ML20070U682

Submits Results of Coping Category Determination & Revised Coping Analysis Study Performed for Station Blackout,Per 10CFR50.63 & Reg Guide 1.155.Meeting Requested for Util to Present Station Blackout Coping Analysis

ML20070U682
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	03/28/1991
From:	Crimmins T Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
RTR-REGGD-01.155, RTR-REGGD-1.155 NLR-N91048, NUDOCS 9104090258
Download: ML20070U682 (25)

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Thomas M. Crimmins, Jr.

PutM 5em e E wn wid Oas Company P.O fu i% Hanmas Bodge. W 08038 609-339 4703 j

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j NLR-N9104 8 J

l United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

-Gentlement j

STATION BLACKOf!' REVISED COPING ANALYSIG HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION F

DOCKET No. 50-354 public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) horeby submits the results of the coping category determination and the revised coping analysis study performed for the llope Creek Generating Station in response to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.63.

4 This coping analysis was-performed in accordance with the i

guidance provided in USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.155, NUMARC 87-00,

" Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing 1

Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors," and NUMARC letter,

" Station-Blackout (SBO) Implementationi Request for Supplemental SDO Submittal to NRC," date January-4, 1990,--in ordor to comply with the requirements of 10 CPR 50.63.

PSE&G would like to extend an offer to present our S80 coping analysis-to the NRC Staff at your offices.

It is our belief that this meeting-would facilitate _the_ review of our coping analysis, by the staff, and provide a forum to address any questionr or F

concerns raised by this review.

Please do-not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions L

regarding this submittal.

Sincerely, I.nj %s dc.

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Attachment

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9104090258 910328 PDR ADOCK 05000354

) y. I }

P PDR

Document Control Desk 2

MAR 2 8 1991 NLR-N91048 C

Mr. Stephen Dembek Project Manager Mr. T. P. Johnson Senior Resident Inspector Mr. T. Martin, Administrator Region I Mr. }(ent Tosch, Chief New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Division of Environmental Quality Bureau of Nuclear Engineering CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625

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.s-ATTACHMENT TO NLR-N91048 i

I TABLE OF CONTENTS j

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SECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE t-1.0 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

3 2.0 GENERAL CRITERIA AND 4

I BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS i

2.1 GENERAL CRITERIA 4

2.2 BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS 4

3.0 REQUIRED COPING DURATION 5

CATEGORY 3.1 COPING DURATION CALCULATION 5

3.1.1 OFF-SITE POWER DESIGN 5

CHARACTERISTIC GROUP

-3.1.2 EMERGENCY AC POWER 5

l-CONFIGURATION GROUP l

3.1.3 CALCULATED EDG RELIABILITY 5

3.1.4 ALLOWED EDG TARGET RELIABILITY 5

3.1.5 COPING DURATION-CATEGORY 6

4.0 STATION BLACKOUT RESF7NSE 7

PROCEDURES 4.1 PROCEDURES-7 4.2 TRAINING 7

5.0

_ COLD STARTS 8

6.0 EMERGENCY AC POWER 9

AVAILABILITY l

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1 7.0 COPING WITH A STATION 10 SLACKOUT EVENT 7.1 OVERVIEW 10 7.1.1 COPING METHODOLOGY 10 7.1.2 COPING DURATION 10 7.2 COPING ASSESSMENT 11 7.2.1 CONDENSATE INVENTORY 11 7.2.2 CLASS 1E BATTERY CAPACITY 13

7. 2. 3 -

COMPRESSED AIR 16 7.2.4 EFFECTS OF LOSS OF 17 VENTILATION 7.2.5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION 20 l

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1.0 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR Part 50.63, Loss of all Alternate Current Power, requires that "Each light water-cooled nuclear power plant licensed to operate must be able to withstand for a specified duration and recover from a station blackout...".

The guidelines for complying with this regulation are provided in USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.155, dated August 1988, and Nuclear Management and Resources Council document NUMARC 87-00, dated November 1987.

A Hope Creek Generating Station, Station Blackout Analysis has been performed in accordance with the guidelines provided.in-RG 1.155 and NUMARC 87-00 for assessment of its compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50.63.

The assessment used the "AC-Independent" approach outlined in NUMARC 87-00 for its coping capability.

In.this approach,_ plants rely on available process steam, de power and compressed air to operate equipment necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown.

The required SBO coping duration for Hope Creek Generating Station is calculated as 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> in accordance with the methods provided in NUMARC 87-00.

The analysis establishes that: 1) adequate condensate inventory will be available for decay heat removal, 2) i the plant class 1E batteries have adequate capacity to supply all SB0 de and inverter loads for four hours with no manual load stripping, 3) the SBo equipment operability will be maintained at the elevated room temperatures caused by. loss of ventilation, 4) containment isolation capability will be maintained to ensure containment integrity,_and 5) the plant compressed-air system is not essential to cope with the-SBO.

These resulte provide adequate assurance that Hope Creek Generating Station shall be able to withstand and recover from a station blackout event for a coping duration of-four hours.

The plant Emergency Operating Procedures-(EOPs) and other_related plant Operating Procedures (ops) will be revised as required to include results of this

-analysis.- Appropriate plant-personnel will be trained in the revised /new plant procedures.

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2.0 GENERAL CRITERIA AND BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS 2.1 GENERAL CRITERIA The general criteria for Station Blackout coping provided in NUMARC 87-00, Section 2.1 has been used for Hope Creek Generating Station, Station Blackout (SBO) coping and recovery analysis.

This states that:

" Procedures and equipment in light water reactors relied upon in a station blackout should ensure thei satisfactory performance of necessary decay heat removal systems is maintained for the required station blackout coping duration.

For a PWR, an additional requirement is to keep the core covered.

For a BWR, no more than a momentary core uncovery is allowed.

For both BWRs and PWRs, appropriate containment integrity should also be provided in a station blackout to the extent that isolation valves perform their intended function without ac power."

2.2 BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS NUMARC 87-00 baseline assumptions pertaining to each of the following areas provided in Section 2.2 through 2.11 have been evaluated for their applicability to Hope Creek Generating Station.

Initial Plant Conditions Initiating Event Station Blackout Transient Reactor Coolant Inventory Loss Operator Action Effects of Loss of Ventj'.ation System Cross-tie Capability Instrumentation and Controls Containment Isolation Hurricane Preparations These above assumptions are applicable to Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) except for Hurricane i

Perparations.

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3.0 REQUIRED COPING DURATION CATEGORY Hope Creek Generating Station coping duration is determined as per the methodology provided in NUMAr.C 87-00, Section 3.2.

i 3.1 COPING DURATION CALCULATION 3.1.1 off-Site Power DerlJn Characteristic Group (P Group)

Site Specific Evaluation (Ref. NUS-5175 " Estimated Frequency of Loss of Off-Site PoWor Due to Extremely Severe Weather (ESW) and severe Weather (SW) for Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations") places the plant in ESW group 2 and SW group 2.

The offsite power system falls in the I1.2 group.

ESW group 2, SW group 2 and 11/2 group places the plant in Offsite AC Power Design Characteristic Group Pl.

3.1.2 Emergency AC (EAC) Power Configuration Group (A, B,

C or D Group)

There are four dedicated EAC power supplies avalloble for Hope Creek Generating Station.

Only two of these are necessary for safe shutdokn in case of a loss of off-site power in a one-out-of-two-taken-twice mode (A

+ C or B + D).

As per NUMARC 87-00, Table 3-7, this corresponds to an EAC Power Configuration Group C.

3.1.3 Calculated EDG Reliability Hope Creek Generating Station started operating in December, 1986 and the total number of demands on the emergency diesel generators recorded is 81 for EDGs A and B, and 79 for EDGs C and D.

Based on these demands, Hope Creek Generating Station ca}culated EDG j

reliability is determined as 99.35%.

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3.1.4 Allowed EDG Target Reliability t

l As established in Section 3.1.2 above, Hope) Creek Generating Station falls in EAC Power Configuration l

l Group c.

Therefore, the EDG target reliability for Hope Creek Generating Station is 0.95 as per NUKhRC 87-00, Section 3.2.4.

This is allovable for Hope Creek l

Generating Station since the calculated EDG reliability for Hope Creek is larger than 0.95.

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i 3.1.5 Coping Duration Category Baced on the Off-Site Power Group P1, EAC Group C and 2,ilowed EDG Target Reliability of 0.95, llope Creek Generating Station ialls in the Required Coping Duration Category of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as por NUMARC 87-00, Tablo 3-8.

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4.0 STATION BLACKOUT RESPONSE PROCEDURES I

4.1 PROCEDURES Hope Creek Generating Station Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and other Plant Procedures shall be revised and new Plant Procedures shall be prepared as requirod to incorporate the results of the Station Blackout analysis.

Revisions and new procedures will be in accordance with NUMARC B7-00, Section 4.0.

4.?

TRAINING Appropriate plant personnel will be trained on new and revised Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and other plant procedures, i

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.s 5.0 CCL!J STARTS Hope Creek Generating Station emergency _ diesel generators (EDGb) are provided~with continuous-I pre-warmed circulating water and pre-lubrication features.

As defined in NUMARC 07-00, Section 5.1, emergency diesel generators with continuous pre-warmed and pre-lubed features are not considered to have cold starts.

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6.0 EMERGEACY AC POWER AVAILABILITY Hope Creek Generatir.J Station has established EDG reliability target levels ~msistent with the plant category and coping duratioa..ss explained in NUMARC 87-00, Section 3.2.4.

There are existing surveillance testing and performance monitoring procedures designed to track EDG performance and to support maintenance activities.

There are maintenance programs for the emergency dies 11 generators that provide capability for failu'.e ar.alysis and root-cause investigation.

These procedures and programs ensure that the selected reliability levels of the emergency diesel generators for Hope Creek Generating Station are achieved and maintained.

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s 7.0 COPING WITH A STATION BLACKOUT EVENT 7.1 The SBO coping assessment has been performed in accordance with the procedures provided in NUMARC 87-00, Section 7.u.

This assessment addresses all five NUMARC 87-00 initiatives listed below:

1. Condensato Inventory for Dacay Heat Removal

2. Assessing Class 1E Battery Capacity

3. Compressed Air 4.

Effects of Loss of' Ventilation

5. Containment Isolation 7.1.1-Coping Methods

' SBO coping assessment of Hope Creek Generating Station is performed with the 'AC-Independent' approach.

In this approach, plants are assumed to rely on available process steam, de power and compressed air to operate equipment necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions for four hours.

7.1.2 Coping Duration As described in Section 3.0, Hope Creek Generating Station must cope with a SBO for a duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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7.2 COPING ASSESSMENT 7.2.1 CONDENSATE INVENTORY The Condensate Inventory requirement for Decay Heat Removal (DHR) following a Station Blackout (SBO) event is evaluated as per the guidelines provided in NUMARC 87-00, Section 7.2.1.

l-7.2.1.1 Condensate Inventory Calculation The condensate inventory requirement (B) is calculated as follows:

B=

A (22.12 Gal /MWt)

+C

Where, 4

A = The plant thermal rating

== 3,293 MWt C = 24,500 gal. (for Cooldown) + 19,425 gal. (for level shrinkage in the Reactor Vessel)

= 43,925 gallons Therefore, B = 3,293'(22.12) + 43,925

= 116,766 gallons An-additional term-is. introduced to incorporate Technical Specification limits for reactor coolant system: leakage and recirculation pump _ seal leakage.

Assuming-_the constant leakage rate, this term is equivalent to 15,840 gallons.- Therefore, the total condensate inventory _ requirement'is - 132,606 gallons.

-The required minimum usable Technical Specification-volume.for condensate storage.tankiis 135,000 gallons compared to a calculated requiredLvolume of 132,606 gallons.

In_ addition'to verifying the adequacy of condensate inventory by using NUMARC.87-00 equation as shown above, a-reactor-coolant inventory analysis has been performed in accordance with NUMARC 87-00, Section=2.5, Lusing MAAP' Computer ~ Codes and Hope Creek plant-specific-models.-

These dynamic analyses also demonstrate that adequate reactor coolant inventory is maintained for a coping duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and that the core stays covered.

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The decay heat is rejected by system leakage, safety relief. valve action and to the suppression pool-through HPCI/RCIC turbines.

7.2.1.2 Conclusion on the basis of the above calculation, it is concluded that adequate condensate inventory is available for the decay heat removal including plant cooldown for a coping duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following a station blackout event.

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4 7.2.2 CLASS 1E BATTERY CAPACITY 7.2.2.1 Methodology The capacity of the Hope Creek Generating Station existing batteries to food their connected SBO loads for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is veriflod by calculating the battery capacity required for the SBo battery duty cycle as per IEEE Standard 485.

If the existing battery sizes equal or excoed these calculated SBo battery sizes, then the existing battories are considered adequate for SBO.

NUMARC 87-00, Section 7.2.2 states that the SBo loads on the battery can be estimated from design basis accident loads since they are generally a subset of these loads.

Hope Creek Generating Station 125V and 250V DC Load Studies which identify the battery loads l

for the most severe plant design basis accident condition of coincident LOOP and LOCA have been used as i

the basis for determining the battery SBO duty cycle.

The duty cycle includes the ac power costoration loads at the most limiting time in the battery duty cycle.

In addition to calculating the battery capacity for SBO duty cycle, battery terminal voltage profile corresponding to the SBO duty cycle is also calculated to verify that the minimum voltages reached during the l

duty cycle are higher than or equal to the minimum voltages required for oporation of the de loads.

The calculations for the SBo battory capacity use the p

lowest electrolyte temperature (72'F) anticipated under plant normal operating conditions as required by NUMARC 87-00.

The calculations for the Sao battery capacity use a Design Margin of 1.1 as recommended by IEEE standard 485 and as required by NUMARC 87-00.

An Aging Factor of 1.25 has been used in calculating the SBO battery capacity as recommended by IEEE Standard 485 and as required by NUMARC 87-00.

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7.2.2.2 Calculation The results of the battery capacity evaluation for SBO are summarized as follows:

AVAI LABLE EXCESS CA; "TY OVE.

BATTERY EXISTING REQUIRED SBO 1.1 DESIGN DESCRIPTION BATTERY SIZE BATTERY SIZE MARGIN 125V DC LC-25 LC-25 0.0%

Battery 1AD411 125V DC LC-25 LC-21 20.0%

Battery 1BD411 125V DC LC-25 LC-25 0.0%

Battery ICD 411 125V DC LC-25 LC-23 9.0%

Battery 1DD411 125V DC KC-15 KC-9 75.0%

Pattery 1CD447 125V DC KC-15 KC-9 75.0%

Battery 1DD447 250V DC KC-9 KC-7 33.3%

Battery 10D431 (RCIC) 250V DC KC-21 KC-15 43.0%

Battery 10D421 (HPCI)

These battery capacity evaluations do not include any manual load stripping.

The minimum battery terminal voltages reached during the battery SBO duty cycle ensure minimum required operating voltages at the de buses which are 105 volts for 125V DC systems and 210 volts for 250V DC system.

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7.2.2.3 The results of the battery SBO capacity evaluation I

verify that ilope Creek Generating Station existing Class 1E 125V DC and 250V DC batteries have adequate capacity to supply their connected "sBO loads for the SBO coping duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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l 7.2.3 COMPRESSED AIR Hope Creek Generating Station does not use any air operated valve requiring' compressed air for coping with a station blackout event.- The Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) are used to depressurize, as necessary.

The SRVs are provided with nitrogen accumulators which have sufficient capacity to support necessary actuations of the SRVs during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO coping duration.

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7.2.4 EFFECTS OF LOSS OF VENTILATION The average steady state temperature in dominant areas of concern containing equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown during a station blackout has been calculated using the assumptions provided in NUMARC 87-00, Section 2.7.1 and the methodology provided in NUMARC 87-00, Section 7.2.4 and Appendix E.

The dominant areas of concern include the following:

ROOM DESCRIPTION ROOM No.

1.

RCIC Pump Room 4110 2.

HPCI Pump Room 411.1 3.

Battery Room 5104 4.

Battery Room 5128

5. Control Equipment Room 5302 6.

Inverter Room 5447 7.

Inverter Room 5448

8. Electrical Access Room 5501

9. Control Room 5510

10. Inverter Room 5615 Credit has been taken for opening area doors where feasible during the SBO event to allow for removal of heat through natural circulation.

The effect of opening the doors has been calculated as per the methods provided in NUMARC 87-00, Section 7.2.4, and/or Appendix E.

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7.2.4.1

- The calculated maximum steady state temperatures in the dominant areas of concern during station blackout are as follows:

DOORS OPEN CLOSED ROOMS DOORS

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1. RCIC Room 4110 134.8'F

2. HPCI Room 4111 173.2'F 3.

Battery Room 5104 94.3*F 4.

Battery Room 5128 93.6'F 5.

Control Equip.-

157.3*F 142.0'F Room 5302

- Appendix E 134.5'F Approach

- Reduced Heat Load 118.3'F 6.

Inverter Room 5447 105.8'F 7.' Inverter Room 5448 127.3'F-8.

Elec. Access Room 120.0'F*

5501

9. Control Roor. 5510

- with acoustic ceiling 176.6*F

- without acoustic ceiling-120.0'F -

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10. Inverter Room 5615 129.4'F 111.7'F This takes in to account the effect of solar radiation on the roof which is exposed.

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-sm-a a"A..mm-,-i, 7.2.4.2 Operability-of the equipment required for coping with a station blackout event at the steady-state temperatures reached during SBo as shown abova has been. evaluated as per methodologies given in NUMARC 87-00, Appendix F.

In this evaluation, SBo equipment has been assumed to be required for the entire four hour duration of the SBO event to be conservative.

Analysis has also been made for control room habitability during the SBo condition based on the control room steady state temperature and relative humidity.

This analysis indicates that control room habitability will not be affected during SBO.

l This evaluation provides reasonable assurance that all equipment needed to cope with a station blackout will

- operate at the steady-state temperatures reached due to loss of ventilation for the entire duration of the SBO event.

An evaluation has also been made for the effect of the steady-state temperatures reached due to loss of ventilation on the plant fire protection equipment.

This evaluation shows that there will be no inadvertent actuation of any fire suppression system during an SDO.

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l 7.2.5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION The containment isolation valves required for coping vjth a SBO have been identified, reviewed and evaluated as per the guidelines provided in NUMARC 87-00, Section 7.2.5.

7.2.5.1 Analysis A complete list of containment isolation valves provided in Technical Specifications were reviewed for exclusion as per the criteria listed in Stop 1 of NUMARC 87-00, Section 7.2.5.

Additional exclusion criteria noted in Question and Answer No. 101 for inboard and outboard isolation valves were utilized to ensure containment integrity by closing one valve only (critor,sn 6).

Furthermore, SBO Clearinghouse memorandum dated February 12, 1991 identified additional exclusion criteria gaining conf'dence of the NRC staff.

Two of these criteria are ut.lized for valves as follows:

o Water Seals:

Suction inlets and discharge points are submerged below the water level in the suppression pool.

The water in the pipe provides a barrier from the containment atmosphere (criterion 7).

o Valves That Must Be closed For Reactor Operation:

The RHR shutdown cooling suction valves and the RHR head spray valves are interlocked closed by reactor high pressure signal.

The RHR containment spray valves are interlocked closed on reactor level and drywell pressure signals.

These valves must be closed for proper reactor operation (criterion 8).

There are fourteen (14) valves identified that are not excluded and not required for manual cycling and require closure capability for containment isolation.

These fourteea valves can be closed or verified closed by manual operation.

The 7alves are listed in the following table.

The accessibility and habitability of the areas where these valves are located have been evaluated end found to be acceptable.

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CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES REQUIRING CLOSURE CAPABILITY I INI.

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ht.eivi ManuA it e 14 ' lust %ne P il 4

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AC Messer Omal 4321/102 Y

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g 7.2.5.2 Conclusion on the basis of the above evaluation it is concluded that the fourteen (14) valves requiring closure capability for containment isolation can be closed or verified closed by manual operator actions.

No plant modification is required to comply with the requirements of 10CFR50.63.

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