ML20072E973
| ML20072E973 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1983 |
| From: | Parsons R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-86, REF-PT21-83-919-000 10CFR-50.55E, PT21-83-919, PT21-83-919-000, NUDOCS 8306270223 | |
| Download: ML20072E973 (4) | |
Text
I CP&L Carolina Power & Light Company DC P. O. Box 101, New Hill, N. C.
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.7 Mr. James P. O'Reilly NRC-86 hbS United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission h
Region II c.
9" 101 Marietta Street, Northwest (Suite 2900) g Atlanta, Georgia 30303 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1986 900,000 KW - UNITS 1 & 2 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMPS, WESTINGHOUSE SHOP ORDER 205, ITEM 113
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Attached is an interim report on the subject item which was deemed reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21, on May 16, 1983. CP&L is pursuing this matter, and it is currently projected that corrective action and submission of the final report will be accomplished by September 1, 1983.
Thank you for your consideration in this matter.
Yourts very truly,
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R. M. Parsons Project General Manager Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant RMP/sh Attachment cc:
Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)
Mr. R. Prevatte (NRC-SHNPP)
Mr. V. Stello (NRC)
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CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT.1 AND 2 INTERIM REPORT BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMPS WESTINGHOUSE SHOP ORDER 205 ITDI 113 JUNE 13, 1983 REPORTAELE UNDER 10CFR50.55(e)
REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR21 1-
SUBJECT:
SHNPP Units 1 and.2 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps purchased under NSSS contract with Westinghouse, NY-435002, Shop Order 205.
ITEM:
Unidentified bolting material' and undersize welds on the support plates.
SUPPLIED BY:
Crane Company, Chempump Division, Warrington, Pennsylvania.
NATURE OF DEFICIENCY:
(1) The suppliers' seismic shock analysis report assumed SAE Grade 5 bolting (minimum) to be used on the pump support structure. However, this could not be confirmed, since no certificate of compliance was available at that time nor was identification available on the bolt head.
At the_ time of procurement, bolt head identification was not r.equired.
(ii) The suppliers' seismic shock analysis report assumed a nugget size of 0.190" (minimum) on the gusset stiffener spot welds. On other similar chempumps, the weld nugget size (0.150") was less than that assumed in the report.
While these particular spot weld nugget sizes have not actually been inspected, (destructive test required), the same potential deficiency exists as the other chempumps since the weld was completed using a spot weld machine.
DATE PROBLEM OCCURRED:
Upon completion of inspection ( (i) above), the deficiencies were. noted on Deficiency and Disposition Report DDR-1248, dated December 29, 1982.
DATE' PROBLEM REPORTED:
January 13, 1983, CP&L (Mr. N. J. Chiangi) notified the NRC (Mr. A. Hardin) that this item is potentially reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21.
February 8, 1983, CP&L (Mr. R. :M. Parsons) submitted interim notification (NRC-42) to the NRC (Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Region II) on this item.
May 16, 1983, CP&L (Mr. N. J. Chiangi) notified the NRC (Mr. A. Hardin) that this item was reportable under
-10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21.
. SCOPE OF PROBLEM:
The deficiencies involve two Unit 1 and two Unit 2 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS: The Boric Acid Transfer Pumps are safety Class 3 and designated as " active" pumps. That is, these pumps are required to operate for safe shutdown purposes.
Since the pump support structure (bolting and spot welds) contain deficiencies,.
-there is no assurance that the pumps structural supports will remain in sound condition during a seismic event, and could therefore make the pumps inactive.
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- I REASONS DEFICIENCIES REPORTABLE:
This item is reportable due to lack of specific information from Westinghouse in determining the effects of the deficiencies. The deficiencies described may affect the ability of safety related equipment to perform their intended function and thus mitigate the consequences of an accident.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
(i) The pump support structure bolting will be replaced by bolting that is identifiable and meets or exceeds SAE Grade 5 minimum strength requirements.
Purchase orders for these bolts and associated washers have been placed.
(ii) The gusset stiffener spot welds will be supplemented by fillet welds along each leg.
Weld Data Reports have been prepared to accomplish this, FINAL REPORT: Completion of the above corrective action will be achieved by September 1, 1983.
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