ML20070N148
| ML20070N148 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1982 |
| From: | Dixon O SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20070N125 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8301250432 | |
| Download: ML20070N148 (6) | |
Text
I SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY 3
,-Q POST OPPICE 784
)
CoLuusiA. south CAROLINA 29218 M
pe. ember 23, 1982
- o. w. oixon. ;R.
c VICE Pne SIDENT m
NuCLEAn Openat ONS v)
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
'ij Region II, Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street, N.
W.
Atlanta, Ga. 30303
SUBJECT:
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Notices of Violation and Deviation NRC Report 82-54
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Please find attached South Carolina Electric and Gas Company's ( SCE& G) response to the Notices of Violaton and Deviation as addressed in Appendix A and B of NRC Inspection Report 82-54.
If there are any questions, please call us at your convenience.
Ver trul
- yours, O. W.
ixon,.r.
CJM:OWD:meb Attachments cc:
V.
C.
Summer A.
R.
Koon T.
C.
Nichols, Jr.
H. Radin G.
H.
Fischer Site QA O. W.
Dixon, Jr.
C. L. Ligon (NSRC)
H.
N.
Cyrus G.
J. Braddick H.
T. Babb J.
L.
Stolds D.
A.
Nauman J.
B.
Knotts, Jr.
M.
B. Whitaker, Jr.
J. B.
Knotts, Jr.
W.
A.
Williams, Jr.
I&E (Washington)
O.
S. Bradham Document Management Branch R.
B.
Clary NPCF M.
N.
Browne File l
OVFICIM:C%d l
8301250432 830107 l
PDR ADOCK 05000395 G
Mr. James P.
O'Reilly hRC Notice of Violation NRC Report 82-54 Page Two December 23, 1982 ATTACHMENT I RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION INSPECTION REPORT 82-54 I.
ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION South Carolina Electric and Gas Company is in agreement with the stated violation.
II.
REASON (S) FOR THE VIOLATION The violation was the result of the electrical circuit breaker for the slow speed Reactor Building Cooling Unit Fan XFN-64B being open with discharged closing springs.
This event appears to be an isolated case for which the cause has not been determined.
The fan was selected on the Main Control Board to automatically start in the event of an Engineered Safety Features Actuation, however, the fan would not have started in slow speed upon receipt of an auto start signal as required in Technical Specification 3.6.2.3. This violation will be referred to as Violation #1 for the remainder of this report.
The NRC Resident Inspector identified an additional violation November 23, 1982.
The Plant was in Mode 1 when the Inspector observed that the control switch for Control Room Normal Fan (XFN-32A) was in the stop position which effectively rendered the fa. inoperable in violation of Technical Specification 3.7.6.
This fan should have been available to start automatically upon an Engineered Safety Features Loading Sequence (ESFLS) or a high radiation signal.
Apparently the fan was misaligned on November 21, 1982 at 1419 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.399295e-4 months <br /> upon the conclusion of Power Operational Test (POT-ll) which initiated a Station Electrical Blackout.
This conclusion is based on:
1.
A review of the Operator Log readings confirmed that the fan was operating on November 18, 1982.
Mr. James P.
O'Reilly NRC Notice of Violation NRC Report 82-54 Page Three December 23, 1982 2.
Upon conclusion of the Power Operational Test (POT-11) when the operators were in the process of re-aligning the HVAC Panel, their work was interrupted by a disturbance, requiring their investigation, on the 482 Elevation of the Control Building.
The November 23, 1982 violation will be referred to as Violation #2 for the remainder of this report.
III.
CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED violation #1 Upon notification of this condition by the NRC Inspector, immediate corrective action was taken to restore the af fected breaker to Operable status by recharging the closing spring.
An inspection was also performed on all 480V Safeguard Switchgear Breakers for similiar problems.
No additional problems were discovered.
Violation #2 Upon notification of the inoperable condition of the Control Room Normal Fan by the NRC Inspector, the control switch was removed from the stop position.
The fan was declared operable upon the satisfactory performance of the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System Operability Test (STP-124.001) at 2220 hours0.0257 days <br />0.617 hours <br />0.00367 weeks <br />8.4471e-4 months <br /> on November 23, 1982.
IV.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID F'1 ETHER VIOLATION Violation #1 The 480V electrical switchgear alignments contained in System Operating Procedures are in the process of being revised to include signoff verifications that the closing mechanisms are charged and power is available to the recharging motor.
Mr. James P. O'Reilly NRC Notice of Violation NRC Report 82-54 Page Four December 23, 1982 Additionally, a Preventive Test Procedure is under development which will perform a monthly check for the verification that the spring motor switch and charging mechanism are in the operable position.
Violation #2 The Emergency Operating Procedure for Station Blackout Operation (EOP-4) follow-up action will be revised to include a checklist for the restoration of systems to normal operational status to avoid further violations of this nature.
V.
DATE OF FULL COMPLIANCE All corrective actions identified in the above will be complete by January 30, 1983.
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Mr. James P.
O'Reilly NRC Notice of Violation NRC Report 82-54 Page Five December 23, 1982 ATTACHMENT II RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF DEVIATION INSPECTION REPORT 82-54 I.
ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED DEVIATION South Carolina Electric and Gas Company is in agreement with the stated deviation.
II.
REASON (S) FOR THE DEVIATION The deviation was the result of procedural omissions in System Operating Procedure (SOP-101) and Surveillance Test Procedure (STP-142.001).
The Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP-15), which is utilized during an unusual plant condition requiring the venting of the Reactor vessel, was correctly developed with the assumption that the Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves were shut and de-energized prior to and after usage.
System Operating Procedure (SOP-101), which initially aligns Reactor Coolant System equipment for operation, and Surveillance Test Procedure (STP-142.001), utilized for valve operability tests, failed to de-energize the subject valves following use.
III.
CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED The Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves have been de-energized and Danger Tagged to the Shift Supervisor in order to insure compliance with Section 5.5.15.2.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
IV.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER DEVIATION System Operating Procedure (SOP-101) will be revised to de-energize the subject valves upon completion of Reactor Vessel filling and venting.
Additionally, the Reactor Coolant System Operability Test performed on Surveillance Test Procedure (STP-142.001) will also be revised to allow temporary re-energization of the valves for the purpose of operational verification.
The Surveillance Test Procedure will verify that valves are shut and de-energized upon completion of test.
\\
Mr. James P. O'Reilly l
NRC Notice of Violation NRC Report 82-54 Page Six December 23, 1982 V.
DATE OF FULL COMPLIANCE All corrective actions identified above will be complete by January 15, 1983.
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