ML20063K225
| ML20063K225 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1994 |
| From: | UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20063K202 | List: |
| References | |
| ULNRC-2960, NUDOCS 9402280368 | |
| Download: ML20063K225 (11) | |
Text
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0 ULNRC-2960 ATTACHMENT FOUR PROPOSED TECHNICAL BPECIFICATION REVISIONS
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9402280368 940217 1
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O 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS _
3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each Reactor Coolant System accumulator shall be OPERASLE witn:
a.
The isolation valve open and power removed, b.
A contained borated water volume cf between 6061 and 6655 gallons, c.
A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2500 ppm, and l
d.
A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 602 and 648 psig.
APPLICABILITY: MOD'ES 1, 2 and 3*.
ACTION:
a, SAlrGRT A Por rearent eNer -/f an a.,
/, -+.
With one accumulator inoperable 7 e*:Op !! 3 u!! :# : ! ::d it:1;tica ecl.c,- restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status witnin ' bc r or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and re ace RCS pressure to less than 1000 psig
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within the followi 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
M houer b.
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3::y y33, 4 77g735,3 gue 77 twg $t:13 qee glyg
-being cle d*,
ither % diately Oper th: 1:012 tier /:h: Or te d a 2: 102 t 40T ST"N05Y "i S - 5 hour: Or.d redu:: CS prt;;ur -
4 to 1c;; th;n 1000 p;ig seithin tnc f;11;eing : h;ur;.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS
- 4. 5.1.1 Eacn accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:
Maf 1)
Verifying, b; th: ts:nt: Of :.1:.rm;,Vthe contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanke, and are toi#in#de/r lim fe 2)
Verifying that eacn accumulator isolation valve is open.
- RCS pressure above 1000. psig.
= On: :::urul t:r ::clatier -:h: m:y be c':::d f: up t: ? 50u-: '-
met: 2* f:r cur :i'1:r:: ::: ting per I.C.: cr f.f.E.2.2.
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 23, /,0, 44
i INSERT A i
With one accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration not within limits, restore the boron concentration to within the above limits within 72 j
hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce RCS pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
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.'l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVilLLAMCE REOU!REMENTS (Continued 1 At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 70 gallons by b.
hh verifying the baron cor. centration of the accu,ulator solution $ ad--1NrERT 6 least once oer 31 cays wher. tha P.C5 pre:sure is above 1000 psic tna isola-Atby verifying tnat tne circuit creaxer supplying pc-ar ::
c.
tion valve operator is o:er f. 5.1. 2 E::r :::u ul ::r ::ter ?:;;! :nc prc::urc n:n-c! ' :!' re dcrrns:--
- ted ore""SLE ct 1:::t : :: per 10 :: nth; by th: perf:rm:nc Of : C:..'N:L r.,,--rver,<
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3/4 5-2 CAllAWAY - UNIT 1
- ~ ' - - - - - - -
INSERT B This latter 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> smveillance is not required when the volume increase makeup source is the RWST and the RWST has not been diluted since verifying that its boron concentration is within the limits of Specification 3.5.5.
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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 5
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BASES i
3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be inmediately forced into the core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on accumulator volure, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.
The accumul.ator power operated isolation valves are considered to be
" operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive In cddition, as these accumulator isolation valves e
conditions are not met.
fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.
- t7/JE}77~ C:
for :per: tion with :n ;;:umul:::r 'n per:b!: f:r :ny re::en
-Th: limi t
-execpt :n i;ciatica vaivt ;1csed minimizes th; tim ;xp;;;r: ;f the pl :: t: :
LOCA event accurring c;ncm rent with fiiivre ;f ca additional :::cmulat:r
!# : c!cred
- hich m;y rcsult in un;;;;;tabis p :t ci:dding t~mperatur::.
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4::!:tien v:!ve : rnet b; #cr:di:tely ep: :d. the full capabi'ity of cre 3
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accu *"litar is not avai4:b1: :nd prompt ::ti n 1: r quir:d t: pl::: th: re::ter-in MODE 'here thi: ::p:bi'ity 1: not required.
In e-dea te per#c-- check valv: Ourveillen:: test 4ng p;r '.0.5 Or '.'.S.2.2 abeve 1000 prig DCS press"*e.-
3 caly.
-cre accumulator 1:ol: tion v:1ve m:y be cic;;d for up to 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; in m d The requirement to verify accumulator isolation valves shut with power removed from the valve operator when the pressurizer is solid ensures the accumulators will not inject water and cause a pressure transient when the Reactor Coolant System is on solid plant pressure control.
3/4.5.2, 3/4.5.3, and 3/4.5.4 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the a
double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recircula-tion mode during the accident recovery period.
With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling recuirements.
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CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No.10 1
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INSERT C The allowed outage time limit for operation with one accumulator inoperable due to bolon concentration not within limits reflects the fact that no credit is taken in the accident analysis for boron concentration in the accumulators during the LOCA blowdown phase. Injection of borated water provides the fluid medium for heat transfer from the core and prevents excessive clad temperatures, contributing to the filling of the reactor vessel downcomer. The downcomer water elevation head provides the driving force required for the reflooding of the reactor core. Negative reactivity is initially a function of the void fonnation in the core. One accumulator below the minimum boron concentration limit will have no effect on available ECCS water and an insignificant effect on core suberiticality during reflood. Boiling of ECCS water in the core during reflood concentrates boron in the saturated liquid that remains in the core. Boron concentration during the sump recirculation phase is dominated by the RWST boron concentration.
The allowed outage time limit for operation with one accumulator inoperable for any other reason has been detennined ta have an insignificant effect on the i
Callaway core damage frequency. The accumulator fault tree was quantified using an accumulator test and maintenance unavailability of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> per calendar year.
5
i 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION t
3.5.1 Each Heactor Coolant System accumulator shall be OPERABLE WITH:
a.
The isolation valve open and power removed, b.
A contained borated water volume of between 6061 and 6655 gallons, c.
A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2500 pom, and d.
A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 602 and 648 psig.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 AND 3*
ACTION:
a.
With one accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration not within limits, restore the boron concentration to within the above limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce RCS pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
b.
With one accumulator inoperable for reasons other than a., restore the
-l inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce RCS pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:
1)
Verifying that the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks are within their limits, and 2)
Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.
- RCS pressure above 1000 psig.
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 28,4'O,44
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 1
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) i I
b.
At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 70 gallons by verifying the boron J
concentration of the accumulator solution. This latter 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> surveillance is not required when the volume increase makeup source is the RWST and the RWST has not been diluted since verifying that its boron concentration is within the limits of Specification 3.5.5.
c.
At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 1000 psig by verifying that the circuit breaker supplying power to the isolation valve operator is open.
f CALLAWAY - UNIT-1 3/4 5-2
i
-l 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3L4.5 1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.
The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be
" operating b; passes" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition,-as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.
The allowed outage time limit for operation with one accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration not within limits reflects the fact that no credit is taken in the accident analysis for boron concentration in the accumulators during the LOCA blowdown phase, injection of borated water provides the fluid medium for heat transfer from the core and prevents excessive clad temperatures, contributing to the filling of the reactor vessel downcomer. The downcomer water elevation head provides the driving force required for the reflooding of the reactor core. Negative reactivity is initially a function of the void formation in the core. One accumulator
~
below the minimum boron concentration limit will have no effect on available ECCS water and an insignificant effect on core subcriticality during reflood Boiling of ECCS water in the core during reflood concentrates boron in the saturated liquid that remains in the core. Boron concentration during the sump recirculation phase is dominated by the RWST boron concentration.
The allowed outage time limit for operation with one accumulator inoperable for any other reason has been determined to have an insignificant effect on the Callaway core damage frequency. The accumulator fault tree was quantified using an accumulator test and maintenance unavailability of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> per calendar year.
The requirement to verify accumulator isolation valves shut with power removed from the valve operator when the pressurizer is solid ensures the accumulators will not inject water and cause a pressure transient when the Reactor Coolant System is on solid plant pressure control.
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 40 1
J.-
3/4.5.2. 3/4.5.3, and 3/4.5.4 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem l
operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double onded break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
With the RCS temperature below 350 F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
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I LCALt AWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1(a)
Amendment No. 40
.