ML20063P338

Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Fueled Experiments & Staffing,Supplementing 800523 Application to Renew License R-81

ML20063P338
Person / Time
Site:	05000054
Issue date:	09/29/1982
From:	UNION CARBIDE CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20063P336	List: ML20063P335 ML20063P338
References
NUDOCS 8210130306
Download: ML20063P338 (5)

Text

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EXHIBIT B Additional Technical Specification Changes. Requested on 9/29/82 License No. R-81, Docket No. 50-54 3.5.2 Fueled Experiments Proposed Changes:

1. Eliminate 3.5.2.c.(2) and re-number 3.5.2.c.(3),

(4) and (5) as 3.5.2.c.(2), (3) and (4) respectively.

2. Replace the last 4 sentences of 3.5.2.d. (Bases) with the words, "The total amount of special nuclear material in the core at any time does not affect the consequences of the release from a single capsule as analyzed in Reference 1 for it has been established (see Licer.se Amendement No.

10) that failure of a single capsule will not initiate a failure in other neighboring capsules".

Reason for changes and safety evaluations:

1. The Technical Specifications place requirements on individual target reactivity worth, fuel mass, heat generation and I-131 inventory. Since failure of one target has been shown not to affect other targets, the total target inventory with respect to failure is immaterial. The parameter of concern regarding the total target inventory is the combined worth that can add positive reactivity to the core due to common made failure; this is addressed in Tech Spec 3.5.1.c.(1) and (2).

2. The wording of the bases as it presently exists is misleading and the rationale is incorrect. An assumption is made that each of 15 irradiation positions contains only one irradiation capsule.

A typical experiment involves four capsules per core position.

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EXHIBIT B (cont'd)

Additional Technical Specification Changes Requested on 9/29/82 License No. R-81, Docket No. 50-54 6.1.3 Staffing Proposed Change:

1. Replace 6.1.3.b.(3).2 with the words, " Signals which in the opinion of the Senior Operator were properly verified to be either false or readily explainable and to have resulted from monitoring, experimental, or control equipment, or from personnel inadvertence; and" Reason for changes and safety evaluation:

1. Confusion has arisen in the interpretation of the term of " false signal". A broad definition includes signals which orignated from a known but readily explainable cause whereas a narrow definition would include only spurious signals.

The proposed words clarify the issue.

2. The issue in question is whether a Senior Reactor Operator must be present for a recovery from shutdown caused by a false signal. Including readily explainable automatic shutdowns along with false signals in this respect does not affect the overall safety of the operation.

While a Senior Operator will use discretion in determining whether his presence will benefit the scram recovery, he will not be locked into being present due to a technicality.

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b. Objectives - The objective is to prevent damage to the reactor, prevent excessive release of fission products in the event of an experiment failure, and also to en-sure that safety limits are not exceeded.

c. S >ecifications - Fuel-bearing experiments in the reactor s n11 meet the following conaitions:

(1) All fueled experiments are to conform to the specifications listed above in Section 3.5.1.

(-2 ) The ' r rte y ef :01td feel Maring =terial i

W eg 4-radiated 4- ee re :ter cor4.at-any-t!- th:11 5: If=fted te >nn o ar cere: ::;d/

cr 750 g ef :p:;ial asleer ;;;eteriel.

(s) (St The inventory of solid fuel-bearing materials in a single irradiation capsule shall be limited

to 200 g of source and/or 50 g of special nuclear material .

('S) (At The fission power of an irradiation capsule i

containing special nuclear material shall be Ifmited to 13 KW.

( (M tGT The iodine inventory of a singly encapsulated gg j capsule shall be limited to a maximum of 1000 curies I-131 dose equivalent. s/6/r;

d. Bases - These specifications place limits on the fission product inventory in a fueled capsule such that capsule failure and the hypothetical release of all contained i fission products to the reactor coolant will not result j in excessive exposure to personnel on and off site.

The detailed analyses that form the bases of this speci-t fication are given in References in Section 7. The total lg h, ".

f(,

I amount of special r.uclear material pe-f tied in the core at any time h : 5:03 incrc ::d te 750 g. Thi; ' crc:00 d::: ::t l

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af fect the consequences rf tne release f rom a single capsule as analyzed in Ref. 1 for it has been estab-r -

lished (see L,1 cense Amendment No. 10) that failure of a single capsule will not initiate failure in other

', neighboring capsules. Th cc. 1,2-! t -cf 750 9 i- bescs

, e eppe '=tely i;- i rred!::!c.. ;,c-+t+orn , ;;d. hd4h t-50 g of 5".;. 7;.  ?!=it cf 15 Ec;!':!en: !: dicietid 5, eve!! b* ;;ir ui gi omry cc;!'ng ::p::!:y,,

3.6 'Fu21 ,

', a . Appilcability - These specifications apply to the number

, ,' , and con'dition of-tne fuel elements present in the core.

b. Objective - To ensure that power is distributsd in the core araong c sufficient nur ber of fuel elements to

, avoid exc-ssive peak / aver'ses a ratio, and to avoid ex-cessive release of fission products. _

c. Specifications i

Ii (1) The minimum ramber of fuel elements in the core shall be 30. Each control. element shall I

. count as 1/2 fuel element for this pu'rpose.

(2) Control rods shat! be kept wit'hin 1 10% of their}Mean position whenever the reactor power exceeds 500 KW. *

(3) Fuel elements exhibiting release of fission ,

products due to cladding rupture shall, upon positive identification, be removed froa the ,

core. An increase in. the normal gaseous fis-sion product release (due to system contami-nation) by a factor of 100 shall constitute initial evidence of cladding rupture and require identification of the ccuse.

(4) Fuel element loading and distribution in the core shall be such that peak / average thermal flux will not exceed 3.3 S

= -

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6.1.'3 S:affing .

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a. The minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured shall be:

i (1) A licensed Reactor Operator in the control room. -

(2) A second licensed reactor operator present at the- reactor facility. Unexpected absence for two hours is acceptable provided imediate action is taken to obtain a replacement.

(3) A licensed Senior Reactor Operator shall be readily available on call.

- . (4) A member of the operating shift shall be designated by Level 2 management as knowledgeable in radiation control.

b. Events requiring the presence of a Senior Operator:

(1) All fuel-element or control-rod alterations within' the reactor core region.

(2) Relocations of any experiments with reactivity worth t 1 dollar.

(3) Recovery fror.: unplanned or unscheduled shutdowns.unless

they are of a type excluded by the Level 2 authority.

Such exclusions . shall be posted in the control room or placed ' ,

in the appropriate procedures. Furthermore, the presence of a I

senicr operator at the facility s, hall not be required during .

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recovery from Unilaiin~ed or unscheduled shutdown or significant re-

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duction in power in instances which result.from:

1. Electiical power interruptions from internal or external failures exclusive of power supply failures of the reactor instrumentation, control and safety systems; r .

2. False $ignals, which, in the opinion of the Senior Operator, EITN KR OR RE Aoia.V EJtPLAIN ABLK were properly verified to beAfalsedand to have resulted from monitoring, experimental, or control equipment, or from personnel inadvertence; and l

l 3. Intep ti6nal shutdowns made by the Reactor Operator which are I not related to the safety of the reactor:

provided that prior to the initiation of sud re:cvery, :<.s Senior Operator snail ce notified of the shutdown cf pcwei reduction, and

( shall determine that the shutdown was caused by one of the enuT.erated t

occurrences, and shall determine that his cresen:e at the facility

rir; re--

, is not required l- .

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