Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Consistency W/Proposed Changes in GL 90-06 Re Resolution of Generic Issues 70 & 94
	ML20070M639
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/25/1994
From:	; NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20070M633	List: B14559, Application for Amend to License DPR-65,revising TS to Provide Consistency W/Proposed Changes to GL 90-06 Re Resolution of Generic Issues 70 & 94; ML20070M639;
References
	REF-GTECI-070, REF-GTECI-094, REF-GTECI-NI, TASK-070, TASK-094, TASK-70, TASK-94, TASK-OR GL-90-06, GL-90-6, NUDOCS 9405020303
	Download: ML20070M639 (61)
	v • d • e

. - - . ._

t Docket No. 50-336 kl.M 59.

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Attachment 1 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2-Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Generic ~ Letter 90-06 Marked Up Pages of Technical Specifications April 1994 9405020303 940425 PDR ADOCK 05000336 P PDR

.s_. , _

February 14, 1992 j l

i l INDEX j

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS SECTION f.ME

\

3/4.0 APPLICABILITY ......................................... 3/4 0-1 1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 1

3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL ................................ 3/4 1-1 i Shutdown Margin - T '

avg 200.F .................... 3/4 1-1 l

l Shutdown Margin - Tavg 200*F .................... 3/4 1-3 Boron Dilution .................................. 3/4 1-4 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) ......... 3/4 1-5 Minimum Temperature for Criticality ............. 3/4 1-7 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS ................................ 3/4 1-8 Flow Paths - Shutdown ........................... 3/4 1-8 Flow Paths - Operating .......................... 3/4 1-9 l l

Charging Pump - Shutdown ........................ 3/4 1- 2 y Charging Pumps - Operating ...................... 3/4 1-13 Boric Acid Pumps - Shutdown ..................... 3/4 1-14 Boric Acid Pumps - Operating .................... 3/4 1-15 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown ................ 3/4 1-16 l Borated Water Sources - Operating ............... 3/4 1-18 i l

l 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES ...................... 3/4 1-20 Full Length CEA Group Position .................. 3/4 1-20 1 l Position Indicator Channels ..................... 3/4 1-24 CEA Drop Time .................................... 3/4 1-26 Shutdown CEA Insertion Limit .................... 3/4 1-27 l Regul ating CEA Insertion Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-28 Control Rod Drive Mechanisms .................... 3/4 1-31 l

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 IV Amendment No. JE, /Sf, JJJ 153 -

0031

_._. . . _ ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

a March 20, 1989 INDEX i-LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE....................................... 3/4L2-1 3/4.2.2 Deleted T

3.4.2.3 TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL' PEAKING FACTOR 7

- F ............ 13/4 2-9.

3/4.2.4 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT................................... 3/4 2-10 3/4.2.5 Deleted 3/4.2.6 DNB MARGIN............................................. 3/4:2 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION..................... 3/4 3 1 3.4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION...................................... 3/4 3-10 ,

! 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION............................. 3/4 3-26 Radiation Monitoring................................... 3/4 3-26 Incore Detectors....................................... -3/4 3-30 Seismic Instrumentation................................ 3/4'3-32 Meteorological Instrumentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-36 Chl orine Detecti on Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 3/4 3-42 Fire Detection Instrumentation......................... 3/4 3-43 Accident Monitoring.................................... 3/4 3-46 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation. 3/4 3-50 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4'3-56 3.4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION.................. 3/44-1 Startup and Power 0peration............................ 3/4 4-1 Hot Standby............................................ 3/4 4-la Shutdown............................................... 3/4 4-lb TotcTtt Cov(o c.4 hp - LMwb) #1 y -Id l

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 V Amendment No. JE, 79, JE, 99, 99, 199 139

i March 20, 1989 i

l- ,

i- INDEX l BASES SECTION E_AqE 1

3.4.0 APPLICABILITY......................................... B 3/4 0 3 3.4.I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS j 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTR0L..................................- B 3/4 1-1 3.4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS.................................. B 3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3_- MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES........................ B 3/4 1 @ %

i 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 4

3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE.................................. B 3/4 2-1 ,

3/4.2.2 Deleted

'l l 3/4.2.3 TOTALINTEGRATEDRADIALPEAKINGFACTOR-Ff....... B 3/4 2-1 i

3/4.2.4 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT.............................. B 3/4 2-1 ,

3/4.2.5 Deleted -

3/4.2.6 DNB MARGIN........................................ B 3/4 2-2 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION........................ 3/4 3-1

- l 3/43.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE INSTRUMENTATION......... I 3/4 3-1 l 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION........................ . I 3/4 3 2 0

l 1

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 XI gendmentNo.JJ,p,JM

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February 14, 1992 INDEX BASES SECTION MGE 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION ............. B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES ..................................... B 3/4 44 3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES ..................................... B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER ....................................... B 3/4 4 O p 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS .................................. B 3/4 4 2 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAXAGE .................... B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY ......................................... B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY ................................. B 3/4 4-4 l 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS ....................... B 3/4 4-5 l B3/44h,&7 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ..............................

3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS ...................... B 3/4 4-8 !

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS ............................ B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS ........................ B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST) ............... B 3/4 5-2

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ............................... B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS .............. B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLAYION VALVES ...................... B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL ........................... B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ............................. B 3/4 6-5 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 XII Amendment No. JE, JJ, /J, Jp/ 153 0036

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June.4, 1992 INDEX-BASES E ;

SECTION faEE 3/4.9.9 and 3/4.9.10 CONTAINMENT AND RADIATION MONITORING .SND CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM ................. B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.11and3/4.9.12 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL ................................. B 3/4 h 3/4.9.13 STORAGE POOL RADIATION MONITORING'................... B 3/4 9 3/4.9.14 and 3/4.9.15 STORAGE POOL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM ... . B 3/4 9-3.

3/4.9.16 SHIELDED CASK ....................................... B 3/4 9 l 3/4.9.17 MOVEMENT 0F FUEL IN SPENT FUEL POOL ................. B 3/4 9-3 1

3/4.9.18 SPENT FUEL POOL - REACTIVITY CONDITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - B 3/4 9-3 .

3/4.9.19 SPENT FUEL POOL - STORAGE PATTERN ................... B3/49-4

! 3/4.9.20 SPENT FUEL POOL - CONSOLIDATION ..................... . B 3/4 9-4 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN ..................................... B 3/4 10-1

3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT AND INSERTION LIMITS ................... B3/410-1 i 3/4.10.3 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION - ,

REACTOR CRITICALITY ............................... B 3/4 10-1

! 3/4.10.4 PHYSICS TESTS ....................................... B3/4-10-1 3/4.10.5 CENTER CEA MISALIGNMENT ............................. B 3/4 10~-1.

i 3/4.11 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS ,

3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS .................................... B 3/4 11-1 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS ................................... B 3/4 11-2 3/4.11.3 TOTAL DOSE .......................................... B 3/4 11-4 l

i MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 XIV Amendment No. %), Jpf, Jpf, JJJ

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REACTIVITY CONTROL'5YSTEMS ,

BORON DILUTION

' ~

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION -

3.' 3 .The flow rate of reactor coolant through the core siell be

>d gpm whenever a reduction in Reactor Coolant. System boron concentation is being made.

. + 1000 - -

8 APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES. l ACTION:

Icoo With the flow rate of reactor coolant through the core < pm, I innediately suspend all operations involving a reduction ron ;

concentration of the Reactor Coolant System. :

- - . j SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS I (000 4,1.1.3 The react. oolant flow rate through'the core shall'be determined to be > ~

gpm prior to the start of and at least once i per hour during a re tion in the Reactor Coola'nt System boron t concentration by either: ,

a. Verifying at least' one reactor coolant pump is in operation, l

. or

b. Verifying that at least one low sure safety injection pump is in operation and supplying > gpm through the. core.

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4 l I MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-4 .

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- - October 11, 1988 ;

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS ELOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths l shall.be OPERABLE

, a. A flow path with a piping temperature of greater than 55'F from j the boric acid storage tank via either a boric acid pump or a i gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor 4

Coolant System if only the boric acid storage tank in Specification 3.1 is OPERABLE, or

b. The flow path om the refueling water storage tank via@ a charging pump a high pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coola System if only the refueling water storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.7b is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILTIY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involv-ing CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one injection path is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT - 4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required . flow paths shall be demon-strated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by exercising all testable power operat- l ed valves in the flow path required for boron injection through at least one complete cycle,

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying the correct position of all manually operated valves in the boron injection flow path not I locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position.

c. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying that the boric acid piping temperature is greater than 55'F. This may be accom-plished by verifying that the ambient temperature in the vicinity of the boric acid piping on elevations (-)5'-0" and (-)25'-6" is greater than 55'F.

l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-8 Amendment No. 133

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October 11, 1988.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .;

e j

FLOW PATHS - OPERATING.

l LIMITING' CONDITION FOR OPERATION

,s 3.1.2.2 The following boron injection flowpaths to the RCS via the l 1

charging pump (s) shall be OPERABLE:

.a. At least one of the following combinations:

l-

1) One boric acid storage tank, with the tank contents in accor- R dance with Figure 3.1-1 and a piping temperature greater than 55'F, its associated gravity feed valve, and boric acid pump. i 2)

Two boric acid storage tanks, with the weighted average of the combined contents of the tanks'in accordance with Figure 3.1-1 and a piping temperature greater than.55'F, their associated .

gravity feed vcives, and boric acid pumps.

l l

3) Two boric acid storage tanks, each with contents in accordance '

l with Figure'3.1-1 and a piping temperature greater than 55'F, i

' at least one gravity feed valve, and at least one boric acid pump.'

b. The flow path from an OPERABLE Refueling Water Storage Tank, as per Specification 3.1.2.8.b.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 2, 3, and.4.

ACTION:

With fewer than the above required boron injection flow paths to the. Reactor !

Coolant System OPERABLE, restore the required boron injection flow paths to l' the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or make the l

reactor suberitical within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and borate to a' SHUTDOWN MARGIN l

equivalent to at least @Ak/k at 200*F; restore the required flow paths to '

OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next r

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . '

3.6 % :

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l 1

Amendment No. 133

( . MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-9 l

~- ...-., , - - , . . , - , , . . , . . , - - . . . . . . . . . , , . . . - . - . . , . . - . . - - , ,

August 1, 1975 s .

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP ---SHUTOOWN hr

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kk e LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION o,.A 3.1.2.3 As; air.ir;,/nechargingpumpp/onehighpressuresafety injection pumfin the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pur-suant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall 'be OPERABLE and capable of being

' powered from an OPERABLE energency bus, on additionau chrmA Nap ma uPsEN,D m u. cyggAxug pJ,et w,uc 1tes, a deJesi +4* w H c~ % dvd APPLICABILITY: MODES S arid 6. ve4 ./. 3 2.B m2,

ACTION: -

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. o With e c.ar;ir.; p=; Or 'i;S ;;ressure sefet, injudwii pumps 0PERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE

, sta tus. e

$ t>. 03m ace -Wac Sk ame.Jum alle.o=M- Dwps cSPe2.ARtf Me- e M ld k

ca.4op 40 cc.,srau w.4L '5.l. ?_.3 11 l .

SISVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS A@

4.1.2.3Dheaboverequiredchargingpumppf'highpr'essuresafety injection pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at.least once per 31 days by:

A

a. Starting (unless already operating) the pump from the control room,

b. Verifying pump operation for at least 15 minutes, and s

c. Verifying that the pump is aligned to receive electrical power

from an OPERABLE emergency bus. -

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L MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-12 -

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INSERT C -

4.1.2.3.2. All charging pumps, except for the above OPERABLE _ pump (s), l shall be dernonstrated inoperable at least once -per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying.

that the motor. circuit breakers are -in the open position.-

i i

4.1.2.3.3. All high pressure safety . injection pumps,- except for- the above '

l OPERABLE pump (s), shall- be- demonstrated inoperable; at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months a) Verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been

~~

' d'5"~g either: l l - from their' power supply circuits or; b) shutting' and tagging. the discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel (2-SI-654 or .2-SI-

. 656). ,

4.1.2.3.4. The RCS vent (s) of greater. than or equal .to-2.8 square ' inches ,

shall be verified to be open at least _ once per 12. bours# whenever the .

vent (s) is being used for overpressure protection.

Except when the vent pathway is provided 'by a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, or .by havingL he _

t l mactor head removed, then verify these open at .least once : per 31 days.

i i, !

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1 I

August 1, 1975 1

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS F

\

l CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITINGC0yITIONFOROPERATION i

-T 3.1. 2.4 At least,two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE. j APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. l l

ACTION:

i i With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps I to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in. HOT STANDBY within the next 4 '

hours; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . l l

I i

1 l

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.\ l

_? Two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

a. Starting (unless already operating) each pump from the control '

room, and

b. Verifying that each pump operates for at least 15 minutes.

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.0ctober 11,'1988 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING.

x LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 Both of the.following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

~a.- At least' one of the following Boric Acid. Storage Tank (s) combinations:.

1) One boric acid storage tank,'with the.: tank' contents in-accordance with Figure 3.1-1.and a minimum temperature of-55'F, its' associated gravity feed valve, and boric: acid pump, or l

2) .Two boric acid storage tanks,-with the weighted average;of the' combined contents'of the tanks.in accordance.with Figure-3.1-1:and a. minimum temperature'of 55'F, their associated gravity feed valves,'and boric acid pumps,.or 3)' Two boric' acid storage tanks', each with contents.in accordance with figure'3.1-1 and a minimum temperature of 55*F, at.least one gravity feed valve, and at least one.

A boric acid pump. :

and b. The refueling water storage tank with:

1. A minimum contained volume of 370,000 gallons of water,-

2. A minimum boron concentration of.1720 ppm, ,

3. A minimum solution temperature of 50*F when in MODES l'and 2, and

4. A minimum solution temperature of 35'F when in MODES 3 and ,

4.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. i ACTION: -

With only one borated water source OPERABLE, restore at least two borated water sources to OPERABLE status within'48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or make the reactor

- suberitical within' the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and borate to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least @ A k/k at 200*F; restore.at least two borated water sources to:

OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

4 2,b 9o i

l MitLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-18 Amendment No. 133 I

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! I l l l REACTOR COOLANTSYSTEM REACFOR COOLANT PUMPS--SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN LIMITINO CONDITION FOR ,0@Artcd .

l l 3.4.1.4. A maximum of 2 reactor coolant pumps shall be OPERABLE.

l APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 ACTION: With more than 2 reactor coolant pumps OPERABLE, take immediate action to comply with specification 3.4.1.4.

SURVETLLANCE REOUIEMENTS l

4.4.1.4 Two reactor coolant pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been dis""*4Jfrom their electrical power supply circuits.

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June.18, 1990

~

l REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SAFETY VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.2.1 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 PSIA i 1%.

~

ge.o1,ts TtraPtuatuve( cm 4t#?c.5 cu o Le6 is APPLICABILITY: MODEX4 ACTION:

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE-shutdown cooling loop into operation.

3.4.2.2 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift' setting of 2500 PSIA 1%.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

l AC'IM:

With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in HOT SHUTDOWN ,

within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-4.4.2 Each pressurizer code safety valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 PSIA i 1%, in accordance with Specification 4.0.5. l l

l l

1 Amendment No. 66, 147 I

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-2

. +,

i i February 26, 1991 L

REACTOR C00L'dNT SYSTEM FElkEFVALVES I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION oTH 3.4.3 valves shall be OPERABLE. power operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. '

pf1 "

ACTION:

C /. W ith ;both r.;

Auo W EAM T ** ~desi4 Wowur cyced cett,ed cetM PORVh...~.c to OPERABLE inoperable ^ withinlK hourX either restore PORV(s) valve (o and remove power from status or close the block the associated block valve'(5).

eth:H i:Idbein-at leastthe.following within HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLO 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . ::UTOCWii 6 Nor smr w )

b d.4. With one or e.+h ere block valve (s) inoperable, within]E hourX ci&r n..m i . ; .( .) restore

..d . the ye~ block

...... valve (s) ol.o(2 U.s. Lima to OPERABLE statushr cun

otherwise, be'in

. at -least within HOT STANDBY the following M hours. within the next 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months s: UTDOWii an)d in COLO G 14dT sNY M i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS la Acid.M,*J Tu THE 1ECWR5teco:TS W

} 4.4.3.1 ;

l Ylach PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:UMcsFec AYmd 9 O 3~

l

' a.

Once pervalve excluding 31 days by performance operation, and of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TES b.

c. Once sc*-

opeer per 18 tb months by cerformance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

uu d s T4 4.4.3.2 operating Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE the is valve

[ on demonstration not through one complete cycle of full travel. This removed to meet Specification required3.4.3 if a PORY

/ or F. block valve is closed and power

b. c d I cm 96 N:.E tTS AshrY. TEb dR c W 5"* N *' E* atom M LEA c4hek.

pg omMcAct4*. vawc w QPE.TEASUE re%TORti vrAM Wimid AMI ' DEN AWI 6 W OPEEAIEI Ii'"#* #W' MWwac W IF Bo wAws utm0 ~1L houfM

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-3 Amendment No. fE, EE, EE 151

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/:

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,k o-. 00iTA oue. ca. SoTA PORVs toopeaAsut AwoeavAtoron HetM RA M W cycceD, warmd i Heaun EtrHem itesTrag l

! THe Poav e ve; OPERA 8( 6 symus e,n ctose Tue assoc,4rco t

i- 3 Lock \/ALuf (D WITH 90WER. MAld7MidED TO TN( SGoCk. t/Atud6)*

i ~

! QTHER.W656. BE 14 Ar Ltiny- HOT STAN@ WiTh19 TME cecr*

5 6 MS A2 to SOT .5BWM wiTwic Tar 4;2mikt, 4

! 6 gouts s

b. WsTA OM N k\/ idOPEttAGLE A4 Mrr c.A44BL6 GF EmK swuf ;

Cxcs.eD, uumgQ ( W g/mcet Rd31twr817461bR/

113 OPEWOW 3YATv5 oR. C.L.os6 175 Assectnith Block. L/Attsti Am ?cko06 PfaQ6lt. FRCM 1ME Block. VALOs ilita5 TOT 4s THE it> C*PN ETwius omsto THs FOMf A 7Z. NCMt3 cR. 58' IQ Hot- 5,TAADRY Wrmt9 TMF OtvY C hours Avosw hot SHuTtowd WiTH10 THE F"ococ.cl06 6 houra.

/ \

l l

l 1

,,- \

j December 8,-'1986

, \

REACTOR' COOLANT SYSTEM .l 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE /TEf1PERA'TURE LIMITS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. ,

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION "

1

3. 4. 9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in ~accordance with the limit lines'shown on.

Figure 3.4-2 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and l hydrostatic testing with:-

a.

i A maximum heatup of'20'F in any one' hour period with Tavg.

at or below 110*F,- 30*F-in ~any one hour period with Tavg

.at or below 140'F and above 110*F and 50*F in any one hour period with Tavg above 140*F..

b.. A maximum cooldown of 80*F in any one hour period with Tavg

, above 300'F and'a maximum cooldown of 30'F in any one hour period with~ Tavg at or below~ 300*F and above 200*F, and '

20*F in any one hour period with Tavg at or below 200*F.

c. A maximum temperature change of 5'F in any one hour' period,

! .during hydrostatic testing operations above system design-pressure.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3, 4 and 5. mJ dueJi?_ovfd. -

p p. , w p.n44 ACTION: A Tg 4 or- 6 j

' v~ nwJ With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering ,

evaluation to detemine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on ;

l the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; detemine that l the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations l

' or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6, hours and reduce the RCS Tavn ,

and pressure to less than 200*F and 500 psia, respectively, I within fhe following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

1

See Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

, - - .., . - ,, .~u... - - - - - , , .

w.--.. ... . , _ ,, L

l

. . I 4 February 26, 1991 1

et , j' REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

i 3.4.9.3 t shall be OPERABL * 't 1;;.;t en; c,f the fellewing e erycesaw. e p.viect' n ayajsma j g Mow- " arated relief valves (PORVs with a lift setting of less 4 Lab or ge t 4-o 4 4bu psig m ~

b. a r: ::t:r :;; hat systc; v;nt of 21.3 ayuu e i m.h n .

l APPLICABILITY: ';!'. : r. t h t :;;r:tur: Of n; ;r m;r; ef th; I,CS ;;ld I;;; .5 5 275'F, except ' hen the reacter vc::el head-!: rem:ved. .

McDe 4 wa.o w Teos=4 var op em Rc5 coa t.e4 as i.en woo 2. councio 7.7f*E ACTION: sooe 5~. e= Muse Gge En wa Nc<ia 4 0" "I '2'**

WM '"

M * * * *"

vCmt;O TIMousM A ' hit SWRK M H c.a. LAR&cR.M*

i

a. With one PORV inocerabled ;ith;r restore the inoperable PORV to

' d " " "" -

@ OPERABLE through a statu.

2 1. Within 7inch days or depressurize and vent the RCS m;.intain the ",0 quare vent (s) within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ;.

ia ; .;at;d ;;aditi;n .atil b;th POP,7; h;v; b;;a re5tv..d to 0^;"a0L; n dva.

t C.Y. With W eeu M*' cKoa oti PORVs ~ inoperable,vdepressurizt and vent the RCS through c4- tectf a 1 1. square inch vent (s) within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; : W i & th: " C S ' ; -- .

vaateu readit!cr Ent!' bcth !q"!: 5:v: 5::n r;;ter:d t; OP;"a0LE p J t;; 5.

c. sf.

In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent (s) are used to mitigate awRCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or RCS vent (s) on the transientjand any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

k l - b. W.m oua vuW iwowanua4 su MotheS h 6. ei&c(0 res4c.,re_.

i 6,e iePe2Auc.e: POW b OPEY ABLE sr4Ws wimu 2.9 hourie or (U c.cmexe cie owuung.c.4:u.J o,.cl vc04 rue itc1 hou:n 4r LensT c~

ik Stavasts ioca utstr' 44: NIN A Tur4( C# T2 h(A.rta.

d. (4):m T14e 'RCS vesuc> Pen ACTlOL)S a. b.c.,r c.. ve ciav ne vexr huY AT Lt.AsT- oue.s Det. ~3 L elcvs t,)ned 7nE Pah)Av t1 Patcu bub IW A vat vt#5J Tsw a uveua . senes. <.re. emsami ) ut 3 Ec vn.eb w venc cm) hAmun:

une.nutur. veriny Tw tocr majav c4av ti_ n.<as.

4. we. Pru.,iuous c,a hee.irie.ariou ~3.c>.4 c re our a neuc.nau5.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-21a

Amendment No. 50, 151

. 1 l

l l

) June 18, 1990 l REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM j' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT l i

i . .

4.4.9.3.1 e

Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

! a. Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV I

! actuation ' channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days l 2 prior to entering a condition in which the PORY is required ;

1 OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV

! is required OPERABLE. :

b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORY actuation l channel at least once per 18 months. l

c. Verifying the PORV T: bleach

1:tist. valve is open at least once per 72 l hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection, j

d. Testing _in. accordance with the inservice -test requirements of l Specification 4.0.5. -

l

' '.0.2.2 ha""*

Th; 000 J;;.t(:) hell be . . : T;ed te Le vys . et lee;; v.n.. vs. 11

'hea the "ent(:) 1: beir.g : d fer ever;r:::;r: pr;t::ti :. l l

l I

1

. *Er :;t th:n th; ;;r. p:thu;y i: pr;vid:d ith :. 4:17: 2.i;h i: 1;;k;d, teiled, 07 :th: =i:: 03:tr,;d i, th: :p:n p;;iti:n, th:

upen .6

, v:ri'y th::: v:lv;;

s e a um.c y , u ..,..

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 "*" "*"* " '

3/4 4-21b '

4

.J

' March 23, 1979-j Q - !

I* EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS i

l

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS .- T.vg < 3006F l 1

! LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION '

1 <

i ,

J I 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall l be OPERABLE:'.

a.

One3 OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, and l3 i ,

j b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refuel- 4 i ing water storage tank _on a safety injection actuation signal !

l i

and automatically transferring suction.to the containment sump 1

on a sump recirculation actuation signal.

b. APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4. ;

d i ACTION-

(

i 0

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE,. restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD i SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

l r In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the b.

[ Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and l

submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 i

within 90 days describing the circumstances of the. actuation and j the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

c, w,m 2. c,<- *c,ve, his her., LAG rarccrs.> w oPERAatt m wi 1

u.nn.wre. cA e.n c.e un a,c aa uc.s ec,M tea s s= *z.7S*1: 4Alc.r c"" " ' NN A"

! SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS " - M Ac = 4 ro W d " do = 0794ar' ,

i l i . i 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE-per the applicable IF i

i Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2. -

4.5.3.2 'All high-pressure safety injection pumps, except the above required l "

OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ,

whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is < 275'F b '

i i

by ::ri"yh; th:t .th; seter ;ircuit treaker; he,e i... .ae,ed (Tvi. timii

1;;tri;;l pe.;;r es p1y ;i. ceit;. ehe.W uasiker mr soir.4 crecur-Re<>rev's kc.w., kee'O chsco MA Cr: w' Al.-s'r MC SUPM C E UC "O 'S ' E ? *.* "

i i

e aseo ant x w u p,n kev icaJc. cw ne ca.nwu %a Cz.-st m cr z-sr- e ,

% v s

(- With pressurizer pressure 4 1750 psia.

IAmaximumofonehigh-pressuresafetyinjectionpumpshallbeOPERABLE .

f-whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs-is _< 275'F. _

4~

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 i______________________.. _ . - _ . . _ . . . _ _ _ . . . _ . . . _ _ , _ . . _ , . _ , _ , . ,, ,_, ,, .,_ ,~ ,.._ _ ,

e 4

D2cemb2r 18, 1981

!. . REFUELING' OPERATIONS

(. g\ M M o r E q M N M cj h c a l A

, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 9. 8.1 At least one shutdown cooling loop shall be ver ified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow ratej l60 decay heat requirements at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . (consistent with i 4.9.8.2 Once per 7 days, the required shutdown cooling loops. if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying correct breaker align-ments and indicated power availability for pump and shutdown cooling valves, or

Verifying that the reactor vesstl water level is at or above the vessel flange, j the reactor vessel pit s'eal is installed, and greater than 370.000 gallons of 60 water is available as a heat sink, as indicated by either:

a. refuel pool level greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, or

'b. -the combined volume of the refuel pool and refueling water storage

tank exceeds 370,000 gallons and a flow path is available from the refueling water storage tank to the refuel pool.

1 i

1 i i

i i

i 4

l l

j a

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-Sa 4

"v' ~

f v es*' ~w a aw an-w

October 12, 1990 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

' l BASES ,

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made suberitical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel i The most restrictive depletion,RCSboronconcentration,andRCST'$e.

condition occurs at EOL, with T at no load rating temperature, and is associated with a postulated stlDil line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, the minimum !

SHUTDOWN MARGIN specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is initially required to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR accident analysis assumptions. For earlier periods during the fuel cycle, this value is conservative. With T S 200*F,.the reactivity transients resulting from any postulated accid $XE are minimal and l the reduced SHUTDOWN MARGIN specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT provides adequate protection.

3/4.1.1.3

(+ 1000 BORON DILUTION AND ADDITION Y

M Ml g 4 A mini hum flow rate of at least ( GPM p ovides adequate mixing, prevents strati fication and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual during ,

boron :oncentration changes in the Reactor Coolant System." A. flow rate of at least SD GPM will circulate @wWJ Reactor Coolant System volume

""AnVfo c"Mc feet?in approximately@ minutes.g The reactivity ch@ange rate associated with boron concentration chaages will be within the capability for operator recognition and control.

3/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT M The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each fuel cycle. The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurance that the coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

h W Av 4 R0f' b vh W op C iCL , -tlO M Cod d rq A W~A w& can:ukdt A oggcMq 2r ce, ,

@ TW wes otac. b pecef- Mek a f4r_. soc 3 c.),o N *t#- Iup ce*d'"> k'

\

cessiled w+4 k.w ed(drin c "Ty w as & e% .

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 l B 3/4 I-I Amendment No. JL9,148 4 i

. -- ~. - . . -- -. . .- - -_-. - . .- .

p. . .

october 12, 1990 .

k

. BASES-

- 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued) i . .

s The analysis to determine the boration-requirements assumed that the i Reactor Coolant System is borated concurrently with cooldown; JIn the' limiting i

situation when letdown is not available, the cooldown is assumed to be initiated within 26. hours and cooldown to 220*F,-is completed in the next 28-

} hours.

1

[ With the'RCS temperature below 200*F, one injection

without. single failure consideration on the basis of-the . system stable-isreactivity acceptable '

condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE- t

ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection. -

system becomes inoperable ~.

i i

2 The boron capability required below 200'F is. based upon providing a-SHUTDOWN MARGIN within the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT o

! at 140*F after xenon decay. This condition requires 'either 3750 gallons of

! 2.5% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 57,300 gallons of 1720 j- ppm borated' water from the refueling water storage tank.-

i ~

4 The maximum boron concentration requirement-(3.5%) and the minimum-temperature' requirement (55'F) for' the Boric Acid Storage Tank ensures that j boron does requirement,not precipitate'in provides sufficientthe Boric Acid assurance that System.-

the temperature The daily of surveillance the tank

[I 3

will be maintained higher than 55'F at all times..

! A minimum boron concentration of 1720 ppm ~ is required'in the. RWST at all -

j- times ~in order to satisfy safety analysis assumptions for boron dilution L incidents and other transients using the RWST as a borated water source as L well as:the analysis assumption to determine.the boration requirement to j;

ensure adequate shutdown margin.

j

/4.1.3 MOVEABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES i

i The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is i maintained, and ~(3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are 1

, limited to acceptable levels. I i The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic 1 !

' requirements are accompanied by additional restrict 1:ns which ensure that the i original criteria are met.

The ACTION statements applicable to an immovable or untrippable CEA and to a large misalignment (1 20 steps) of.two or more CEAs, require a prompt shutdown of the reactor since either 4 -

l 3- -d D d % fLT h M A D kM e

u- ,

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 I-3 Amendment No. JS, #1, 77, JJE, 1 JJ, JJJ, 148 i

- - - - , mm . ~ e . - -. , -- -....w., , , .. , , < ~ - - . . _ , . . - -mm..

INSERT D E

q l

A maximum of two charging pumps OPERABLE, when-RCS temperature is ,

less . than 300 degrees F, ensures that the maximum inadvertent - dilution (

flow rate as' Asuiro . in the boron dilution analysis is 88 gallon per gg minute. pF q l The requirements for maximum pumping capability; to: reduce = shutdown #

risk :and ' low temperature overpressure protection are met -by balancing the number of OPERABLE pumps 'with PORV's and RCS vents. An LTOP accident scenario assumes all OPERABLE pumps start, one relief path fails,)

and RCS pressure-then must remain less than 450 PSIT For shutdown risk -

reduction it is desirable . to have the maximum' pump c'apacity- and ' maintain' the RCS full-(not vented). The ' scenarios- considered by these technical specifications are as follows: 1) A -minimum' pumping capability; of 1 >

charging and 1 HPSI pump with relief from 2 PORVs .(to account'for single l failure);- 2) pumping = capacity of 2. charging. pumps .and 1 'HPSI pump or 2 -

charging pumps and 2 HPSI pumps with: relief from an RCS tvent of- greater than of equal to 2.8 square inches. To further reduce-shutdown risk -by 7W maximizing pumping capacity, a HPSI pump may be .made -inoperable- but ,

available at short notice by shutting it's ' discharge valve' with the key lock on the control panel.

t

, .- , r. ,- r .w -- m . , - . . --rm.,%..- .-m-!- ,%rw.. e*n-, -- ..e,., .w.-r

~*

September 5, 1984 '

i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

).

RASES-

, During operation, all pressurizer code ' safety valves must be OPERABLE to l J

prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia.

The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to limit the Reactor ;

Coolant System pressure to within its Safety Limit of 2750 psia following a '

complete loss of turbine generator load while operating at RATED THERML POWER

and assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip L setpoint (Pressurizer Pressure-High) is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for '

! a direct reactor trip on the loss-of turbine) and also assuming no ~ operation of the pressurizer power operated relief valve or steam dump valves.

l 3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES i The power operated relief valves (PORVs) operate to relieve RCS pressure l j below the setting of the pressurizer mode safety valves. These relief valves i

have remotely operated block valves to provide a positive shutoff capability l i- should a relief valve become inoperable. The electrical power for both the ';

i relief valves and the block valves is capable of being supplied from an emer- 1 i g gency' power source to ensure the ability to seal this possible RCS leakage. path. ,

[ /4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

~

i

! An OPERABLE pressurizer provides pressure control for the reactor coolant i system during operations with both forced reactor coolant flow and with natural i

circulation flow. The minimum. water level in the pressurizer assures the.

pressurizer heaters, which are required to achieve and maintain pressure ,

control, remain covered with water to prevent failure, which occurs if the i heaters are energized uncovered.'.The maximum water level in the pressurizer ensures that this paramter is maintained within the envelope of operation

^

l' assumed in the safety analysis. The maximum waten level also ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and that a steam bubble will be pro-vided to accomodate pressure surges during operation. The steam bubble also

~

protects the pressurizer code safety valves and power operated relief valve f

. against water relief. The requirement that a minimum number. of pressurizer

heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reat cr

! Coolant System pressure and establish and maintain natural circulation.

+ .

! Yhe requirement that 130 kW of pressurizer heaters and their associated

controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency bus

provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during a loss of off-j site power condition to maintain natural circulation at HOT STANDBY.

i 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS j The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator

tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be 4 maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator. tubes is -

! based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice

inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain-i surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is t

MILLSTONE-UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-2 Amendment No. 22, 37, EZ, 65,97 i

I

1 l

l INSERT B f

With the PORV inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, either the PORV must be restored, or the flow path isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The block valve should be closed, but the power must be maintained to the associated block valve, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. Although the PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed and in this manner can be used to perform its function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems, automatic control problems, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA. Operation of the plant may continue with the PORV in this inoperable condition for a limited period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage,so that maintenance' can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate the degraded condition. The PORVs should normally be available for automatic mitigation of overpressure events and should be returned to OPERABLE status prior to entering note'M M Ac vtiud p.

Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made when power remains on the closed block valve. <

If one block valve is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status, or the associated PORV placed in the closed position. The prime importance for the capability to maintain closed the block valve is to isolate a stuck open PORV. Therefore, if the block valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour, the required action is to place c.ssrDg'Ih'PPORV in the closed position to preclude its automatic opening for an overpressure event and to avoid the potential for a stuck open PORV at a time that the block valve is inoperable. Although the block valve may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed and in this manner can be used to perform its function. Block valve inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems, automatic control problems, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA. This condition is only intended to permit operation of the plant for a limited period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage so that maintenance can be performed on the block valve to climinate the seat leakage condition or other similar concern. The block valve should normally be available to allow PORV operation for automatic mitigation of overpressure events. The block valves should be returned to OPERABLE status prior to entering . i.co? 9 w. c, yt6bgce p If more than one PORV is inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled. it is necessary to either restore at least one valve within the completion time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or isolate the flow path by closing and removing the power to the associated block valve; ,

cmAJu >% d<p#@,ad ved 6c 'l2CL

June if, 1992 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES .

Mequirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWST 3

water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures. The ECCS leak rate surveillance l requirements assure that the leakage rates assumed for the system outside )

containment during the recirculation phase will not be exceeded. j The purpose of the ECCS throttle valve surveillance requirements is to provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

l Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system i to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from l exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance

! configuration,(2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in

! accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST)

The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of Srated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. line limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that

1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subtritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

E at ==@ % m ~ sQ 8

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 45, 159 0023

l INSERT E cvr,b"I Lw1 l' ';( S**t

'Only one HPSI pump may be OPERABLE in MODE 4 with' RCS temperat less than or equal to 275 F due to the restricted relief capacity with<LTOP .

To reduce shutdown risk by having additional pumping capacity readily available, a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by shutting its discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel.

+

b i

6 I

l l

1 i

- < , , , r-- w -, a - < - , <-- -y,y

June 2, 1987 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.6 CRANE OPERABILITY - CONTAINitENT BUILDING The OPERABILITY requirements of the cranes used for movement of fuel assem-blies ensures that: 1) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel element, and 2) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from exces-sive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lif ting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly and CEA over irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that no more than the contents of one fuel assembly will, be ruptured in the event of a fuel hand-ling accident. Specific analysis has been perfonned for the drop of a consoli-dated fuel storage box on an intact fuel assembly. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.8 SHUTDOWN COOLING AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling loop be in operation A ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140*F as required during the REFUELING MODE, @ (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a baron dilution incident and prevent buron stratification [aud. [3) is cohs k M,gL' bc.o c?. Iv4du

~

c .h n s c3swpM.

The requirement to have two shutdown cooTing loop's OPERABLE wnen the refuel pool is unavailable as a heat sink enseres that a single failure of the operating i shutdown cooling loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel water level at or above the vessel flange, the reactor vessel pit seal installed, and a combined available volume of water in the refueling pool and refueling water storage tank in excess of 370,000 gallons, a 'large heat sink is readily available for core cooling. Adequate time is thus available to initiate emergency procedures to provide core cooling in the event of a failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop.

i 3/4.9.9 and 3/4.9.10 CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORING AND CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of these systems ensures that the containment purge valves will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to restrict the release of' radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

3/4.9.11 and 3/4.9.12 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated . fuel assernbly. The minimum water depth is consistent

, with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-2 Amendment No. H,7J,117

Docket No. 50-336 B14559

\

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Attachment 2 Millstone' Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Generic Letter.90-06

, Retyped Pages of Technical Specifications.

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l April 1994

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l 1

1 INDEX i 1

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

]

d I

, I SECTION PAGE 4

3/4.0 APPLICABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 0-1 i 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-1

,1 Shutdown Margin - T., 200*F . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3/4 1-1

Shutdown Margin - T , 200*F . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-3 Boron Dilution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-4 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) . . . . . . . . 3/41-5

4 Minimum Temperature for Criticality . . . . . . . . . . 3/41-7 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-8 Flow Paths - Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-8 Flow Paths - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-9 Charging Pump - Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/ 4 1 - 1 1 J Charging Pumps - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1 - 13 Boric Acid Pumps - Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1 - 14 Boric Acid Pumps - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1 - 15 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown ............ 3/4 1-16 Borated Water Sources - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . 3/41-18 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES ............... 3/4 1-20 Full Length CEA Group Position . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1 - 20 Position Indicator Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/41-24 I CEA Drop Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/ 4 1 - 2 6 Shutdown CEA Insertion Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/ 4 1 - 2 7 Regulating CEA Insertion Limits ............ 3/4 1-28 Control Rod Drive Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1 -31 1

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 IV Amendment No. 77. Jpp, JJ7, 177 0119 1

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INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAE 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE .................... 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 Deleted 3/4.2.3 TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR3/4 2-9. . . . . .

- Ff 3/4.2.4 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT .................. 3/4 2-10 3/4.2.5 Deleted 3/4.2.6 DNB MARGIN ....................... 3/4 2-13 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION ........... 3/4 3-1 i 1

3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM l INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-10

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION ............... 3/4 3-26 Radiation Monitoring .................. 3/4 3-26 Incore Detectors .................... 3/4 3-30 l Seismic Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-32 Meteorological Instrumentation ............. 3/4 3-36 Chlorine Detection Systems ............... 3/4 3-42 Fire Detection Instrumentation ............. 3/4 3-43 l Accider.t Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-46 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation . 3/4 3-50 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation . 3/4 3-56 3.4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-1 Startup and Power Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-1 Hot Standby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-la Shutdown ........................ 3/4 4-lb Reactor Coolant Pumps - Shutdown ............ 3/4 4-Id MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 V , Amendment No. 75, 77, JJ.

M's $9,91,19f, 119

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BASES l -

SECTION PME 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 0-1 l

l 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS f 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS ................... B 3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 M0VABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES ....... . . . . . . B 3/41-3a l t

! 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 Deleted l T

3/4.2.3 TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR - F 7

. . . . . B 3/4 2-1 l

3/4.2.4 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT ................. B 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.5 Deleted 3/4.2.6 DNB MARGIN ...................... B 3/4 2-2 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION .............. B 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . B 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION .............. B 3/4 3-2 HILLSTONE - UNIT 2 XI Amendment No. 77, J7, Jpf, ono l}7

. l INDEX BASES i

l SECTION PAGE 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 4-1 !

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES .................... B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER ..................... B 3/4 4-2a l 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS ................... B 3/4 4-2a l 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE ............ B 3/4 4-3 l 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY ...................... B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ,................

B 3/4 4-7 j i 3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS ............. B 3/4 4-8 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS ................ B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS . ............. B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST) ......... B 3/4 5-2 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ;

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS ......... B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ............. B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 6-5 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 XII Amendment No. M, Q, 77, NJ, #7, 0120

) INDEX J

l BASES I

SECTION PAGE

3/4.9.9 and 3/4.9.10 CONTAINMENT AND RADIATION MONITORING AND

CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM ....... B 3/4 9-2

' 3/4.9.11 and 3/4.9.12 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE P0OL WATER LEVEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-2a l

! 3/4.9.13 STORAGE P0OL RADIATION MONITORING .......... B 3/4 9-3 l 3/4.9.14 and 3/4.9.15 STORAGE P0OL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM .... B 3/4 9-3 q 3/4.9.16 SHIELDED CASK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-3 i 3/4.9.17 MOVEMENT OF FUEL IN SPENT FUEL P0OL . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-3 l 3/4.9.18 SPENT FUEL P0OL -REACTIVITY CONDITION ........ B 3/4 9-3 j 3/4.9.19 SPENT FUEL P00L - STORAGE PATTERN .......... B 3/4 9-4 3/4.9.20 SPENT FUEL P0OL - CONLOLIDATION . . _ . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-4 d

l 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN . . . . . . . . . ._. . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 10-1

! 3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT AND INSERTION LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 10-1 ,

i 3/4.10.3 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION -

REACTOR CRITICALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~

B 3/4 10-1 j 3/4.10.4 PHYSICS TESTS .................... B 3/4 10-1

3/4.10.5 CENTER CEA MISALIGNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 10-1 l 3/4.11 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS

! 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS ................... B 3/4 11-1 3/4.11.2 GASE0US EFFLUENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 11-2 >

- 3/4.11.3 TOTAL DOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 11-4 i

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 XIV Amendment No. 77. Jpf, 19), JJ/, ,

w J11.JP9, l i

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTENS BORON DILUTION LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.3 The flow rate of reactor coolant through the core shall be 21000 gpm whenever a reduction in Reactor Coolant System baron l concentration is being made.

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES.

ACTION:

With the flow rate of reactor coolant through the core < 1000 gpm, l immediately suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.1.1.3 The reactor coolant flow rate through the core shall be determined to be 2 1000 gpm prior to the start of and at least once per hour during a reduction in the Reactor Coolant System boron ,

concentration by either: I

a. Verifying at least one reactor coolant pump is in operation, I or

b. Verifying that at least one low pressure safety injection pump is in operation and supplying 2 1000 gpm through the core.

I NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. !

0107 l

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTENS 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTENS ELOW PATHS --SHUTD0WN LINITING COM ITION FOR OPERATION ,

3.1. 2.1.. As a minimum, one of the 'following boron' injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE: .

a. A flow path with a piping temperature'of. greater. than 55'F from ,

the boric acid storage tank via either a boric acid pump or'a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor-

Coolant! System:1f only the, boric-acid < storage, tank'in

" Specification-3.1.2.7a is OPERABLE, or- ;

b. . The flow path' from the: refueling' water storage tank via a charging -

pump and a-high pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor. l Coolant System if'only the refueling water storage tank '

-in Specification 3.1.2.7b is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILTIY: N0 DES 5'and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involv- <

ing CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one injection path is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT i

4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demon--

strated OPERABLE:.

a. At .least once per 7 days by exercising all . testable power operat- '

ed valves in the flow path required for boron ~ injection through-at least one complete cycle,

b. At least once per.31. days by verifying the correct position of .

all manually operated valves in the boron injection flow path not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position. t

c. At least.once'per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying that the boric acid l piping temperature is greater than 55'F. This may be accom- -l plished by verifying that the ambient temperature in theTvicinity of the boric acid piping on elevations (-)5'-0" and (-)25'-6" is greater than 55'F.

J NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-8 Amendment No. 777,

-0108 ,

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- - - = - - - . . -. - _ .. -.- . .-

[ ,

! REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS t

FLOW PATHS - OPERATIjE 1 LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i .

{ 3.1.2.2 .-The following boron injection flowpaths to the RCS via the j charging pump (s).shall be OPERABLE:

a. At least one of the following combinations:

! 1) One boric acid storage tank, with the' tank contents in accor-dance with Figure 3.1-1 and a piping temperature greater'than 55'F, its associated gravity feed valve, and boric acid pump.

! 2) Two boric acid storage tanks,.with the weighted average of-the i combined contents of the tanks in accordance with Figure 3.1 '

1 and a piping temperature greater than 55'F, their associated gravity feed valves, and boric acid pumps.

j 3) .Two boric acid storage tanks, each with contents in accordance -l

with Figure 3.1-1 and a piping temperature greater than 55'F,

at least one gravity feed valve, and -at least one boric acid j pump.

] '

! b. The flow path from an OPERABLE Refueling Water Storage Tank,' as

per Specification 3.1.2.8.b.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

[

l With fewer than the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor '

4 Coolant System OPERABLE, restore the required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or make the-j reactor subcritical within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and borate to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN

equivalent to at least 3.6% A k/k at 200*F; restore the required flow paths to l

! OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

1 4

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I j NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-9 Amendment No. 777, i 0108

. _- _ _ _. . . __ ._ ._. --- _. _ ~ . . _

i

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- l l' I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l ;

1 !

CHARGING PUNP - SHUTDOWN l 1

i LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.1.2.3 One charging pump and one high pressure safety injection pump

in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification j 3.1.2.I'shall be OPERABLE and ca)able of being powered from an OPERABLE j emergency bus. One additional ciarging pump and high pressure safety 1 injection pump may be OPERABLE provided that the RCS is vented through a

j. passive vent of it 2.8 in ,a APPLICABILITY: N0 DES 5 and 6.

l ACTION:

l a. With less than the minimum required pumps OPERABLE, suspend all .l j operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes t until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE status.

1 j b. With more than the maximum allowed pumps OPERABLE take immediate action to comply with 3.1.2.3.

l 3

4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS i

l 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump and high pressure safety l injection pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by:

a. Starting (unless already operating):the pump from the control room, l b. Verifying pump operation for at least 15 minutes, and i-1: c. Verifying that the pump is aligned to' receive electrical power

from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

! 4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, except for the above OPERABLE pump (s),

i shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are in the open position.

4.1.2.3.3 All high pressure safety injection pumps, except for the above OPERABLE pump (s), shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

. by either: (a) verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been disconnected from their power supply circuits, or (b) shutting and tagging the discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel (2-SI-654 or 2-SI-656).

-

When in N0DE 6 with the reactor vessel head removed then only one charging pump is required.

b NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11 Amendment No.

l 0109 4

. SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (continued) 4.1.2.3.4. The RCS passive vent (s) of greater than.or equal to 2.8 square inches shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

whenever the vent (s) is being used for overpressure protection.

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Except when the vent pathway is provided by a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, or by having the reactor head removed, then verify these open at least once per 31 days.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-12 Amendment No.

0109

{

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k REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS f

CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two** charging pumps shall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

, With only.one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; restore at least two charging pumas to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN wit 11n the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

4.1.2.4.1 Two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once l per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

. a. Starting (unless already operating) each pump from the control 4

room, and i

l b. Verifying that each pump operates for at least 15 minutes.

4.1.2.4.2 One charging pump shall be demonstrated inoperable at least

once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs

is < 300*F by verifying that the motor circuit breaker is in the open position.

i

- A maximum of two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than 300*F.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-13 Amendment No.

4 0109

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j REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTENS BORATED WATER S0l!RCES - OPERATING l

f LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.8 Both of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE

1 l a. At least one of the following Boric Acid Storage Tank (s)-

combinations:

1) One boric acid storage tank, with the tank contents in i accordance with Figure 3.1-1 and a minimum temperature of

[ 55'F, its associated gravity feed valve, and boric acid j pump, or i

! 2) Two boric acid storage tanks, with the weighted average of-j the combined contents of the tanks in accordance with i

j. Figure 3.1-1 and a minimum temperature of 55'F, their .i j associated gravity feed valves, and boric acid pumps, or l l . . l f 3) Two boric acid storage tanks, each with contents in ;

a accordance with Figure 3.1-1 and a minimum temperature of

, 55'F, at least one gravity feed valve, and at least one 1 boric acid pump. ;

i and b. The refueling water storage tank with: ;

1. A minimum contained volume of 370,000 gallons of water, l

l 2. A minimum boron concentration of 1720 ppm, i

j 3. A minimum solution temperature of 50*F when in MODES I and

2, and i 4. A minimum solution temperature of 35'F when in MODES 3 and l 4.

+

) APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

i

ACTION

4 i With only one borated water source OPERABLE, restore at least two borated

! water sources to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or make the reactor subcritical within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and borate to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent j to at least 3.6% Ak/k at 200'F; restore at least two borated water sources to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next

) 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

1 j

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-18 Amendment No. JJJ 0110

}

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEN REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS - SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.4 A maximum of two reactor coolant pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 ACTION:

With more than two reactor coolant pumps OPERABLE, take immediate action to comply with Specification 3.4.1.4.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.4.1.4 Two reactor coolant pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been disconnected from their electrical power supply circuits.

I l

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 0111 3/44-Id Amendment No.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM JAFETY VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.2.1 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall bc OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 PSIA i 1%. i APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is greater than 275'F.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE shutdown cooling loop into operation.

3.4.2.2 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 PSIA i 1%.

APDLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.2 Each pressurizer code safety valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2500 PSIA i 1%, in accordance with Specification 4.0.5.

l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-2 Amendment No. JJ, JJ/,

0098

1 . ,

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES 3

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 Both power operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block l valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or both PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, within I hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve (s) with pcwer maintained to the block valve (s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With one PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORY to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c. With both PORVs inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valves and remove power from the block valves and be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

d. With one or both block valves inoperable, within I hour restore the 1 block valve (s) to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV(s) controls in the "close" position. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within i the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , i

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

i MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-3 Amendment No. JJ, JJ JJ JJJ.

oon

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.3.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. Once per 31 days by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, excluding valve operation, and

b. Once per 18 months by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

l

c. Once per 18 months the PORVs shall be bench tested at conditions ,

! representative of MODES 3 or 4. )

l 4.4.3.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE once per 92 days by !

operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel. This I demonstration is not required if a PORV block valve is closed and power removed to meet Specification 3.4.3 b, c or d.

I i

l l

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/44-3a Amendment No. (J, pp, ooes

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:

a. A maximum heatup of 20*F in any one hour period with T,y, atorbelow110*F,30'FinanyonehourperiodwithT,*8 at or below 140*F and above 110*F, and 50*F in any on hour period with T,y, above 140*F.

b. A maximum cooldown of 80*F in any one hour period with T above300'Fandamaximumcooldownof30*FinanyonehoE8 period with T at or below 300'F and above 200*F, and 20'F at or below 200*F and above in any one hoe 8 period with T ' period with T. ,at or below 120*F 120*F,and5'FinanyonehouE

c. A maximum temperature change of 5'F in any one hour period, during hydrostatic testing operations above system design pressure.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3, 4 and 5.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce the RCS T and pressure to less than 200*F and 500 psia, respectively, withiE'thefollowing30 hours.

See Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-17 Amendment No. fJi, Pf, JJJ 0112

+

1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM J

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS ,

1 l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 Both power operated relief valves (PORVs) shall be OPERABLE with a t

lift setting of less than or equal to 450 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 275'F. MODE 5 and MODE 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel and the RCS is not vented through a 2.8 square inch or larger vent.

ACTION:

1 a. With one PORY inoperable in MODE 4 restore the inoperable PORV to l

' OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS l through a 2 1.4 square inch vent (s) within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . l

, b. With one PORV inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, either (1) restore inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , or (2) complete depressurization and vent the RCS through at least a 1.4 square inch vent within a total of 32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months .

c. With both PORVs inoperable, complete depressurization and vent the RCS through at least a 2 2.8 square inch vent (s) within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

d. With the RCS vented per ACTIONS a, b, or c, verify the vent pathway at least once per 31 days when the pathway is provided by a valve (s) that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position; otherwise, verify the vent pathway every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

e. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent (s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the 4

circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or RCS vent (s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to (

, prevent recurrence. I i f. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. [

l l

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-21a Amendment No. pp, JJJ, 0099 I

\

l REACTOR COOLANT SYSTIM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

__ i 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required i OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV !

is required OPERABLE. i i

b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.

c. Verifying the PORV block valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

d. Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements of Specification 4.0.5. l l

l l

I l

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-21b Amendment No. 79 JJ/,

0099

. - . - - -- . - -- - . . . . . - - . - - . - - - . -~ -

s'. ,

4 i- ENER6ENCY CORE COOLING SYSTENS

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T_j < 300*F i l

) LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

', 3.5.3 ' As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

.a. One # OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, and b .' - An OPERABLE. flow path-capable of taking suction from the refuel-7

-ing water storage > tank on-a safety injection > actuation signal

'and automatically transferring suction to the containment. sump.

. on a sump recirculation ' actuation signal.

APPLICABILITY: NODES 3*-and-4..

~

ACTION:

a. With no.ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at:least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within one' hour or be in COLD.

SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

I

b. In the event-the ECCS is_ actuated and injects water into the .

i Reactor Coolant System, a Special' Report shall. be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and :

the total' accumulated actuation cycles to date.

c. ~With two or more high pressure safety injection pumps OPERABLE and the temperature of one'or more of!the'RCS cold legs s 275'F take immediate action to-have a maximum of one high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS

+ 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable -

Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

With-pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia.

A maximum of one high-pressure safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is s 275*F.

6 NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. # ,

0113

. , ._, ,.. ._ , . , , . - _ m..._ _ . _ . <

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) d 4.5.3.2 All high-pressure safety injection pumps, except the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months whonever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is 1 275*F by either: (1) verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been disconnected from their power supply circuits; or (2) shutting and tagging the discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel (2-SI-654 or 2-SI-656).

B MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7a Amendment No. 15, !

0113 l

I

l. .

l REFUELING OPERATIONS l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.9.8.1 At least one shutdown cooling loop shall be verified to be in l operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate greater than or equal i to 1000 gpm and consistent with decay heat requirements at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

4.9.8.2 Once per 7 days, the required shutdown cooling loops, if not in l

operation, shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying correct breaker align- ;

ments and indicated power availability for pump and shutdown cooling valves, '

or:

Verifying that the reactor vessel water level is at or above the vessel flange, the reactor vessel pit seal is installed, and greater than 370,000 gallons of water is available as a heat sink, as indicated by either:

a. refuel pool level greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, or' I b. the combined volume of the refuel pool and refueling water storage l tank exceeds 370,000 gallons and a flow path is available from the l refueling water storage tank to the refuel pool.

l l

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-8a Amendment No. pp, 0114

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made suberitical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated. accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel i depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T . The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T, at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is initially required to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR accident analysis. assumptions. For earlier periods during the fuel cycle, this value is conservative. With T. s 200*F, the reactivity transients resulting from any postulated accident are minimal and the reduced SHUTDOWN MARGIN specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT provides adequate protection.

3/4.1.1.3 BORON DILUTION AND ADDITION A minimum flow rate of at least 1000 GPM provides adequate mixing, prevents l stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual during boron concentration changes in the Reactor Coolant System. This was done to prevent vortexing in the SDCS when in mid-loop operation, while being consistent with boron dilution analysis assumptions. A flow rate of at least 1000 GPM will circulate the full Reactor Coolant System volume in approximately 90 minutes. With the RCS in mid-loop operation, the Reactor Coolant System volume will circulate in approximately 25 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated with boron concentration changes will be within the capability for operator recognition and control.

3/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC)

The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each fuel cycle. The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel ,

burnup. The confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit -

provides assurance that the coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 1-1 Amendment No. J # , /pp 0115

,e ,

BASES 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The analysis to determine the boration requirements assumed that the Reactor Coolant System is borated concurrently with cooldown. In the limiting situation when letdown is not available, the cooldown is assumed to be initiated within 26 hcurs and cooldown to 220*F, is completed in the next 28 hours3.240741e-4 days 0.00778 hours 4.62963e-5 weeks 1.0654e-5 months .

With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boron capability required below 200*F is based upon providing a SHUTDOWN MARGIN within the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT at 140*F after xenon decay. This condition requires either 3750 gallons of 2.5% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 57,300 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The maximum boron concentration requirement (3.5%) and the minimum .

temperature requirement (55'F) for the Boric Acid Storage Tank ensures that I baron does not precipitate in the Boric Acid System. The daily surveillance requirement provides sufficient assurance that the temperature of the tank will be maintained higher than 55'F at all times.

A minimum boron concentration of 1720 ppm is required in the RWST at all times in order to satisfy safety analysis assumptions for boron dilution incidents and other transients using the RWST as a borated water source as well as the analysis assumption to determine the boration requirement to ensure adequate shutdown margin.

A maximum of two charging pumps OPERABLE, when RCS temperature is less than 300*F, ensures that the maximum inadvertent dilution flow rate as assumed in the baron dilution analysis is 88 gallons per minute. l The requirements for maximum pumping capability to reduce shutdown risk and low temperature overpressure protection are met by balancing the number of OPERABLE pumps with PORVs and RCS vents. An LTOP accident scenario assumes all 0PERABLE pumps start, one relief path fails, and RCS pressure then must remain less than the 10CFR50, Appendix G limits. For shutdown risk reduction, it is desirable to have the maximum pump capacity and maintain the RCS full (not vented). The scenarios considered by these technical specifications are as follows: (1) A minimum pumping capability of I charging and 1 HPSI pump with relief from 2 PORVs (to account for single failure); (2) pumping capacity of 2 charging pumps and 1 HPSI pump or 2 charging pumps and 2 HPSI pumps with relief from an RCS passive vent of greater than or equal to 2.8 square inches.

To further reduce shutdown risk by maximizing pumping capacity, a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by shutting its discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 17, JJ, 77. JJJ.

01'e II,lif,Iff,

EASES 3/4.1.3 MOVEABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met.

The ACTION statements applicable to an immovable or untrippable CEA and to a large misalignment (120 steps) of two or more CEAs, require a prompt shutdown of the reactor since either HILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3a Amendment No. JJ, JJJ, l 0118

REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEN BASES During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia.

The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to limit the Reactor Coolant System pressure to within its Safety Limit of 2750 psia following a complete loss of turbine generator load while operating at RATED THERMAL POWER and assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint (Pressurizer Pressure-High) is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of turbine) and also assuming no operation of the pressurizer power operated relief valve or steam dump valves.

3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES The power operated relief valves (PORVs) operate to relieve RCS pressure -

below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves. These relief valves have remotely operated block valves to provide a positive shutoff capability - ,

should a relief valve become inoperable. The electrical power for both the l relief valves and the block valves is capable of being supplied from 'an emer- I gency power source to ensure the ability to seal this possible RCS leakage path.

With the PORV inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, either the l PORV must be restored, or the flow path isolated within I hour. The block valve ;

should be closed, but the power must be maintained to the associated block valve, ;

since removal of power would render the bicck valve inoperable.. Although the :

PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and ;

closed and in this manner can be used to perform its-function. PORV-inoper-ability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems, automatic control problems, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA. Operation of the plant may continue with the ,

PORV in this inoperable condition for a limited period of time not to exceed the j next refueling outage, so that maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate the degraded condition. The PORVs should normally.be available for automatic mitigation of overpressure events and should be returned to OPERABLE status prior to entering MODE 4 after a refueling outage.

Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made when power remains on the closed block valve.

If one block valve is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status, or the associated PORV placed in the closed position. The prime importance for the capability to maintain-closed the block valve is to isolate a stuck open PORV.

Therefore, if the block valve cannot be restored to.0PERABLE status within i 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , the required action is to place the associated PORV in the closed position to preclude its automatic opening for an overpressure event and to avoid the potential for a stuck open PORV at a time that the block valve is inoperable.

Although the block valve may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed and in this manner can be used to perform its func-tion. Block valve inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems, automatic control problems, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA. This condition is NILLSTONE-UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-2 Amendment No. Jg. 77, 57, JJ, J/

0100 <

. _ ___ .. __ . = _ __ . -- _____ _ _ _ _ _

a .

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES only intended to permit operation of the plant for a limited period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage so that maintenance can be performed on the block valve to eliminate the seat leakage condition or other similar concern.

The block valve should normally be available to allow PORV operation for auto-matic mitigation of overpressure events. The block valves should be returned to OPERABLE status prior to entering MODE 4 after a refueling outage.

If more than one PORV is inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, it is necessary to either restore at least one valve within the completion time of I hour or isolate the flow path by closing and removing the power to the associ- !

ated block valve, cooldown, depressurize, and vent the RCS. l 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER I An OPERABLE pressurizer provides pressure control for the reactor coolant system during operations with both forced reactor coolant flow and with natural I circulation flow. The minimum water level in the pressurizer assures the pressurizer heaters, which are required to achieve and maintain pressure control, remain covered with water to prevent failure, which occurs if the I heaters are energized uncovered. The maximum water level in the pressurizer l ensures that this parameter is maintained within the envelope of operation assumed in the safety analysis. The maximum water level also ensures that the ,

RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and that a steam bubble will-be' pro- l

'vided to accommodate pressure surges during operation. The. steam bubble also '

protects the pressurizer code safety valves and power operated relief valve ;

against water relief. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer L heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish and maintain natural . circulation. i l

l The requirement that 130 kW of pressurizer heaters and their associated I

controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency bus provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during a loss of off-I site power condition to maintain natural circulation at HOT STANDBY.

3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS l l

l The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain 1 surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the' event that there-is '

l i

MILLSTONE-UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-2a Amendment No. //, J/, J/, JJ, J/,

0100

a .

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEdi BASES l

The purpose of the ECCS throttle valve surveillance requirements is to provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. l Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points I

equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

Only one HPSI pump may be OPERABLE in MODE 4 with RCS temperatures less than or equal to 275*F due to the restricted relief capacity with Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection System. To reduce shutdown risk by having additional pumping capacity readily available, a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by shutting its discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST)

The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient i supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of l a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that

1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes wi .h all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. Q , J # ,

0116

REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.6. CRANE OPERABILITY - CONTAI blies ensures that:The OPERABILITY requirements of thNMEN element, and 2) 1 sive liftin the co)reeach internals crane has and sufficientpressur load cape cranes used assem-operations.g force in the event ethey 3/4.9,7 vessel areare inadveprotected t from exceac r ently engaged during lifting s-CRANE TRAVEL -BUILDING SPENTSUEL STORAGE fuel assembly and CEA over irThe restriction on movement the contents of one fuel ass ling accident, Specific dated fuel storage box radiated fuel assemblies analysis on an i has been perfembly weight of a willthan at no more ensur be ruptured in th with the activity release assumed ntact fuel assembly.

orme i

3/4,9.8 This a d for the drop of a consolient o n the accident analyses.ssumption is consistent SHVTDOWN COOLING CULATION AND COOLANT CIR 2 1000 gpm ensures that (1The requirement that at least decay heat and maintain the) maintained through sufficient water the in the

, (2 cooling capacity reactorrequired reactor pressure a vesduring operation is at av theilone shut REFUE 1

incident and prevent boron st able to remove

s. core to)minsufficient coolant aonboroncirculation l

dilution analysis assumption ratification,imize and (3) the effects of s diluti l

pool is unavailable as a heatThe requirement to have is consistent with boron two sh i

shutdown capability. cooling loop willunot down cooling loops OPERABLE wheI sink ensures that a single fail the in the reactor vessel pit result seal iWith the reactorure in a complete vessel loss water hl n the refuel of operating of the decay nstalled timeaislarge thusheatavailable n

sink is and readily a

totank agea i combined itgallons, avail bl o in excess refueling available nge, water pool volua in the event of a failure of eth for core cooling. f 370,000 3/4.9.9 and 3/4,9.10 VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM iate emergency p.procedures to pe ope Adequate CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORIN will be automatically isolated G upThe AND CONTAINMENT OPERABILITY PURGE of th the containment.

release of radioactive material on detection fThe OPERABILITY of high purgeradiation of these syst valves lems ensur evels within rom the containment atmosphere tems is required to r o the environment.

LLSTONE - UNIT 2 11 B 3/4 9-2 Amendment No. JJ, 7J. JJ7

-. . - . . ~ .-- -- .- - - -- - .-.

ie .

i '

) REFUELING OPEkATIONS .;

4

BASES

]

L i j 3/4.9.6 CRANE OPERABILITY - CONTAINMENT BUILDING ;

! The OPERABILITY requirements of the cranes used for movement of fuel assem-- ,

i blies ensures that: 1)- each crane has. sufficient load. capacity to lift a fuel l l element, and 2) the core internals and pressure vessel-'are protected' from exces-j sive lifting force in the' event they are inadvertently- engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL'- SPENT FUEL' STORAGE BUILDING 4

!- The restriction on movement of loads in; excess of the' nominal weight of a

! fuel assembly' and CEA over irradiated-fuel. assemblies ensures that- no more than n i the contents of one fuel assembly wil1 ~ be ruptured in the event of a fuel hand- :

i ling accident. Specific analysis has been performed for the drop of a consoli- !

dated fuel storage box on an intact fuel assembly. This assumption is consistent- '!

j with the activity release assumed in the accident ~ analyses.

3/4.9.8 SHUTDOWN COOL'ING AND COOLANT CIRCULATION i .

! The requirement'that at least.one shutdown cooling loop be in operation at j j, it 1000 gpm ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove- !

. decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure. vessel-below 140*F'as .

j required during the REFUELING MODE, (2) sufficient coolant circulation' is l 1 maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution 3 incident and prevent boron stratification, and.(3)- is consistent with boron 1 dilution analysis assumptions.

{

! The requirement to have two shutdown cooling loops OPERABLE when the refuel i pool is unavailable as a heat sink ensures that a single failure of.the operating .

shutdown cooling loop will-not result in a' complete loss of decay heat removal i

! capability. With the reactor vessel water level at or above the vesself flange,- ;i

the reactor vessel pit seal installed, and a combined available volume of water i in the refueling pool and refueling water storage tank in' excess _ of 370,000 i

gallons, a large heat sink is readily available for. core cooling. Adequate. ,

time'is thus available to initiate emergency procedures to provide core cooling i in the event of a failure of_the operating shutdown cooling loop.

3/4.9.9 and 3/4.9.10 CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORING AND CONTAINMENT PURGE

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VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of these systems ensures that the containment purge valves i will be automatically isolated upon-detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to restrict the-j.. release of radioactive' material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

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NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-2 Amendment No. # , 7J, JJ7 0117 I

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l BASES (Continued) 1 3/4.9.11 and 3/4.9.12 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE P0OL WATER LEVEL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth .

is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent {

1 with the assumptions of the accident analysis. !

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yJLLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-2a Amendment No. l 0117 l

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ML20070M639

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