ML20064J134
| ML20064J134 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1978 |
| From: | Quintenz T JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20064J131 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812290097 | |
| Download: ML20064J134 (2) | |
Text
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Date of iitic1 Telephone Occurrence:
November 29, 1978 port Date:
Time of mitial Written Occurrence:
0500 apart Date:
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FORKED RIVER NEW JERSEY 08731 Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-219/78/28-lP Valve V-1-106 (Main Steam Line Drain Valve) and the TIP isolatio valves for TIPS 1-1 and 1-3 failed to close during the performance
- DENTIFICATION of a low-law reactor water level primary containment isolation F OrrDRRENCE:
test.
This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.(3).
Routine Shutdoest CONDITIONS PRIOR Steady State Power 170 OCCURRENCE:
Hot Standby Operation Load Changes During X
Cold Shutdows Routine Power Operation Refueling Shutdown Other (Specify)
Routine Startup OPet 4.ina 29, 1978, at approximately 0500, while On @ h e i.4r, Novenber DESCRIPTION performing'w low-low reactor water level primary contaiment isolation test, valve V-1-106 (a main steam line drain valve) 0F ( CURRENCE:
Additionally, two traveling incere probes failed to close.
(183) failed to fully withdraw, preventing the' isolation valves for these penetrations to primary containment from closing.
Failure of V-24-29 (reactor coolant sample valve) to close was noted during the test but t?s later discovered to be a failure of the 6K27 relay to provide power to the valvo closed indication.
APPARENT CAUSE Design
_ Procedutw Unusual Service Condition 0F OCCURRDiCE:
Manufacture Installation /
Inc. Environmental Construction X(183) Component Failure X(2) Other (Specify)
Operator l
l 7 812 2 9 o 0 h
(
.?-
apartable Occurrenco Page 2 epos-t No. 50-219/78/28-1P
(
i (1)
The inability of the 6K27 relay to provide closed indication is attributed to the januming of one of the stationary contacts into the armature of the relay. This prevented the relay from traveling to its fully de-energized position, but did not prevent it free performing its intended function of de-energizing the V-24-29 isolation valve and de-energizing the seal in circuit.
(2)
TIP l-1 did not fully withdraw because of the setting for "in shield" was corresponding to the setting for machine i
l "stop" in the control logic; therwfore, the isolation valve did not close.
TIP 1-3 required an "in shield" plunger switch adjustment in order to provide a valve closure signal.
(3)
The V-1-106 valve failed to close because of a faulty power fuse holder which prevented the energizing of the valve motor operator.
UtALYSIS OF The containment integrity isolation valves are provided to
)CCURRENCE:
maintain contairament integrity following the design basis loss of coolant accident.
Failure of the above valves to close caused a loss of redundancy in all cases.
Primary containment was not required at the time the test was being performed, and additionally, if primary containment had been required in an emergency situation, redundant valves could have operated to prwide isolation of the primary containment.
CORRECTIVE The 6K27 relay was replaced.
The power fuse holder in the M~ TION:
setor control center for valve V-1-lC6 was repaired, and the j
position switches and logic for the TIP system were adjusted.
i 7 AIL
.E DATA:
To be provided later.
[ b k8=3 Date:
//-30-7B red by:
T.
Quin y l
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