ML20062K306
| ML20062K306 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1993 |
| From: | Howell A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062K304 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-93-29, 50-368-93-29, NUDOCS 9312220015 | |
| Download: ML20062K306 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1993029
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APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report: 50-313/93-29; 50-368/93-29
Operating Licenses: DRP-51; NPF-6
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Route 3, Box 137G
Russellville, Arkansas 72801
Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: Russellville, Arkansas
Inspection Conducted: November 29 through December 3, 1993
. Inspectors: Paula Goldberg, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Section
Division of Reactor Safety
Charles Paulk, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Section
Division of Reactor Safety
Philip Wagner, Team Leader, Division of Reactor Safety
Approved: jh 011(/Yi, & (4 93
' Art.1ur T.' Howell, Deputy Director, Division of Date
k._,r Reactor Safety
Inspection Summary
Areas Inspected (Units 1 & 21: Routine, announced followup inspection of
licensee actions in response to previously identified and reported issues.
Results (Units 1 & 21:
- The licensee's actions in response to the previously identified items-
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were found to be good.
- The licensee's proposed additional improvement to the sources of offsite
power and additional' distribution system evaluations were considered to
be indicative of a proactive corrective action program.
- The licensee's engineering documentation was found to provide a thorough
and easy to understand design basis.
9312220015
DR 931215
ADOCK 05000313
PDR3
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Summary of Inspection Findings: ,
- The following inspection followup items were closed:
313/9010-01
313/9011-01
313/9216-01
313/9216-03
313/9216-04
313/9216-05
313/9216-06
313/9313-03
313/9313-10
313/9313-11
368/9102-02
368/9102-03
368/9102-04
368/9102-06
368/9102-08
368/9102-09
368/9102-10 -
368/9102-11
368/9313-03
368/9313-10
368/9313-11
- The following unresolved items were closed:
313/9102-01
368/9102-01
368/9102-05
Violation 313/9216-07 was closed
- The following licensee event reports were closed:
313/91-007 ,
313/91-009
313/91-010 '
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313/91-011
313/93-002
368/01-011
368/91-014
368/92-006
- Inspection followup ' item 313/9216-02 remains open (paragraph 2.12)
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Attachment: Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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DETAI(S
1 INTRODUCTION 1
An inspection of the licensee's actions in response to items identified during
the Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspections (EDSFIs) was
conducted from November 29 through December 3,1993. The Unit 2 (ANO-2) EDSFI
was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/91-02; 50-368/91-02, and the
Unit 1 (ANO-1) EDSFI was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/92-16;
50-368/92-16. The inspectors used the guidance of Temporary
Instruction 2515/111, " Electrical Distribution System Followup Inspection"
while conducting this inspection.
The inspectors also evaluated the licensee's actions in response to EDSFI
related issues that were describet ;n Licensee Event Reports and some other
findings and reports that were not related to an EDSFI.
2 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FOLLOWUP INSPECTION (TI 2515/111)
2.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 313/9102-01: 368/9102-01: Acceptability of
161kV Offsite Power Supply
During the AN0-2 EDSFI, the licensee determined that adequate voltage levels
from one of the two offsite electrical power supplies could not be assured
under all operating conditions. The licensee provided detailed information of
this condition in Licensee Event Report ?!3/91-010. Addizional information
and proposed corrective actions were provided in the licensee's letter dated
July 24, 1320.
By letter dated May 24, 1993, the NLC notified the licensee that the condition
that had existed was a violation of General Design Criteria 17. The letter
also stated that the NRC found the licensee's corrective actions to be timely
and acceptable. Therefore, based on the licensee's actions in response to the
problem, the NRC decided that enforcement discretion was warranted.
By letter dated May 28, 1993, the licensee provided the details of additional
improvement to both of the sources of offsite power to each unit. The
inspectors found these additional actions to be indicative of a proactive
corrective action program.
2.2 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 368/9102-02: AC System Voltaae Droo
Study
The ANO-2 EDSFI identified a concern with excessive voltage drops to various
motor control centers. The licensee committed to reevaluate the voltage
regulation conditions for the motor control centers and to replace any control
power transformers that were determined to be undersized. By letter dated
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July 30, 1993, the licensee informed the NRC that the calculations had been
completed and the control power transformers had been upgraded as necessary.
The licensee also stated that a similar evaluation and control power
transformer upgrade had been completed on the ANO-1 electrical system.
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Tha inspectors verified that the voltage drop study had been completed and
that the control power transformers had been replaced as necessary. The
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inspectors also verified that the ANO-1 control power transformers had been
l upgraded. The inspectors found the voltage drop calculations to be thorough
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and easy to understand. The licensee's self-assessment of the ANO-1
electrical system was considered to be indicative of a proactive corrective
action program.
2.3 (Closed) Insoection Followup Item 368/9102-03: AC System Short Circuit
Study
The EDSFI noted shortcomings in the licensee's short circuit calculations.
The licensee had identified similar problems and had initiated steps to
correct the calculations. The licensee's program was provided in a letter
dated December 20, 1991.
The inspectors reviewed Calculations 92-E-0037-02, " Cable AC Impedance," dated
April 9,1993, and 92-E-0037-03, "AN0 AC Equipment Models for Short Circuit
and Load Flow Studies," dated riay 28, 1993. These calculations were found to
be acceptable and were verified to have been used as inputs into the short
circuit calculation. Calculation 02-E-0037-05, "AND Unit 2 Short Circuit
Study," dated October 1,1993, was performed using the computer programs
DAPPER and AFAULT. The inspectors found the assumptions and methodology to be
acceptable.
The inspectors also reviewed Calculation 92-E-0037-08, "ANO Unit 2 Equipment
Short Circuit Rating Study," dated October 21, 1993. This calculation
verified the adequacy of the momentary withstand and the interrupt capability
of all of the involved electrical equipment with the exception of the 6.9kV
feeder circuit breakers. Since these were nonsafety-related circuits that
were verified to not effect the safety-related circuits, the inspectors found
the equipment to be acceptable.
2.4 (Closedl Inspection Followup Item 368/9102-04: Voltaae Droo Study
During the EDSFI, the licensee was in the process of upgrading the dc system
voltage drop studies.
During this inspection, Calculations 92-E-0072-01, "ANO Unit 2, Class lE,
125VDC, Train 1, DC Voltage Drop Study," Revision 0, and 92-E-0072-02, "ANO
Unit 2, Class lE, 125VDC, Train 2, DC Voltage Drop Study," Revision 0 were
reviewed. The inspectors found the methodology used in these calculations to
be consistent with industry practices and acceptable. The inspectors also
reviewed Calculation 91-E-0093-01, "120V Vital AC System Voltage Drop,"
Revision 0, and found the methodology to also be consistent with industry
practices and acceptable.
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2.5 (Closed) Unresolved Item 368/9102-05: Acceptability of Removing the
Power Supply to Certain Postaccident Monitoring Instruments
During the EDSFI, the team noted that the licensee postulated load shedding
one of the two safety-related inverters on each of the batteries. The load
shedding was necessary under loss of all ac power conditions to maintain
adequate battery voltage and capacity for other critical loads. The team was
concerned, however, because some of the loads being shed included certain
postaccident monitoring instruments. Following the EDSFI, the licensee
conducted a further review of the design and qualification criteria for
postaccident monitoring instrumentation. By letter dated July 24, 1992, the
licensee provided the results of the review the NP,C. The licensee's submittal
discussed the team's concern of removing power to certain instruments and
provided a justification for those proposed actions.
By letter dated August 23, 1993, the results of the NRC review were sent to
the licensee. The NRC found the ANO-1 and -2, design to be in conformance
with, or justified in deviating from, the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.97,
" Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant
And Environs Conditions During And Following An Accident," Revision 3.
2.6 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 368/9102-06: Emergency Diesel
Generator (EDG) Fuel Oil S_ystem Modifications
During the ANO-2 EDSFI, the team found that the licensee's self-assessment had
identified a lack of measurement instrumeniation for the differenthi prenura
across the fuel oil transfer pump suction strainer. The self-assessment had
also identified that there was no control room indication of the fuel oil
storage tank level other than an alarm when the volume dropped below
22,500 gallons.
The licensee evaluated the two concerns and determined that modifications were
not needed to improve the reliability of the system. The licensee's
determination that it was not necessary to measure the differential pressure
across the strainers was based on the facts that the strainers were cleaned
each refueling outage and there was no work history of the strainers becoming
clogged. In addition, fine filters were installed on the inlets of the
storage tanks, downstream cross-connects were provided to facilitate cross-
connecting the EDG fuel oil systems in an emergency, and a differential
pressure alarm was located across each transfer pump.
The licensee determined that the fuel oil storage tank low level alarm was not
( required because the fuel oil transfer pump differential pressure would alarm
if the differential pressure increased to 25 psid. This alarm would come in
if the EDG fuel oil storage tank level was low or the strainer was clogged.
The inspectors reviewed Calculation ll-E-0107-11, "EDG Transfer Pump Delta
Pressure Alarm or low Fuel Oil," Revision 0. This calculation determined that
the transfer pump had at least 55 minutes of running time left, after the
pump's differential pressure alarm came in, prior to exceeding the pumping
requirements.
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The inspectors concluded that the 55 minutes of running time allowed 1
sufficient time for operator action and that the licensee had met all
regulatory requirements.
2.7 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 368/9102-08: Evaluation of Ambient
Temperature Effects on Electrical Components Located in the EDG Rooms ,
The EDSFI noted that electrical components located in the EDG rooms were
qualified for 40 years of normal use in environments up to 55*C (131 F). The
EDSFI also noted that the licensee had calculated that the temperatures the
components could experience under worst case conditions could exceed the
qualified temperatures.
During this inspection, the licensee's actions were reviewed. The licensee
determined that the components would have to be subjected to 65 C (149 F) for
a relatively long period to significantly reduce the qualified life. The
inspectors determined that the electrical components were not normally
subjected to temperatures in excess of their design and, therefore, their
qualified lives would not be adversely affected.
2.8 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 368/9102-09: Battery Room Ventilation
During the AN0-2 EDSFI, the licensee identified a shortcoming in the circuitry
design for the low ventilation flow alarm of a battery room. . A loss of power
to the battery room exhaust fan would also. disable the low flow alarm because
the alarm circuitry was powered from the fan's control power.
Design Change Package 88-2111, "AN0 Annunciator Upgrade Phase II (Unit 2),"
modified the circuit for the battery room exhaust fan. The circuit
modification replaced the time delay energized alarm relay with a time delay
de-energized alarm relay and rewired components to support the logic changes.
This modification provided for an alarm upon loss of power to' the exhaust fan
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or low air flow. The modification was completed during Refueling Outage.2R9,
September 4 through October 21, 1992. The inspectors determined that the
modification had corrected the problem.
l 2.9 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 368/9102-10: Fuse Control Program
o During the EDSFI, the team noted that the licensee ~ did not have 'a formal fuse
l control program.
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The inspectors reviewed Procedure 1025.056, " Fuse Control,". Revision 0. The
procedure required fuses to be replaced in accordance with the fuse-lists in
the procedure or "like-for .like" if the fuse was not listed. The inspectors
were informed that the fuse' lists represented approximately 40 percent of the - ,
fuses in_both units. The licensee had performed a physical ;nspection of
approximately 4 percent of the fuses on the fuse lists. The licentee found
several discrepancies during their inspections, however, no operability
i concerns were identified.
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2.10 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 368/9102-11: Boric Acid Pipino in
EDG Room
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During the ANO-2 EDSFI, the team found that there were boric acid transfer:
pumps, riping, and valves located within the "A" EDG room. The team also
noted tt there were no physical barriers between the boric acid piping.and
EDG to tre /ent damage to the EDG equipment from potential leaks 'and the spray -
of boric acid. The licensee initiated Licensing Information Request
(LIR) L91-0293 to eval'uate if boric acid spray shields were_ necessary in the .
EDG A room.
The inspectors reviewed Letter AN0-93-00646 dated March 25, 1993, which stated
that, from a safety analysis basis, licensing basis, and risk basis, the
addition of boric acid shields was not-required. In addition, the' inspectors
reviewed Calculation 92-E-0076-01, " Boric Acid Pumps 2P-39A and 2P-39B Spray
Shields to Protect EDG Control Panel 2C11 and Flood Alarm Switch 2LS-2803,"
Revision 1, dated July 15,'1993. The purpose of the calculation was to
determine if it was prudent to install boric acid spray shields-in the EDG A
room. The conclusion of the calculation was that it was not prudent to
install the shields since the boric acid system had been designed in seismic
Class I, and EDG B would be available to supply the power demand if EDG A was >
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not available due to boric acid spray.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had met all regulatory
requirements.
2.11 (cioaO, Inmction F911cem Uw 313/0716-0).+ Agr a pth ilit LoL Startup
Transformer Surge Protection
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The ANO-1 EDSFI noted that an analyses of the startup transformer's surge ,
protection was not available. By letter dated August 3, 1992, the licensee
committed to perform an evaluation to verify the adequacy of the surge
c protection.
During this inspection, Calculation 93-E 'J027-01, " Surge Protection," dated
June 21, 1993, was reviewed and found to. be acceptable.
2.12 (0 pen) Inspection Followup:ltem 313/9216-02: Adequacy of Protective
Devices of the Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs)
. The EDSFI team noted that the licensee had not conducted a formal evaluation
of the thermal and mechanical protection for the EPAs. The ANO-1 design
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predated the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 1.63, " Electrical l
Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Water-Cooled Nuclear
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Power Plants." However, the licensee had initiated Engineering Assistance
Request 92-285 on May 15, 1992, to perform an evaluation. I
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During the NRC staff review of the ANO-2 de system overcurrent protective
features, concerns were raised about the protective devices for the ANO-2-
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EPAs. The licensee provided an initial response to the concerns by letter. l
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dated April 30, 1993. The staff reviewed the licensee's submittal and
transmitted a request for additional information to the licensee by letter
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dated June 18, 1993. By letter dated August 20, 1993, the licensee responded
to the latest staff questions. The response was under review at the time of
this inspection.
The licensee's April 30, 1993, letter also informed the NRC that the AN0-1 EPA
evaluation would be deferred until April 29, 1994, to allow time to complete
an evaluation that considered all of the aspects being considered for the
ANO-2 EPAs. This item remains open pending completion of the licensee's
evaluation.
2.13 LClosed) Inspection Followup Item 313/9216-03: EDG Loading
Considerations
The AN0-1 EDSFI noted several problems with the licensee's EDG loading
calculations. By letter dated August 3,1992, the licensee committed to
recalculate the EDG loading and evaluate conditions that would occur during
potential load sequencing overlaps.
The inspectors reviewed Calculation 86-E-0002-01, " Diesel Generator Load
Study," Revision 6 dated November 8, 1993. Attachment 1 to the calculation
contained a tabulation of EDG loads. The total loads on the EDGs were
determined to be within the EDG load ratings for the period that the loads
would be connected to the EDG. The concerns with frequency dips when starting
the auxiliary feedwater pump had been resolved by changing the loading
sequence. The load sequencing overlap concerns had, for the most part, been
resuhed by ti,e replacastnt of pr.cumatic tfeers with more accurate solid state
timers. The potential for containment spray pump and containment fan coolers <
to overlap had been evaluated and determined to only be problem under a. unique
reactor coolant system break size. The licensee concluded that the unlikely
occurrence of the unique break size would result in the loss of only one of
the EDGs and was, therefore, acceptable. The inspectors found the licensee's
calculation and associated evaluations to be acceptable.
2.14 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 313/9216-04: Unit 1 DC System Voltage
Drop Study
During the EDSFI, the team noted that the licensee had identified the lack of
adequate dc voltage drop calculations.
The inspectors reviewed Calculation 92-E-0021-06, " Unit 1, Class 1E,120 Volt
Vital AC System Voltage Drop Analysis," Revision 0. The inspectors found the
methodology to be the same as that used for ANO-2 (see paragraph 2.4) and
considered this calculation to be acceptable also. The licensee had not
completed Calculation 92-E-0021-08, "AN0 Unit 1, Class 1E,125V de, Train 1,
Voltage Drop Study," or Calculation 92-E-0021-09, "ANO Unit 1, Class 1E,125 V
dc, Train 2, Voltage Drop Study." However, the inspectors noted that'the
methodology was the same as used for the ANO-2 dc voltage drop study and found
it acceptable.
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2.15 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 313/9216-05: EDG Fuel Oil System
Improvements
The AN0-1 EDSFI found that the EDG day tanks were not protected against
accidental overfill as recommended by ANSI N195-1976. The EDSFI also found
that a single level switch on each day tank controlled the operation of the
fuel oil transfer pump and the low level alarm. The licensee had identified -
that the EDG day tank vent pipes were subjact to possible " pinch off" by
tornado missiles. In addition, the licensee identified a lack of measurement
instrumentation for the differential pressure across the fuel-oil transfer
pump suction Y-strainers.
The inspectors reviewed Letter AN0-93-00796, dated May 21, 1993, from the
design engineering department.to the licensing department. The subject of the
letter was the resolution of the ANO-1 EDG day tank vent vulnerability from a
tornado missile. The letter stated that a modification could be performed at
a relatively low cost; however, the relative benefit would not justify the-
expenditure. The resolution of the issue was administrative actions to
address vent damage after a tornado. The inspectors reviewed _
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Procedure 1203.025, " Natural Emergencies," Revision 11, which added followup
actions requiring the EDG day tank vents to be inspected for damage and, if
damage was found, to initiate corrective action to clear the damage as quickly
as possible.
The inspectors reviewed LIR L92-0233, dated August 8, 1992, and the response
dated February 5,1993, concerning modifications to the fuel oil day tank low
level switch and the addition of a high level alarm. The response stated that
no appreciable pl:nt safety tr.provcm ats would ba schicved by a,dding a high
level alarm to the day tanks. The response stated that the only risk involved
would be during manual fuel oil transfer operation. The inspectors reviewed
Procedure 1104.036, " Emergency Diesel Generator Operation," Revision 32,-which
added a caution note that manual operation of the fuel oil transfer pump _ could
cause day tank overflow. In addition, the response to LIR L92-0233 stated
that the existing day tank level control and alarm scheme met the requirements
of all pertinent ANO design criteria. The response also stated that ANO-1 was
not committed to meet the requirements of ANSI N195-1976.
The inspectors reviewed Letter AN0-93-00546, datr.d February 15, 1993,
concerning the lack of differential pressure measurement across the fuel oil
transfer pump suction strainers. The letter stated that differential pressure
measurement was not required because monthly tests were conducted to ensure
that the transfer pumps were performing adequately and monthly fuel oil
samples were analyzed. The licensee stated that, if the filters became
clogged, the EDG day tank low level alarm, located on the local panel in the
EDG rooms, would alert the operator of a problem. The action in response to
this alarm was for the operator to verify that the transfer pump was-
operating. If the level continued to drop, the operator was referred to
Procedure 1104.036 for emergency cross-connecting of the fuel oil systems.
The cause of low flow would be determined after flow was restored through
cross-connection of the fuel oil systems.
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The inspectors concluded that the licensee had met all regulatory
requirements.
2.16 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 313/9216-06: EDG Air Exhaust
Vent Stacks Tornado Missile Protection
During the ANO-1 EDSFI, the team found that the EDG exhaust piping extended '
above the concrete barriers for tornado missile protection. The team was
concerned that the exhaust pipes and associated exhaust hoods could become
crimped and limit the EDG's capability.
The inspectors reviewed LIRs L91-0231, dated August 6, 1992, and L92-0334,
dated December 17, 1992, for AN0-1 and -2, which requested tornado missile
studies to evaluate the actions required in the event of an on-site tornado.
The responses to both LIRs stated that abnormal operating procedures should be.
revised to require inspection and clearing of any damage to the exhaust piping
after a tornado.
The inspectors reviewed ANO-1 Procedure 1203-025, " Natural Emergencies,"
Revision 11, Change PC-2. The procedure was revised to include statements to
inspect the exhaust piping for damage and clear the piping as quickly as
possible, if damaged. The inspectors noted that AND-2 Procedure 2203.008,
" Natural Emergencies," Revision 4, Change PC-1 was also revised to clear the
EDG exhaust piping as quickly as possible if damaged by a tornado.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had met all regulatory
requirements.
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2.17 (Closed) Violation 313/9216-07: Failure to Properly Update Plant
Procedures
During the EDSFI, the team identified two procedures that had not been made
inactive after biennial reviews indicated revisions were necessary. This was
determined to have been in violation of the licensee's procedures.
The licensee acknowledged the violation by letter dated August 3, 1992. The
inspectors verified that the actions described in the response letter had been
completed. The inspectors also noted that the licensee cancelled the
procedure for biennial review of procedures as a result of receiving
permission from the NRC to reduce the commitment to ANSI N18.7-1976. The
. licensee placed administrative requirements for biennial review of station
administrative and engineering administrative procedures in
Procedure 1000.006, " Procedure Control," Revision 37, Change PC-2.
3 ADDITIONAL EDSFI IDENTIFIED ISSUES (2515/111)
Paragraph 2.2.2, " Coordination and Protective Relays," of the NRC ANO-2 EDSFI
Inspection Report (50-368/91-02) discussed a concern with the separation of
non-Class IE loads from Class 1E dc distribution panels. As stated in the
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report, this issue was referred to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation for further review.
By letter dated June 18, 1992, the licensee was informed that the existing
configuration would not impact the safe operation of the facility. However,
to preclude future misunderstandings, the licensee was requested to revise
Section 8.3.2.1.4, " Distribution Panels," of the Updated Safety Analysis
Report. The inspectors verified the text had been modified to discuss the
remote possibility that an inadvertent battery discharge could result if a
fault on a non-Class IE distribution panel coincided with the failure of the
Class IE circuit breaker protecting the faulted circuit.
4 ONSITE REVIEW OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (92700)
4.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 313/91-007: Inadeauate Fuse / Circuit
Breaker Coordination
On June 14, 1991, the licensee identified that the fuses between the emergency
batteries of both ANO-1 and -2 and their associated de control centers were
not fully coordinated with the control center's load circuit breakers. The
licensee determined that this condition would occur only at the upper range of
available fault current and could, under certain conditions, result in the
loss of the entire control center before the affected load circuit breaker
would trip. The cause of the problem was design inadequacies related to
design changes made in 1984 and 1986.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had revised the design' change
program such that these problems should be eliminated. The inspectors also
verified that the correct fuses were installed by reviewing work packages
J0 847774 and 847775 (ANO-1) and JO 847396 and 847397 (ANO-2).
4.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 313/91-009: 480V Load Centers in
Nonseismic Confiauration
During the ANO-2 EDSFI, the team identified that 480V Load Centers 2B5 and 2B6
were not in a seismically qualified configuration. The licensee investigated
ANO-1 and found that Load Centers 85 and B6 were in the same configuration as
the AN0-2 load centers. Lifting trolleys used to aid in installation and
removal of circuit breakers were found mounted on their guide rails and were -
not secured in place. The licensee determined that the load center vendor had
not seismically qualified the equipment with the trolleys on their guide rails
in place.
The licensee's initial corrective action was to remove the lifting trolleys
and rails from the load centers and store them in a remote area.' The
inspectors reviewed the job orders that removed the trolleys. In addition to
removing the lifting trolleys and rails, the licensee performed a walkdown of
both units which determined that no other safety-related load centers were
affected by this condition.
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The licensee prepared Limited Change Packages 92-5001, " Seismic Restraint of
Jib Trolley for Load Centers B5 and B6," Revision 1, for Unit 1 and 92-6003,
" Seismic Restraint of Jib Trolley for Load Centers 2B5, 286, and 287,"
Revision 0, for Unit 2. The inspectors reviewed these modifications and found
that two separate anchoring devices were used to anchor the lifting trolley
assemblies to the load centers. By implementing these modifications, the
lifting trolleys were seismically qualified in a stowed position. The ANO-1
modification was installed during Refueling Outage IR10 and the ANO-2
modification during Refueling Outage 2R9.
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The licensee issued Procedure 5220.002, " Equipment / Component Seismic
Evaluation," Revision 0, which provided the method for evaluating equipment
and components for seismic qualification. The inspectors reviewed the
procedure and concluded that clear and specific instructions were.provided.
The inspectors reviewed Memorandum ESU-91-00348, dated October 16, 1991, which
provided interim guidance to design engineering personnel concerning the
review of vendor documentation for seismic qualification requirements. The-
memorandum stressed careful review of any documents that could effect seismic
qualification.
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The inspectors also reviewed a training plan that was presented to the AN0
technical staff during the fourth quarter of 1991 and found that it discussed
the configuration control problem for the load centers.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had implemented complete and
thorough corrective actions for this issue.
4.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 310/91-010: Adeauacy of Offsite Power
Supply
The licensee's actions in response to this issue are discussed in
paragraph 2.1.
4.4 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 313/91-011: Inadecuate procedure for
Setting Lube Oil Pressure Control Valve
On October 9, 1991, following an. overhaul of High Pressure Injection
Pump P36A, the licensee observed an oil leak of approximately 236 ml/ min
(8 oz/ min) from the outboard pump bearing area. The licensee noted a similar
condition on Pump P36C. The licensee determined that this condition rendered
the pumps inoperable.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause evaluation and corrective
actions. The inspectors found the proposed actions to have been adequate and
completed as described in the event report.
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4.5 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 368/91-011: Reactor Trio During
Surveillance Testinq
On April 15,. 1991, during the performance of surveillance testing, an
automatic reactor protective system trip occurred. The licensee contributed
the cause of the trip '.o a procedural inadequacy.
The inspectors reviewe the licensee's evaluation and proposed corrective
actions. The inspectors icund the corrective actions to have been adequate
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and complete as stated in the event report.
4.6 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 368/91-014: 4160V Circuit Breakers in
Nonseismic Configuration
The licensee determined that four circuit breakers routinely positioned in the
racked-down position were not seismically qualified in that position. The
licensee determined that the root cause of the condition was incomplete
information concerning seismic qualification in the licensing basis documents.
The. licensee immediately removed all of the breakers in the switchgear rooms
that were in the racked-down position and stored them in another area.
The inspectors reviewed System Operating Procedure 2107.002, "ESF Electrical
System Operation," Revision 7, Change PC-2. The inspectors determined that
this procedure was revised to delete the requirement for maintaining the
circuit breakers in the racked-down position.
The licensee conducted an evaluation to determine if additional procedural
guidance w?S necessary for performing maintenance activities with circuit :
breakers in a racked-down position. The inspectors reviewed the evaluation,
which stated that the circuit breakers were operable in the racked-down u
position for maintenance purposes only if racked-down and then racked-up-by 1
inch above the floor. Calculation 91-E-0089-01, Revision 0, qualified the
circuit breakers for this condition. The inspectors verified that the
maintenance and operating procedures had been revised to specify when and for
how long the circuit breakers could be kept in the racked-down position. i
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4.7 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 368/92-006: Inadvertent Start of EDG
)
During the replacement of a relay in the engineered safety features actuation
system of ANO-2 on September 9,1992, in accordance with a special work plan, i
four other_ relays were deenergized. J
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The inspectors reviewed _the circumstances of this event and found that the i'
licensee utilized technicians to develop the work instructions for the task.
The technicians were not familiar with the equipment and the wiring
information from the vendor. This unfamiliarity led to the technicians '
missing the " daisy chain" of connections. As a-corrective action, the
licensee required an engineering evaluation prior to performing any additional
relay replacements. The inspectors considered these actions to be acceptable
due to the uniqueness of the special work being performed.
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4.8 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 313/93-002: Automatic Start of an EDG
On March 9, 1993, ANO-1 was operating at 100 percent power when a 4160 volt
engineered safeguards bus was deenergized during the transfer of power sources
from an off-site supplied startup transformer to the unit auxiliary
transformer. The circuit breakers from the startup transformer and the unit
auxiliary transformer did not operate properly during the transfer.
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective
actions and found them acceptable.
5 FOLLOWUP (91701)
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's actions in response to previously
identified findings that were not related to the EDSFIs.
5.1 (Closed) Isspection Followup Item 313/9010-01: Service Water Structure
Ventilst'e
Problems with the ventilation system for the ANO-1 service water structure
were identified in Condition Report 1-89-453. The ventilation systems for
both unit's service water structures was subsequently included in the
licensee's service water integrity plan.
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in-
response to Condition Report 1-89-453 and the additional licensee evaluations.
The licensee had implemented acceptable interim corrective actions in response
to the condition report,. The licensea iMtiated I.imited Change Pachoe 93-
5015 on July 8, 1993, to upgrade the ventilation systems for both structures.
The change package provided instructions for replacing the solid security
doors with doors containing manually operated dampers and other enhancements
to improve structure cooling. The inspectors found the proposed changes to be
acceptable. The inspectors observed portions of the in-progress work and were
informed that the changes were scheduled to be completed by December 20, 1993.
5.2 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 313/9011-01: Battery Testino
Reauirements
The battery testing requirements contained in the ANO-1 Technical
Specifications were found to be inconsistent with the actual testing being
conducted at the facility and were less than currently considered acceptable.
The licensee was in the process of revising the battery testing requirements
contained in the ANO-2 Technical _ Specifications and committed to upgrade the
ANO-1 requirements to be consistent with the ANO-2 requirements when they were
finalized.
During this inspection, the licensee's Technical Specification Change
Request 1-91-25 was reviewed and found to satisfy the inspection concern.
Since the change request will be reviewed as part of a licensing action to
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ensure that the latest staff guidance has been incorporated, the inspectors
had no further questions on this item.
5.3 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 313: 368/9313-03: Sprina Pack Test
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Device Accurac_y
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During an inspection of the licensee's motor-operated valve program, it was
noted that the licensee did not compensate for the inaccuracies associated
with the spring pack tester.
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During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions to
address this issue. The inspectors found that the licensee did not have
information related to the accuracy of the spring pack tester and had ,
requested the information from the vendor. The vendor informed the licensee
that there was no formal data relating to the accuracy of the tester; however,
the vendor provided informal data to the licensee. Although the value
provided for the accuracy of the tester was extremely small (0.28 percent),
the inspectors verified that the licensee had incorporated the information
into the motor-operated valve testing program.
5.4 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 313: 368/9313-10: Placement of Open
Toraue Switch Bypass
During an inspection of the licensee's motor-operated valve program, it was
noted that the torque switch bypass settings for ANO-1 motor-aperated valves
were' typically set at lower opening positions than those in ANO-2.
Purir,g this inspect!99., the inspectcri verified that the licenscu had reviewed
the settings of. all valves in the motor-operated valve program at ANO for
consistent and conservative settings. The inspectors noted that the licensee
did not identify any valves with a nonconservative bypass setting. The
inspectors also found that the licensee was consistent in the methodology used
for setting the bypass switches.
5.5 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 313: 368/9313-11: Review of Diagnostic
Traces by Second Engineer
During an inspection of the licensee's motor-operated valve program, concerns
were identified regarding the licensee's control of the diagnostic testing
process. The concerns were based on two instances where a presumed
differential pressure was little more than a static test and one instance
where the test data was severely scattered. As a result of those concerns,
the licensee committed to review all of the other differential pressure traces
to identify any similar problems. The licensee also committed to initiate a
second engineer's review of diagnostic traces.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had revised the procedures to
require a second engineer's review of the diagnostic traces to ensure the data
was valid. The inspectors also verified that the licensee reviewed all motor-
operated valve test data during differential pressure testing to ensure all
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traces were marked correctly and conservatively. The inspectors found that
the licensee had paid particular attention to points for flow initiation and
flow cutoff. The licensee changed the marks on 36 of the 46 differential
pressure tests as a result of the review. The licensee also eliminated three
tests due to questionable data. The licensee was in the process of completing
the engineering reviews and no problems had been identified.
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ATTACHMENT 1
1 PERSONS CONTACTED
1.1 Licensee Personnel
- S. Bennett, Supervisor, Licensing
- M. Cooper, Licensing Specialist
- G. Dobbs, Design Engineering Supervisor
- R. Edington, Plant Manager, Unit 2
- B. Greeson, Acting Manager, Design Engineering
- R. Howerton, Manager, Engineering Support
- D. Macphee, Senior Engineer
- T. Ott, Design Engineering Supervisor
- M. Stroud, Design Engineering Acting Manager
- C. Turk, Engineer
- J. Vandergrift, Plant Manager, Unit 1
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1.2 NRC Personnel
- S. Campbell, Resident Inspector
- J. Helfi, Resident Inspector
- L. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Weaver, Resident Inspector, Co-Op
In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other
personnel during this inspection period.
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting. .
2 EXIT MEETING
An exit meeting was conducted on December 3, 1993. During this meeting, the
inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee
did not express a position on the inspection findings documented in this
report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary, any information
provided to, or reviewed by the inspectors.
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