ML20064F876

Final Deficiency Rept Re Incorrect Wipe Setting of Contacts on GE Hfa Relays.Initially Reported on 820810.Relay Will Be Adjusted Per GE Svc Info Ltr 44,Suppl 4.Deficiency Reported Under Part 21 by GE

ML20064F876
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	12/30/1982
From:	Manno S NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
REF-PT21-82 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8301110210
Download: ML20064F876 (6)

Text

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M Y NIAGARA R UMOHAWK NBAGARA 100 HAWK POWER CORPORATION /300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST SYRACUSE. N.Y.13202/ TELEPHONE (315) 4741511 SAMUEL F. MANNO VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR CONSTRUCTION December 30, 1982 Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I Attention: Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the deficiency regarding HFA relay contact setting. This condition was reported by telephone to Mr. G. Kelley, of your staff, on August 10, 1982. An interim report on this matter was submitted to you with my letter dated August 31, 1982.

Very truly yours, h

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S. F. Man o Vice President Nuclear Construction

/djm Enclosure xc: Mr. R. D. Schulz, Resident Inspector Director of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 8301110210 821230 PDR ADOCK 05000410 S PDR g

. 1 NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-410 FINAL REPORT FOR A REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY UNDER 10CFR50.55(e)

Description of the Deficiency The problem concerns the incorrect " wipe setting" of contacts on some HFA relays after disassembly / reassembly. Qualification of the relay was performed with calibrated contacts; therefore a relay with less than a minimum wipe setting does not fall within the component qualification limits. General Electric reported this problem to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10CFR21 on July 27, 1982. This matter was reported to Mr. G. Kelley of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I on August 10, 1982, and an interim report was provided on August 31, 1982.

Analysis of Safety Implications The safety hazards associated with this problem - had it remained uncorrected -

are described in the attached General Electric letter to Mr. S. F. Manno (Niagara Mohawk) dated July 29, 1982. HFA relays are planned for use in various safety related applications at Nine Mile Point Unit 2.

Corrective Action For Nine Mile Point Unit 2, two HFA relays are installed in HPCS Diesel Generator local panel H22-P028. This panel is in storage at the site. These two relays will be adjusted in accordance with General Electric Service Information Letter No. 44, Supplement 4. Those HFA relays installed in panels located in General Electric, San Jose will be corrected prior to shipment to Nine Mile Point Unit 2 in accordance with Repair / Modification Bulletin RG002 (General Electric, San Jose issued).

In addition, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation will review balance of plant HFA relays for the above-reported deficiency and corrective action will '

be provided in accordance with General Electric Service Information letter 44, Supplement 4.

' ATTACHMENT

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NUCLEAR POWEH

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l l SYSTEMS DIVISION GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY.175 CURTNER AVE.. SAN JOSE. CALIFORNIA 95125 MC 394, (408) 925-3574 l July 29, 1982 Responds to:

NMP2- 4500 J0 #12177 g.;, , , , , e y 'f])

.'id'3 6 Mr. S. F. Manno Vice President - Nuclear Construction Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation S.F. MANNO 300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, NY 13202

SUBJECT:

NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 2 10CFR PART 21, REPORTABLE CONDITION HFA RELAY CONTACT SETTING This letter is to inform you that we have notified Richard C. DeYoung of the NRC on July 27, 1982 of a reportable defect per 10CFR Part 21. The defect occurred in the installation of HFA Relays in control room panels and racks.

The enclosed evaluation dated July 23, 1982 identifies all pertinent information required by 10CFR Part 21.

For NMP2, two HFA Relays are installed in local panel H22-P028. This panel is in storage at the site. Other HFA Relays are installed in panels that are still in the factory and therefore not reportable.

Very truly you s,

,h m C. G. Lewis Project Manager Nine Mile Point 2 CGL:hjr/C07288 Attachment

! cc: W. R. D'Angelo R. J. Hall R. E. Miller J. P. Ptak C. C. Zappile

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REPORTABLE CONDITION .

1. Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission; ,-

Dr. Glenn G. Sherwood, Manager of Safety and Licensing Operation General Electric Company,175 Curtner Avenue, San Jose, CA '95125

2. Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied' $

for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to A.-

comply or contains a defect. s sq ,

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Electrical panels incorporating HFA relays. x' ' '- ' ' 1

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3. Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying trelbasic 4 ,

component which fails to comply or contains a defect. ,  ; i T

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General Electric Company, Nuclear Eneroy Business Operation, Ssh ' Jose,. ^

California s

4. Nature of the defect or failure to' comply and the safety hazard which 'is ,

created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. .y ,

The defect is the incorrect " wipe setting" of normally closed (NC) -

contacts on some HFA relays converted from normally open (NO)-by GE shop and/or field personnel. ("Normally closed" means closed in the deenergized state.) Qualification was performed with calibr3ted contacts, so a relay with less than a minimum wipe setting does not fa?l4within the component qualification limits. The safety hazard created is the potential for a NC contact in the HFA relay to fail to actuate engineered safety systems properly during a seismic event. For example, the ' Reactor Protection System Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) circuit breaker trip coils are energized by Ne > N relay contacts. During no'rmal operation the HFA relay NC contact: arc kept open by energizing the coil. This prevents the ,

RPT circuit ht.r .c * * (p coils from being actuated. Should an event occur requiring the 2.t p.rict, of the trip coils, the energy to the HFA relay coil would cea;e, reledsing the contact arm to make contact with the '

stationary arm, thereby energizing the RPT circuit breaker trip coil. The failure to initiate RPT per design may create thermal transients which threaten the fuel thermal safety limits which are designed to assure fuel '

cladding integrity.

5. The date on which the information of such deuct or failure to comply was obtained.

July 26, 1982 ,

6. In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or

.being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

Plants under construction or prior to operating license turn over.

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's LaSalle 1 & 2 . 242 HFAs ea Zimmer 1 216 HFAs Susquehanna 1 & 2 231 HFAs ea Shoreham 304 HFAs Grand Gulf 1,& 2 24 HF4h ea- '

Hanford 261 HFAs Perry 1 &,2;' 38 liFAs, #N 3 Fermi 2 286 HFAs Limerick I & 2 4 HFAs eA~'.,

Clinton 58 HFAs (Not all relays have normally closed contacts.)

Safety systens using HFA relays:

ADS Autoaatic Depressurization System)

RHR Resided Heat Removal System)

LPCS Low Pressure Core Spray System) i RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling)

HPCI High Pressure Cooling Injection) .

HPCS (High Pressure Core Spray)

CS (Core 1* pray)

RPS (Seactor Protection System)

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Opdating GE BWR plants also use HFA relays in varying quantities. The a4 tent of this defect is not known for operating plants, since the current Utate of calibration of the"HFAs for these' plants is not known by GE. The

"\ risk associated with' continued plant operation is not substantial during i> the upcoming calibration period. Operating plant experience has not s

'sytelded evidence of uncalibrated H/A relays causing potential safety Nza rds. It is likely thit most of the operating plant HFA relays have a heady been readjusted in the_ field at some point in time. Of those HFA

- 7'N1ays that need readjustment, few, if any, would be applied in systen logid that r,equires operation ~ during a seismic event in order to maintain plant sa fety. These points, coupled with the very low probability of occurrence of a design basis seismic event, provide justification for continued plant operation while the HFA relays are being checked. ,

7. The corrective action'which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

+ Tssuance of GE Field Disposition Instructions (FDI) to all affected BWRs

\- under construction instructing that all safety related HFAs be checked and recalibrated, if necessary, using GE-PS!!BD Instructions, GEH 2024,

, "!!alticontact Auxiliary Relay Type HFA 51. and/or GE-PSMGD Instructions GEK ,45484, Multicontact Auxiliary Relay Type HFA 151.

70! JScue. Dates: 2/12/82-LaSalle #1; 2/19/82-Susquehanna #1 & #2, Grand Gulf #1 & #2; 2/20/82-LaSalle #2; 2/24/82 Zimmer, Shoreham, Hanford;

[ 3/10/82-Clinton; 3/19/82-Perry #1 & #2, Limerick #2.

h GE - San Jose issued Repair /Modificabon Culletin RG002 "HFA Relay

• Magnetic Coil Assembly Replacement and Contact Inspection / Adjustment" g 2/12/82. This Bulletin provides instruction to GE shop persnnnel in the f correct adjustment procedure for relay wipe setting.

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GE SIL (Service'Information Letter) 44 Supplement 4 will be issued to inform operating plants of the potential HFA relay anomalies, and the corrective action to resolve such anomalies.

8. Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licenses.

None 4

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