you want water going in the re. "

l

\\_]

25 That is page 51.

1

= _ _.

1 Faust 543 2

When you made that statement as to what 3

your trend of thought was, you weren't basing that on 4

what somebody else told you after the accident?

5 MR. MacDONALD You are asking what his 6

recollection is when he said that?

7 A

I don't remember those -- I don't remember that 8

exactly stating it that way.

It is not even that I 9

don't remember stating it that way.

I don't recall the 10 whole form of what I was saying at that time and what I 11 was thinking when I was speaking to those people.

12 MR. SELTZER:

Let him finish.

13 MR. FISKE:

I think he is finished.

14 A

That is what I was trying to say earlier.

When 15 I was giving these, a lot of time we were asked in the 16 form of, what did you think or what was it -- what did 17 you think they were doing, and to a point that is what 18 I was also trying to say as having a problem with keeping 19 straight what I heard after the accident occurred.

I 20 was actually using terms, I was becoming worried about 21 terms that I didn't normally or hadn't used that day 22 that I can recall.

23 Q

I am just talking about this one answer 24

)

that you gave, which is at the top of page 51 of the

%J 25 transcript, when you said, "Our trend of thought was,

1 Faust 544

(')N

(

2 at least mine was, you want water going in there."

3 I am simply asking you, when you made that 4

statement, are you telling us that that was based on llh 5

what somebody else told you after the accident?

6 A

I don't recall what I was basing -- what my 7

thinking was at that point when I was saying that.

8 Q

It goes on, the same answer, "You are trying 9

to establish circulation, but to me we were also under 10 situations that really didn't indicate that to me, that 11 we were going to make it, because we started to 12 cavitate our pumps."

(*

13 In that sentence were you basing that on 14 what somebody else told you after the accident?

15 MR. MacDONALD: "Trying to establish natural 16 circulation" is what it says.

17 Q

Were you basing that statement on what 18 somebody else had told you after the accident?

19 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking for his 20 recollection?

21 A

I d n'c recall what I was basing it on at that 22 point.

23 Q

The next sentence, "It is,a lot of the 24 indication to me was a lot of voids, whatever you want

[s\\

~

25 to call it.

Voiding out in the loops."

1 Fauot 545

^h

[O 2

A That is what I am saying.

I don't remember saying "v ids" the day of the accident.

I had heard an awful 3

4 lot of voids after the accident and also saturation lh 5

was a big point after the accident.

6 Q

You heard the tape, did you not?

A Yes, I did.

That is what I am trying to say.

I 7

8 had a problem separating what I heard and from what I was thinking the day of the accident.

g 10 Q

When you said on that tape, "The indication 11 to me was a lot of voids, whatever you want to call it, 12 voiding out in the loops," are you telling us you made

}

13 that statement based on something you heard after the 14 accident?

15 A

I started using terms after the accident, it I

16 became easy almost to use terms like that to discuss 17 things because it was be' coming commonplace to talk about 18 it.

19 Q

My question is, when you were asked "What the reasoning behind initiating safety injection,"

20 was 21 and you answered, "The indication to me was 9

a lot of 22 voids, whatever -you want to call it, voiding out in the 23 loops," are you telling us that that statement was based 24 on s mething you heard after the accident?

O

\\'

25 MR. MacDONALD:

I think you heard his answer

1 Faust 546 k_x) 2 twice.

A Are you waiting for another answer 2 3

4 Q

Yes.

ll 5

MR. MacDONALD:

If it is any different.

6 A

I don't recall what the statement was made on.

7 Q

You are not telling us that someone after 8

the accident told you what you were thinking at the time HPI was initiated?

9 10 A

If you listen to what I said.

What I said was that 11 we were being questioned a lot.

We were hearing a lot 12 of talk about voiding in the core after the accident

)

13 and steam, conditions, saturation.

That is what I am 1

14 saying.

It became difficult for me to talk about 15 something that I was trying to remember during the 16 accident the way I thought and the way I was beginning 17 to think after the accident.

That is what I was saying.

18 I was going through some of these, some of my statements 19 with these people.

It became hard to keep it out of 20 it.

That is why I am saying -- I don't know if I even 21 thought of the word " void" during the whole day of the l

l 22 a c ci den t.

l 23 Q

Are you saying that when you were asked 24 a question, what was the reasoning behind initiating (a~]

25 safety injection, and you said, "The indication to me was

Faust 547 1

a lot o f voids," a lot of voiding in the loops, that 2

that was based on -- that your answer as to what your 3

reasoning was at the time of the accident was based on 4

something you learned later?

5 MR. MacDONALD:

He told you three times nov 6

the answer to that question.

7 MR. FISKE:

I want to be sure he has plenty 8

of opportunity to consider that question.

9 10 A

out of all the testimony I have given, I am supposed to consider that one little point?

13 12 Q

That is the one I am talking about.

O A

I know you are.

That is why I am saying I am Am/

13 having a hard time remembering what I said and what I 34 recall telling a lot of people about the accident.

15 MR. FISKE:

We would like to mark as the 16 next exhibit, 275, a letter from Mr.

G.

K.

Hovey, 17 18 Vice President and Director of TMI-2, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated May 11, 1981, 19 which transmits what is described as the final 20 report of the TMI-2 accident of March 28, 1979, 21 and the licensee event report, and the letter 22 refers to five attachments which will be include 6 23 as part of this exhibit.

f^J) 24

\\_

(Letter from Mr.

G.

K.

Hovey, Vice President 25

Faust 548 1

0) and Director of TMI-2, to the Nuclear Regulatory

'(_,

2 Commission, dated May 11, 1981, with attachments, 3

was marked B&W Exhibit 275 for identification, as 4

I of this date.)

5 6

Q Let me show you attachment D.

Do you see attachment D to that exhibit?

7 g

MR. MacDONALD:

Are you asking whether he has ever seen the document?

9 10 MR. FISKE:

That is exactly what I am asking.

MR. MacDONALD:

D or the whole thing?

11 12 MR. FISKE:

The document describes sequence

(

13 of events.

MR. MacDONALD:

Attachment D does.

34 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

15 16 A

1 have seen a sequence of events.

17 Q

Do you remember seeing that document, 18 attachment D?

19 A

I believe I have seen this one, yes.

The sequence of events.

20 21 Q

Did anybody give you a document that looked like that and ask you to review it to be sure that it 22 23 was accurate, to the best of your recollection?

A If I got everything in it.

'N 24 V

25 Q

I am not asking now about all the charts

l Faust 549 1

(

2 and graphs that are attached at the end.

I am just talking of the narrative description which is part of 3

attachment D.

4 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking if he was 5

6 given this revision to review?

MR. FISKE:

I am not asking specifically 7

8 whether he received that one.

g Q

Did you receive a document that looked like 10 that?

11 A

I received a sequence of events of Three Mile 12 Island that I was looking over.

I don't think I looked O

13 over the whole thing.

14 Q

My question was, did you see any document that looked like this upon which you made any correc. ions?

t 15 16 A

I don't recall if I made corrections to it.

I received a document that I was going over documents 17 18 in the sequence of events.

I don't recall the 19 corrections.

20 Q

Going back to the time that the second set of reactor coolant pumps were turned off, did you lll 21 22 disagree with that course of action?

A I didn't feel like turning the pumps off, the 23 i

best I can recall.

I had a disagreement with just the 24 idea of taking the pumps off.

25 1

1 Faust 550 d

2 Q

Did you express that position to anybody?

A I expressed it in the form o2, are you sure you 3

4 want to do this?

I believe that was it.

I think I said h

5 it three times when I was doing it.

6 Q

who did you say that to?

7 A

Bill.

g Q

Zewe?

9 A

Yes.

10 Q

What did he say?

11 A

I don't recall him saying anything.

He gave me 12 the order.to take the pumps off.

13 Q

What was your reason for feeling that the 14 pumps should not be turned off?

15 A

I don't recall what my reasons were at that time 16 or if it was reasons.

I just don't remember if it was 17 the feeling of taking four reactor coolant pumps off.

18 Q

Did you hear anyone else at the time express 19 that same feeling?

20 A

I d n't recall anybody else expressing or saying 21 that.

22 Q

You do recall a time when you were at the 23 makeup panel and you were told to reduce the flow of 24 HPI?

25 A

I recall being given orders to reduce the flow o.f HPI.

l 1

Faust 551 h

V 2

Q Who was it that gave you that order?

A I thought it was Ross.

I am not sure, though.

3 At that time I wasn't sure who was behind me.

I was 4

5 given instructions to reduce high-pressure injection 6

flow to I believe the staggered flow in the loops.

7 Q

At one point, isn't it a fact that you shut l

l 8

off one of the pumps 9

MR. MacDONALD:

you are talking of HPI now?

10 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

and throttled the valves on the others?

11 Q

~

MR. MacDONALD:

At the same time?

12 13 Q

Isn't it a fact that after you received 14 these instructions to reduce t,he flow of HPI, you i

15 reduced the flow in part by throttling the valves, the 16 16's that you described earlier?

17 A

To do~the'erder.that

.I recall being given, 18 I throttled back, they told me to shoot for 100 GPM

{

19 per leg, staggered across the pumps.

I don't remember 20 which staggered pattern it was.

I took two of the valves and shut them and 21 22 I was throttling the flow on the other two.

23

Earlier, 24 Q

I am just talking of this point in time.

25 A

I don't know which point in time this is.

1 Faust 552 0

2 Q

That is after you received this instruction.

That is all I am talking about.

You said that you 3

4 throttled the flow in part by use of the 16 valves?

llh 5

A Right.

6 Q

I am just saying, isn't it a fact that at 7

some point during that period you for some period of 8

time shut down one of the pumps, closed it off?

A I don't think so.

I don't know if it was during 9

10 that point in time or not.

There was a point in time 11 where I throttled -- I was receiving instructions to 12 throttle back flow.

I became very concerned about the

(~)T

(_

13 reactor coolant pumps and their" operation, making sure' 14 because of the starts and stops we were having from 15 the building pressure, we would be getting an 16 initiation on building pressure, and I would end up 17 going to a one-pump configuration because we were backed 18 off.

19 I remember getting back flow with about 80 GPM.

I said, "I am back far enough."

I didn't want 20 21 two pumps on.

22 I talked to Fred, I think it was, and told 23 him what I was g'oing to do.

I backed off and took off

/~'

N. )N 24 a pump.

I was down to one pump at the time, at that 25 point in time somewhere.

1 Faust 553

~

2 Q

Was that Fred Scheiman that you mean by

"##*d"?

3 4

A Yes.

llh 5

Q Going back to the period of time right after 6

you opened the 12's, allowing emergency feedwater to flow into the steam generator, during that period of 7

8 time right after that, did you have any procedure in front of you that you were working with?

9 10 A

When I opened the emergency feedwater valves?

11 Q

After that.

12 A

Right at that point, no. Not that I remember.

I

/~T 13 was still following up on mem*ory.

14 Q

was there a point during the accident after 15 that when you did get out a specific procedure?

16 A

I didn't get any procedures out.

They were handed 17 to me.

18 Q

What procedures were handed to you?

19 A

The one I recall was the leak in the steam 20 generator.

Steam leak in the steam generator.

21 Q

Were you attempting during this period of time to determine what the cause of this transient was?

22 23 A

I think we were trying to do that all day.

(~}

74 Q

At some point after the 12's were opened V

25 allowing emergency feedwater to flow into the steam

1 Fauot 554 (S) 2 generator, did you become aware that there had been a decrea8e in pressure in the primary system?

3 l

4 A

I don't recall the point in time I became aware of llh 5

a decrease in pressure.

6 Q

Was there some time starting with the first 7

question during the transient when you became aware g

that there was a decreast in pressure?

A on the steam generator.

9 10 Q

On the primary side?

11 A

I just don't remember what point I became aware 12 that it was called out that we had a decrease in

()

13 primary pressure.

I knew we had a decrease of pressure 14 in the primary, but when, I am not sure.

15 Q

can you tell us now whether you learned of 16 a decrease in pressure on the primary side before the 17 first reactor coolant pump was turned off?

18 MR. MacDONALD:

From his. recollection, 19 whether that happened on the day of the accident?

20 MR. FISKE:

Yes.

A Whether the reactor coolant pump was turned off, 91 22 I believe I was ' aware of decrease of pressure in the 23 primary.

,x 24 Q

When you found out about the decrease of 25 pressure in the primary, did you find out what the

1 Faust 555 O

2 pressure in fact was?

A The way I remember pressure that day was pressure 3

4 was low and level was high in the pressurizer.

5 Q

Did you learn that pressure had gone down 6

below the actuation point for high-pressure injection?

7 A

I knew we had actuated high-pressure injection 8

at some time, yes.

9 Q

Before the first set of reactor coolant 10 pumps was turned off, did you learn that there had been 11 an increase in reactor building temperature?

12 A

I don't recall temperature increasing.

I recall 13 it was more along the lines of reactor building 14 pressure.

15 Q

Let's take pressure first.

16 Do you remember reactor building pressure 17 increasing before the first reactor coolant pumps were 18 turned off?

In other words, at any time up to the 19 time the first reactor coolant pumps were turned off, 20 did it come to your attention that reactor building 21 pressure had increased?

22 A

I don't recall when it was.

I am not sure when it 23 was.

I knew I was looking for reasons for pressure 24 going up in the building, and I suspected the generator 25 and possible having a steam leak.

Faust 556 1

U<~s 2

Q Is it your recollection that you were doing that at some point before the first reactor coolant 3

4 pumps were turned off, which was about ten minutes after 5:007 5

6 A

I think I was suggesting the possibilities.

Once again, I was watching the steam generator pressure and 7

8 levels mainly at the time.

I was also working on the g

bypass.

I was controlling the four stations at the 10 time, the manual.

11 Q

I understand that you were doing a lot of 12 different things.

O 13 A

I can't remember if I was saying it at that point.

\\~/

I am trying to figure out when I was looking st it 14 15 with respect to that.

16 Q

was there a strip chart that showed 17 building pressure in the control room?

1 81 A

Yes, it was on the panel across from me.

I didn't go over and actually look at pressure.

I believe 19 it was what I heard.

I can't place in time when it was.

20 Q

tare y u saying that whatever you learned 21 about reactor building pressure, you learned from 22 23 something somebody said rather than by looking at this ID chart?

q,}

24 A

Yes.

s 25 s

557 Faust 1

O 2

Q Did you learn sometime during the accident that reactor building temperature had increased?

3 A

That I am not sure of.

I don't know if I knew 4

that that day now.

Maybe I should say, realized it that 5

6 day.

Q was there instrumentation available in the 7

control room which would have indicated temperature?

g A

Yes, on the back panel.

g 10 Q

were you aware at any time before the first reactor coolant pumps were turned off~that there had gi 12 been an increase in the reactor building sump level?

()

A I don't recall.

13 Q

Did you make any effort any time up to 14 the time the first reactor coolant pumps were turned 15 off to find out whether there had been an increase in 16 the reactor building sump level?

17 MR. MacDONALD:

You are asking whether he 18 over spoke to anybody or looked at the instruments?

19 MR. FISKE:

Any effort.

20 A

I d n't recall doing that.

lll

~

any effort before the first 21 Q

Did you make 22 reactor coolant pumps were turned off to try to find 23 f ( s) out what building temperature was?

24 u

MR. MacDONALD:

You are talking of Mr. Faust i

25

558 Faust 1

O Personally?

2

"** #I8 3

A I don't recall knowing that.

4 Q

Did you make any effort to find out whether 5

there had been any high radiation alarms in the reactor 6

building?

7 A

Before the pumps went off?

g Q

Yes.

9 A

I remember about that, we had two radiation alarms.

10 Q

In other words, two radiation alarms had gg 12 90"* Off?

O A

Yes, early.

13 Q

Which ones were those?

14 A

The ones on the letdown coolers for the 15 intermediate side of it.

They are located down on the 16 letdown coolers in the reactor building basement.

17 18 Q

Are those 1091 and 1092?

A A

I d n't remember the numbers on those two 19 right now.

It sounds right.

20 Q

Did you attribute those alarms to the fact 21 that there was background radiation in the vicinity of 22 the sump?

23 A

No.

We talked about it earlier.

They were in for (mj g

a while.

We thought it was at the time.

25

559 Faust 1

O Q

When you say "we talked" 2

A I 9"*** ~"*

i' # ##* **

3 Q

My question is, did you think at the time 4

that this was background in the intermediate area?

5 A

I think we thought it was -- I remember we thought 6

we had a CRUD burst in the system.

It was probably due 7

to letdown from that possibly.

g Q

Isn't it a fact that you also thought that 9

this radiation alaru might be attributable to background 10 in the intermediate area?

11 A

It would be background.

12 O

Q What do you mean by background?

13 A

Those things, what I recall we were thinking, it 14 may have been possibly a leak in the letdown coolers.

15 It was a possibility, but then we were also saying we 16 maybe had a CRUD burst which got into the letdown g7 system which somehow the detectors are sitting down in 18 that area and maybe it was affecting.

19 Q

A leak in the letdown area would produce 20 background --

21 A

In the intermediate system.

We sort of checked 22 that by just--somebody else checked that, I didn't, 23 as far as level change in the intermediate system O

Qj 24 itself.

It was just that I remember attributed to a 25 t

560 Faust 1

e b) i CRUD burst causing higher levels in the area.

2 How did you think a CRUD burst had caused Q

3 higher levels in the area?

4 Moving contamination down in the line.

A 5

Q Did you remember that this was a high-level 6

alarm?

7 A

I believe so.

g Q

Had you ever seen a high-level alarm on g

10 that, on those monitors before?

A There were alarms on it.

I don't remember if 11 they were high or not now.

J2 O

Had you ever seen a high-level alarm on Q

13 those monitors produced by a CRUD burst?

74 A

That is what I am saying.

I don't know if I ever 15 saw a CRUD burst on it before.

I didn't exactly know 16 what the effects of it would be.

37 18 Q

I think you referred earlier to a 227 alarm.

A HPR 227.

Atmospheric alarm in the reactor gg building, off the reactor building.

20 Q

G ing back to the 1091/1092 monitors that we 21 were talking about just a moment ago, isn't it a fact 22 that you believed that those monitors were on alarm 23 because of high background resulting from dumping water

()

24 into the sump?

25

~'

  • l 561 Faust 1

b' A

I don't recall that at this time.

2 Q

Let me ask you, referring to page 54 of the 3

transcript of the interview of April 21 4

A If I said that --

5 Q

Let's take it one step at a time.

6 Page 54, the April 21 transcript, the last 7

two sentences on the statement that appears on the top 8

of page 54, "And we really didn't have any problems with 9

the level on the intermediate closed surge tank 10 to indicate a primary secondary leak on the letdown 11 coolers, so it was just reasoned out it is down cear 12 o-the. sump down there and it is high, probably high 13 background right now because we were dumping water in 34 the sump."

15 Did you make that statement to the NRC?

16 A

The answer I gave on that --

g7 Q

why d n't I

read the question and the 18 entire answer.

The question is on page 53 and the 19 answer is on 53 and 54.

20 were you asked this My question to you is, 21 question and did you give this answer to Mr. Hunter 22 f the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on April 21, 19797 23 f3

" Question You saw it dip?

What was next, g

what was the next thing you saw or that you recall at 25 1

t 1

Faust 562 l

(%J

)

2 that time?

" Faust:

That is where I can't remember what 3

I did exactly.

O.K.,

we just started a pump.

There is 4

5 a hard part here on time, but the next thing we really 6

started, like I said before this, we had noticed or indicated that intermediate letdown coolers had alarms 7

3 on the rad monitors back there, as far as the secondary closed side of it, which we pointed out and reasoned g

just due 10 that due to probably the location of the 11 to the location of those detectors, which are down by the 12 letdown coolers, were outside the room from it, but O

13 they are down in that area of the letdown coolers, the sensors are

- that just high background was probably g4 15 setting it off at this time down there.

There are 16 things I am missing right now because I can't remember when we started seeing building pressure come up, 17 18 because at the time the answer that I got back, I said, 19 why the heck are we getting that?

It would indicate a l

leak in the heat exchanger to me, going pessible leak, 20 and we really didn't have any problems with the level 21 on the intermediate closed surge tank to indicate a 22 23 primary secondary leak on the letdown coolers.

( )

"So,it was just reasoned out it's down near 24 25 the sump down there, and it is high, probably high

1 Faust 563

/~N 2

background right now because we were dumping water in l

the sump.

3 4

"Mr.

Hunter Being high background, would 5

that mean that it was primary coolant to you, a 6

radioactive coolant of some type?

7

" Faust Yes, it would have to be."

g A

Keep going.

g MR. MacDONALD:

Keep reading.

I i

10 MR. SELTZER:

Read the part where, "I

11 visualize a lot of CRUD."

(

Q "To tell you the truth, I figured it was

.12 13 at the time I thought this, but$ I was thinking that was j

\\

14 sort of -- I hate to say this, too -- but that was sort 15 of an intermediate problem to me, to what we were having 16 out front.

So, it was said high background, and for 17 some reason, I visualized a lot of CRUD coming out of 18 the system because of the thermal shock we had just 19 put it through, and probably coming down in through the 20 letdown coolers.

You really have to get into it.

I 21 don't have a real feel for what kind of curie contien t 22 microcuries, you'd be seeing in this CRUD of such a 23 CRUD burst.

I pictured that it would be a big one and I 24 just figured that possibly it would be coming from there."

25 First of all, were you asked those questions

I 1

Fcuot 564

(

2 and did you give those answers to Mr. Hunter of the NRC on April 21, 1979?

3 4

A I don't recall the whole interview, no.

I recall lll 5

giving an interview to him.

6 Q

so the answer is no?

A I don't know.

I don't recall all.

I recall 7

8 giving the interview and some answers seem familiar to me.

I can explain what I think I was saying there.

9 10 Q

The first question is simply whether or not 11 you were asked those questions and gave those answers, 12 and the answer is you don't remember?

()

13 A

I don't recall the whole interview like that.

I 14 recall giving an interview to the NRC.

15 Q

Going to the 227 atmospheric monitor that 16 you referred to earlier, was there an alarm signal 17 somewhere on the instrument panel for that alarm?

18 A

There was a readout for alarm on the RMS panel.

19 There is a readout that has alarms on it.

20 Q

And the RMS panel is in the control room?

A Yes, it is.

21 O

22 Q

Did you ever go back at any time during the 23 accident to check that alarm to see whether there was a radiation alarm for the 227 monitor, for the 227 24 73 25 alarm?

I 1

Faust 565

[ ')

k/

2 A

We had a clear board at the time with the excepti n f the point in time that I was thinking 3

4 about those two alarms.

I didn't notice any other alarms.

5 Q

Did y u ever go to that alarm to see whether 6

or not there was an alarm signal for the 227 that had been activated?

7 8

A It is up in front of you and I didn't see one on it.

That is why I noticed those two.

9 10 Q

Which two?

11 A

The intermediate closed that we were discussing.

.12 Like I said earlier, why they would be in.

13 Q-So is it your testimony that at no time 14 during the sequence of events on the morning of March 15 28 up to the time of the turning off of the first 16 reactor coolant pumps did you see any radiation alarm 17 for the 227 mq,nitor?

18 A

I don't recall seeing any.

19 (Time noted:

4:30 p.m.)

20 21 CRAIG C.

FAUST g

22 Subscribed and sworn to 23 before me this day of O,-

24 1981.

m 25

1 566

/~b}

CERTIFICATE 2

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

- 3

ss.:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

4

(

I, JOSEPH R.

DANYo

, a Notary Public of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the continued deposition of CRAIG C.

FAUST Was taken before 8

me on FRIDAY, AUGUST 21, 1981 consisting 9

of pages 413

_through 565 I further certify that the witness had been previously sworn and that the within (O

transcript is a true record"of said testimony; j

13 That I am not connected by blood er marriage with any of the said parties nor interested directly or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of the counsel.

18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this'/ k~

day of (4 h/f /17/,

.9 20

/

21

6. xt /. o_

~

SEPH R.

DANYo O

24 v

25

..