ML20070Q943

Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1982

ML20070Q943
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	12/09/1982
From:	Caba E TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20070Q935	List: ML20070Q931 ML20070Q943
References
NUDOCS 8301270213
Download: ML20070Q943 (11)

Text

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AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL WKET NO. 50-346 WIT Davis-Besse Unit 1 1

DATE '

COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba TELEPHONE (419) 259-53 0, Ext.

196 MONTH November, 1982 ,

DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net) (MWe-Neo o 852 37 882 2 870 gg 881 3 870 g9 875 4 . 873 20 875 f 870 21 873 6 871 874 22 7 871 23 877 3 323 24 878 9 439 25 878 j

.10 801 26 878 l 1I .. 863 27 877

-12 866' 23 878 13 872 29 878 34 868 877 30 15 877 31 ---

16 879 c.

INSTRUCTIONS On this format.fi:t the average daily unit power levelin MWe Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/77)

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OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET Np 50-346 DATC COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba TELEPHONE (4191 259-5000 Ext. 196 OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name:

Davis-Bessc Unit 1 Notes November, 1982

2. Reporting Period:

3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt):

2772

4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 925

5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906

6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 918

7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 874

8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report.Give Reasons:

9. Power LevelTo Which Restricted.lf Any(Net MWe):

10. Reasons For Restrictions.lf Any:

This Month Yr..to.Date Cumulative 720 8,016 38,017

11. Hours in Reporting Period

12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical 719.6 3.921 1 20.151.5

13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours 6.4 ,

29.4 3,364.1 701.1 3,780.0 19,030.2

14. Ilours Generator On-Line 0.0 1.1 1,732.5

15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours

16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH) 1.889.111 8.324.585 43.446.110 -

17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) 634,838 ,_, 2,776,805 14,459,006 603,233 2,604,208 13,501,493

18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) 97.3 47.2 50.1

19. Unit Service Factor

20. Unit Availability Factor 97.3 47.2 54.6

. 21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 95.9 37.2 40.6

22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net) 92.5 _

35.9 39.2

23. Unit Forced Out;ge Rate 2.6 1.3 21.2

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type. Date,and Duration of Each):

25, if Shut Down At End Of Report Period. Estimated Date of $sattup:

26. Units in Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation): Forecast Achiesed INITIAL CRITICA LITY INITIAL ELECTRICITY COMMERCIAL OPERATION (9/77i

1 DOCKETNO. 50-346 ', ,

- UNIT 511UIDOWNS AND FOK .a REDUCTIONS ' UNIT NAME Davis-Besse Unit 1 DATE.

COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba REPORT MONTil November, 1982 TELErilONE (419) 259-5000. Ext. 196-

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Licensee - ,E, *,, g*^.

65 Cause & Corsective A "" ' "

i No. Date k dg .s . Event 3,7 EV l- f :,, 5 Report a mu g -

Pievent Recurrence j ;?, g 6

n h Reactor tripped due to the Anticipa-

8. 82 11 08 F 18.9 A 3 NA HJ INSTRU tory Reactor Trip System (ARTS) caused by an erroneous moisture separator reheater high water level

. signal.

e b-I 2 3 4 F: Forced Reason: Method: Exhibit G Instructions l A-Equipment Failure (Explain) 1-Manual sbr Preparation of Data S: Schedu!cd B. Maintenance of Test 2 Manual Scrain. Entry Sheets for L'censee .

1 C. Refueling 3 Automatic Scram. Event ReporI(LERI File (NUREG-D.Regulatosy Restriction ' 4-Continuation from Previous Month 0161)

E Operator Training & License Examination l 5-Load Reduction F. Administrative 19-Other (Explain) 5 G. Operational Ee ror (limplain) Exfiibit I Same Source (9/77) Il-Olher (Explain)

OPERATIONAL

SUMMARY

November, 1982 11/1/82 - 11/7/82 Reactor power was increased to approximately 98%

of full power and maintained at this level.

.11/8/82 At 0938 hours0.0109 days <br />0.261 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.56909e-4 months <br /> on November 8, 1982, an erroneous moisture separator reheater (MSR) high water level signal caused.a turbine trip. The Antici-

.. -patory Reactor Trip System (ARTS) then tripped the reactor from a power level of approximately 100% full power. The MSR #1 high level turbine trip switch was replaced, and the reactor was critical again at 1603 hours0.0186 days <br />0.445 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.099415e-4 months <br /> the same day.

11/9/82 - 11/20/82 The turbine-generator was synchronized on line at-0435 hours on Davember 9, 1982. Reactor power was increased to approximately full power and naintained for the rest of the month.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR NO: 77-006 SYSTEM: Miscellaneous COMPONENT: Control Room Vertical Panels CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 77-006 proposed the fabrication and installation of covers for the east-and south ends of the vertical panels

- in the Control Room.

REASON FOR CHANCE: On. July 19, 1977, these panels were installed to close the east.and south ends of these panels.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The added vertical panel covers will in no way affect the safety function of the Control Room panels, nor were the seismic

- qualifications affected.

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ICOMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR NO: 78-315 SYSTEM: Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS)

COMPONENT: SFAS wiring for CC 1407B CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: On June'26,-1978, the internal wire connected to pin "K" of.J208 and J40f. :onnectors was rerouted'through the spare wire

' linking pin "c" of the same connectors.

. REASON FOR CHANGE: . Wires-connected to pin "K" of J208 and J408 connectors.

showed discontinuity-along Channels 2 and 4 of SFAS. This discontinuity 1 prevented _ actuation of L422B and L424B' logic modules, which in turn prevented the Component Cooling Return Header Containment, Outer Isola-tion,' Motor-Actuated Butterfly Valve, CC1407B from closing. The problem was caused by the defective wire attached to pin "K".

SAFETY EVALUATION: Fm;ility Change Request 78-315 provided for the change of an internal cabinet connection wire in Channels 2 and 4 of SFAS. The

- wire would be-replaced by-a good wire which would enable actuation of CC1407B as required by SFaS.

y Replacing the wires does not: constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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7 COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR NO: 79-213' SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generators

__ COMPONENT: Cabinets C-3617 and C-3618

. CHANGE, TEXT'OR EXPERIMENT: On May 1, 1980, new relays, relay sockets, and diodes were installed and tested to:cnable proper annunciator action for the SCR Diode Failure Excitor Regulatory Alarm.

= REASON FOR CHANGE: When running the Diesel Generator,'the SCR Diode Failure Alarm is on, however, there are no red lights (which indicate an alarm) on the SCR diodes. Several resistors and relays for this alarm have failed, and it.is believed this happens because of a design problem

~in the circuit.

. SAFETY EVALUATION: This FCR consists of installing new relays relay sockets, and diodes associated with the SCR Diode Failure Exciter Regula-tor Alarm.

This change will aot affect the safety-function of the Emergency Diesel Generators.' It will' improve the reliability of the annunciator alarm

? circuit.

The modifications 'are internal to Cabinets C-3617 and C-3618 and will not prevent a safe shutdown of the plant.

All work involved with this-package has been done under the supervision of

-the vendor. Installation in accordance with the vendor's instructions is

to insure no adverse environment is created. An unreviewed safety question

.does not exist.

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

'FCR NO: 80-018 SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater System COMPONENT: Rooms 237 and 238 CRANCE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 80-018 proposed the' installation of a 6" curb around the penetrations through the Auxiliary Feed Pump Room ceiling.

REASON FOR CHANCE: Installation of'the curb prevented excessive water on the heater bay floor-from draining to the Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms directly below and causing damage to equipment.

Work was completed June 6, 1982.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 80-018 involved the installation of' curbing around three (3) existing core drills on the floor of the heater bay area. The curbing would prevent possible water damage to equipment in Auxiliary Feed Pump-Rooms located below the heater bay area.

No new adverse environments were created and an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST.

FCR NO: 80-275 SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel. Generators _

COMPONENT: Turbochargers CRMMGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: New turbochargers with a high contact drive gear were installed on the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) per FCR 80-275. The work was completed June 30, 1982.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Former turbochargers were being replaced every 200 operating hours. The new high capacity turbocharger ,would increase the life span to approximately 3000 operating hours.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 80-275 provided for changes to the turbocharger of each EDG. The new turbocharger has thicker gears to reduce contact stress level and increase contact ratio to better distribute torque. This turbocharger was intended to increase EDG reliability without affecting its safety function. No new adverse environment was created.

Jus unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR NO: 81-060

! SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator COMPONENT: Lube Oil Coolers CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 81-060 proposed the_ installation of rolled type lube oil cooler cores to replace presently installed soldered' cores.

REASON FOR CHANGE: FCR 81-060 was implemented following reports of lube oil cooler leaks at other nuclear generating stations. Leaks were caused by soldered joints on the cooler core being attacked by improper corrosion inhibitors.

Work was completed and inspected on Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 on April 7, 1982 and on Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 on April 17, 1982.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 81-060 involved the Emergency Diesel Generators which are required for_ safe plant shutdown in the event of loss of offsite power. This aforesaid change does not affect the performance of the coolers, nor.does it affect the capability of the Emergency Diesel Genera-tors to perform their safety function. This change improved the reliabi-lity of the lube oil coolers and thus improved the reliability of the Emergency Diesel Generators.

No new adverse environments were created.

An unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR-NO: 82-025 SYSTEM: 125/250 Volt D.C.

COMFONENT: Battery Charger DBC-2N CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 82-025 proposed the temporary operation of Battery Charger DBC-2N with only 42 of the total 43 filter capacitors in service.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The aforesaid Battery Charger DBC-2N was needed in order to facilitateLthe cutage testing of the batteries as well as act as a replacement charger in the event of failure on DC MCC2. Since the replacement filter capacitor was on order and not available, the one filter capacitor that had failed was unable to be repaired.

Work was completed March 5, 1982 and represented a corrective action for

-Non-Conformance Report 159-82.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 82-025 provided for the temporary operation of Battery Charger DBC-2N without its full complement of filter capacitors.

Use continued until a replacement for the faulty capacitor was installed August 5, 1982.

The sare.cy rusction of the filter capacitor banks are to reduce the output ripple voltage of the battery charger. The loss of one filter capacitor from the total of 43 did not adversely affect the function of DBC-2N. The modification is-internal to Battery Charger DBC-2N and did not prevent the safe shutdown of the station.

FCR 82-025 does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and, further, created no new adverse environments.