ML20062M471
| ML20062M471 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1982 |
| From: | Chiangi N CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-82 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, CQAD-82-1307, NUDOCS 8208200113 | |
| Download: ML20062M471 (5) | |
Text
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Carohna Power & Light Company
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July 30, 1982 FILE: SH N-2/18 CQAD8N1307 ITEM 76 D
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Region II
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101 Marietta Street, Northwest p
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 o
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET No. 50-400 WELDING OF 6.9KV CLASS IE SWITCHGEAR
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AND SEISMICALLY DESIGNED 6.9KV NONCLASS IE SWITCHGEAR FOR UNIT NO. 1 i
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
t Attached is a second interim report on the subject item which was deemed reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21, on March 31, 1982. Ao stated in the attached report, corrective action has not been completed and it is currently projected that the final report will be submitted by August 31, 1982.
Yours very truly, l8.{
sus N. J. Chiangi - Manager Engineering & Construction f
Quality Assurance / Quality Control NJC/gea (203)
Attachment ccr Mr. C. Maxwell W/A Mr. V. Stello (2) W/A t
b 8208200113 820730 PDR ADOCK 05000400 S
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411 Fayettevitte Street
- P. O. Box 1551
- Raleigh. N. C. 27602 i OFFICIAL Colq
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Unit No. 1 Interim Report July 30, 1982 i
Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e)
Reportable Under 10CFR21 WELDING OF 6.9KV CLASS IE SWITCHGEAR AND SEISMICALLY DESIGNED 6.9KV NONCLASS IE SWITCHGEAR FOR UNIT NO. 1 4
m.,
SUBJECT:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant / Unit No.1 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR Part 21 Reportable Deficiency.
Welding for 6.9kV Class 1E switchgear and seismically-designed 6.9kv Nonclass 1E switchgear purchased under Purchase Orders NY-435112 and NY-435113 from Siemens-Allis, Inc.
ITEM:
Welding in Class 1E 6.9kV switchgear and seismically-designed 6.9kV Nonclass 1E switchgear SUPPLIED BY:
Siemens-Allis, Inc., West Allis, Wisconsin NATURE OF DEFICIENCY:
In December 1980, the Switchgear Division of Siemens-Allis, Inc. (West Allis, Wisconsin), shipped 6.9kV switchgear to the CP&L site on Purchase Orders NY-435112, Class 1E switchgear, and NY-435113, Nonclass 1E Seismically-Designed Switchgear.
Welding in the switchgear was not i
inspected by Ebasco's vendor Quality Assurance representative prior to shipment, as the check plan did not include mechanical inspection requirements.
On January 28, 1982, and February 1, 1982, a Siemens-Allis representative was brought on site with the vendor shop drawings so that an inspection of the welding could be performed. The inspection revealed that the weld lengths and spacing were not in conformance with the vendor shop drawings.
It was also noted that the quality of the welding was poor.
Subsequent inspection of the test prototype, which was seismically tested, revealed similar discrepancies to the vendor drawings.
Comparison of the quality of welds and Siemens-Allis' internal acceptance criteria indicated that approximately 40% of the welds did not meet the criteria.
Although the switchgear on site and that seismically tested exhibit similar welding deficiencies, they were not similar enough to conclude that the equipment on site adequately reflected the same structural construction of the equipment seismically tested.
DATE PROBLEM OCCURRED:
Refer to section above.
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DATE PROBLEM REPORTED:
March 31, 1982 - CP&L (N. J. Chiangi)' notified the NRC (C. W. Berger and C. Julian) that this item was reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR Part 21.
SCOPE OF PROBLEM:
The deficiency involves the two Unit 1 Class 1E 6.9kV switchgear buses (26 cubicles) and five Unit 1 Nonclass 1E seismically-designed 6.9kV switchgear buses (43 cubicles).
SAFETY IMPLICATION:
Seismic qualification of the Class lE switchgear is required to assure that safety-related loads are capable of being powered during a seismic event. As the seismically-designed Nonclass lE switchgear is located in the same room as Class 1E equipment, qualification is required to assure that no switchgear component will become loose and possibly damage safety-related components during a seismic event.
REASONS DEFICIEN.CY IS REPORTABLE:
Failure of the supplier's QA program to control the welding on the switchgear has resulted in switchgear being shipped to the site which did not adequately reflect the same structural construction as that of the piece of equipment which had been seismically tested and whose test report had been accepted.
Failure of the switchgear to be seismically constructed could result in the loss of power supply to safety-related loads during a seismic event as a result of failure of the switchgear.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
1.
Inspection of structural construction has been added to the VQA inspection check sheet for seismically-designed AC and DC distribution equipment yet to be shipped.
Any equipment on site will be inspected by Site QA.
In order to preclude a similar situation, suppliers of seismically-designed AC and DC distribution equipment have been requested to provide a written response describing the provisions in their quality assurance program, which would assure that the drawings and/or procedures used for manufacturing / fabrication of the equipment will reflect the actual structural and operational characteristics of the equipment being seismically qualified.
s 2.
Subsequent to producing the switchgear for Unit 1, Siemens-Allis has moved their manufacturing facility from West Allis, Wisconsin, to Wendell, North Carolina.
This new facility is not producing any Class IE switchgear at this time, and therefore, no QA program is in place for doing so.
Prior to releasing Unit 2 switchgear for fabrication, Ebasco and CP&L will assure that Siemeuo-Allis has a program in place which will preclude a similar occurrence.
3.
A tabulation of all components which make up the cubicles was made by Siemens-Allis indicating the method of fastening to other components. A functional review was made of all components having arc-welding attachments to determine if weld failures could adversely affect the switchgear IE operation.
In making this determination, the following was considered:
a.
Whether any weld failure could cause a cubicle structural failure or, b.
Could the components affected fail and cause additional failures to the equipment In analyzing for the possibility of cubicle structural failure, calculations were made to demonstrate that the front side plates are actually capable of absorbing all of the seismic loading in the front-to-back direction, if appropriate hardware is used for bolting them to the frames.
Where indicated by the Siemens-Allis report,,1/2" - 13 Grade 5 bolts are being replaced by 5/8" - 11 Grade 8 bolts. For other braces which could affect IE operation, a rewelding program is being conducted as required to assure:
a.
All welds on these braces met the acceptance criteria of Siemens-Allis.
b.
Quantity of weld on connected' pieces was at least the amount on the test unit.
The report concluded that the seismically-designed Nonclass lE switchgear would maintain structural integrity without rewelding or changing hardware. Hence, only the cubicles and superstructures associated with the Class IE functions of the reactor coolant pump motors are being reworked to meet the above requirements on the Nonclass IE switchgear.
FINAL REPORT:
A final report will be issued once the corrective action described in Item 3 is completed.
It is currently projected that the submittal date will be August 31, 1982.