ML20065U435

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Status of Evaluations & Mods of Diesel Generator Status Annunciator Sys at Various Us Nuclear Power Plants
ML20065U435
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 10/31/1979
From: Rumble R, Shindell B
EG&G, INC., LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20064J905 List:
References
CON-FIN-A-0231, CON-FIN-A-231 UCID-18145, NUDOCS 8211040504
Download: ML20065U435 (60)
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STATUS OF EVALUATIONS AND H0DIFICATIONS OF DIESEL GENERATOR STATUS ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEMS AT

,VARIOUS U. S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Benjamin M. Shindell EG&G, Inc.

Robert P. Rumble LLL khI October 1979 .

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.. M This is se informal report intended primarRy for internal or limited essernal distributies. De .

.I opemons and condosions stated are these of the author and may or may est be these of the

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Laboratory.

This work was supported by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Comndsson under a 4 Memorandum of Understandag with the United States Department of Energy.

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ABSTRACT This report documents the current status of evaluations and

,- modifications to the diesel generator status annunciators in a number of U. S. nuclear power plants. These modifications may be required in order

. to:

(1) Ensure that all conditions which might -render the diesel generators incapable of automatic starting are annunciated in the control room.

(2) Ensure that the wording on the control room annuncia-tor clearly indicates 'to the operator that the diesel generator is unavailable if such is the case.

(3) Separate disabling and non-disabling annunciation.

This report is supplied as part of the Selected Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Issues Program being conducted for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

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@ -FOREWORD e

This report is supplied as part of . the Selected Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Issues (SEICSI) Program being con-ducted for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear

. Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors, by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Field Test Systems Division of the Electronics Engineering Department.

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission funded the work under the authorization entitled " Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Systgm Support," B&R 20 19 04 031, FIN A-0231.

Part of this work was performed by EG&G, Inc. , Energy Measure-ments Group, San Ramon Operations, for Lavirence Livermore Laboratory under U. S. Department of Energy contract number DE-AC08-76NV01183.

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t (bh TABLE'0F CONTENTS P,,,ag

. 1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. EVALUATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR STATUS ANNUNCIATORS . . . 3
3. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . .,. . 7 APPENDIX'

SUMMARY

OF THE EVALUATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR .

STATUS ANNUNCIATORS AT VARIOUS U. S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS . 9

1. Cooper Station . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. Palisades . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Cook, Units 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Troj an. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 (bh 5. Maine Yankee . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Vermont Yankee. . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Pilgrim, Unit 1 . .' . . . . . . . . 17
8. Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2, and 3 . . . . . . 18
9. Humboldt Bay, Unit 3 . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Three Mile Island, Unit 1. . . . . . . . 20
11. Millstone, Unit 1. . . . . . . . . . 21
12. Millstone, Unit 2 . . . . . . . . . . 22
13. Salem, Unit 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14. Calvert Cliffs, Units 1 and 2 . . . . . . . 24
15. Xewaunee . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
16. Dyster Creek, Unit 1 . . . . . . . . . 26
17. Yankee Rowe . . . . . . . . . . . 27
18. Duane Arnold . . . . . . . . . . . 28
19. Rancho Seco, Unit 1 . . . . . . . . . 29
20. La Crosse . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
21. Haddam Neck . . . . . . . . . . . 31 l k i

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q .-+g M' STATUS OF: EVALUATIONS AND MODIFICATIONS OF

. DIESEL GENERATOR STATUS ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEMS AT VARIOUS U. S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

'Behjamin M. Shindell-EG&G, Inc., Energy Measurements Group, San Ramon Operations Robert P. Rumble Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Livermore I

1. INTRODUCTION h

By letter dated November 28, 1977, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission (NRC) requested a number of nuclear power plant licensees

  • to review the circuitry of and wording on their diesel generator status annunciators and to provide the following information:

s (1) All conditions which render the dilesel generators incapable of responding to an automatic start signal.  ;

(2) The wording on the annunciator panel for each of the l conditions listed in (1) above.

(3) Any other alarm signal which causes each panel listed in (2) above to alann. ~!

  • A list of the licensees and their respective plants is given in Section 2.

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2. EVALUATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR STATUS ANNUNCIATORS v

Alliof the licensees who ' received the NRC request for information on diesel generator status annunciators replied. These licensees and their respective plants are as-follows:

LICENSEE PLANT

1. AEP Corporation Cook 1
2. Alabama Power Company Farley 1
3. Arkansas Power and Light Company Arkansas 1 Arkansas 2
4. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs 1 Calvert Cliffs 2 (5h 5. Br.ston Edison Company Pilgrim 1
6. Carolina Power and Light Company Brunswick 1 Brunswick 2 Robinson 2
7. Commonwealth Edison Company Dresden 1 Dresden 2 Dresden 3 Quad Cities 1 Quad Cities 2 Zion 1 '

Zion 2

8. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Haddam Neck Power Company

, 9. Consolidated Edison Company Indian Point 1 of New York, Inc. Indian Point 2

10. Consumer Power Company --

Cig Rock Point 1 Palisades

11. Dairyland Power Cooperative Lacrosse

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31. Public Service Company of Colorado Fo-: St. Vrain
32. Public Service Electric and Salem 1

}' Gas Company

33. Rochester Gas and Ginna Electric Corporation
34. Sacramento Municipal Rancho Seco Utility District
35. Southern California San Onofre 1 Edison Company
36. Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry 1 Browns Ferry 2 Browns Ferry 3
37. Toledo Electric Company Davis-Besse 1
38. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Vermont Yankee Power Corporation

&: 39. Virginia Electric and North Anna 1 Power Company Surry 1 Surry 2

40. Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach 1 Point Beach 2
41. Wisconsin Public Service Kewaunee Corporation
42. Yankee Atomic Electric Company Yankee Rowe The correspondence between the NRC staff and the various li-censees on the subject of diesel generator status annunciators was eval-uated using the NRC staff position criteria given in Section 1. Some of the licensees identified problems 'as a result of the review and proposed .j changes and schedules for their implementation. Other licensees replied that no problems existed and their replies satisfied the NRC staff. Most GD J

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's 3. CONCLUSIONS An evaluation was made of the diesel generator status annuncia-  ;

tors at various U. S. nuclear power plants. The conclusions and recommend-ations for each individual nuclear power plant evaluated are contained in the last two columns of each page in the Appendix. In those cases where the licensee 'has indicated that it does not use a lock-out relay to shutdown the diesel generator and where we have'used the notation " NOTE 2",

we reconnend that the NRC Inspector witness the next diesel generator test to ascertain that there is no step of the shutdown procedure which could leave the' diesel generators incapable of responding to an automatic start signal and which is not annunciated in the control room.

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SUMMARY

OF THE EVALUATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR STATUS ANNUNCIATORS AT VARIOUS U. S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

1. Cooper Station 24. San Onofre, Unit 1
2. Palisades 25. Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3
3. Cook, Units 1 and 2 26. Crystal River, Unit 3
4. Trojan 27. Beaver Valley, Unit 1
5. Maine Yankee 28. Brunswick, Units 1 and 2 .
6. Vermont Yankee 29. Fitzpatrick, Unit
7. Pilgrim 30. Nine Mile Point, Unit 1
8. Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2, and 3 31. Point Beach, Units 1 and 2
9. Humboldt Bay, Unit 3 32. Fort Calhoun
10. Three Mile Island, Unit 1 33. R. E. Ginna, Unit 1
11. ' Millstone, Unit 1 34. Arkansas
12. Mtilstone, Unit 2 35. Monticello
13. Salem, Unit 1 36. Prairie Island, Units 1 and 2
14. Calvert Cliffs, Units 1 and 2 37. Hatch, Unit 1
15. Kewaunee 3d. Surry, Units 1 and 2
16. Oyster Creek, Unit 1 39. St. Lucie, Unit 1
17. Yankee Rowe 40. Indian Point, Units 1 and 2
18. Duane Arnold 41. Dresden, Unit 1
19. Rancho Seco, Unit 1 42. Dresden, Units 2, 3, and 4
20. La Crosse 43. Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2
21. Haddam Neck 44. H. B. Robinson, Unit 2
22. Turkey Points, Units 3 and 4 45. Davis-Besse, Unit 1
23. Zion, Units 1 and 2 46. J. M. Farley EE 9

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l. COOPER stall 0N DOCFE T No. 298 SECOND DUCE [i NO.

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LAST ACil0H RE SPONSE NEXT ACTION FINAL ACTION Licensee proposed modification in NRC 00R approved proposed prxfifi- None. NRC should verify modification its May 19, 1918 letter to add cation in its letter dated March 2, complete.

annunciators in the control roon 1979.

for itses a, b, c, and d of letter NOIE 1. March 2, 1979, from NRC (Lear) to licensee dated -

April 18,1918.

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3. COOK. tMITS I & 2 DOCEE T MI.- 50-315 SECOND DOCKET M1.- 50-316 LAST ACilull RESPONSE IEXT ACiloll - FIIML ACTICIl Staff review of Ilcensee response leone. IsitC should infom the licensee of MtC should verify that the licensee to initial inquiry has been com- the staff position. les implemented the staff position.

pleted. and the following actions should be taken by the licensee:

1) Annunciate the centrol knife switch open position.
2) Detemine if a manual shutdom lockout relay esists.
3) Verify that an annunciator is provided to clearly indicate when the D/G control switch is not in the automatic position.

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5. MIME TANK (( DOCFET No.: 50-309 5((0E DOCE[I No.:

. LAST ACTION RESPONSE lEIT ACil0N FINAL ACTION Licensee was requested by MRC Licensee respondr

  • by letter dated I) None. 1)None.

letter of July 6, 1918 to: August 4,1918 t',at:

2) NRC should review the sche- 2) Document results of tiu? . letC ~
1) Verify that all shared annun- 1) Iten I has been verified. matic diagram of the as-built review.

clators for disability con- system in the field to verify 1 -ditions cannot . be cleared 2) There is no manual shutdown that no manual shutdoun lock- N0i[ I, August 22, 1918.

until all abnormal conditions lockout relay provided, out relay exists, are corrected.

2) Verify if the D/G is provided with a manual shutdoesi lockout relay. - An alarm should be prov ided uhtch is worded to clearly indicate the D/G is incapable of an auto start when the relay is not set.

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i. I'lLGRIM. UMli I DOCKET 100.. 50-293 SECOND DUCEEI 110.-

LAST ACil0ld RESPONSE MEXT Acil0N IINAL ACil0ll Licensee was requested by feltC Licensee responded by letter dated 1) The Licensee should be inform- 1) IIRC should verify and document -

letter of September 15,1978 to: October 20,1918 that: ed to implement the letC staf f the modifications installed.

position.

1) Provide a separate alam for I) Functionally testing the D/G 2) leone.

each valve / switch on a single af ter maintenance and daily 2) Mone.

. shared alarm (with reflash checking the position of the . .

3) The results of review should capability) for all affected shut-off valves provide ade. 3) If the D/G is in the test mode be doceented and the licensee devices with wording clearly . quate assurance that the D/G and the shutdown relay is informed of the .. final- dis-indicating that the D/G is will not be left in an in- energized (e.g., by pushing position.

incapable of an automatic operable mode due to the the normal post-test shutdown start. Incorrect positioning of the button), it appears that the air start shutof f valve. 10 0 alans can be cleared in the

2) Provide confirmation that all modification is necessary, control room af ter the local shared annunciators for the alarm is cleared. Can the D/G disabilnq conditions 2) During the emergency mode. all local alarm be cleared without cannot be cleared in the shared annunciators for D/G clearing the shutdown relay?

control room until all abnor- disabling conditions -cannot be If so, an automatic start mal (disabling) conditions are cleared in the control room could be blocked if the local N corrected. Provide a descrip- until all abnormal (disabling) alarm were cleared without tion of any exceptions and the conditions are corrected. first reverting the shutdown corrective measures to be During the test mexle, these relay and the operators were initiated. conditions can be cleared in not aware of it. This should the control room after ac. be reviewed and corrected if

3) Provide infonsation suf ficient knowledging the trouble alarm such conditions exist, to verify that an alarm is of the local control panel, provided which clearly indi- During the emergency mode, cates when the D/G control these controls are bypassed switch is not in the automatic and alarmed in the local panel position. and the control rous on a common alarm.
3) Even if a switch is not in the automatic position, it will not prevent an automatic start.
9. HUMBOLDT BAY, UNIT 3 DOCKET Ho.: 50-133 SECUND DOCKET NO.:

1 LAST ACil0N RESPONSE NEXT ACil0N Licensee was requested ' by NRC Licensee responded by letter of May 1) NRC should verify that . the flNAL ACTION letter of April 18,1978 to: 19, 1978: wording has been changed.

I)NRC should docuent the re-j

1) Identify the D/G disabling 1) The wording for this annuncia- 2) NRC should review the sche- , sults of the inspection.

,comittions not clearly annun- . tor, whic h alarms if the matic diagram or the as-built clated in the control room control switch is not in the system in tie field to verify 2) The results of the NRC review (control switch not in the automatic positl6n, will be that no manual shutdown lock- should be doc uented.

automatic position). changed to "[NI RGE NC Y ENGINE out relays exist. MRC should GENERA 10R DISABLED". verify that the modification 3) None.

2) Detemine if the D/G is pro- is installed. NOIE 2.

vided with a manual shutdown 2) The D/G is provided with an lockout relay. es:ergency-stop relay which is 3) None.

energized and locked-in when

3) Provide confirmation that overspeed engine water high shared annunciators for the temperature or low oil pres-sure sensors exceed their D/G disabling conditions i

, cannot be cleared in the setpoints. Activation of this to control roan until all of the relay initiates an emergency abnomal (disabling) condi- shutdown by opening a contact

- tions are corrected. In the engine ignition cir-cultry to shut down the en-

! gine. The licensee will add a j modification to monitor' this

! relay and innunciate it on the

, annunc1ator in item (1) above.

3) The annunciator is not capable of being cleared or reset unless all of the abnormal conditions associated with it ,

are corrected. Resetting these annunciators cannot be

accomplished in the control

) room and requires that an operator be dispatched to take corrective action.

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11. NILLST0rfE, INIli 1 DUCEET NO : 50 245 SECOND DOCRET NO.:

LA5T ACT10N H[SPONSE MEXT ACi10N FlilAL ACT10N Licensee was requested by MRC Licensee responded by letter of May I) NRC should verify that the Il The results of the verifica-letter to: 12, 1918 that: licensee has implemented the tion should be docessented.

, modifications.

1) Propose modifications result- 1) It proposes to add a separate '2) Ike results of the ~ verifica-Ing frrun the review. annunciator for the D/G to 2) NRC should verif y that the tion should be decimentsi.

distinguish between disalpling IIcensee has Implemented the and nondisabling conditions. modifications. 3)llone,

2) Determine if the D/G are provided with a. manual shut-down lockout relay. 2) The D/G is provided with 3) None, manual shutdown lockout re-
3) Verify that an alarm is pro- lays. Alarms are provided vided ekh clearly indicates which Indicate when these when the D/G control switch is relays are not reset. -The not in the automatic position. main control roan alarms will be modified as necessary to

, to clearly indicate that the D/G

" is incapable of an automatic start if the relays are not reset.

3) No alarm exists for the D/G -

because there is no control switch dich could prevent the D/G from responding to an l

automatic start.

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13. SAlfN. (Bili 1 DOCKET NO. 50-212 $[COND DOCKET NO.

IAST ACTION RESPONSE NEXT ACil0N flNAL ACil0N Licensee was requested by NRC Licensee responded by letter of NRC should verify that: ' l) NRC should verify the wording letter to: August 2, 1918 that: and doceent the completion of l) An alarm has been added to the the modification.

1)~ List any D/G disabling con- 1) The test switches will be auxiliary annunciator for the .

dition not clearly annunciated modified so that whenever the relay . test switch so that the 2) 18tC should verify the wording in tie control room with the contacts of the switch are condition is also annunciated and docuent the completion of relay test switches in test operated which could prevent in the control room and the the modification.

position. the automatic start of the wording on this annunciator is D/G, an alarm will appear on i r. accordance with the NRC 3) NRC should verify all of the

2) D/G breaker control switch in the auxiliary annunciator. staff position. annunciators to ensure that
  • PULL TO LOCK oui" position. The alarm will be appropri- those required to be in the -

ately worded to alert the 2) NRC should verify ' that the control room are ret located

3) Provide an alarm if a manual operator of such a condition. . test switches have been mod- in an auxiliary or control ~

shutdown lockout relay exists. Ifled and that the annunciator console.

The alare should be worded to 2) It proposes to change the wording is in accordance with g clearly indicate that the D/G control switch to a spring- staff position. NOTE I, September 8, 1978.

O is incapaule of an automatic return switch.

start when the relay is . not 3) NRC should verify that no reset. 3) The manual lockout of the D/G manual shutdown lockout relays is accomplished with a lockout exist and that the lockout switch, switch is ahnunciated in the control room.

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DOCEET No.: 50-305 SECOND DOCKET NO.-

15. KEWAUMLE FINAL ACTION LAST ACTION RESPONSE NEXT ACil0N
1) lutC should verify the annon-Licensee was requested by NRC l) Licensee responded by letter clators to ensure that . those.

letter dated March 29,1911 to: of June 9, 1911 that the 1) It is the 15tC staf f position required to be in the control design of the D/G annunciation that all of the conditions scheme was reviewed to ensure which could prevent operation room are not located in an -

1)-List all of the conditions that all of the conditions. of the D/G are clearly annun- avulliary or control console, that render the D/G incapable The results should be docu-of responding to any automatic which could prevent operation clated in the control roan.

of the D/G are properly mont- mented.

emergency start signal.

tored and that such monitoring 2) None.

, and annunciation is compatible 2) None.

2) Provide information sufficient with the design intent.

to determine if the D/G is provided with a manual shut-down lockout relay. 2) per phone conference on April 25, 1979 between Mark March and Lenny Olsban, there are no manual lockout relays nn the N system. only automatic relays

  • which are annunciated on the control panel as
  • ENGINE -

START RUN FA!LtNtE".

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11. YANKEE R0WE DOCKET NO. 50-29 SECOND DOCKET NO,:

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LAST ACTION RESPONSE NEXT ACTION FINAL ACTION Licensee was requested by MRC Licrnsee responded by letter of May 1) NRC should verify that this I) NRC should docissent the re.

letter to: 10, 1911 that: modification has been com- suits of the review.

pleted and, at the same time, 1)I,ist any D/G disabling con- 1) It proposes to add a new check if this condition has 2) NRC should confirm that ' a ditions not clearly annunciat- annunciator window ("D/G reflash capability. mispositioned control switch-l 15 alarmed as a disabling ed in the control room with DISABLING CONDlil0N") to alarm .

the emergency stop not reset, on this corwlltion and other 2) The IstC staff position is that condition and document the equignent failure-type disabl- this condition should be review.

2) List any D/G disabling con- Ing conditions. annunciated as a D/G disab11pg ditions not clearly annunciat- condition with reflash cap. 3) NRC should decisment the re-ed in the control room with 2) It proposes to add a new ab il i t y and, if so, the sults of the review.

the energency restart control annunciator window (" DIESEL licensee should be Informed.

switch in the *0FF" posillo .. RESTART PROGRAM CS OFF"). NOTE 1, May 2, 1918.

3) NRC should verify that no t
3) Deteraire if the D/G's have a 3) The information provided is manual shutdown lockout relays m manual shutdown lockout relay, not suf ficient to determine.lf exist. If such relays exist, N the D/G's are provided with a an alarm should be provided manual shutdown lockout relay. which is worded to- clearly indicate that the D/G is inca pable of an automatic start when the relay is not reset.

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19. RANCHO SECO. UNIT 1 00CLE T No.- 50-312 SECOND 00CEET No.:

LAST ACTIDM RESPONSE lEXT Atil0M FINAL ACTION Licensee was requested by NRC Licensee respoMed by letter of May I) la making the review. the 1) NRC should verify that the letter to: 16. 19U that: licensee assumed the following . assumed conditions do not, cosuittions: present any abnomal or non-I) Review the status annunciator 1) Licensee proposes to add an annunciated conditions. NRC

- for D/G disabling conditions annunciator worded *DSL GEN a) All supporting systems and should deciment results of the not clearly annunciated in the AUTO STARI INOPE RABL E " to equlgment are properly review.

control roan, alare on all disabling aligned.

conditions including equipment b) There are no abnormal or 2) None.

, 2) The information provided is f ailures. defective mechanical or

not sufficient to detemine if electrical components or se0IE 1, May 24.1918.

1 the D/G are prov ided with a 2) Later NRC discussions with systems, the failure or manual shutdown lockout relay. licensee staff determined that abnormal operation of editch the D/G are provided with could not be detected manual shutdown loclout relays without actually attempting.

with alarms. An engineering to start or operate the safety feature signal will emergency generating units.

@ override the l ockout and c) The D/G unit had performed automatically reset the lock- satisf actorily on its last out relay. automatic start test and no work had been done on the units since the performance of the tests.

The IRtc staff position on the above

- is:

a) An alarm should be prov ided i for any equipment that could i block an auto start if mis-posttloned.

b)None.

c) The NRC does not wish to accept the assumption that this is only valid if the technical specification re-quires a test a f ter all maintenance.

2) None, e

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21. MDDAM IECK DOCKET NO.. 50-213 SECOND DOCKET NO.-

LAST ACTION RE SPONSE ,

NEXI ACil0N flNAL ACil0N o Licensee was requested by MtC to the licensee responded by letter of I) NRC should verify that the 1)INtC should doceent the re-review the alarm circuitry and D/G May 16, 1971 that: licensee has implemented the sults of the review.

control circuits for the D/G's to: modifications.

1) It proposes to add an annun- 2) NRC 'should doceent the re-1)' Identify all conditions which clator for each D/G to alarm a 2) idtC should verify that there suits of the review.

are not clearly annunciated in disabling condition, are no manual sleutdown lockout the control room, relays from the schematic 3) NRC should docuent the re-

, 2) Per conversation with PM on diagram or the~ as-built sults of the review. -

2) Determine if the D/G are April 25, 1979, there are no system.

provided with a manual shut- manual shutdown lockout re-down lockout relay. lays. 3) NRC should verify that these modifications have been in-

3) Verify that an alarm is pro- 9) Per conversation with PM on corporated and that the annun-videel dich clearly indicates April 25,1919, two new alarus clation meets the staff when the D/G control sutch is will be wired to indicate edien position.

w* not in the autmatic position. either mergency D/G is incap-able of responding to in automatic start signal.

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23. 21018,tmlis I 8 2 DOCKET No.: 50-295 SECilleD DOCKET 100 304 LAST ACiloft RESPOIISE leEXT ACTI0lt- FILIAL ACTIDII Licensee was requested by lestC Licensee responded by letter of May NRC should draf t a letter informing Ilone.

letter of March 29. 1911 to iden- II, 1911 tiut the remits of its the licensee that its response is tify the D/G disabling . conditions review do not Indicate any cmdi- Inadequate and requesting a more IIUTE I, September 29, 19111.

not clearly annunciated in the tions which might lead to a mis- explicit response.

control room. Interpretation of the operational status of the D/G.

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25. PEACH BOTTOM, imITS 2 8 3 DOCKET llo.: 50-277 SECfsID DOCKET HD.: 50-278' LAST ACTION RESPONSE IIERT ACil0N FIIIAL ACil0H Licensee was repsted by IEIC to Licensee's response hy letter of IIRC should request that one annun- Ilone.

review the alarm ctrtultry and D/G Hay 16, 1971 Ilsted all of the clator be identitled as D/G dis-control circuits for the D/G's. alarm circuits and the annunciation abled, in addition to a . separate . IIDIE I, April 12, 1979 and June 9 for each alava, annunciator for each disabling 1978.

condition. This annunciator should 1 be tied to all disabling 'condi-tions. .

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21. BEAVER VALLEY, UNIT I DOCKET NO.: 50-334 SECOND DOCKET NO.-

LAST ACil0N RESPONSE NEXT ACTION FINAL ACil0N Licensee was regsested by MtC to: Licensee responded by letter of my 1) NRC should check the wording 1) NRC should doctament ; the re. -

18, 1911 and discussions with NRC to be certain that it clearly sults of the review.

l) List the disabling conditions on May 30 and June 5,1918 that
Indicates the D/G will not not clearly annunciated in the

. automatically start. 2) NRC should doctment ' the re-3 ~ control room. ^1 ) It identified two . con- sults of the review.

ditions--D/G control switch 3) INtc should review the sche.
2) Provide infomation sufficient not in the automatic position matic diagram or the as-built NOTE 1. August 11, 1918.

to detemine if the D/G's are and D/G breaner control not in system in the field to verify provided with a manual shut- the automat ic position. It that no manual shutdown lock-down lockout relay. proposes to change the wording out relays exist.

on the control room annuncia- .

tors, but it failed to state what the new wording would be.

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2) A condition. was listed as'
  • w " START LOCKOUT RELAYS NOT A N y. RESEi" but no information was i s 4~

provided on manual shutdown

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NEXT ACTI'g ',' .,/ , Fl80AL ET10N -,'

LAST ACTION RESPONSE ,

Licensee was requested by IRC to - Licensee responded by letter of Ny NRC staid position is that all NRC should . review the impl ement a- .

8 list the disabling conditions not 17 all conditions annunciators which have disabilpg tion for compliance to the . Staff f clearly annunciated in the control which1971 are listinfated annunc and alarmed conditions should also be annt.ws posillos and document ti.* review.

room. In the control room. There are no clated "D/G DISABtED" and all

  • other conditions that render a D/G disabling conditions should be inca pabl e of res pond ing to an separated from nondisabling con- NOIE 1. April 12,1918. -

automatic emergency start signal ditions, \ ,

that is not alanned in the control room. No modifications will result from this review.

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31. PuliliBEACI,tMITSI82 DOCFET NO.- 50-266 ,' SECOND DOCKCi No.- 50-301 ,

f LAST ACil0N RESPONSE fEtt ACil0N FINAL ACil0*!

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Licensee was requested by NRC to Licensee's response by letter of NRC should verify that there are no NRC should docuacnt the results of ,

prh ide information sufficient to May 16, 1977 Ifstco Mat the 86 manual shutdown lockout relays from the review.  ;

, determine if the D/G's are provided lockout on the eurput -breiter can ,. t he schematic diagram or the as. -

7 with a manual shutdown lockout energize thereby tripping the ' built systen. N0i[ 1. April 13,1918. *p^

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DOCKET Mn.: 50-263 SECOND DOCFET NO.,

35. MONilCELLO NEXT ACil0N FINAL ACTION LAST ACTION RESPONSE Licensee was rewsted by MitC to Licensee responded by letter that The NRC staf f position is that the MitC should document the results of list the D/G disabling conditions no disabling conditions wgre nondisabling conditions should be the review.

not clearly annunciated in the identified that are not clearly transferred to the "D/G TROUBLE" contr.oi room. annunciated in the control room. window. Thus, the operator can be Certain nondisabling conditions, assured that the "D/G NOT IN AUT0" however, shared the "D/G NOT IN alarm is a positive indication that AUT0" window with other disabling the D/G is disabled, conditions.

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' 31. HAICil, tNili I DOCitET No.: 50-321 SECOND DOCKET NO.:

LAST ACTION RESPONSE NETT ACil0N FINAL ACTION

' Licensee was requested by NRC to: Licensee responded by letter of May 1) NRC should verify that the 1) INIC should document the re-18, 1911 that: wording clearly indicates that . sults of the review.

1) List the disabling conditions the DS is incapable of an .

~ not clearly annunciated in the 1) It would add an alarm for this automatic start. 2) NRC should document

  • the ' re-control roan, and the proposed condition, but it did not suits of the review.

modification resulting from specify the wording to be used 2) NRC should evaluate the re-the review. on the annunc i a tor window. . sponse and make recommenda ' NOTE 1. May IT, 1918.

The disabling condition gener- tions as necessary.

2) The Information provided is ator differential lockout not suf ficient to determine if relay not reset is annunciated the DS's are provided with a as " GEN. OR STA. SERV. TRANSF.

manual shutdown lockout relay. ID DIFF. AUX. TRIPPED".

2) The licensee should be re-quested to supply the inform-A atton.

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39. ST. LUCIE, UNii I DOCKE T NO.- 50-335 SECOND DOCKET No.:

LAST ACTION RESPONSE NEXT ACTION FlilAL ACTION Licensee was requested by NRC Licensee responded by letter of I) None. 1) None.

letter of May 8,1918 to: June 7,1918 that:

2) NRC should verify that the 2) letC should docisment the re-
1) Verify that all shared annun- 1) No annunciator for a disabling annunciator is worded to suits of the review.

clators for ' the disability condition clears before the clearly Indicate that the D/G conditions are unable to be condition is corrected. Is incapable of an . automatic NOTE 1. September 1,1918.

cleared until all abnormal start when the relay is not conditions are corrected. 2) The lockout relay will inhibit reset.

a start attempt unless the

2) Verify that if a Is/G is pro- condition leading to the vided with a manual shutdown lockout is corrected and the lockout relay, an alann should lockout relay is reset. The be provided iditch is worded to lockout is annunciated and the clearly indicate . the D/G is
  • annunciator will not clear incapable of an automatic unless the lockout relay is g start when the relay is not Set.

reset.

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41. DRESilEN, UNIT I IMICKET NO.- 50-010 SECOND UUCKET NO.:

LAST ACil0N RESPONSE NEXT ACil0N FINAL ACTION Licensee was requested by NRC Licensee's response by letter of 1) NRC should verify that the*  !) NRC. should review . these letter of April 18, 1918 to provide May 10, 1918 that: licensee has installed the actions and document the alarms for the following conditions alarm. results of the review.

which the licensee has confinned I) It would install an alans for can result from normal routine the manual air shutoff valve 2) NRC should verify that the 2)NRC should review 'these periodic testing or maintenance: placed in the closed position. licensee has installed the actions and document the alarm. results of the review.

1) Manual air shutoff valve 2) It would install an alarm for placed in the closed position. the bus tie breaker between 3) NRC should verify t hi.t the 3) NRC should review--these the D/G and its emergency bus licensee has changeI the actions and document the
2) Bus Lle breaker between the placed in test position. . operating test proceduris for results of the review.

D/G and its emergency bus the droop setting or tlat an placed in the test position. 3) It would either modify the alarm has been added. MuiE 1, June 13, 1918.

procedure for D/G testing to ci 3) Improper D/G governor droop preclude changing the D/G

-a setting. governor droop setting or install an alarm for improper droop setting.

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43. QUAD CITIES, UNITS 1 & 2 DOCKET NO.: 50-254 $[COND DOCKET NO.: 50-265 LAST ACil0N RESPONSE NEXT ACil0N FINAL ACil0N Licensee was requested by MRC to Licensee respomled by letter of May 1.2,3) The staff position is if NRC should review all of the list the D/G disabling conditions 27, 1977 Identifying the following these conditions can result from actions proposed by licensee and not clearly annunciated in the corutitions that: riornal routine periodic testing or docwant the reolts of the review.

control room, maintenance, they should.be alarmed

1) Manual air shutoff valve to clearly indicate a D/G automatic

,placed in the closed position. start is blocked.

2) Bus tie breaker between the 4,5) The staff position is that D/G and its emergency bus this wording could be confusing.

placed in the test position. The D/G automatic start and auto-matic start blocked annunciators

3) Improper D/G governor droop should be in separate windows, setting. ,
6) Are the D/G's provided with a
4) Control switch in the "$10P" manual shutdown lockout relay? If m position. a manual shutdown lockout relay W exists, an alarm should be Provided
5) Local selector switch in the which is worded to clearly indicate

" LOCAL" position. the D/G is incapable of an auto-matic start when the relay is not

6) Did not provide information on reset.'

manual shutdown lockout relay.

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l l 45. DAVIS-BESSE,tNili 1 DOCKET NO.: 50-346 SECOND DOCKET NO.:

l LAST ACTION RESPONSE NEXT ACil0N FINAL ACil0N Licensee was requested by NRC Licensee responded by letter of l} 1he NRC staff position is that 1) NRC should review the staff let'er of Masth 6,1979 to respond April 9, 1979 that: disabling conditions should position with the licensee and '

to.the Mtc staff positions that: not be alarmed on the same doc eent the results of the.

1) Emergency D/G annunciators are annunciator as nondisabling review.
1) All shared ' annunciators for in total copliance. conditions. -The existing
disability conditions should design should be modified to 2) INtC should review the wording be alle to be cleared until 2) The annunciator window which provide separate annunciators on the annunciator and all a. normal conditions are alarms the condition that the worded to clearly distinguish doceent the results.

corrected. safety lockout relay is not between these conditions, reset is presently inscribed 3) lione.

2) If a D/G is provided with a "EMER DG TRBL TRIP". This 2) The annunciator should be manual shutdown lockout relay, will be reworded as "EMERG DG reworded "[MERG DG LOCK-0UT M an alarm should be provided LOCKOUT-0UT AND TR8L TRIP". Til8L TRIP" as these are two which is worded to clearly separate conditions.

Indicate the D/G is incapable 3) The D/G voltage regulator m of an autmatic start when the control switch must be in the 3) None.

  • relay is not set. "0N" position for automatic

, operation. A signal will be

! 3) An alarm should be provided added to the annunciator which clearly indicates when described above, which will the D/G control switch is not cause it to alarm when the i in the automatic position, voltage regulator control switch is off.

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' 'o UNITED STATES g

[ g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 :j WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 August 26, 1982 k ....+ /

Docket No. 50-219 LS05-82 059 Mr. P. B. Fiedler Vice President and Director - Oyster Creek Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Dear Mr. Fiedler:

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC VIII-4, ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT - OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION The staff's final safety evaluation report (SER) on this topic for your plant is enclosed. The enclosure supercedes the staff concerns expressed in our March 26, 1981 letter from D. Crutchfield to I. R. Finfrock. Our evaluation is based on our contractor's technical evaluation provided in a July 3, 1980 letter from D. Crutchfield to I. R. Finfrock, which remains unchanged, and additional information provided in an August 2,1982 letter from P. B. Fiedler to D. M. Crutchfield.

The enclosed SER provides the bases for the staff's position with regard to the acceptability of the electrical penetrations for your facility.

The staff has concluded that your comitments to assure that your facility meets current licensing criteria is an acceptable basis for considering this topic complete.

Sincerely.

??t.&adG4 DennisM.Crutchfield,Cdief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

As stated >

cc w/ enclosure: 9k See next page i r

Oyster Cre;k Docket No. 50-219 Mr. P. B. Fiedler .

R; vised 3/30/82 CC G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Resident Inspector Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge c/o U. S. NRC 1800 M Street', N. W. Post Office Box 445 Washington, D. C. 20036 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 J. B. Liebeman,- Esquire Comissioner

. Berlack,'Israels & Liebeman New Jersey Department of Energy 26 Broadway 101 Commerce Street New York, New York 10004 Newark, New Jersey -07102

.- . Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I 631 Park Avenue

- King of Prussia, Pennsyl-vania 19406 J..Knubel

~

BWR Licensing Manager GPU Nuclear 100 Interplace Parkway ~

Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Deputy Attorney General ~

State of New Jersey ,

Department of Law and Public Safety 36 West State Street - CN 112

' Mayor Lacey Township 818 Lacey Road Farked , River, New Jersey 08731 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office .

ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza

, New York, New York 10007 Licensing Supervisor Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 Forked Rivar, New Jersey 08731 9

- 9 e

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_____,,____,,,,___,_m_________.______---------b

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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC VIII-4  ;

,0YSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION l l

TOPIC: VIII-4, Electrical Penetra.tions of Reactor Containment j INTRODUCTION  ;

I.

The safety objective of Topic VIII-4, " Electrical Penetrations of Reactor l i

Containment," is to assure t containment structure are de$at all electrical penetrations in thesignedi during a high energy line break. l As part of the Systematic Evaluation Program'(SEP) the NRC staff f perfomed an audit, comparing sample containment electrical penetrations  !

1 in SEP facilities with current licensing criteria for protection against [

fault and overload currents following a postulated accident.

II. REVIEW CRITERIQ The review criteria are presented in Section 2.0 in an EG&G Report titled, -

" Electrical Penetrations of the Reactor Containment." In addition, in licensing new plants, the staff requires compliance with' the recommenda- t tions of Regulatory Guide 1.63 or an acceptable alternative method.

For each containment electrical penetration, the_ protective systems should provide primary and backup circuit protection devices to prevent a single  ;

failure in conjunction with a circuit overload from impairing containment integrity. The primary and backup protection devices must have trip time vs. current response characteristics which assure protection against i penetration failure. The protection devices are to be periodically tested {

to verify trip setpoints and adequacy of response. .!

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No single failure should allow excessive currents in the:. penetration f conductors that will degrade the penetration seals. Where external control power is used for actuating the protection systems the power for primary and backup breakers should be derived from separate sources,  !

Overcurrent signals for tripping pHmary and. backup system devices should l be electrically independent and physically separated.  !

III. RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of effort since some aspects of the review were perfomed under the related Topic III-12 " Environmental Qualification." The related topic report contains the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject i matter.

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Theoretically, there are no safety topics that are dependent on the -

present topic information for their completion, however, the results of the present topic have a definite impact upon the capability of equip- '

ment inside of containment to function after a high energy.line break.

IV. REVIEW GUIDELINES The review guidelines are presented in Section 3.0 of the EG&G Report titled, " Electrical Penetratipns of the Reactor Containment.  ;

V. EVALUATION ,

The EG&G Report on this topic states that with a LOCA environment inside containment, the protection for some low voltage and medium voltage pene-trations do not conform to the current licensing criteria. However, the -

licensee has provided additional information in their August 2, 1982 submittal. .

The August 2,1982, letter provides an analysis of the differential  !

protection for the motor generator / pump circuit that is similar to that '

presented on Millstone 1. This analysis is based, in part, on a generator , i impedance that is too high to support currents large enough for a suffi-  ;

cient time to damage the penetration. l The licensee also agreed to review the backup protection for the low  ;

voltage penetrations and to install new or additional protective devices l nee 08Y d0cem*bMf9db.e staff position. Their evaluation is to be com-VI. CONCLUSION As a result of our review'we have concluded that a suitable program is in  !

place to assure that the low voltage penetrations conform to the current licensing criteria. We also have concluded that the present design of i the medium voltage penetrations is acceptable. l l

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1; UNITED STATES 8 .,.f.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION *

.;l(" " R_ t WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 k'v ,! -

.n Docket No. 50-219 MAR 2 61981 LS05-81-03-069 Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr.

Vice President . Generation Jersey Central Power & Light Company

' Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Dear Mr.' Finfrock:

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC VIII-4, ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF REACTOR ,.

CONTAINMENT (0YSTER CREEK)

Draft Technical Evaluation Reports (TER) on Topic VIII-4 have been prepared and forwarded to all SEP Licensees for comment. Comments from some licensees (e.g., Northeast Utilities letters dated August 29, 1980 and January 29, 1981)

> indicated a concern with the model used and assumptions made in the initial

conditions and material properties. Unfortunately, most respondents have not provided sufficient technical information nor detailed schematics to

, g support their comments.

Our audit calculations ' failed to establish that the fault current protection for containment electrical penetrations in SEP facilities is generally ade-quate. This does not necessarily mean that the protection is inadequate. ,

Our calculations were simplified and conservative so that there is room to improve the result by using more realistic models. In addition, licensee comments have indicated that there may be some errors in our calculations. '

Nevertheless, our audit did not put the matter to rest and, thus, you are requested to evaluate the adequacy o,f all electrical pen,etrations in your facility in accordance with the enclosed position.

i Generally, where needed, our position calls for more realistic calculations

than were used in our audit. In relation to current licensing criteria, I

it provides relief from the need for redundant circuit protective devices in certain instances and specifically provides for using fuses as an .

alternative to circuit breakers. Other straightfonvard alternatives such I as deenergizing circuits are also provided for.

i j- If any instances arise where your calculations cannot demonstrate circuit protection in accordance with our position, you are requested, to inform us/

l of your intended corrective actions.

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t,iAR 2 61961 S In order to complete our. review of Topic VIII-4, please provide a report describing the calculations performed and criteria used for evaluating 1 the penetrations for the specific circuits identifled in the staff's previous report within 45 days of receipt of this letter. l The report as a minimum should address the following items:

1. Backup protection for penetrations like fil.
2. Circuit design and theory of operation for differential current protection of pump motor circuits for (a) Motor Faults (b) Conductor Faults at the penetration (single phase and bolted faults).
3. An analysis of how the design of the line relay and differential protection satisfies the single failure criterion for all faults.

The requested information will be used to revise our topic Safety Evaluation Report and will be used in the preparation of the integrated assessment for 1 your plant.

1 g Sincerely,

  • g l-Dennis M. Crutchfield, ief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

As sta,ted cc w/ enclosure:

See next page

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Mr. I . - R. Fi nf rock , J r.

O CC G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire . Gene Fisher Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge Bureau Chief 1800 M Street, N. W.-

Washington, D. C. Bureau of Radiation Protection 20036 380 'Scotts Road.

Trenton, New Jersey 38628 GPU Service Corporation ATTN: Mr. E. G. Wallace Comissioner Licensing Manager New Jersey Department of Energy 260 Cherry Hill Road 101 Comerce Street Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Newark, New Jersey 01102 Natural Resources Defense Council Plant Superintendent 91715th Street, N. W. Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Washington, D. C. 20006 . Station P. O. Box 388 Steven P. Russo, Esquire 248 Washington Street Resident inspect or P. O. Box 1060 c/o U. S. NRC Tcts River, New Jersey 08753 P. O. Box 445 I Forked River, NEd Jersey 08731 Joseph W. Ferraro, J r. , Esquire Deputy Attorney General Director, Criteria and Standards State of New Jersey Division

- @e:.b Department of Law and Public Safety Office of Radiation Programs 1100 Raymond Boulevard

(ANR-460)

Newark, New Jersey 07012 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Ocean County Library Washington, D. C. 20460 Brick Township Branch 401 Chambers Bridge Road Brick Town, New Jersey 08723 U. S. Environmer tal Protection Agency Region II Office Mayor ATTN: EIS C00RCJNATOR Lacey Township 25 Federal Plazr P. 0. Box 475 New York, New Yc% 10007 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Comissioner ,-

Department of Public Utilities '

State of New Jersey 101 Comerce Street Newart, New Jersey 07102 e

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ENCLOSURE POSITION ON PROTECTION DF CONTAIM4ENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATIORS AGAINS1 FAILURES CAUSED BY FAULT AND OVERLOAD CURRENTS FOR SEP PLANTS Introduction As part of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) the NRC staff performed an audit, comparing sample containment electrical penetrations in SEP facilities with current licensing criteria for protection against fault and overload currents following a postulated accioent. The simplified and conservative model useo did not shDw that the SEP facilities meet current licensing criteria nor did it show the existing circuit protection to be adequate. Accordingly, e the SEP licensees are requested to demonstrate, using more realistic calcula-tions where necessary, that the circuit protection is adequate in accordance with the position described below.

Encicround In licensing new plants, the staff requires co=pliance with the reconwendations of Regulatory Guide 1.63 or an acceptable alternative method.

For each containment electrical penetratier., the >-etective systems provide

({?" primary and backup circuit protection devices to prevent a single failure in con-junction with a circuit overload from impairing containment integrity. The primary and backup protection devices have trip time vs. current response charac-teristics which assure protection against penetration failure. The protection devices are periodicallj tested to verify trip setpoints and adequacy"of response.

No single failure allows excessive currents in the penetration conductors which will degrade the penetration stals. Where external control power is used for actuating the protecticn systems the power for prirary and backup breakers are derived from separate sources. Overcurrent signals for tripping primary and backup system devices are electrically independent and physically separated.

Staff Audit The safety objective of SEP Topic VIII-4, " Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Ceatainment," is to assure that all electrical penetrations in the containment structure are designed not to fail from electrical faults during a high energy line break (LOCA' or secondary system line break). -

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O We have perforced preliminary evaluations, on a conservative basis, of the f..uli.

current protection for three samle containrent electrical penetrations for

. each of the eleven SEP plants. The entire penetration was assumed to be initially at the peak calculated LOCA temerature. Then, for a given fault current, the point to time of heat the.raterial) the seal wire to the waslimiting raterial tenerature (usually the celting calculated. This tire was cogared to the'tice for the protective device (s) to interrupt the fault current.

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On this basis, protection several device fails. penetrations exceed limiting temeratures if the prirary Others do so without postulating prirary device failure.

Two of the samle penetrations even have melting te@eratures less than the peak fLOCA temerature and thus exceed the limits of this nodel even if there is no ault current. (References 1 through 11)

This does not necessarily mean that the netrations would actually fail. a The analysis was conservative, particularly in assuming that the penetration was initially at the peak calculated contain ent te,perature. The penetraticas would not reach such a temerature following an accident. In addition, licensee coments have indicated that there ray be so 1e errors in the calculations. (For exagle, Northeast Utilities letter dated August 29,19S0, Docket No. 50-245, providing this audit coments clearly did onnot theput staffthe calculations for Millstone Unit 1). Nevertheless, ratter to rest.

Position h Each SEP licensee is requested to evaluate the adequacy of the existing fault current protection for containrent electrical penetrations in accordance with the position discussed in core detail below and to propose remedies where needed in order to reet the position.

1. The basic requirement of Regulatory Guice 1.63 that all penetration circuits, Class IE or non-Class IE, be provided with overcurrent protection in conformance with the redundancy and testability requirements of IEEE 'td 279-1971 should be met; 2.

r A single circuit breaker to protect a penetration serving a Class IE circuit or i a non safety circuit containing only components that are qualified to Class IE requirements is acceptable provided that each component of such circuit is

, qualificd to the accident environment; 3.

A circuit whose loads inside containment are not required to mitigate the consequences of accidents may be automatically disconnected from its power source on receipt of an accident signal or it may be maintained dcenergized by positive means such as those outliend in Branch Technical Position ICSB 18 (PSB) of Appendir. 8A to the Standard Review plan whenever cunt 6inment integrity is required.

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For the purpose of evaluating the adequacy of protection for contain:ent  !

protection, faults should be postulated up to a bolt,ed cable fault inside  ;

containnent at the penetration (a bolted three phase fault for three phase  ;

circuits). The primary protection device should.have a trip tine vs. current  ;

response characteristic that assures against penetration failure under all fault conditions. j Circuit. breakers should be tested periodically to verify their trip setting I value and response tine. Breakers should be designed to interrupt the rarimam possible fault current for the circuit or backup protection fast ,

response current limiting fuses should be provided.

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  • In addition, fuses ray be used in lieu of circuit breakers as protective devices.

Where fuses are used, documentation of their response characteristics derived f f rom production testing should be avai,1,able_for audit. f i

It is acceptable to use 'less conservative rodels than were used in our {

preliminary evaluations provided that they address f ault currents up to bolted faults and still provide reasonable assuran:e that the penetration ,

will not f ail. For exaerle, a core realistic initial temperature of the  ;

cor.tainrent penetration could be detercined rather than assuming the ',

(h penetration has reached the peal calculated containment atnosphere terp-  ;

e rature. .. _

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Circuits may be modified to reduct the short circuit current to acceptable  !

values by the use of current limiting devices (such as resistors, isolation  ;

transformers, and changing transformer taps) external to the containment.

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