ML20072C668
| ML20072C668 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1983 |
| From: | Bouchey G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GO3-83-482, NUDOCS 8306210154 | |
| Download: ML20072C668 (5) | |
Text
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Washington Public Power Supply System Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 (206)482-4428 Docket No. 50-508
' June 16, 1983 G03-83-482 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT 3 RESPONSES TO NRC ACCEPTANCE REVIEW QUESTIONS (April - May 1983)
References:
a) Letter D. G. Eisenhut to R. L. Ferguson, dated 08/20/82 b)
Letter #G03-82-830 G. D. Bouchey to H. R. Denton, date 08/20/82 c) Letter #G03-82-1085 G. D. Bouchey to J. D. Kerrigan, dated 11/22/82 Reference a) transmitted a set of questions generated during the NRC's ac-ceptance review of the WNP-3 Operating License Application (reference b).
Reference c) represents the initial Supply System response to these ques-tions and provided a schedule for those cases where our evaluations were not
-yet complete.
This letter transmits those responses scheduled to be provided for NRC re-view in April and May.
In those cases where it is considered necessary or desirable to amend the FSAR due to our responses, we have provided marked up FSAR pages which show the changes which will be included in a subsequent amendment.
8306210154 830616
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Mr. G. W. Knighton Page 2 June 16, 19P,3 RESPONSES TO NRC ACCEPTANCE REVIEW QUESTIONS If you require additional information or clarification, the Supply System point of contact for this matter is Mr. K. W. Cook. Licensing Project Mana-ger (206/482-4428 ext. 5436).
Sincerely, A$D&
G. D. Bouchey, Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Programs AJM/ss Attachments: ~ 1.
NRC Question 280.4 2.
NRC Question Enclosure 4 Item 5 (040.79) cc:
D. J. Chin - Ebasco NY0 N. S. Reynolds - D&L E. F. Beckett - NPI J. A. Adams - NESCO D. Smithpeter - BPA A. Vietti - NRC AA Tuzes - Comb. Engr.
Ehasco - Elma WNP-3 Files.- Richland l
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W NRC QUESTION NO. 230.4 (9.5.1.3)
Many items in Appendices 9.5-1 through 9.5-21, " Fire Hazard Analyses by Fire Areas" are marked "Later".
In the proposed completion of these items, they should be evaluated against the Standard Review Plan, (NUREG-0800).
RESPONSE
As committed to in letter G03-82-1085 dated October 22, 1982, the items marked "Later" in Appendices 9.5A-1 through 9.5A-21 have been dispositioned in the following manner:
1)
Clarification of "Later" for cable trays: All "Later" designations for cable tray functions have been deleted. The function of cable trays have been marked "not applicable".
FSAR Appendices 9.5A-1 through 9.5A-21 have been amended to remove all "Laters" for cable trays (Amendment 2).
The function of cables essential for safe shutdown, in case of fire, will be evaluated where A and B safety divisions are present in the same fire area. The fire impact on the redundant cables will be as-sessed and documented in the Fire Hazard Analysis which is estimated to be completed by October 1983. The findings will be reviewed and evalu-ated against NUREG-0800.
2)
The function of equipment now designated as "Later" within Appendices 9.5A-1 through 9.5A-21 will be amended coincident with the completion of the Fire Hazards Analysis. Accordingly, the original completion date of 4/83 will be deferred until October 1983.
~
Enclosure'4 Item 5 (040.79) 4
.The Residiial. Heat Removal System is. generally a. low pressure system that in-j terfaces with the high pressure primary coolant system. To preclude a LOCA through this interface, we require compliance with the recommendations of
-Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1.
Thus, this' interface most likely con-sists_of two redundant and-independent motor operated valves with diverse interlocks in accordance with Branch Technical Position 1CSB 3.
These two motor operated valves and their associated cable may be subject to a single fire hazard.
It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two 4
t valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the subject high-t low pressure system interface. To assure that this interface and other 4
I high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require the following information:
a.
Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devides (such as two series motor oper-ated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary cool-ant boundary.
.b.
Identify each device's essential cabling (power and control) and describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination..
c.
Identify each location where.the identified cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables from the redundant device.
d.
For the areas identified in Item 5.c above (if any), provide the bases and justification as to the acceptability of the existing 3
design or any' proposed modifications.
RESPONSE
?
As committed to in letter G03-82-1085 dated October 22, 1982 the following is our response to the subject concern:
l The only high-low pressure interfaces which use two electrically controlled motor operated isolation valves in series occur on redundant. lines
.lSI-16-175SABR and ISI-16-176SABR. -These lines are used for shutdown cool-ing during normal operation. The valves associated with these lines are
-ISI-VP-091SAR (SI-653) and 1SI-VP-092SAR (SI-651) on line ISI-16-175SABR and valves ISI-VP-097S8R (SI-654) and ISI-VP-098 SBR (SI-652) on line ISI-16-176SABR. The cables for valves ISI-VP-091SAR and ISI-VP-092SAR run h
through the same "A" designated fire zones.
The cables for redundant valves ISI-VP-097SSR and 1SI-VP-098 SBR run through the same "B" designated fire zones.
d In the event of a fire in any given fire zone where cables for one set of j
these valves is-located, safe shutdown would not be affected as the other l.
set of valves located on the redundant line would be opened and shutdown cooling can take place.
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In order to prevent the spurious opening of both valves on one line, the MCC breaker compartment for valves 1SI-VP-091SAR and 1SI-VP-09758R -(one valve on each-line) is padlocked in the trip position.
In the event of a short cir-cuit of any cable associated with these valves, the valves will not travel from the close to open position. An Administrative procedure will be de-i veloped to operate these valves when they are required 10 open in the shut-I down cooling mode of reactor operation.
This response will be included in the Fire Hazards Analysis.