ML20062H489
Text
,'
O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of S
S HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER S
CCMPANY S
Docket No. 50-466 S
(Allens Creek Nuclear S
Generating Station, Unit S
No. 1)
S Material Facts As To Which There Ia No Genuine Issue to Be Heard 1.
This contention is based upon instrumentation problems that occurred at older BWRs.
Significant design differences exist between the systems cited by Intervenor and the ACNGS Rod Pattern Control System (RPCS) such that past problems will not occur at ACNGS.
(Affidavit, pp. 1-2) 2.
The RPCS design already incorporates changes which aleviate the source of.past problems; the most significant changes are listed below:
(a)
The RPCS is a dual-channeled, hardwired system that cannot be bypassed.
(b)
Redundant sensors, in the form dual magnetic reed switches installed on a probe in the control rod hydraulic drive, are used to determine rod position.
j (cl Any failure of any component interrupts the permissive signals necessary to produce rod movement.
i i
1 8008190069 G5 i
(Affidavit, p. 8)-
=3.
The RPCS system prevents unacceptable rod patterns, including limited input substitutions, when operated within the detailed technical specifications.
(Affidavit, pp.
4-7) 4.
The reliability of the RPCS will be demonstrated by the start-up and pre-operational test programs of the lead BWR/6 plant.
ACNGS will demonstrate specific system reliability through testing of the RPCS in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.68, " Initial Startup Test Programs for Water-Cooled Reactor Power Plants."
(Affidavit, p.
8)
' ll 66
'50-8 55 E AF/CO MP Doherty Contention No. 12/
COST $
8 Rod Pattern Control System PAID BY PLF. OEF.
f i
IN T!!E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION N
1L IN THE MATTE R OF :
)
!!OUS TON LIGIITING AND POWER
)
- COMPANY, DOCKET NO. 50-466 r
(ALLENS C RE EK NUCLEAR
)
[
GENE RATING S TATION,
UNIT NO. 1)
)
E Ii i
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DEPOSITION OF:
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w 1917 Bank of the Southwest Building Hounon, Texas 77002.(713) 652 5911 t
wg
2 I s.,.
e 1
a factual 10315 in
- r.
t-o b b ' c b e o l. ?
g 3
2 A.
yes.
2 0
I didn't want to overlock anything.
e b.
Yc s."
h
!4 5
0.
C I: a y.
1 G
A.
I ' s.-
t r el:a r ei. to stay quite late, if l
3 4
7 that's yet.r ve i c h.
A 5
r C.
Lo t
- r. e cet how r.t e n y
- t. c r e we have.
P A.
rrobar1y quite a ict.
10 M i;. I I r r t. r :
Cfr the record.
M 11 l
12 (FI l'r r t'r0 N, therc ha u a '11ccussion 12 held off the record.)
t 14 15 Pr. F I r r.l. I' :
Le t 's take a break.
16 i
I 17 (Cho r t Dececs) 18 19 C.
( l' y t:r. ridd}c)
All r i e;li t.
Iet'c discuss 20 your con ten t ico on red rattern centrol r: y s t e ra El Oltich is your n ttn b c r 17.
22 Co you know for a fact that ll r e s d e n III 72 has an TrrS s y s t e r, id e n tical to that designed for 2n I.C N C C ?
25 7.
ro you want to cive het c r.> t h i n g ?
[-
68 3
1 C.
She ba:
then already.
)
A.
In reply to your question, I don't i
3 Delieve i t does.
4 c.
Are they substantially cimilar?
5 A.
I can't tell that for certain.
There J
6 are some differences, I'n pretty ce r ta in.
7 C.
/.re these differences pertinent to this F
contention?
^
A.
I'm no t all tog e tn e r certain there cre t
ir circuitry e.ifferences an I understand t! en, and 11 t h e v. ' v e been made wa v.
since ree den was f
10 constructed in
'70.
1:
ell, what was i n o ;. e r a b l e at
.O r e c d e n 1
that you allece will be ecually inoperable at
.llens Creek?
15 le A.
The rod wortn minimizer wa s inoperable 17 througheut the power decent by valition of the le operator.
10 C.
Co you believe that Allens Creek will 20 have a rod worth minicizer?
II A.
No.
There's nothing labeled about that.
I:
C.
bell, then of what relevance 10 the 2.1 i n o p e r a 'c i l i t y of the rod. orth eintricer?
Allens 2/
Creek is not going to have a red worth rinirizer?
25 A.
Allens creek will have a system c.'
nn I.,7 5.h o T I o */,L cccar nrrr,:,
z;.r.,
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La p.e.r..:
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- n. e _.c. i.3 w.
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o
-u e
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control red worth which will have cubstantial cistlarity, I guess is the term for it, which j
l i
will have a similarity to thic.
e All of thene reacter systens recuire 5
sore way of controlling the insertion of the i
it's control rods; the aeount each are renoved l
t o..ov al that's important of t i: u redc.
There j
c ene
.111 ne a t y r.e of centrol fer tnat.
g C
C.
- o u a '. l e -; e that 1. l l e n :. Creek will hava a
- r syste= acostantially similar to the red nininitor 1;
A.
It will te Lypassable.
1 f
- ow will
- v. o u bypass the sinilar system i.-
\\
I:
ut Alluna CreeA7 12 A.
I never havc neen one.
I don't kncu.
15 C.
Then how do you know it will be l
15 typassable?
17 A.
I've never seen a statecent by aFFlicant, 15 Counsel, that it would be i.m p o s s i b l e to bypass 19 the rod worth or the rod pattern control cycten 20 of ACNCE.
21 C.
"o h a t do you mean by " impossible"?
Ee yo nd the ingenuity of can?
22 A.
Sc.
Eeyond the ingenuity of the control IA roon opec 3Cors.
I 25 C.
.h y would a con:rol room o r. e r a t o r have 70
..C.
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s.
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any interest in hypasnino a syste=?
e 2
A.
It's a pretty siow and tedious process 2
to accend.
It recuites a goed deal of f
4 concetration.
5 C.
khere did you learn this fact that the i
r 3
option of Allens crook is slew and tedious?
q 7
is.
- n a letter froc Alvin Epler whieb ic l
c cut of the roen at the renent, I believe.
i r.
a r.. a p a it's here.
Fe's citad a number of the ir
- ,r c h i c e s, re nd t !.a t 's one of then acco rd ing to h im.
11
!!e ' s a ' o r :- e r Nnber at the 5C S.
1; C.
Pr.
Epler has co.mented on the A Ci! C 2
'2 Fr.
?'er has c o r.. e n t a d on ? '- P centrol well, for F. V R ' s.
la cyctens similar :=
1~
2
- l. r e all F'.*R control cycters id en t ical?
1G A.
.vo.
Thi-is a new one as we've cited 17 C.
And
.r.
Epict concented on this new one?
10 A.
I'll check that.
I'm not certain l '.'
there's any experience with this system that is 2C proposed.
!!c does not speak of the P. F C E directly, 21 tut he speaks of obr's.
22 C.
So you're just ex tra pola ting at best on 22 your conclusions that the reactor operators at 2/
A C FI C G will have a reason to try to bypa ss the i
8 25 system which is equivalent to the rod worth 1: ; e t *: A 1 I c. /s i. ( c i: a 7 es ; E c.' ': L. :.,
1.c.
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(".' '.)
n' '.t
's '- 1 '.
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3
_- _ _ w _ _ _ _._ _
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11 1
minimiser?
'!e l l, they will have reason to bypass A.
2 the systce ecrtainly for some rods if they have a e
stuck rod, because it will he hazardous not to 5
bypass under those conditions.
r O.
Is your centention l i r i t e r' to the stuck 7
rod cons id er a tionc?
A.
No.
inis c e r: t o n t i o n is not lirited to e
stuck rod si t ua tions.
l' O.
Fell, then, ttking for gronted.ye u r asserciens tnat operators will want to
.ypaun 1-for utuck red conditions, h e '. will thay brin' 12 t.. i s desire into truition?
I'c w will t r. c y cyrace 1/
tn.s system?
15 A.
Apparontly, there is a way to singly li remove the control.
I do not know what butt 7n'is 17 pushed.
10 C.
Shy do you glean the f ac t that it is s
I 10 possible to do co?
^
7.
Pron the fact that it's never heen that it is incessible.
71 stated that it's not 22 And tha t's the sole basis for your i
l 22 assertion?
i 22 A.
At the monent enat's the sole banis for 25 t ::e assertion tnat it's possib.e.
l 2
- "; I ht./,7 I C:,A L Cerni
- P o r.7 E n S, I '. C.
i l ~
!! C C 0 7 0 N, TixA" (713)
- EC-5"Il p,-
73 I
~
ae....
s 1
6 l.
1 C.
You have not stunOled acro:S a S t a t O ~. e r t I
to the contrary?
2 A.
That's CCfrCCt.
I'Ve F. e V e r C C r* e aerodS the s ta tement that it's inpossible.
5 C.
shat's your dcEinition of " i: tr o s s i -
b ili tie s" cc that if you encountered s':: h a 7
ctatenent
- v. : e culd afford it ant-c r e d u l i e v. ?
O A.
% ell, it's hard to f o r r. u l e t e a E
definitian of " 1. p o s s i b l e "for tnis situation in 10 c secent.
11 T.
La t rc pose f o r. yce a peccibility:
- e're t a i r, i n e atcut i n t ec r a t e.! circuits.
!' guess 1:
the.arec. situation to overco o in an int:-
It rated circuit 1 hardware where you ?cr't have le novanle connections soldered in place, if */c u I P-will, so you have to cc in and rewire the 17 terminal and the whole complex to alter l' t ' s 10 characteristics.
Oces that
- r. e e t your definition 10 of " impossible"?
2C A.
Yes, it does.
21 C.
Lc ce return to Crosden briefly to nake sure I u nd e r s ta nd the relevance of that reference.
22 If I understood what you said correctly, 2.'
what was i..o p e r a b l e at Presden wa s rendered 2F incperable voluntarily or purposely?
+
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m m -emmenm - emune esse emium eene,. m m game manuma m Nenumb a.
1 A.
Yes.
My und er s ta nd ina is that that's I
- true, f
?
C.
You do not now have e.
basis for e
a sse r t ing that that sace system will exist er S
that the sirilar systen which cight exist will he 6
s i n f l a r l,' vulnerable to p u r t:o s o f u l overrides; is
~
tnet correct?
! think I answered that sonewhat earlier.
d C.
til right.
Very well.
d e uld you tell n
I 1r e whethar or no t Cuad Cities units 1 and 2 have
{
'n FFCF systen similar to trat Allens creeh?
17 A.
I'm einost certain they are not i~
identical.
They may be, but I '.~. not ce r ta in at 14 the
- r. o r.; e n t.
I 15 C.
You don't have a definitive basis fo r
}
1" making a comparison for the s a r. e reasons that you l'
didn't in Cresden?
4 0
10 A.
I don't know the cuad Cities systen.
1 l
some of these are lo Cone of these may have been 20 codified.
21 C.
'/ h a t was inoperable at Cuad Cities which 27 wo uld similar at Allens Creek?
?!
I believe the same pronien occurred at 24 Cresden and Quad Citics.
I
- c C.
This is the same thing over again?
l l
. c.. _ r c A. L c.. A i. Cuto.
n i.M. n '. i i4 ;
I.c.
!! C L S T C N, T E.U. C (712)
'32-5c11
.o-1 A.
Yes.
2 C.
Ho w about
.v i'l l s t o n e ?
De they have an 2
id en t ical syster, and what was inoperable there?
4 A.
I believe that they had a rod wo r t n 5
ninial:ct systen-in *illstone.
P
.4 C.
Al l right.
So we're still in the
~
Cresden code then; correct?
~
~
A.
Yes.
P C.
Erunswicx-27 1r A.
Same.
i s
f 1:
?.
Se of all of these fotr references you 1;
take, it all centers on the purposeful override 12
-he roc worth n i n i.~ i z e r ?
1/
A.
- !el l, all of those can bo were i
f 1<
everriden by the operators.
t 13 C.
And it was the roc worth
.a l n i n i z e r in 1"
cach case?
10 A.
I believe so.
'C C.
So that is the portion of the sy s t e..
2C that is in focus in tnis centention, the ability 21 to
- a n ua lly override the rod worth ainic.izer or 2:
its equivalence?
2-A.
I don't have a copy of the contention l
t I
- .1 with me, but it sounds to me that that's the l
t 25 problen.
l t
l >-
r
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.....F,..A.-,,...
C L,,,.
4..-
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6;t..e ~...,..:.. -
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- o.
1 t:
I 1
C.
You may want te take a look at it.
i A.
Thank you.
Sell, i n the case of i
l 2
Erunswick, there was a failed circuit which l
caused bypass of the systen.
4 bypassed 5
C.
Caused bypass of the rod worth minimizer f
a C
systen aqain?
i 7
A.
Yes.
I believe t r.a - ' s right.
- t was i
i
?
I not voluntary.
Th e r e f o r e, I was concerned about i
1 similar events here.
t I
10 7.
All right.
In other wo r d s, there s.as a i
11 circuitry f a ilure which in; aired the autoratic control functions of the rod worth m in im i c e r ?
1:
A.
Yes.
A ;. :. a r e n t l y it sent und e tec ted for l
le cuite sometine.
1:
C.
So it wa s possible tnen to operate 15 con tr a r y to what the properly functioning rod 17 worth
- e. i n ic i t e r wo uld allow?
19 A.
Yes.
I C-C.
Ckay.
Is there any other anglifications 2r you want to nake on thoce references?
21 A.
I think that's all.
2:
C.
Okay.
- ere any oi the reportanle 22 cccurrences in 2 '< R ' s in 1"~' which you reforence 2'
here wnich were reported i n the instumentation j
i 25 and control area concerned with the inCS system, I
i.
O be*[
48M*
Id+
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en b
6 g
e 8
e ti C C C i c !., C X A S
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v
I to your k no wl edg e ?
2 A.
No.
!3c t to ny knowl edg e.
C.
'c h a t is an average power range monitor?
e A.
All right.
The average power range 5
nonit:r is essentially a computing device whic..
A takes i n [: u t from the local power rance
.a o r i t o r s 7
and converts it into a neaningful figure; perhaps, i.
convert: it to uix displayed nunbers which i nd ica tes t>e neutron f l ux in the core.
It's an ir averager.
I 11 C.
. hat's it's relationship to brcF?
17 A.
Its unreliability would tend to create a 12 ccre serious accident when the rod werte what do you call it?
The R FC F is
!?
mininiter or 15 inoperative or bypassed.
16 C.
Why would that be so if it's just an 17 indicator of core conditions?
13 A.
Well, that's almost the answer.
If it 12 f a ils to give a correct analysis of the core 20 c o n d i a. i o n s, then the opera to r night well preceed 21 C.
Ex cu se me.
I understood that FPCS was an 22 a u toma t ic system; that it was independent of 22 operator action?
24 A.
iie l l 25 O.
Are you telling ne that the F FC F i
I F T E a rl A T I c N A r. C e t'h ; ;;rPCR;rati, : :. c.
p-- g' H C I: c 7 C N, TEXSS (712) if2-r711
o 1
A.
I! it's byre.c ed it's not.
C.
All r i g t. t.
So A p r. w playc a role only if G
i 2
it is bypassee?
4 A.
Cr ino pe r a tive.
5 C.
All right.
Cr i n o r. e r a t i v e ?
9 i
6 A.
I guess tha t's right.
s t
s C.
'# h a t la s u r ;; 1 a s neutron f l u :17 A.
It's the sace thinq as reactivity e
i I
i, O
increase.
{
.easuring reactivity i r O.
- s A?Fu I'
yo, it would 1;
A.
It would indicate 1
provide an indication of that how w o u i r.'
it i nc' i c a t e rea:tivity?
1.'
r 1.*
.a.
It would indicate rapidly increased i
t 15 f i s s io n i ng in a locale ci t !. e core.
? a yoe not 12 well, but it would.
17 C.
All right.
1 ?.
A.
There's a good chance of it.
19 C.
I tnought it was an averacer?
it richt be 20 A.
As an averager, it would 21 av e r ag i ng a high e no ug h nueber that it :1 9 h0 be 22 visible to the operatort that one part of the l
i 22 core was fissioning much note than others, anc 2r
.~ o r e than they thounht was desirable.
c 25 C.
All r ig ht.
Ar : correct in assuming I
l i : ' ! r..
- c....... i. i L 6 6-
.: L i s h ' c n.'
i..C.
p --- p o..gge c.,
..v,c
(
1.7. )
c e. as. c o. i..t
.O e
.o.
l I
that tt.is is again just a r. r e l u d e to a scenaric 2
wnich envisions the bvpassing or f a ilu r e of the 4
2 rod worth r.s i n i n i t e r ecuivalent r e s ul t i ng in an e
unanalyted serious accident?
5 I think you said that right.
C.
t.l l right.
It will not necessarily cause the accident, but it Vill Con t r ib u te to its r
severity; is enat a ccrrect s un e. a r y ?
E a.
No.
It could cause an accicent.
1r 7.
!. c '.
ill it cause the red pattern 11 ca t. t r ol systen to malfunction?
1:
A.
Now, let's get this all in line.
If the 1
12 roc pattern contrcl systee is not used, there is j
l' danger of reactivity insertion due to renoval of 15 cere rods or of control rods.
IC C.
All right. This contention says to no, 17 in the first case, that it is possible to have an 13 override or nalfunction in the RPCS system civin-19 rise to an unanalyzed reactivity accident?
Or re.
All right.
21 C.
That's the basic hypothesis.
The 22 cuestion i s:
'.;h a t can cause the FPCS to so 22
.alfunction?
I believe we've identified operator e
action and failed circui:s.
t 25 de then started a discussion on a FTs.
A n'* *m
- f..'-
s.'- n'a e's.Q@
.\\.R' 9.e
.saU.
ymg s 9 pm
-a%
Fm n
t i \\. e a.m ye.s.e -* e\\ n f, s.e<-6
.s 9
lic ec Tr i,
- r. x,- s (712) cs2-Scil A
Ld?
1 And it's my understanding that they don't i
T contribute to the f a ilur e to the ACCC, but can exacerbate the results of a failed nFC3 systen; correct?
i 5
A.
Yes.
l i
C.
All right.
Yo u make reference te rower 7
cange in st unen ta t ion or f a ilures of power renje I
i T.
instunentation.
E Are any of the repcrtable occurrences in I
I IC 2hR's in 1975 and
'77 referenced in ycer 11 contention involving icwer range instonentation 17 also concerned with tbc 7 PCC syster?
17 A.
I don't beliave so.
r.
All riyht.
l'
.n.
I den't believe anything was sa id about l'
the RPCC system in those s ta ti s t ic s at all.
I '.m 17 no t certain.
l?
C.
What is the relevance of those 19 sta ti s tic s?
- r t.
The statistics were provided en the ' r "."
II only, I guess.
I don't think there are any statistics on RFCS.
22 0
You say hera that power r a ng e i
2a instu=entation contributed to 3s repertahic i
I 25 cccurrences in EvF's in
'7' and 17 in 107 7 I. T i. n :: A T I o r. A L c ca; sipr.u;;;.,c, I.:c.
a s g e....,
. e..v c
(. 3. _3 ) < c.,_ e e..,.,
80 3
i.-
p I
A.
icn.
.1h L
C.
/nd those
- ete e v. t r a c t e d from the 2
?! u c l e a r Cafety Schulations?
4 A.
Yes.
,14 Ei l
5 O.
I n t] my (pir# c t i o n is, sirtly
.4 t a t e d, so
<3 Q
f
- s. h a t ?
' 1. a t r'oes that have to c' o vith tbc 7
A.
': h o s e fiqures were put in to establish l
g d
the ti n c e l l.* b i l i t '; of the / r F r-systen.
F 0.
Al l right.
i g
i f-b.
7hc
- 7. r F r : nystens w e' r e 'i c n t i o n c e: to N
11 indicate how the !:CIF failutes or bypasues might
-3 iE 12 he note serlovs.
,p ja
- r..
t.1 1 ri ht.
c.n a y.
r.e t ' s go to your
- g. J 54 t
14 contention n on tie r er, which I call short reactot
- g' 15 t
- e r i o d.
16 lio you have anything tbat n e e('s to be 17 dutlicated from that last one?
IP A.
One iten.
,1 JP 0
I want to a c ir you a fev trclininaty i
2r questionn o r, t! e a c t t'e l phyricci events.
'ould p
i 21 you describe fot le hou a rod een 1; c t n e o u te l e c*
l 72 fron itr r* r i v e ?
c..
1 U l
23 A.
tell, there huve been several reported 24 wayn.
I wi11 a t t e n t.. t to f i n r.'
then.
25 say a <; a i n.
I'r sorry.
I e' o n ' t have the 4
7-g 4
1 r t. re r T i r " r. r c r l'r 1 r r r r r: ; c r e.
T e:r.
- _.