Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Deleting Rod Sequence Control Sys & Lowering Rod Worth Minimizer Setpoint from 20% of Rated Power to 10% of Rated Power
	ML20070U664
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	04/02/1991
From:	; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20069M900	List: ML20070U663; ML20070U664;
References
	NUDOCS 9104090241
	Download: ML20070U664 (53)
	v • d • e

..

i.

AII'ACIIMENT B PROPOSED CilANGES TO APPENDIX A, TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NPF-11 AND NPF-18 REYlSED_EAGES o

UNIT QNE.INEEdD UNIT.IWO_(NPE-18.)

IV IV X

X XVI XVI.

XIX XIX 3/414 3/4I4 3/41-11 3/41-11 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-13 3/4.1-16 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-17 3/4 1-17 3/4 1-18 3/4 1-18 3/4 1-19 3/4 1-19 3/4 1-20 3/4 1-20

-3/41-21 3/4 1-21

~

3/4 1-22 3/4 1-22 3/4 1-23 3/4 1-23 3/4 10 3/4 10-2

.B3/41-3 B3/41-3 B 3/410-1 B 3/4101 W

3HLD807/7 9104090241 910402 ADOCK0500gy3 j>

- DR

v

SUMMARY

.OENROPOSED_ TECHNICAL SPECIEICATMLCilANGES UniLLTeshnicaLSpe.cifications EAGENOdS)

DES.CRIErlON OE.C11ANGES IV On Index page IV, section 3/4.1.4, the section on Rod Sequence Control System is omitted. The section on Rod B!ock Monitor, page 3/41-18 is changed to page 3/41 17.

Section 3/4.1.5, Standby Liquid Control System, page 3/41-19

)

is changed to page 3/41-18. Section 3/4.1.6, Economic Generation Contml System, page 3/41--23 is changed to page 3/4122.

X On Index page X, special test exception 3/4.10.2, is changed from "Roo Sequence Control System" to " Rod Wodh Minimizer.,

XVI On Index page XVI, special test exception 3/4.10.2 Bases is changed from " Rod Sequence Contrc,1 System" to " Rod Wonh Minimizer."

g XIX On Index page XIX, Figure 3.1.5 1, page 3/41-21 is changed to page 3/41-20. Figure 3.1.5 2, page 3/41-22 is changed to page 3/41-21.

3/41-3 No changes on page 3/41-3.

3/4 1-4 In the " Control Rod Operability" Tech. Spec., surveillance requirement 4.1.3.1.2, is changed from "When above the low power setpoint of the RWM and RSCS,..." to "When above the low power setpoint of the RWM,..."

3/4 1-11 In the " Control Rod Drive Ce'ipling". Tech Spec., all references to RSCS are deleted.. Action Statement a.l.a)is changed fro.a. If permitted by the RWM and RSCS,..." to "If permitted by the RWM,..." Action statement a.1,b)is changed from "if not permitted by the RWM or RSCS then until pennitteil by the RWM and RSCS" to "if not pemiitted by the RWM then until pennitted by the RWM,".'

3/4 1-13 In the " Control Rod Position Indication" Tech. Spec. 3.1.3.7.,

references to'RSCS are changed to RWM.- Action statement

. a.3.(a) is changed from "Within the low power setpoint of the RSCS,..." to "Within the low power setpoint of the RWM,..'.".

Action statement a.3.(b)is changed from," Greater than the low power setpoint of the RSCS,..." to " Greater than the low power of the RWM,...".

7.tJLD007 / 8 J

,.w,-,-~~,-,e

.~,n-nr,a,-n,

-vr.--,

a---

~,

a-,

.-v e

v.,

--ew-a--+.--~ve-,,n

.,~~,v.-~,

,--m,,,,-r-

,en-,

vn-

-new~--~-

u n,-

A 3/4 1-16 In the " Control Rod Program Controls, Rod Worth Minimizer" Tech. Spec. 3.1.4.1., the low power setpoint is changed from 20% thennal power to 10% thermal powe; The Applicability statement is changed from,"... THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER,...", to s

"...TilERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 10% of RATED TilERMAL POWER,...". Action statement b, "The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.", of the RWM Tech. Spec. (3.1.4.1) is changed to, action statement c, "The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable, with the exception that control rod withdrawal for reactor startup shall not begin witii the RWM inoperable". This will help minimize substitution of a second operator as the tunendment requires. Since the RSCS Tech. Spec, is being deleted, the control of number of inoperable control rods must be transferred to the RWM Tech Spec as Action Statement b; "With an inoperable control rod (s), OPERABLE control rod movensent may continue by bypassing the inoperable control rod (s) if 3e RWM provided that: 1. The position and bypassing of inoperable control rods is verified by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff, and 2. There are not more than 3 inoperable control rods in any RWM group."

3/4 1-17 The " Control Rod Program Controls, Rod Sequence Control System" Tech. Spec. 3.1.4.2., is deleted in its entirety.

3/4 1-18 Page 3/41-18 is changed to page 3/41-17.

3/4 1-19 Page 3/4 I-19 is changed to page 3/41-18.

3/4 1-20 Page 3/41-20 is changed to page 3/41-19.

3/4 1-21 Page 3/41-21 is changed to page 3/41-20.

3/4 1-22 Page 3/41-22 is changed to page 3/41-21.

\\.

3/4 1-23 Page 3/41-23 is changed to page 3/41-22.

3/4 10-2 In "Special Test Exceptions,3/410.2 Rod Sequence Control System", the entire Tech. Spec. is rewritten for RWM instead of RSCS. The title is clumged from " Rod Sequence Control System" to " Rod Worth Minimizer".

IENLD007/9_ _-.

Specification 3.10.2 is changed from "The sequence and constraints imposed on control rod groups by the rod sequence control system (RSCS) per Specification 3.1.4.2 may be suspended by bypassing the low power setpoint switches for the following tests, pmvided that the rod worth minimizer is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.1." to "The Sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the rod worth minimizer (RWM) per Specification 3.1.4.1 may be suspended by bypassing the RWM for the following tests, provided that control rod movement prescribed for this testing is veri 5ed by a second licensed operator, or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff, who is present at the reactor control console." Specification 3.10.2.d is changed from "Startup Test Program with the TilERMAL POWER less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.", to "Startup Test Program with the THERMAL POWER less than 10% of RATED TilERMAL POWER " The Action statement is L

changed from "With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, verify that the RSCS is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.2." to "With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, verify that the RWM is OPERAELE p-Specification 3.1.4.1." Surveilkmce Requirement 4 so.2 is changed from "When the sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the RSCS are bypassed,..." to, "When the sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the RWM are bypassed...".

Surveillance Requirement 4.10.2.a, "That the RWM is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.1, " is changed to

" Deleted". Surveillance Requirement 4.10.2.b is changed from "That movement of control rods from 75% ROD DENSITY to the RSCS low power setpoint", to "That movement of control rods from 75% ROD DENSITY to the RWM low power setpoint...".

B3/41-3 in Bases 3/41.4," Control Rod Program Controls", all references to RSCS are deleted and the low power setpoint is changed from 20% to 10% of rated thermal power. Change "When THERMAL POWER is greater than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod worth which, if dropped at the design rate of the velocity limiter, could result in a peak enthalpy of 280 cal /gm. Thus requiring the RSCS '

and RWM to le operable when TIIERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate control." to "When THERM AL POWER is greater than 10% of RATED TilERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod worth which,if dropped at the design rate of the velocity limiter, could result in a peak enthalpy of 280 cal /gm.

7.%!MM /10

-4 Thus requiring the RWM to be operable when TilERM AL POWER is less than or equal to 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate control." Also chang ~e "The RSCS and RWM provides automatic supervision.. " to aeRWM provides automatic supervision..."

B 3/410-1 In Bases section, change name of Special Test Exception 3/4.10.2 from " Rod Sequence Control System" to " Rod Worth Minimizer".

Unit 2_TeclulicaLSpecifications IM G E R O d S)

DESCRIL710N_OEC11ANGES IV On index page IV, section 3/41.4, the section on Rod Sequence Control System is omitted. The section on Rod Block Monitor, Page 3/41-18 is changed to page 3/41-17.

Section 3/4.1.5, Standby Liquid Control System, page 3/41-19 is changed to page 3/41-18. Section 3/4.1.6, Economic Generation Control System, page 3/41-23 is changed to page 3/4 1-22, X

On index page X, special test exception 3/4.10.2, is changed from " Rod Sequence Control System" to " Rod Worth Minimizer."

XVI On Index page XVI, special test exception 3/4.10.2 Bases is changed from " Rod Sequence Control System" to Rod Worth Minimizer."

XIX On Index page XIX, Figure 3.1,5-1, page 3/41-21 is changed to page 3/41-20. Figure 3.1.5-2, page 3/41-22 is changed to page 3/41-3, 3/41-3 No changes on page 3/41-3.

3/41-4 in the " Control Rod Operability" Tech. Spec., surveillance requirement 4.1.3.1.2, is changed from "When above the low power setpoint of the RWM and RSCS,..." to "When above the low power setpoint of the RWM,.. "

7HLC99F/11

.S.

3/41-11 In ;he " Control Rod Drive Coupling" Tech. Spec., all references to RSCS are deleted. Action statement a.l.n)is changed from "If pemiitted by the RWM and RSCS,..." to "If permitted by the RWM,...". Action statement a.l.b) is changed from "if not pennitted by the L VM or RSCS then until pennitted by the RWM and Rs S " to "if not permitted by the RWM then until pemiitted by the RWM,"

3/4 1-13 In the " Control Rod Position Indication" Tech. Spec. 3.1.3.7.,

references to RSCS are changed to RWM. Action statement a.3.(a)is changed from,"Within the low power setpoint of the RSCS,..." to "Within the low power setpoint of the RWM,..."

Action statement a.3.(b) is changed from. " Greater than the low power setpoint of the RSCS,..." to " Greater than the low power setpoint of the RWM,..."

3/4 1-16 In the " Control Rod Program Controls, Rod Worth Minimizer" Tech. Spec,3.1.4.1., the low power setpoint is changed from 20% thennal power to 10% thennal power. The Applicability statement is changed from, "... THERM AL POWER is less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERM AL POWER,...", to

"... THERM AL POWER is less than or equal to 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER,...". Action statement b,"The provisions of Specification 3.0.4. are not applicable.",of the RWM Tech. Spec. (3.1.4.1) is changed to, action statement c, "The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable, with the exception that control rod withdrawal for reactor startup shall not begin with the RWM inoperable." This will help minimize substitution of a second operator as the amendment requires. Since the RSCS Tech Spec is being deleted, the control of number ofinoperable control rods must be transferred to the RWM Tech Spec as Action Statement b; "With an inoperable control rod (s), OPERABLE control rod movement may continue by bypassing the inoperable control rod (s) in the RWM provided that: 1. The position and bypassing of inoperable control rods is verified by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff, and 2. There are not more than 3 inoperable control rods in any RWM group."

3/4 1-17 The " Control Rod Program Controls, Rod Sequence Control System" Tech. Spec. 3.1.4.2., is deleted in its entirety.

l 211Lb89 7 /12

3/4 1-18 Page 3/41-18 is changed to page 3/41-17.

3/4 1-19 Page 3/41-19 5 changed to page 3/41-18, 3/4 1-20 Page 3/41-20 is changed to page 3/41-19.

3/4 1-21 Page 3/41-21 is change to page 3/41-20, 3/4 1-22 Page 3/41-22 is change to page 3/41-21, 3/4 1-23 Page 3/41-23 is change to page 3/41-22.

3/4 10-2 in "Special Test Exceptions,3/4.10.2 Rod Sequence Control System", the entire Tech Spec is rewritten for RWM instead of RSCS. The title is changed from " Rod Sequence Control System" to " Rod Worth Minimizer". Specification 3.10.2 is changed from "The cequnce and constraints imposed on control rod groups by the rod sequence control system (RSCS) per Specification 3.1.4.2 may be suspended by bypassing the low power setpoint switches for the following tests, provided that the rod worth minimizer is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.1." to "The Sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the rod worth minimizer (RWM) per Specification 3.1.4.1 may be suspended by bypassing the RWM for the following tests, provided that control rod movement prescribed for this testing is verified by a second licensed operator, or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff, who is present at the reactor control console."

Specification 3.10.2.d is changed from "Startup Test Program with the TIIERMAL POWER less than 20% of RATED TilERMAL POWER.", to "Startup Test Program with the THERMAL POWER less than 10% of RATED TilERMAL POWER." The Action statement is changed from "With the requirements of the above specification not satisified, verify that the RSCS is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.2" to "With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, verify that the RWM is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.1." Surveillance Requirement 4.10.2 is changed from "When the sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the RSCS are bypassed,..." to "When the sequence I

constraints imposed on control rod groups by the RWM are bypassed,..." Surveillance Requirement 4.10.2.a, "That the RWM is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.1," is changed to

" Deleted". Surveillance Requirement 4.10.2.b is changed from "That movement of control rods from 75% ROD l

DENSITY to the RSCS iow power setpoint", to "That movement of control rods from 75% ROD DENSITY to the RWM low power se! point...".

Z trt,MM 11

B 3/4 1-3 In Dases 3/4.1.4," Control Rod Program Controla", all references to RSCS are deleted and the low power setpoint is changed from 20% to 10% of rated thermal power. Change "When THERMAL POWIiR is greater than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod worth which,if dropped at the design rate of the velocity limiter, could result in a peak enthalpy of 280 cal /gm. Thus requiring the RSCS and RWM to be operable when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate control." to "When THERMAL POWER is greater than 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod worth which,if dropped at the design rate of the velocity limiter, could result in a peak enthalpy of 280 cal /gm.

Thus requiring the RWM to be operable when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate control." Also change "The RSCS and RWM provides automatic su ervision..." to "The RWM provides automatic supervision...p' B 3/410-1 In Bases section, change name of Special Test Exception 3/4.10.2 from " Rod Sequence Control System" to " Rod Worth Minimizer."

ZtiLDS07/11

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/,4,. 0 APPLICABILITY................

3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN..............................................

3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY AN0MAllES.........................................

3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS Control Rod Operability.......................

3/4 1-3 Control Rod Maximum Scram Insertion Times....................

3/4 1-6 Control Rod Average Scram Insertion Times....................

3/4 1-7 Four Control Rod Group Scram Insertion Times.................

3/4 1-8 Control Rod Sc ram Accumula tors..............................

3/4 1-9 Control Rod Drive Coupling..............

3/4 1-11 Control Rod Position.:dication..............................

3/4 1-13 Control Rod Drive Housing Support.....

3/4 1-15 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS Rod Worth Minimizer.............

3/4 1-16 (RodSequenceControlSystem.................................

3/4 1-17 Rod Block Monitor............................................

3/4-1-J6'17 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQU10 CONTROL SYSTEM................................

3/4 1-)?'ll 3/4.1.6 ECONOMIC GENERATION. CONTROL SYSTEM...........................

3/41-/f 2L 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENiRATION RATE...................

3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 APRM SETPOINTS..................................

3/4 2-2 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO........

3/4 2-3 3/4.2.4 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE............

3/4 2-5 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 IV Amendment No. 70 4

i

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS s_,

SECTION PAGE 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH..........................................

3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION..............................................

3/4 S-3 3/4.9.3 CONTROL R00 P0SITION.........................................

3/4 9-5 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME...................................................

3/4 9-6 3/4.9.5 C0MMUNICATIONS,..............................................

3/4 9-7 3/4.9.6-CRANE AND H0lST..............................................

3/4 9-8 3/4.9.7 C RAN E T RAV E L.................................................

3/4 9-9 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL.................................

3/4 9-10 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE P00L........................

3/4 9-11 3/4.9.10 CONTROL R0D REMOVAL

-Single Control Rod Removal....................................

3/4 9-12 Multiple Control-Rod Removal.................................

3/4 9-14 3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION High Water Level.............................................

3/4 9-16 Low Water Level..............................................

3/4 9-17 3/4i10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS k ed No M M W i2.R P L

3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INT ITY................................

3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2TRODSEQUENCECONTROLSYSTEM.)ff 7...........................

3/4 10-2 3/4J10.3 SHUTD0h'N MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS...............................

3/4 10-3

'3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS..........................................

3/4 10-4 3/4.10.5 0XYGEN CONCENTRATION.........................................

3/4 10-5 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS............................................

3/4 10-6 3/4.10.7 CONFIRMATORY FLOW. INDUCED VIBRATION TEST.....................

3/4 10-7

~

3/4.10.8 $UPPRESSION CHAMBER WATER TEMPERATURE........................

3/4 10-8 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 X

_m INDEX BASES s.

SECTION PAGE

'3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS b

3/4.10.1 -PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY...........................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2((RODSEQUENCECONTROLSYSTEM.[)Fff[.......................

8 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN HARGIN DEMONSTRAT10NS..........................

5 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS.....................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION.,.................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS.......................................

8 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.7 CONFIRMATORY FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION TEST................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.8 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER WATER TEMPERATURE...................

8 3/4 10-2 3/4.'11 RADIOACTIVF,_ EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Concentration............................................

B 3/4 11-1 Dose....................................................

B 3/4 11-1 Liquid Waste Treatment System........,,.................

B 3/4 11-2 Liquid Holdup Tanks.....................................

B.3/4 11-2 3/4.11.2 GASE0US EFFLUENTS Dose Rate...............................................

B 3/4 11-2 Dose - Noble Gases......................................

B 3/4 11-3 Dose - Radioiodines, Radioactive Materials in Particulate Form and Radionuclides Other than Noble. Gases...........................................

B 3/4 11-3 Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System and Ventilation Exhaust Treatment System..............................

8 3/4 11-4

-Explosive Oas Mixture.................................-..

-B 3/4 11. Main-Condenser..........................................

8 3/4 11-5 Venting or Purging......................................

B 3/4 11-0

-3/4.11.3 SOLID RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE....................-.............

B 3/4 11-5 3/4.11.4 TOTAL 00SE................................

B 3/4-11-5 3/4.12 RADI0 ACTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ~ MONITORING 3/4.12.1 MONITORING PR0 GRAM......................................

8 3/4 12-1 3/4 12.2 LAND USE CENSUS.........................................

B 3/4 12-1 3/4 12.3 INTERLABORATORY COMPARISON PR0 GRAM......................

B 3/4 12-2.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 XVI

l l

INDEX LIST OF FIGURES d

FIGURE PAGE 3.1.5-1 SODIUM PENTABORATE SOLUTION TEMPERATURE /

CONCENTRATION REQUIREMENTS.........................

3/4 1-p 20 3.1.5-2 SODIUM PENTABORATE (Na:B o038 10 H 0) i 2

VOLUME / CONCENTRATION REQUIREMENTS..................

3/4 1-g Al 3.4.1.5-1 CORE THERMAL POWER (% OF RATED) VERSUS TOTAL CORE FLOW (% OF RATED)............................

3/4 4-4c 3.4.6.1-1 MINIMUM REACTOR VESSEL METAL TEMPERATURE VS. REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE........................

3/4 4-18 3.4.6.1-la MINIMUh REACTOR VESSEL METAL TEMPERATURE VS. REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE...................................

3/4 4-18a 4.7-1 SAMPLING PLAN FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST..........

3/4 7-32 8 3/4 3-1 REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL.........................

B 3/4 3-7 i

B 3/4.6.2-1 SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL SETPOINTS.................

8 3/4 6-3a S.1.1-1 EXCLUSION AREA AND SITE BOUNDARY FOR GASE0US AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS..............................

5-2 5.1.2-1 LOW POPULATION ZONE...............................

5-3 6.1-1 DELETED..........................................

6-11 6.1-2 DELETED...........................................

6-12 6.1-3 MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION 6-13 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 XIX Amendment No. 71

L REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

~~

ACTION (Continued) 2.

If the inoperable control rod (s) is inserted:

a)

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months disarm the associated directional control l19 valves

either:

1)

Electrically, or 2)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves, b)

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

3.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not appliceble.

ls c.

With more than 8 control rods inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.1.1 The scram discharge ume drain and vent valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

I a.

At least once per 31 days verifying each valve to be open**, and l 16 b.

At least once per 92 days cycling each valve through at least one i

l complete cycle of full travel.

b 4.1.3.1.2 When above the low power setpoint of the RWM(Eand RSCS), all withdrawn control rods not. required to have their dire:tional control valves disarmed electricallyaor hydraulically shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by moving each control rod at least one notch:

.a.

At least'once per 7 days, and

b..

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when any control rod is immovable as.a result of excessiva friction or mechanical interference.

ll 4.1.3.1.3 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE by performance of L

Surveillance Requirements 4.1.3.2, 4.1.3.4, 4.1.3.5, 4.1.3.6 and 4.1.3.7.

May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing l gg associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

- These valves may be closed intermittently for testing under administrative l is control.

LA aALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 18

- ~.

e d

.+

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CDNTROL kOD DRIVE COUPLING

~'

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*.

ACTION:

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 and 2 with one control rod not coupled to a.

its associated drive mechanism:

'I.

Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , either:

3g, a)

If permitted by the RWM(End RSC5) insert the control rod drive mechanism to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod, and:

1)

Observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation, and 2)

Demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel positi b)

If recoupling is not complished on he first attempt or, if not permitted b he RWM(br RSC9 then until permitted by the RWM nnd RsCS?, declare the control rod inoperable and insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

1)

Electrically, or 2)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

2.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control. rod not coupled to its associated dris, mechanism, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , either:

1.

Insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod and demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, or.

'2.

If recoupling-is not accomplished, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

l-a)

Electrically, or b) hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water u

isolation valves.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

I c.

L

At least each withdrawn control rod.

Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

- May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

l LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 58

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATI0H LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.7 The control rod position indication system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 5*,

ACTION:

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with one or more control rod position a.

indicators inoperable, within one hour:

i 1

1.

Intermine the position of the control rod by:

(a) Moving the control rod, by single noich movement, to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator, (b) Returning the control rod, by single notch movement, to its original position, and (c) Verifying no control rod drif t alarm at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , or 2.

Move the control rod to a position with an OPERABLE position inaicator, or 3.

When THERMAL POWER is:

(a) Within the low power setpoint of the 1)

Declare the control rod inoperable, 2)

Verify the position and bypassing o. contro rods with inoperable "r ll in" and/or " Full out" po tion indi-u cators by a second licensed operator or her techni-cally qualified member of the unit techn cal staff.

(b) Greater than the low power setpoint of the SC, declare the control rod inoperable, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

1)

Electrically, or 2)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

4.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

^At least each withdrawn control rod.

Not applicable to control rods removed per Speci fication 3.9.10.1 or 3. 9.10. 2.

- May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to CPERABLE STATUS.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-13 Amendment No. 26 l

l

l.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS ROD WORTH MINIMIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.1 The rod worth minimizer (RWM) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

OP: RATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2*, when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to of RATED THERMA _L POWER mthe _ minim _u lowable low power i

setpoint.

[{g'56R.T PolGR5PU#'6" ACTION.

. fro M iMGT B ith the RWM inoperable, verify control rod movement and compliance a.

with

oreser! bed control rod pattern by a second licensed operator or oths. technically qualified member of the unit technical staf' who is present at the reactor control console.

Otherwise, control rod movement may be only by actuating the manual scram or placing the reactor mode switch in the ShJtdown position, 4 are n wiO NC cg.

The isio exce[ tow N Specifkcati n 3.

begm wid etwM bt applicable \\te+vp sbi,l tod w4 r resc. tor c%tro not e R wrA ; % pera ge.,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.4.1 The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

10 %

a.

In OPERATIONAL rn"D F F" rior to ithdrawal of control rods for the purp of making the r tor ~ itical, and in OPERATIONAL r

CONDI 1 prior to reaching 0 of RATED THERMAL POWER when reducing TC AL POWER, by verifying proper annunciation of the selection tror of at least one out-of-sequence control rod.

b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.

c.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 within one hour after RWM automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.

d.

By verifying the control rod patterns and sequence input to the RWM computer is correctly loaded following any loading of the program into the computer.

Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is pe'.iditted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to l.

criticality.

1 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 58

JESERTE b.

With an inoperable control rod (s), OPERABLE control rod movement may continue by bypassing the inoperable control rod (s) in the RWM provided

- that:

1.

The position and bypassing of inoperable control rods is verified by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical stall, and 2.

There are not more than 3 inoperable control rods in any RWM group.

l l

Ztru;997/16

_m.___

d sREACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM LIMIT G CONDITION FOR OPERATION j

e s

sequence control system (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE.

3.1.4.2 e

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2*# when THERMAL POWE is less than or equal (o APPLICABILIT RATED THERMAL POWER, the minimum allowable lo power setpoint.

ACTION:

a.

With the RS

-inoperable:

1.

Control r-withdrawal for reactor startu shall not begin.

ient shall not be permi ed, except by a scram, 2.

Control rod b.

With an inoperable rod (s), OPERAB control rod movement maj continue by bypassin % noperable con rol rod (s) in the RSCS provided that:

e--

1.

The position and byp of operable control rods is verified by a second n d perator or other technically qualified member of the uni technical staff, and 2.

There are not more than 3.noperable control rods in any RSCS group.

~~~C)

-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- - r-y i

s e 4.1.4.2 The RSCS shall be demo atrated OPERABLE a.

Performance of a s f-test prior to:

1.

-Each react startup, and

-2.

Rod inhi'.t mode automatic initiation when educing THERMAL POWER.

b.

Attemptine to select and move an inhibited control r d:

1.

Af er withdrawal of the first insequence control i d for each eactor startup, and 2.

Within one hour-after rod inhibit mode automatic init tion when reducing THERMAL POWER.

See Spe.al Test Exception 3.10.2.

Entry ito OPERATIONAL CON 0lTION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rod is

-permi ted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RSCS prior o wit rawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to critic. lity, SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-17 5

l l

i

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM R00 BLOCK MONITOR v

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.3 Both rod block monitor (RBM) channels shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 30% of RATED THERMAL POWEF.

ACTION:

a.

With one RBM channel inoperable, verify that the reactor is not operating on a LIMITING CONTROL R00 PATTERN and restore the inoperable RBM channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ; otherwise, place the inoperable rod block monitor channel in the tripped condition within the next hour, b.

With both RBM channels inoperable, place at least one inoperable rod block monitor channel in the tripped condition within one hour.

SURVEILLANC5 REQUIREMtNT v

4.1.4.3 Each of the above required RBM channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by per'ormance of a:

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at the frequencies 3.

and for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS specified in Table 4.3.6-1.

b.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST prior to control rod withdrawal when the reactor is operating on a LIMITING CONTROL R00 PATTERN.

L 1

1 l

v LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-g 17

i REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM

.3/4.1.5' STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.5' The standby liquid control system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*.

ACTION:

a.

'In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2:

1.

With one motor operated suction valve, one pump and/or one explosive valve inoperable, restore the inoperable suction valve, pump and/or explosive _ valve to OPERABLE. status within 7 days or be in et.least-HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

2.

With the standby' liquid control system inoperable, restore-the

' system to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the-next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months '.

b.-

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5*:

1.

With one motor operated suction valve, one pump and/or-one explosive valve inoperable, restore-the-inoperable-suction valve, pump and/or explosive valve to OPERABLE status within 30 days-or insert all insertable control rods within the next hour.

2.

With the standby liquid-control system inoperable, insert 1

- all _ insertable control rods within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . -

l

~SUREILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-

4.1.5 The standby liquid control _ system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

- At least once per:24 hours by verifying that;.

~1.

The available1 volume and temperature of,the sodium pentaborate solution are within the limits of Figures 3.1.5-1 and 3.1.5-2, and 2.

The' heat tracing circuit is OPERABLE by _ verifying the indicated temperature to be > 60*F on the-local-indicator.

With any control rod withdrawn.

Not applicable to control' rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

LA'SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-)4'lI Amendment Nc.18

. - =..

- -. ~

.. ~,

\\

REACTIVlfY CONTROL SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) s_,

b.

At least once per 31 days by; 1.

Starting both pumps and recirculating demineralized water to the test tank.

2.

Verifying the continuity of th 1xplosive charge.

3.

Determining that the concentration of boron in solution is within the limits of figure 3.1.5-2 by chemical analysis.*

4.

Verifying that each valve in the flow path that is not locked, s

sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown by; 1.

Initiating one of the standby liquid control system loops, including an explosive valve, and verifying that a flow path from the pumps to the reactcr pressure vessel is available by pumping demineralized water into the reactor vessel.

The replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be ' rom the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by having one of that batch successfully fired.

Both injection loops shall be tested in 36 months.

s_

2.

Demonstrating that when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, the minimum flow requirement of 41.2 gpm at a pressure of greater than or equal to 1220 psig is met.

3.

Demonstrating that the pump relief valve setpoint is less than or equal to 1400 psig and verifying that the relief valve does not actuate during recirculation to the test tank.

4.

- Demonstrating that all heat traced piping between the storage tank and the reactor vessel is unblccked by verifying flow f rom the storage tank to the motor operated suction valve and then draining and flushing the piping with domineralized water.

5.

Demonstrating that the storage tank hcaters are OPERABLE by verifying the expected temperature rise for the sodium pentaborate solution in the storage tank after the heaters are energized.

T This test shall also be performed anytime water or boron is added to the solution or when the solution temperature drops below the limit of Figure 3.1.5-1.

- This test shall also be performed whenever the heat tracing circuit has been found to be inoperable and may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total flow path steps such that the entire flow path is included.

3/4 1-y4F li LA SALLE - UNIT 1

1 4'

s.:

pi r-

~

T s:

.~.s L

&~--~~---~

~~'

~~

p-

_ g

I r.,

r ACCEPTABLE OPERATIriG t!

],.,0 c

t 4="4 t

PEGIOu y

e w.

.rr 3-q j

i L

t-

'I l',,

l;i.

j.

i

=--

&g

- 1, e l!.. p..

itit t

r p

g

'l; i ;<

I J;

l 1

r, I

,1.ll

' Ey. i:

'l1 3

c i

,i-g p. _.

i t.

i 2.._..-..__

t, 3

___w-

. w __--. _.

, - q.

g si

4,

]

l '1l:iliii..

[.t l-

3

,i.

.. i

,,'glj l.

't

, iin 5

- i n:u:_.~. -

i

. __m

_g oi,ili'il.!

i s

90 -

o w

r T

1i;F.ll,4 ',

.,;,f ji e

6 s

i

.i.

4 I:

g

^ " ' '

~~

"f"

,l Y

B0

'l ii

?

t

(*

.; ::, ; ;.+

g,. t y

I.'

4 i

. ;; i O

r j

70 l

, 1. l - 'l:," : y

. l '-

=

it;:::!, ;

',,,J...;j. I,.,8 j.

1 i ;.,.

e

.e.

ri 9 r

t--

. h.... i.. !,1lu.jp su 4"

.!..:t l., r I

... 77

+"i -

..- 'f 7_l_ #

~~ -

gg

. ;'u.al n

.m

+

'i

., a I}.av esi..j.g.p.s...,selsolisi.,isists'ai.

i l

el ;.n-i

:jp ng ;. : a q-'1.,,

y *,i t T i.

lrp

, ;'.{

..?

...t

i

..on

[a lq!,

' ~ "

y.

~

j

[~ g r.. !j;r. t.

p i

50 ik g..;. ;.i t t

.I.,. ~

I l;

~

j

. EO L

5 10 H

20 25 40 Concentratibn, % By Weight.

l SODIUM PENTABORATE SOLUTION TEMPERATURE / CONCENTRATION REQUIREMENTS Figure 3.1.5-l' a

p--

y

.d

e v

k.,

a. -

b cws o

>0 O

o>

m i

r a

~

c: a ot

~

x &

.56 5

o2 o

e m 45 tw 6 u m

O

2 e

g "O

cs m.-

mz su n

n o a O

E m

c; e N

c.. y r

O ma e

3 v

c3 kn NC m o M

c>

8 5 ':1 A

E l

*o %C li% :

o GA

.w L.

of Cn c

o u N

.O C

LL.

H M C 4 u 3

+J C N O

G)

C Z

A O. g E e 2 o 3z

s. u i

2g

- to 3u

~

e

$g E'

I l

d

'l g

2 JHDI3M AB AN33W3J'N011YWANMNO3 NOllA10$

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-pl M

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 3/4.1.6 ECONOMIC GENERATION CONTROL SYSTEM

_ LIM 111NG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.6 The economic generation control system may be in eperation with auto-matic flow contrui provided that:

a.

Core flow is > 65% of rated core flow, and b.

THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 20% of Rt.IED THERMAL DWER.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1.

ACTION:

With core flow less than 65% of rated core flow or THERMAL POWER less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, cease eperation under the economic generation control system.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.6 The economic genaration control system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a.

Calculating current efficiency and, using a nominal curve of ef flency versus THERMAL POWER, verifying that the EGC lower MW setpoint will maintain core flow > 65% of rated core flow an8 THERMAL POWER > 20% of RATED THERRAL POWER:

1.

Prior to entry into EGC operation, and 2.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months while operating in EGC.

b.

Verifying that current core flow is > 65% of rated core flow and THERMAL POWER is > 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER:

1.

Prior to entry into EGC operation, and 2.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months while operating in EGC.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/41-yI N

/00 t4/8&f/ Af/N/NIZ6R SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

="^"

3/4.10.2 / ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEMK s

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

.10.2 The sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the rod M

sequence control system (RSCS) per Specification 3.1.4.2 may be suspended by bypassing the low power setpoint switches for the following tests, provided jl QhattherodworthminimizerisOPERABLEperSpecification3.1.4.1.

y i

f a.

Shutdown margin demonstrations, Specification 4.1.1.

PAR @

T %

b.

Control rod scram, Specification 4.1.3.2.

c.

Control rod friction measurements.

/07a d.

Startup Test Program with the THERMAL POWER less than

,0* of RATED THERMAL POWER.

t APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

I With the requirements of the above specifica ion not satisfied, verify that the is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4

~

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS f~

4.

O.

e sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by t e SCS re bypassed, verify; That the RWM is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1_.

a.

o-b.

Tnat movement of control rods from 75% R00 DENSITY to the b [ow power setpoint is limited to the apprnved contrer rod withdrawal MEN D sequence auring scrae and friction tests 1 c.

That movement of control rods during shutdown marg.n demonstrations is limited to the prescriotd sequence per Specification 3.10.3, and d.

Conformance with this specific.ation and test procedures by a second licensed operator or other tectlnically quaiified memts r of the unit technical staff.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 10-2

=_ -

INSERT A 3.10.2 The sequence constaints imposed on control rod groups by the Red Worth Minimizer (RWM) per Specification 3.1.4.1 may be suspended by means of bypassing the RWM for the following tests, provided that control rod movement prescribed for this testing is verified by a second licensed operator, or other technically qualifie.

member of the unit technical staff, who is present at the reactor control console.

I tilLLst 9 7 /1 *y

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES i

CONTROL RODS (Continued) i In addition, the automatic CRD charging water header low pressure scram (see Table 2.2.1-1) initiates well before any accumulator loses its full capa-bility to insert the control rod.

With this added automatic scram feature, the surveillance of each individual accumulator check valve is no longer necessary to demonstrate aaequv e stored energy is available for normal scram i

act on Control rod coupling integrity is required to ensure compliance with the analysis of the rod drop accident in the FSAR.

The overtravel position feature provides the only positive means of determining that a rod is properly coupled and therefore this check must be performed prior to a;hieving criti;ality af ter completing CORE ALTERATIONS that could have af fected the control rod drive coupling integrity.

The subsequent check it performed as a backup to the initial demonstration.

In order to ensure that the control rod patterns can be followed Und there-fore that other carameters are within their limits, th( control rod po!.ition indication system must be OPERABLE.

The control red housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than 3 inches in the event of a housing failure.

The amount of rod reactivity which could be added by this small amout.t of rod withdrawal is less than a normal withdrawal increment and will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system.

The support is not required when there is no pressure to act as a driving force to rapidly eject a drive housing.

i The required surveillance intervals are adequate to determine that the rods are OPERABL and not so frequent as to cause excessive wear on the system components.

3/4.1.4 CONTROL R00 PROGRAM CONTROL' Control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences are established to assure that the maximum insequence individual cor. trol rod or control rod segments which are withdrawn at any time during the fuel cycle could not be worth enough to r

l result in a peak fuel enthalpy greater than 280 cal /gm in the event of a control rod drop accident.

The specified sequences are characterized by homogereous, scatte ed p terns of control rod withdrawal. When THERMAL POWER is gre, iter tha

.0 of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is possible rod worth which, i' dropped t e design rate of the velocity _ limit _-, could result in a peak enthalpy of gg a

280 cal /gm.

Thus requirino the FSCS anj RWM to be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER l

i s l ep. erin ~ o r equa.

of kAILD THERMAL POWEP provides adequate control.

e The(RSCS a2 WM provide automatic supervision to assure that out-of-sequence rUos will not be withdrawn or inserted.

The analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.4.9 of the FSAR and the techniques of the analysis are presented in a topical report, Reference 1, and two supplements, References 2 and 3.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 33

l 3/4.10, SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES 3/4.10.1 PR! MARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is removed during the period hen open vessel' tests are being performed during the low power PHYSICS

-^

T L ST S' ff00 kIORTH /MlHinf/ZZ--

s 3/4.10.2[RODSEOUEN"ECONTROLSYSTEM gj In order to perform the tests required in the technical specifications it is necessary to bypass the sequence restraints on control rod movement.

The additional surveillance rcquirments ensure that the specifications on heat generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are not exceeded during the period when these tests are being performed and that individual rod worths do not exceed the values assumed in the safety analysis.

3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations with the vessel head removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not occur.

Tt.ase additional restrictions are specified in this LCO.

3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS This special test exception permits reactor cri'icality under no flow conditians and is required to perform certain startup and PHYSICS TESiS while et low THERMAL POWER levels.

E4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION Relief f rom the oxygen concentration specifications is necessary in order to provide access to the primary containment during the intial startup and testing phase of operation. Without this access the startup and test program could be restricted and delayed.

3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS This special test exception permits training startups to be performed with the reactor vessel depressurized at low THERMAL POWER and temperature while controlling RCS temperature with one RHR subsystem aligned in the shutdown coolirg mode in order to minimize contaminated water discharge to the radioactive waste disponai system.

3/4.10 7 CONFIRMATORY FLOW INDUCED V!BRATION TEST This special test exception permi. 3 the primary containment to be open and the RCIC system to be inoperable during performance of the required test provided that the test is performed prior to the initial criticality of the reactor and the heatup to and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN is not performed with nuclear neat.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 10-1

i l

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS

{

_SECTION PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY...................................................

3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN..............................................

3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY AN0MALIES.........................................

3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS Control Rod Operab111ty......................................

3/4 1-3 Control Rod Maximum Scram Insertion Times....................

3/4 3-6 Control Rod Average Scram Insertion Times....................

3/4 1-7 Four Control Rod Group Scram Insertion Times.................

3/4 1 8 Control Rod Scram Accumulators...............................

3/4 1-9 Control Rod Drive Coupling...................................

3/4 1 11 Control Rod Position Indication..............................

3/4 1-13 Control Rod Drive Housing Support............................

3/4 1-15 3/4.1.4 CONTROL R00 PROGRAM CONTROLS Rod Worth Minimizer..........................................

3/4 1-16 V (R'odSecoon-a Nntrol System..................................

3/41-D Rod Block Monitor.............................................

3/41-}s/7 3/4.1.5 STANOBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM................................

3/41-J4f/8 3/4.1.6 ECONOMIC GENERATION CONTROL SYSTEM...........................

3/4 1-)t 22.

3/4.2 POWER OISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE...................

3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 APRM SETP0lNTS...............................................

3/4 2-2 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RAT10.................................

3/4 2-3 3/4.2 4 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE..................................

3/4 2-5 LA SALLE - UNIT 2 IV Amendment No. 54

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATICNS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH...........................

3/4 9 1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATICN...

3/4 9-3 3/4.9.3 CONTROL R00 POSITION.

3/4 9-5 3/4.9.4 OECAY TIME................................

3/4 9 6 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS, 3/4 9-7 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND HOIST.

3/4 9-8 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL....................

3/4 9-9 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL.............

3/4 9-10 3/4.9.9 WATER LtVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE P00L......

3/4 9-11 3/4.9.10 CONTROL ROD REMOVAL Single Control Rod Remova!.................

3/4 9-12 Multiple Control Rod Removal..............

3/4 9-14 3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION High Water Level...................

3/4 9-16 Low Water Leve1..............................

3/4 9 17

_m -

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS NOO h000Ibf flA/IM/

, c __ ~ Y k-3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INT aRITY.

3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 [ ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM [7/ TI.,...................

3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 SHUTOOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS........................

3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 REfIRCULATION L00PS................

3/4 10-4 i

3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATIt'4.

3/4 10-5 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS............

3/4 10-6 3/4.10.7 CONFIRMATORY FLOW INDUCEO VIBRATION TEST.

3/4 10-7 I

(

l LA SALLE - UNIT 2 X

t i

.INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE RCD M)0RTH 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

<HINf ff l 2 (IM!

I 3/4.10.1 PRIMARYCONTAINHENTLKEGRITY...........

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 [ ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEBJ7d 75.........

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 SNUTOOWN MARGIN DEh0NSTRATIONS.............

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS.......................

B 3/4 10 1 3/4.10.5 0XYGFN CONCENTRATION.................

B 3/4 10-3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS...................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.7 CONF!RMATORY FLOW INDUCEO VIBRATION TEST.............

B 3/4 10-1 i 3/4.11_ RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Concentration.........................

B 3/4 11-1 Dose.

B 3/4 11-1 Liquid Waste Treatment System.......................

B 3/4 11-2 Liquid Holdup Tanks......

B 3/4 11-2 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Dose Rate..........................

B 3/4 11-2 Dose - Noble Gases......

B 3/4 11-3 Dose -Radioiodines, Radioactive Materials in Particulate Form and Radionuclides Other than Noble Gases...........

B 3/4 11-3 Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System and Ventilation Exhaust Treatment System.....................

B 3/4 11-4 Explosive Gas Mixture.................................

B 3/4 11-4 Main Condenser.........................................

B 3/4 11-5 Venting or Purging............................

B 3/4 11-5 3/4.11.3 SOLIO RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE..............................

B 3/4 11-5 3/4.11.4 TOTAL 00SE......................................

B 1/4 11-5 3/4.12 RADIOA,CTIVE ENVIRONMENTA: MONITORING 3/4.12.1 MONITORING PR0 GRAM..................................

3/4 12-1 3/4 12.2 LAND USE CENSUS..............................

3/4 12-1 3/4 12.3 INTERLABORATORY COMPARISON PROGRAM...................

3/4 12-1 LA SALLE - UNIT 2 XVI Amendment No. 53

=

LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE i

4 3.1.5-1 SODIUM PENTABORATE SOLUTION TEMPERATURE /

CONCENTRATION REQUIREMENTS........................

3/41-gto 3.1.5-2 SODIUM PENTABORATE (Na 0 0

2 10 16 10 H O) 2 VOLUME / CONCENTRATION REQUIREMENTS.................

3/41-g21 3.4.1.5-1 CORE THERMAL POWER (% OF RATED) VERSUS TOTAL CORE FLOW (% OF RATED).................................

3/4 4-Sc 3.4.6.1-1 MINIMUM REACTOR VESSEL METAL TEMPERATURE VS REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE.......................

3/4 4-19 3.4.6.1-la MINIMUM REACTOR VESSEL METAL TEMPERATURE VS.

REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE...........................

3/4 4-19a 4.7-1 SAMPLING PLAN FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST.........

3/4 7-33 8 3/4 3-1 REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL........................

B 3/4 3-7 i

B 3/4.6.2-1 SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL SETPOINTS..................

B 3/4 6-3a 5.1.1-1 EXCLUSION AREA AND SITE BOUNDARY FOR GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS..............................

5-2 5.1.2-1 LOW POPULATION ZONE...............................

5-3 6.1-1 DELETED..........................................

6-11 6.1-2 DELETED...........................................

6-12 6.1-3 MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION.....................

6-13 LA SALLE - UNIT 2 XIX Amendment No,55

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continuco!

ACTION (Continued) 2.

If the inoperable control red (s) is inserted:

a)

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months disarm the associated directional control valves

either:

1)

Electrically, or 2)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves, b)

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUT 00WN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

3.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not apoiicable.

With more than 8 control rods inoperable, be in at los: HOT SHUTOOWN c.

within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.1.1 The scram discharge volume drain and vent valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

At least once per 31 days verifying each valve to be open**, and a.

b.

At least once per 92 days cycling each valve through at least one i

complete cycle cf full travel.

_W 4.1.3.1.2 When above the low power setpoint of the RWH Gnd RSCf all withdrawn control rods not required to have their directional control valves disarmed r

electrically or hydraulically shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by moving each control rod at least one notch; a.

At least once per 7 days, nnd b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when any control rod is immovable as a l

result of excessive friction or mechanical interference.

4.1.3.1.3 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of Surveillance Requirements 4.1.3.2, 4.1.3.4, 4.1.3.5, 4.1.3.6, and 4.1.3.7.

May.oe rearmea intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associe.ed with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

- These v'iives may be closed intermittently for testing under administrative control.

LA sal.LE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-4 1

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM DONTROL ROD ORIVE COUPLING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and $*.

l ACTION:

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2 with one control rod not coupled to a.

its associated drive mechanism:

1.

Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , either:

a)

If permitted by the RWM (and RSC sert the control rod drive mechanism to accomplisn~recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod, and:

1)

Observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation, and 2)

Demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, b)

If recoupling is not a omplished 0 first attempt or, if not permitted t v ae RWH Qr T(5C9 then until permitted by the RWM CEnd R$C9, declare the control rod inoperable and insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

1)

Electrically, or 2)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

2.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , either:

1.

Insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling and ve-ify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod and demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, or 2.

If recoupling is not accomplished, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either; a)

Electrically, or b)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves, c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

^At least each withdrawn control rod.

Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

- May be rearmed intermittently, urder administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status, d

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 53

4 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM

~

CONTROL R00 POSITION INDICATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

~

.r;-

3.1. 3. 7 The control roc positior Indication system shall be OPERABLE.

APpllCABJLir':

rdEP.ATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 5*

l ACTION:

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with one or more control rod position a.

indicators inoperable within one hour:

1.

Determine the position of the control rod by:

(a) Moving the control rod, by single notch movement, to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator, (b)

Returning the control rod, by single notch movement, to its original position, and (c) Verifying no control rod drif t alarm at least once per 12-hours, or 2.

Move the control rod to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator, or 3.

When THERMAL POWER is:

gg (a) Within the low power setpoint of the (1) Declare the control rod inoperable, (2) Verify the position and bypassing of contr rod with inoperable " Full in" and/or " Full out" po ition indi-cators by a second licensed operator or her techni-cally qualified member of the unit techn. cal staf f, b)

Greater' than the low power,setpoint of the clare the control rod inoperable, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves" either:

/

(1) Electrically, or (2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

4.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

"At least each withdrawn control rod.

Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

- May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status, i

53 LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-13 Amendment No.

v REACTIVITY CONTROL $YSTEM 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PR65 RAM CONTROLS R00 WORTH MINIMIZER

~

LIMITINGCOND'TIONFOROPESAfl0N 3.1. 4.1 The rod worth minimizer (RWM) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2*,

when THERMAL POWER (s less l

than or. equal t of RATED T_HERMAL POWER, the minim"m allowable low power c

setpoin

,gseggy JggAgggq T TION *

~

N8M MI O

~

With the RWM inoperable, verify control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed control rod pattern by a second ljcensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit-technical staff who is present at the reactor control console.

Otherwise, control rod movement may be only by actuating the manual scram or placing the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position, c.)f.

The provisions o{5 e ica on g0 ogpg1gapigul4 r

n 4

& MMWb.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 5

%M

@ d a

4.1.4.1.The RWM-shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

/07e In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to drawal of control rods for a.

the purpose of making the react

Itical, and in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 prior to reachin of RATED THERMAL POWER when reducing

. THERMAL POWER, by verify oper annunciation of the selection error

-of at least one out-equence control rod, N Am"'LnL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal-of control rods for oc the purpose of making the reactor critical, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod, c.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 within I hour after RWM automatic-initiation when reducing. THERMAL POWER, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod, d.

By verifying the control rod patterns and sequence input to the RWM computer is correctly loaded following any loading of the program into the computer.

Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prior. to withdrawal.of control rods for the purpose'of bringing the reactor to criticality.

I LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 53

.. ~

4 i.

IN3ERT D a

b.

With an inoperable control rod (s), OPERABLE control rod rnovernent rnay continue by bypassing the bioperable control rod (s) in the RWM provided that:

i 1.

The position and bypassing of inoperable control rods is verified by a second licensed 0 3erator or other technically qualified rnernber of the unit technical stal, and 2.

There are not rnore than 3 inoperable control rods in any RWM group.

I f

l i

.ZifLD801/16

~ -

..--,,_-e<

i 0

YACTIVITYCONTR0t$YSTEM I

ROQ SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM

--/

LIM NG CONDITION FOR OPERATION c __.

3.1.4.2

'he red sequence control system (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILI PERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2*#, when THERMAL POWER s less l

than or equal t

- RATED THERMAL POWER, the minimum allowable low power i

setpoint.

ACTION:

a.

With the i perable:

1.

Ccntrol sd w.thdrawal for reactor startup, hall not begin.

2.

Control ro-movement shall not be permit id, except by a scram, With an inoperable h l rod (s), OPERABL control rod movement may b.

i continue by bypassi p operable cont I rod (s) in the RSCS i

provided that:

A

/

1.

The position and b-TQy] of in erable control rods is verified by a secon ic sed erator or other technically I

qualified member of t 6n ichnical staff, and 2.

There Are not more than 1 i aperable control rods in any RSCS group.

SURVEli.W4CE REOUIREMENTS m

s i

N 4;1.4.2 The RSCS shall be demonstr ted OPERA a.

Performance of a self-st prior to:

1.

Each reactor st tup, and 2.

Rod inhibit me automatic initiation

.n r ucing THERMAL' i

POWER.

b.

Attempting to s lect and move an inhibited co rol rod:

1.

Af ter wi drawal of the first insequence c trol rod for each reacto startup, and.

c.

With one-hour after rod inhibit mode automat initiation whe. reducing THERMAL POWER.

I "See Special est Exception 3.10.2.

Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdre:wal of selected contr I rods is permitte for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RSCS rior to

.withdra al of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to ri tical i ty, 3

N SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-17 Amendment No.

l

~.s.-.

4 i

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM ROD BLOCK MONITOR LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.3 Both rod block monitor (RBM) channels shall ne OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

a.

With one RBM channel inoperable, verify that the reactor is not onerating on a LIMITING CONTROL R00 PATTERN and restore the inoperable RBM channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ; otherwise, place the inoperable rod block monitor channel in the tripped condition within the next hour, b.

With both RBM channels inoperable, place at least one inoperable rod block monitor channel in the tripped condition within one hour.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.4.3 Each of the above required RBM channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a:

a.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at the frequencies and for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS specified in Table 4.3.6-1.

b.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST prior to control rod withdrawal when the reactor is operating on a LIMITING CONTROL R00 PATTERN.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-}& / 7

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING C;NDITION FOR OPERAT'?N 3.1.5 The standby liquid control system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*

ACTION:

lll a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2:

1.

With one motor operated suction valve, one pump and/or one explosive valve inoperable, restore the inoperable suction valve, pump and/or explosive valve to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

2.

With the standby liquid control system inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5*:

1.

With one motor operated suction valve, one pump and/or one exple-dve valve inoperable, restore the inoperable suction valve, pump and/or explosive valve to OPERABLE status within 30 days or insert all insertable control rods within the next hour.

2.

With the standby liquid control system inoperable, insert all insertable control rods within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS t.1. 5 The standby liquid control system shall be demonstratea OPERABLE:

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying that; a.

1.

The available volume and temperature of the sodium pentaborate solution are within the limits of Figures 3.1.5-1 and 3.1.5-2, and 2.

The heat tracing circuit is OPERABLE by verifying the indicated temperature to be > 60 F on the local indicator.

'With any control rod withdrawn.

Not applicable to control rods removed per Speci fi cation 3. 9.10.1 or 3. 9.10. 2.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-}6'/3

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b.

At least once per 31 days by; 1.

Ctarting both pumps and recirculating demineralized water to the test tank.

2.

Verifying the continuity of the explosive charge.

3.

Determining that the concentration of boron in solution is within the limits of Figurc 3.1.5-2 by chemical analysis.

4.

Verifying that each valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct

position, c.

iAt least once per 18 months during shutdown by; 1.

Initiating one of the standby liquid control system loops, including an explosive valve, and verifying that a flow path from the pumps to the reactor pressure vessel is available by pumping demineralized water into the reactor vessel.

The replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be from the same manuf actured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by having one of that batch successfully fired.

Both injection loops shall be tested in 36 months.

2.

Demonstrating that when tested pursuant to specification 4.0.5, the minimum flow requirement of 41.2 gpm at a pressure of greater than or equal to 1220 psig is met.

3.

Ocmonstrating that the pump relief valve setpoint is less than or equal to 1400 psig and verifying that the relief valve does not actuate during recirculation to the test tank.

4.

- Demonstrating that all heat traced piping between the storage tank and the reactor vessel is unblocked by verifying flow from the storage tank to the motor operated suction valve and then draining and flushing the piping with domineralized water.

5.

Demonstrating that the storage tank heaters are OPERABLE by verifying the expected temperature rise for the sodium pentaborate solution in the storage tank after the heaters are energized.

l l

l

This test shall aIso be performed anytime water or boron is added to the solution or when the solution temperature drops below the limit of Figure 3.1.5-1.

- This test shall also be performed whenever the heat tracing circuit has been found to be inoperable and may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total flow path steps such that the entire flow path is included.

3/4 1,pr#l9 LA SALLE - UNIT 2

en?

140 s

C 130 l ACCEPTABLE OPERATING REGION l 120

-f 110 OPERATI!!G LIMIT

[ 100 f

/'

2

/

3 90 a

2 E

E 8.

/

y

/

70 eO

/

00 40 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Conse. ration, % by Weight I

SODIUM PENTABORATE SOLUTION TEMPERATURE I CONCENTRATION REQU!REMENTS Figurs 3.1.5-1

15 2

j Region of Approved Volume Concentration -

5 14

>m aR g

v

.9; 13 e

Low Level

.{

Alarm 12 Minimum Required j

Concentration Overflow

.ii!

Volume i

i oe l

I I

I l

I 11 4500 4600 4700 4800 4900 5000 5100 5200 Not Tank Volume (Gallone)

SODIUM PENTA 80 RATE (Na28100 16 10H 0) 2 VOLUME /CONCENTRATlON REOUIREMENTS Figure 3.1.5-2 l

l l

l 3/41-[El LA SALLE - UNIT 2

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 3/4.1.6 ECONOMIC GENERATION CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.6 The economic generation control system may be in operation with auto-matic flow control provided that:

a.

Core flow is 1 65% of rated core flow, and b.

THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 20% of RATED THERHAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1.

ACTION:

With core flow less than 65% of rated core flow or THERMAL POWER less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, cease operation under the economic generation control system.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS l

4.1.6 The economic generation control system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a.

Calculating current efficiency and, using a nominal curve of I

effiency versus THER;,t POWER, verifying that the EGC lower i

MW setpoint will maintain core flow > 65% of rated core flow an8THERMALPOWER120%ofRATEDTHERRALPOWER:

1.

Prior to entry into EGC operation, and 2.

A't least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months while operating in EGC.

I l

b.

Verifying that current core flow is > 65% of rated core flow and THERMAL POWER is 120% of RATED THERMAL POWER:

l 1.

Prior to entry into EGC operation, and 1

2.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months while operating in EGC.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2-3/4 1j?f'Z 2,

l I

200 WORDI M/NintfLEE SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS u u_m 1 3/4.10.2 [ ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM W l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION f3.10.2 The sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the rod ) g sequence contro~1 system (RSCS) per Specification 3.1.4.2 may be suspended by (m bypassing the low power setpoint switches for the following tests, provided )

I that the rod worth minimizer is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.l f.

a.

Shutdown margin demonstrations, Specification 4.1.1.

gpf pS I b.

Control rod scram, Specification 4.1.3.2.

c.

Control rod friction measurements.

d.

Startup Test Program with the THERMAL POWER less than of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

h ACTION:

With requirements of the abcVe specifica

'on not satisfied, verify that the SC is-0PERABLE per Specification 3.1.4 2 m kNM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS f

s 4

ien the sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the sci re bypassed, verify;

[That the RWM is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.1 a.

I' b.

That movement of control rods from 75% R0D DENSITY to the SC low power setpoint is limited to the approved control rod with rawal DELEN sequence during scram and friction tests, l

c.

That movement of control rods during shutdown margin demonstrations i

is limited-to the prescribed sequence per Specification 3.10.3, and l

d.

Conformance with this specification and test procedures by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 10-2

INSERT.A l

3.10.21he sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the Rod Wonh Minimizer (RWM) per Specification 3.1 A.! may be suspended by means of bypassing the RWM for the following tests, provided that control rod movement irescribed for this testing is verified by a second licensed operator, or other technical y qualified member of the unit teciatical staff, who is present at the reactor control console.

l I

l ElrLD401/15

_.. -... -. _ _.... _ ~ _..., _.

l REACT!'VITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES CONTROL RODS (Continued)

In addition, the automatic CRD charging water header low pressure scram (see Table 2.2.1-1) initiates well before ary accumulator loses its f ull capa-bility to insert the control rod. With the added automatic scram feature, the surveillance of each individual accumulator check valve is no longer necessary to demonstrate adequate stored energy is avtilable for normal scram action.

Control rod coupling integrity is requ red to ensure compliance with the analysis of the rod drop accident in the FSnR.

The ovartravel position feature provides the only positive means of determining that a rod is properly coupled and therefore this check must be performed t.rior to achieving criticality after completing CORE ALTERATIONS that could hav.r affected the control rod drive coupling integrity.

The subsequent check is performed as a backup to the ini' demonstration.

In order to ensure that the control rod patterns can be followed and the-fore that other parameters are within their limits, the control rod position indication system must be OPERABLE, The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than 3 inches in the event of a housing failure.

The amount of rod reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal is less than a normal withdrawal increment and will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system.

The support is not required when there is no pressure to act as a driving force to rapidly eject a drivo housing.

The required surveillance intervals are adequate to determine that the

ods are OPERABLE and not so frequent as to cause excessive wear on the system components.

3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS Control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences are established to assure that the maximum insequence individual control rod or control rod segments which are withdrawn at any time during the fuel cycle could not be worth enough to result in a peak fuel enthalpy greater than 280 cal /gm in the event of a control rod drop accident.

The specified sequences are characterized by homogeneous, scatt rns of control rod withdrawal.

When THERMAL POWER is greater th #

RATED THERMAL POWER, there is o ossible rod worth which, if dropped at th design rate of the velocity limit

, could result in a peak enthalpy of 280 cal /gm us reg n the GSCS ars) RWM to be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER g

is les an or e p.0 of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate control.

The @SCS and)RWM provide automatic supervision to assure that out-of-sequence rods will not be withdrawn or inserted.

The analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.4.9 of the FSAR and the techniques of the analysis are presented in a topical report, Reference 1, and two supplements, References 2 and 3.

The RBM is designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the ev n t of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of high power density during high power operation. Two channels are provided.

Tripping one of the channels will block erroneous rod withdrawal soon enough to prevent fuel damage.

This system backs up the written sequence used by the operator for withdrawal of control rods.

I LA SALLE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 6

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is removed during the period when open vessel tests are being performed during the low power PHYSICS 3/4.10.2/RODSEOUENCECONTROLSYSTEM)T

f(

In order to perform the tests required in the technical specifications it is necessary to bypass the sequence restraints on control rod movement.

The additional surveillance requirments ensure that the specifications on heat generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are nct exceeded during the period when these tests are being performed and that individual rod worths do not exceed the values assumed in the safety analysis.

3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations with the vessel head removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not occur.

These additional restrictions are specified in this LCO.

3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain startup and PHYSICS TESTS while at low THERMAL POWER levels.

3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION Relief from the oxygen concentration specifications is necessary in order to provide access to the primary containment during the intial startup and testing poase of operation.

Without this access the startup and test program could ti restricted and delayed.

3/4.10.6 1 RAINING STARTUPS This special test exception permits training startups to be performed with the reactor vessel depressurized at low THERMAL POWER and temperature while controlling RCS temperature with one RHR subsystem aligned in the shutdown cooling mode in order to minimize contaminated water discharge to the radioactive waste disposal system.

3/4.10.7 CONFIRMATORY FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION TEST This special test exception permits the primary containment to be open and the RCIC system to be inoperable during performance of the required test provided that the test is performed prior to the initial criticality of the reactor and the heatup to and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN is not performed with nuclear heat.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 10-1

NITACllMENT,C ILVALLWT10 ROES 10NIElCANT_liAZARDLCONSIDERATION i

The proposed Operating License /fechnical Specification Amendment has been evaluated to determine whether or not there is a Significant Hazards Consideration based on the questions provided by 10 CFR 50.92 requirements. In addition, the evaluation was measured against the criteria used to establish safety limits, the limiting safety system settings, and the limiting conditions for operations. The results of the evaluation detennined that the proposed amendment would not:

1.

Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2.

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3.

Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because:

1.

An extensive probabilistic study perfonned by the NRC staff (letter and enclosure from 11.C. Rysche, NRR to R. Fraley, ACRS dated June 1,1976," Generic item 11 A 2 Control Rod Drop Accident (BWRs)")

in conjunction with the extensive use of HPWS rod patterns, and improved RWM reliability demonstrates that the R,'M can be considered an acceptable system of md pattem control in protecting against the Design Limit Rod Drop Accident (RDA). Thus, the RSCS is redundant in function to the RWM Eliminating the RSCS does not eliminate the control rod pattern monitoring furction perfonned by the RWM. The probability of an accident occurring is not increased, since RSCS does not affect the potential of a rod drop event and the l

proposed changes do not remove control rod drive coupling checks or instrument response verifications. When operation proceeds in accordance with this change, the probability or consequences of an accident is not increased.

2.

Im? roved methodologies in the RDA analysis methods (e.g.

Ub L-NUREG 28109, "Thennat llydraulic Effects on Control Drop l

Accident in a BWR, October 1980) have shown that when above 10 percent power no RDA can occur with the peak fuel enthalpy being greater than the RDA design limit of 280 cal /gm. The installed sensors for RWM LPSP actuation are capable of providing actuation within the revised limits. When operation proceeds in accordance with this change, the probability or consequences of an accident is not increased.

EllLt$ 07 /1 ?

l

~ _.. _ _ _ _

2-3, lhe RSCS du ilicates the function of the RWM. While the RWM is operable, the 3SCS is not needed since the RWM prevents control rod pattern error, in the event the RWM is out of service, the proposed Technical Specifications require that control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed control rod pattem be verified by a second licensed operator or technically qualified member of the technical staff. The verification process is controlled procedurally to ensure a high quality, independent review of control rod movernent.

All of these actions demonstrate consistency and applicability to those conclusions reached in the NRC SER, and substantiate the conclusion that there will be no increase in the consequences of an RDA as previously evaluated as a result of eliminating the RSCS and lowering the RWM LPSP.

'the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated because:

1.

The only protective function of the RSCS is preventing the Design Limit RDA. Eliminating the RSCS does not change any other plant protective functions or systems, thus the change does not create any new accident mode.

2.

The only protective function of the RWM is preventing the Design Limit RDA. Lowering the setpoiti of the RWM from 20 percent t

power to 10 percent power does not change any other plant protective functions or systems, thus the change does not create any new accident mode.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:

1.

Elimination of the RSCS will not reduce the margin of safety. The RWM will protect against the peak fuel enthalpy being greater than the l

RDA design limit of 280 cal /gm in the event of a control rod drop.

The consequences of transients or accidents are not increased by this change beyond those previously evaluated and accepted at LaSalle Station.

2.

Lowering the setpoirit of the RWM from 20 percent power to 10 percent power will not reduce the margin of safety. Calculations perfonned by GE and 3NL have shown that even with the nmximum single control rod position error, and most multiple error patterns, above 10 percent power no RDA can occur with the peak fuel enthalpy being greater than the RDA design limit of 280 cal /gm in the event of a control rod drop. The consequences of transients or accidents are not increased by this change beyond those previously evaluated and accepted at LaSalle Station.

l l

U LD807/18

3-4 3.

GE has provided technical justification for the proposed changes in Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A and associated references which justify the acceptability of the proposed changes. The NRC has reviewed imd accepted the GE analysis and provided guidelines for licensees wanting to make the changes proposed in NEDE-240ll-P A and approved in the NRC SER issued December 27,1987 to J.S.

Chamley of General Electric. The proposed changes are consistent with those approved in the NRC SER and the guidelines set forth therein. Therefore, there is no significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Conclusion Guidance has been provided in 51.44 FR 7744 for the application of standards to license change rec uests for determination of the existence of significant hazards considerations. This document provides examples of mnendments which are considered unlikely to involve significant hazards considerations.

This pro,osed amendment does not involve a significant relaxation of the criteria used to establis1 safety limits, a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting safety system settings or a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting conditions for operations. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria estdud. :d in 10 CFR 50.92 (c), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

I L

{

l ENLL401/19 e

._.__._._._.._q l

1 J

Arl'ACllMENT D liNYlRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT STATEMENT Al'i'LICABILITY REVIEW Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed aniendment against the criteria for the identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 31.20, it has been determined that the proposed cluuiges rueet the criteria for a categorical exclusion as provided under 10 CPR 51,22 (c)(9). This conclusion has been detennined because the changes being requested do not pose a significant hazards consideration or do not involve a significant increase in the amounts, and no significant changes in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite. Additionally, this request does not involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

E

.lfLf 4 97 / I 9

NEDE-34011-P-A *-US I

i 1

1 1

1 NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT APPROVING AMENDKENT 17 TO NEDE-24011-?

g s

I O

US.C-377/US.C-378 J

B

.ms y.-,

e----

-.m..

v.2.,,

v.:-

r

--r-w-

ML20070U664

Text

SUMMARY

Navigation menu

Search