ML20072H084

Reaffirms Info Provided to Nrc,Re Operator Training, Technical Support & Probabilistic Safety Assessment in Support TS Change Request 168

ML20072H084
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	08/19/1994
From:	Link B WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-NRC-94-057, CON-NRC-94-57 VPVPD-94-080, VPVPD-94-80, NUDOCS 9408250202
Download: ML20072H084 (12)

Text

.

D Wisconsin iElectnc POWER COMPANY

' 231 W Mchgan, Po Box 2046 Mdwoul.ee W! 5320b2046 (414)221 2345 VPNPD-94-080 10 CFR 50.4 NRC-94-057 10 CFR 50.90 August 19, 1994 3

Document Control Desk U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REOUEST 168 MODIFICATION TO TS 15.3.3,

" EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM, AUXILIARY COOLING SYSTEMS, AIR RECIRCULATION FAN COOLERS. AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY;" 15.3.4,

" STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM;"

AND 15.3.7,

" AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS" POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANTS, UNITS 1 AND 2 In a letter dated August 9, 1994, we submitted Technical Specifications Change Request 168.

This Technical Specifications Change Request proposes to increase the allowed outage times for one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump and for the standby emergency power for the Unit 1, Train B, 4160 Volt safeguards bus (A06) from 7 to 12 days and provides clarification that the service water pump (P-32E) operating with power supplied by the Alternate r

Shutdown System is operable from offsite power.

These are one-time extensions of specific existing allowed outage times.

This letter reaffirms information provided to NRC staff in conference calls on August 17, 1994, regarding operator training, technical support, and the probabilistic safety assessment in support of Technical Specifications Change Request 168.

Operator Trainina All Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators will be trained on the' Technical Specifications for the allowed outage time extension and the procedures that will be used for the connection

)

process.

The connection process procedures, called installation work plans (IWPs), contain the appropriate compensatory measures and contingency actions as described in the original Technical Specifications Change Request 168.

Ot :

000 s u.

9408250202 940819 PDR ADDCK 05000266 w guyHM>&LW O'9mN"'

[88/

P YDR Ill

Document Control Desk August 18, 1994 Page 2 i

Technical Sunnort i

continuous technical support for the operating crews will be provided by an on-call Senior Reactor Operator with detailed knowledge of the connection process.

In addition, there will be an IWP coordinator on site at all times during the connection process.

The IWP coordinators will be technically qualified personnel with detailed knowledge of the connection process.

The IWP coordinators will be responsible for the following:

1.

Monitoring the status of the connection process and completion of the procedural steps that are being performed.

l 2.

Periodically updating the operating crew regarding the status of the connection process.

3.

Providing updates to the refueling outage planning committee to coordinate the connection process with refueling outage activities.

Probabilistic Safety Assessment Additional information regarding the methodology and results of the probabilistic safety assessment performed for the connection process is attached to this letter.

Please feel free to contact us if you have any additional questions.

Sincerely, Bob Link Vice President Nuclear Power CAC/jg Attachments cc:

NRC Resident Inspector NRC Regional Administrator, Region III Public Service Commission of Wisconsin Subscribed and sworn before me on this PPh day of Avaosi 1994.

lu Ybttr.

nu ottr$)Public, 3 tate of Wisconsin My ommission expires IO/27/96

/

I

PSA Analysis ofInterim EDG Tie-In Configuration in Support of LCO Extension Request EnrpnSn To model the interim condition of 2A06 being out of service in support of the G04 Tie-in.

Initia1 CondiljDng 4160 VAC bus 2A06 de-energized 480 VAC bus 2004 being supplied from 2B03 via the cross-tie All major loads off of 2B04 in " Pull-out" to prevent overlaading G01 (including P32D, P38B,2P-1 IB, DOS, D109 (normal supply), K2B, K38)

Service Water Pamp P32E being supplied from alternate shutdown power 125VDC bus D02 being supplied by D09 (Alternate Supply)

Modeling Angrondu Method 1 Method 2

- Set Failure of 2B04 = 1.0

- Set Failure of 2804 = 0.0

- Set all other related or affected failures = 0.0

- Set affected component failure rates = 1.0 Pro's:

Pro's:

- Captures all cutsets that involve multiple

- Captures all cutsets that involve single components powered from 2B04.

components powered from 2B04.

- Allows more detailed modeling Con's:

Con's:

- Might miss cutsets that only have one

- Might miss cutsets that have multiple piece of equipment powered from 2B04.

components powered from 2B04.

Logie Model:

1. use Method 2, failing the highest probability basic event for each piece of equipment, and setting every other failure rate associated with that component = 0.0.

2. Since no other testing or maintence will be allowed to be performed during this tie-in, set all testing and maintenance unavailability numbers (TM) to 0.0.

3. Since this tie-in will be performed while Unit 2 is defueled, failures of Unit 2 specific safety systems or components are of no consequence. This is the way that the PSA model is currently set up, so no changes to the model are required to capture this fact.

4. All common mode failure rates in which the affected piece of equipment is part of the group are set =

0.0, with the exception of the common mode failure of every component in the group (i.e. M of M) which will be kept at it's normal value.

5. The SW pumps that are powered from 2B04 (P-32D,E) will be modeled as occupying opposite roles from their actual condition during the outage period. P-32E will be running during the outage, powered from alternate SD power. P-32D will be in " pull-out" during the outage period. Due to limitations in the PSA model, this must be reversed. The PSA model assumes that there are two normally running SW pumps (P-32A,D), and therefore that there are unique failure modes that only apply to these pumps. In order to capture these failure modes, this simulation will leave P-32D as the normally running pump. P-32E is normally a stand-by pump, therefore failing it will approximate the impact of failing P-32D when it is occupying the role of a stand-by pump.

6. DC bus D-02 will be powered from the swing inverter D-09 during the outage, since the normal inverter D-08 will be in " pull-out" for the entire outage. D-09 is not included in the PSA model, and therefore all of the normal failure modes of D-08 will be left unchanged. This will simulate all of the possible failure modes of D-09.

l

Component Basic Event Basic Event Description of Model Modeled Set = 1.0 Set = 0.0 Electrical Supply 416-BKR-CO-A5247 Prevents double counting component failures. These 416-BKR-CO-A5269 failures have much lower probabilities than those of 416-BKR-CO-A5270 the individual components, so no valid cutsets will 416-BS--LP-02A04 be lost by setting these events = 0.0.

416-BS--LP-02A06 416-X---LP-02X 14 480-BKR-CO-5225B 480-BS--LP-02B04 G02 DG--DG--FR-00G02 Fails G02. Taken OOS for Day 1 of outage only!

G02 will be back in service to supply Unit I from Day 2 through the end of the outage.

DG--DG--FS-00G02 Prevents double counting G02 failure probabilities.

DG--DG--TM-00G02 DG-DG--CM-G0102 125-BKR-CO DI328 FO--MOV-OC-03931 SW-- AOV-CC-02838 SW-- AOV-CM-28389 SW--AOV-TM-02838 SW--MV--PG-00061 VDG-W---FS-0012C VDG-W---FR-0012C VDG-W---FS-0012D VDG-W---FR-0012D VDG-W---CM-12 A BC VDG-W---CM-12A BD VDG-W--CM-12 ACD VDG W---CM-12BCD V DG-W---CM-012 AC VDG-W---CM-012AD VDG-W---CM-012BC VDG-W---CM-012 BD VDG-W---CM-012CD P-32D IiOIE; All of the normal failure modes of this pump (assumed normally running by the PSA model) are left intact to simulate the fact that P-32E is now one of the two running SW pumps. P-32E is failed to simulate the fact that a stand-by pump (P-32D in this case)is not available. This role reversal is necessitated by the way the SW system is modeled in the PSA, and ensures that all legitimate failure modes are captured.

His pump will actually be in pull-out for the duration of the outage.

Component Basic Event Basic Event Description of Model Modeled Set = 1.0 Set = 0.0 K-2 B I A-K---TM-0002 B Models loss of K-2B in both initiating events and I Al.K--FR-0002 B those with 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> mission times. This compressor is in pull-out for the duration of the outage.

IA-K---FR-0002B Eliminates double counting of compressor K-2B I A--K---FS-0002B failures.

I A--F---PG-003 78 I A--IlX--IL-0049B I A--T --RP-0033C IA--PS--FT-03004 IA--PS--FT-03076 IA-PS--CM-04-76 SW--AOV-OC-02824 SW--CKV-CC-IlX49B SW--SOV-CC-02820 SW--YS--PG-02920 IAl-AOV-OC-02824 IAl-AOV-PG-02824 I Al-IlX--IL-0049B I AI-F---PG-0037B 1 Al-F--CM-3537B I Al-T---CM-033 AC I Al-T---CM-033 BC I Al-T---CM-033CD I AI-T---CM-33 A BC I Al-T---CM-33 A CD I Al-T---CM-33 BCD IAl-T---RP-0033C IAl-CKV-PG-ilX49B IAI-IIX--PG-0049B I AI-1IX--PG-K2BilX 1 Al-K--CM-R-B A B IAl-K---CM-R2A2B I Al-K---CM-R2B3 A I Al-K---CM-R2 B3 B I Al-K--CM-RAB-B 1 Al-K--CM-RAB A-I AI-MV--PG-00047 1 Al-M V--PG-00053 lAl-MV--PG-00080 1 Al-MV--PG-00082 IAl-MV--PG-00084 I AI-M V--PG-00086 I AI-M V--PG-00087 i Al-MV--PG-00089 I Al-M V--PG-00091 1Al-MV-PG-00093 IAI-SOV-OC-02820 IAl-SOV-PG-02820 IAl-YS-PG-02920 1A1-BKR-CO-5225B j

IA1-BKR-CO-5232C i

IAI-BKR-CO-A5269 IAl-BS-LP-02A06 l

1Al-BS-LP-02B04 1 Al-MCC-1.P-02342 1 Al-X--LP-02X 14 l

Component Basic Event Basic Event Description of Model Modeled Set = 1.0 Set = 0.0 K-311 S A--K---TM-0003 B Models loss of K-3B in both initiating events and 1 Al K---FR-000311 those with 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> mission times. This compressor is in pull-out for the duration of the outage.

S A-K---FS-0003 B Eliminates double counting of compressor K-2B SA-K--FR-00038 failures.

S A--F---PG-0035 B SA--IlX--lL-0050B I A--PS--FT-03017 I A-PS--FT-03036 I A--PS--FT-03078 IA--PS--CM-36778 SW--AOV-OC-02836 SW--CKV-CC-HX50B SW--SOV-CC-283213 SW--SOV-OC-2832B 1Al-AOV-OC-2836B IAl-AOV-PG-2836B IAl-ilX-IL-0050B I AI-F---PG-0035 B I Al-F---CM-3 537B 1 Al-CKV-PG-ilX50B I Al-I IX--PG-0050B I Al-llX--PG-K3 BilX I Al-K---CM-R-B All I Al-K---CM-R2 A3 B I Al-K---CM-R283 B I Al-K---CM-R3 A 3 B I A l-K---CM-RA-A B I Al-K---CM-RAB-B I Al-M V--PG-00047 1Al-MV--PG-00053 I Al-MV--PG-00066 I AI-MV--PG-00081 I Al-M V--PG-00082 I Al-M V--PG-0066 A l Al-M V--PG-0095 A I Al-M V--PG-0096B I Al-M V--PG-0098 B I Al-M V--PG-0100B 1 Al-MV--PG-0102 B I Al-MV-PG-0103B IAl-SOV-OC-2832B IAl SOV-PG-2832B I AI-YS--PG-2918 B 1Al-BKR-CO-522511 l Al-BKR-CO-A5269 1 Al-BS--LP-02 A06 I Al-BS--LP-02804 I Al-X--LP-02X 14 l

i Component Basic Event Basic Event Description of Modcl Modeled Set = 1.0 Set = 0.0 -

P-32E SW-MDP-TM-0032E Fails P-32E for both initiating event and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SWi-MDP-FR-0032E mission sequences. This simulates P-32D being in

" pull-out" for the duration of the outage.

EDIE1 P-32E will actually be powered from alternate SD power and will be running for the duration of the outage. For a discussion i

of this modeling strategy, see "P-32D".

SW-MDP-FR-0032E Eliminates invalid " fail to run" failure modes, since S W--M DP-CM-R--A E P-32E is already failed.

SW-M DP-CM-R--BE SW--M D P-CM-R--CE SW--MDP-CM-R--DE SW--M DP-CM-R--E F SW-MDP-CM-R-ABE SW--MDP-CM-R-ACE SW--MDP-CM-R-ADE SW--MDP-CM-R-AEF SW--MDP-CM-R-BCE SW-MDP-CM-R-BDE SW--M DP-CM-R-BEF SW--MDP-CM-R-CDE SW-MDP-CM-R-CEF SW--MDP-CM-R-DEF SWi-M DP-CM-R--BE SWl-MDP-CM R--CE SWi-MDP-CM-R-EF SWi-MDP-CM R-BCE SWi-MDP-CM-R-BEF SWi-MDP-CM-R-CEF SW--MDP-FS-0032E Eliminates invalid " fail to start" failure modes SW-M DP-CM-S--BE following losses of AC power, since P-32E is S W--M D P-CM-S--CE already failed SW--M DP-CM-S--EF SW--MDP-CM-S-BCE SW--MDP-CM-S-BEF SW--MDP-CM-S-CEF SW-CKV-CC-0032E Eliminates invalid discharge valve failure modes.

SWl-CKV-CM-032BE since P-32E is already failed.

SWl-CKV-CM-032CE SWi-CKV-CM-32BCE SWl-CKV-CM-32BEF SWI-CKV-CM-32CEF Sif7-#KR-CO-522SR NOTE: For this initiator, leave these failure modes Sif7-BKR-CO-AS269 set equal to their normal values to simulate Sil7-BS-LP-02A06 the loss of alternate SD power to P-32E.

Sil7-BS-LP-02R04 Without this, we are not modeling any Sil7-X-LP-02XI4 electrical losses of the running pump. We do not want these losses to carry over to the other equipment, so leave the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> i

mission failure rates set = 0.0.

Component liasic Event Basic Event Description of Model Modeled Set = 1.0 Set = 0.0 P-3 Hit A F--M DP-TM-0038 B Fails P-38B. This pump is in pull-out for the duration of the outage.

A F--M DP-FR-0038 B Prevents double counting failures of P-38B.

j A F--M DP-FS-0038 B AF 1-MDP-FR-0038B A F--M DP-CM-R38 A B A F--M DP-CM-S38 A B A F--AOV-CO-04014 A F-- AOV-CC-04019 A F-- AOV-TM-04019 A F-- AOV-CM 19 A F--CKV-CC-00104 A F--CKV-CM-102-4 A F--C KV-CM-104-6 A F--CKV-C M-104-7 A F--C K V-C M-2-4-6 A F--C K V-C M-2-4-7 AF--CKV-CM 4-6-7 A F--CK V-CC-00110 A F--CKV-CM 10 A F--C K V-CM 10 A F--CKV-CC-00 l l 3 A F--C K V-OO-00 l l3 A F--CKV-CM-C l i 13 A F--CK V-CM-C l 213 A F--MOV-CC-04021 A F--MOV-TM-04021 A F--MOV-CM-21-23 A F--MOV-CO-04020 A F--MOV-CM-20-21 AF--MOV-CC-04016 A F--MOV-TM-04016 A F--MOV-CM 16 A F.-MOV-CM 16 A F--M V--PG-00044 AF--MV--RE-00052 AF--PC--NO-04019 A F--PC--C M 19 A F--PQ--LP-04019 AF--PQ--CM 12-19 A F--PT--NO-04019 A F-- PT--CM 19 A F--SOV-CC-4014 A A F--SOV-CM-07-14 A F--SOV-CM-90-14 AF-P38A-A LIGN-U2 A F-P38 B-Al.lGN-U2 l

Component Basic Event Basic Event Description of Model Modeled Set = 1.0 Set = 0.0 P-70Il FO--MDP-FS-0070B Fails P-70B. In pull-out for duration of outage.

FO--MDP-FR-0070B Prevents double counting failures of P-70B.

FO--M DP-TM-00708 j

FO--M DP-CM-P70A B FO--CKV-CC-00019 FO--C KV-CM-14-19 2 P-1 I B CC--M DP-TM-2-11 B Fails 2P-11B. This pump is in pull-out for the duration of the outage.

CC-M DP-FR-2-11 B Prevents double counting failures of 2P-1IB.

CC--M DP-FS-2-11 B CCI-MDP-FR-2-11 B CC--M DP-CM-1211 B CCI-M DP-CM--- A B CCI-M DP-CM--U-B CCI-M DP-CM--B A B CCI-MDP-CM-A--B CCI-MDP-CM-A-AB CCl-MDP-CM-AB-B CC--CKV-CC-2724 B CC--CKV-OO-2724A CCI-BKR-CO-5225B CCI-13KR-CO-A5269 CCI-BS--LP-02A06 CCI-BS--LP-02B04 CCI-X---LP-02X 14 l

1

Results 1.1he table below shows that the risk associated with performing the G04 tie-in is less than that associated with our normal EDG maintenance outages for the i1 days when G02 is available, and only slightly greater for the first day of the maintenance when G02 is unavailable.

2. The total differential risk associated with the G04 tie-in can be calculated as follows:

DayI Days 2 - 12 Total Differential Risk = (CDF/ Day)*(# of Days) 4 (CDF/ Day)*(# of Days)

= (8.47E-7/ Day)*(1 Day) + (4.14E-8/ Day)*(ll Days) 130E-6

=

According to EPRI PSA Applications Guide - Volume 1 (currently in draft form, and issued for Industry /NRC review) Section 4.2.3 " Temporary Risk Increases", temporary risk increases less than iE-6 are considered to be "non-risk significant". Temporary risk increases in the range of IE-5 -+ IE-6 require that the "Non-Quantifiable Factors" be assessed in order to deem the associated risk acceptable.

The risk associated with the proposed G-04 tie-in maintenance isjust above the "non-risk significant" threshold.

This can also be compared to the total difTerentia' risk associated with a nonnal 7 day EDG maintenance outage which has been deemed to hav: an ace,ptable level of risk. This would be:

Total Differential Risk = (4.80E-7/ Day) * (7 Days)

= 3.36E-6 Coniparison of the Risk Associated witti tiie G04 Tic-In Maintenance to that Associated with a normal EDG outage Case Analyzed Applicable Old CDF*

New CDF*

% Change A CDF / Day Period in CDF Selected equipment unavailable Day 1 1.03E-4/yr 3.06E-4/yr

+ 196.3%

8.47E-7/ Day G02 unavailable Selected equipment unavailable Day 2 - 12 1.03 E-4/yr 1.16E-4/yr

+ 12.2%

4.14E-8/ Day G02 returned to service 1 EDG out of service for annual

< 7 Days 9.70E-5/yr 2.43 E-4/yr

+ 150.5 4.80E-7/ Day maintenance outage **

NOTE: This excludes ISI.OCA, Excessive !.OCA, and Internal Flooding initi6 ting events. These contribute 1.17E-5/yr to CDF.

0

• NOTE: This calculation was performed to compare the effects on CDF of the timing of EDG maintenance ("at-power" vs.

shutdown). The results of this study were transmitted to the NRC via WEPCo letter "VPNPD-94 025/NRC-94-018" dated March 8,1994. This study used more up-to-date numbers for the reliability and availability of our emergency power supplies, w hich can be seen in the lower initial CDF. The ACDF/ Day may still be directly compared.

i i

.)

3.,Looking at the contributions from various accident initiators to the risk of core damage, we see that most are unchanged from the base case of our JPE submittal. Initiating events involving losses of AC power (l.OSP and SBO) are much more significant when G02 is unavailable, which is expected. With G02 available, the only initiators that show an increased contribution to core damage are SGTR, Transient w/o PCS, Loss of D01, and Loss ofinstrument Air. The dominant contributor among this group is the SGTR initiator. This is due in part to the fact that the PSA model assumes that it is SG-A that develops the leak / rupture. Since SG-B is modeled as the intact SG, AFW being supplied to it is more significant, and therefore the contribution of the failure of P-38B is over-estimated in this sequence. Apart from this contribution due to modeling assumptions, the failure sequences all involve either the failure to align a long-term AFW suction supply or random failures of both IP-29, and P-38A, coupled with failures of the operators to initiate either RCS Bleed & Feed cooling or liigh Ilead ECCS Recirculation.

Contributions Of Various Accident Initiators To The Risk Of Core Damage CDF (Events /yr)

Initiating Event IPE Tie-In Tie-In w/o Submittal W/G02 G02 Large LOCA 2.57E-05 2.58E-05 2.58E-05 ATWOS 2.72E-07 2.71 E-07 2.71 E-07 SGTR 6.07E-06 1.44E-05 2.44E-05 Medium LOCA 1.07E-05 1.06E-05 1.06E-05 Small LOCA 1.96E-06 1.89E-06 1.89E-06 Station Blackout 1.50E-05 1.47E-05 1.26E-04 LOSP 8.98E-06 6.47E-06 5.83E-05 Transient w/o PCS 1.15 E-05 1.88E-05 2.14E-05 Transient w/ PCS 5.79E-06 5.32E-06 1.85E-05 Loss of CCW 5.12E-06 5.28E-06 5.28E-06 Loss of D01 3.92E-07 1.76E-06 2.82E-06 Loss of D02 1.39E-07 9.22 E-08 9.22E-08 HEL8 inside Containment 8.60E-09 8.55 E-09 8.55E-09 Loss of instrument Air 2.96E-06 4.64E-06 4.75E-06 HELB outside Containment 4.12 E-09 4.12 E-09 Loss of Service Water 8.36E-06 5.92E-06 5.92 E-06 Total 1.03E-04 1.16E-04 3.06E-04 NRC QuntinnSi

1. Our assumed LOSP initiating event frequency used in this analysis and our IPE submittal is 6.0E-2/yr.

2. 7 day total differential risk increase associated with EDG maintenance outages is 3.36E-6.

3.12 day total differential risk increase associated with G-04 tie-in maintenance outage is 1.3E-6.

I l

1 l

Tie-in w/o Sequence IPE Tie-In W/G02 l

G02 A02 2.5 7 E-05 2.b 7E-05 2.57E Ob A03 7.79E-08 7.79E-08 ATWO2 2.72E-07 2.71 E-07 2.71E 07 RO2 1.32E-06 1.32E 06 1.32E 06 RO4 1.47E-06 1.47E-06 1.47E-06 RO6 8.69E-08 8.69E-08 l

R10 1.24 E-06 8.16E-06 1.75E-05

}

R11 1.77E-07 2.38E-07 R13 1.30E-09 1.30E-09 i

R14 2.69E-07 7.05E-07 7.05E-07 R16 1.78E-06 2.51E 06 3.03E-06 S102 1.07E-05 1.06E-05 1.06E-05 S203 1.83E-06 1.75E-06 1.75E-06 S206 1.34E 07 1.32E-07 1.32E-07 SBOO2 6.03E-08 2.82E-07 SBOO6 3.17E-07 3.17E-07 3.17E-07 SBOO7 3.16E-07 2.01 E-07 2.92E 06 S8008 3.41 E-06 5.12E-06 3.34E-05 58014 3.23E-07 3.14E-07 3.59E 07 5B016 1.76E-06 1.11 E-06 1.51 E-05 SB018 1.93E 08 8.33E-08 SBO22 1.54E-07 1.54E-07 1.54E 07 i

SBO23 2.24E 08 3.94E 07 SBO24 3.80E 06 4.40E 06 3.61 E-05 SB030 1.28E-07 1.28E-07 1.28E-07 SB032 3.87E-06 2.32E 06 3.1,6E-05 SB038 9.32E-09 9.32E-09 SBO39 9.OOE-07 4.73E-07 5.27E-06 T103 1.53 E-07 1.19 E-07 1.19 E-07 T106 2.48 E-07 5.22E-07 5.22 E-0 7 T107 1.68E-06 2.52 E-06 2.52E 06 T110 1.17E-06 2.58E-07 3.77E 07 T111 3.13E-07 1.12E-07 1.12E-07 T113 1.64E-06 5.83E-07 1.66E 05 1114 3.03E-06 1.59E-06 3.51 E-05 T117 4.89E-08 1.97E-07 T121 7.40E 07 7.22E-07 7.48E-07 T203

1. 74 E-06 3.5 7 E-06 3.63E-06 Ti'04 9.73E-06 1.52E-05 1.78E 05

[304 1.05E 07 1.07E 07 4.54 E-07 I305 5.68E-06 5.22E-06 1.81 E-05 TCC04 5.12E-06 5.28E-06 5.28E-06 TD103 1.07E-07 7.67E 07 7.67E 07 TD104 2.84E-07 9.92E-07 2.05E-06 TD205 1.39E 07 9.22E 08 9.22E-08 l

TFB12 8.60E 09 8.55E41 8.55E-09 TIAOS 2.96E-06 4.62E-06 4.72E 06 TIA10 2.40E-08 2.40E-08 TS014 4.12E-09 4.12E-09 TSWO2 6.OOE-07 5.85E-07 5.85E 07 TSWO3 5.04E-06 3.52 E-06 3.52E-06 TSWO4 1.93E-06 1.82E-06 1.82E-06 Total o 1.03E-04 4 1.16E = 3.06E 04 --

.