ML20071C605
| ML20071C605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1983 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20071C602 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8303030205 | |
| Download: ML20071C605 (3) | |
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) g/'(n E WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 29 TO FACILITY OPERATING' LICENSE NO. NPF-2 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO.1 DOCKET NO. 50-348 Introduction By letter dated January 14, 1983, which confirmed an Alabama Power Company (APCo) telecopy request of the same date, APCo requested a one-time change to License No. NPF-2 for Farley Unit 1.
The char.ge would allow a one-time extension to the Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 Action Statement required time to achieve cold shutdown from 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />.
Background
Technical S 3ecification (TS) 3.6.1.1 requires maintenance of containment integrity wille in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Technical Specification 4.6.1.2.d requires tests of containment penetrations at intervals no greater than 24 months. During tests of electrical penetrations prior to the shutdown from the fourth refueling outage scheduled at midnight on January 14, 1983. excessive leakage was found in one electrical penetration.
The leakage required APCo to declare the penetration inoperable. Thus, Action Statement for TS 3.6.1.1 required restoration of containment integrity within one hour or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
On this basis, APCo decided to shutdown for the fourth refueling outage prior to midnight as scheduled. However, the TS requirement to achieve cold shutdown within 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> created schedular conflicts for tests to be done with the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressurized. To maintain the RCS pressurized requires keeping the plant at temperatures above cold shutdown. Therefore, APCo proposed a one-time change to the 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> time limit on an emergency basis. Our evaluation follows.
Discussion ar.d Evaluation The Standard Technical Specifications Action Statements require placing the plant in cold shutdown within 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Otherwise, the RCS energy due to coolant temperatures above 200'F would create a potential release of radioactive materials beyond the leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. The 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> 8303030205 830217 PDR ADOCK 05000348 p
is easily achievable using nonnal pressurized water reactor procedures.
However, in the case as described by APCo, other valid reasons existed to make it desirable to maintain the RCS temperature and pressure above cold shutdown conditions for sometime longer than the normal 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
Alabama Power Company described the reasons why the one-time change from 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> would not involve any appreciable increased risk to' the health and safety of the public.
Reasons given by APCo were as follows:
(1) The containment electrical penetration in question has both an inner and outer seal. Tests show that only one seal was leaking. Thus, physical containment integrity still exists with one good seal.
(2) Reduced potential of offsite radiological exposure.
(3) Small probability of an accident during the short time extension from 30 to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />.
(4) The reactor is subcritical with all full length control rods inserted.
Later during discussions with the APCo staff, item (2) above was explained as being a reference to onsite personnel exposures which would be less if the extension was granted. With this clarification, we agree with APCo stated reasons.
Therefore, based on the considerations noted above, we concluded that there was no undue risk to the health and safety of the public by this action. Our action at this time is only for record purposes to document in the license the authorization previously given verbally on January 14, 1983 and documented in our letter dated January 17, 1983.
Environmental Consideration We have detemined that the amendment does.not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this detemination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and,. pursuant to 10 CFR Sl.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with th'e issuance of this amendment.
3-Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: Februaey 17, 1983 Principal Contributor-E. A. Reeves O