Text

Proposed Tech Spec 3.9.4, Containment Penetrations, Allowing Containment Personnel Airlocks to Be Open During Core Alterations & Movement of Irradiated Fuel in Containment Provided Certain Conditions Met
	ML20059L401
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	11/05/1993
From:	; BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20059L397	List: ML20059L393; ML20059L401;
References
	NUDOCS 9311170054
	Download: ML20059L401 (41)
	v • d • e

AFACIIMENT (1)

UNIT 1 TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION REVISED PAGES 3/48-6 3/48-7 3/4 8-10 3/4 8-11 3/4 8-16 3/49-3 3/49-4 )

3/49-5 l

BASES 3/4 9-1 d

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9311170054 931105 '"

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( 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEh5 i

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'I 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES l

Shutdown l l l i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION '

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i 3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be i OPERABLE:

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a. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the I

] onsite Class IE Distribution System, and l 2

b. One diesel generator with: i l

1. A fuel oil day tank containing a minimum volume of 4

27S gallons of fuel, M i 4

2. A common fuel Storage System consisting of:

a. No. 21 Fuel Oil Storage Tank containing a minimum volume I of 74,000 gallons of fuel oil, and y ;

b. No.11 Fuel Oil Storage Tank containing a minimum volume of 32,000 gallons of fuel oil, and ;

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3. A fuel transfer pump.

) APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. !

1L ACTION:

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a. With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power l i sources OPERABLE for reasons other than the perfonnance of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.1 on No. 12 diesel

) generator:

1. Imediately* suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of

{ irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads over irradiated

fuel, and i

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2. Imediately initiate corrective actions to restore the minimum A.C. electrical busses to OPERABLE status, and

3. -EstabMsh-centainment-penetrat4cn-closure-as-identified-in- l Spec 4f4 cat 4cn 3 0.4 within 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months sm ^

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[ZAl5an' T' A1 i Performance of ACTION a. shall not preclude completion of actions to

) establish a safe conservative position. ,

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l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 8-6 Amendment No.-177 l

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l 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPER*. M N (Continued)

b. With less than bove minimum required A.C. electrical power J l

! sources 0PERABLE for the performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.1 on No.12 emergency diesel generator.** '

1. Verify either two 500 kV offsite powar circuits or a 500 kV offsite power circuit and the 69 kV SMECO offsite power (

i circuit are available and capable of being used. This ,

availability shall be verified prior to removing the OPERABLE ;

emergency diesel generators and once per shift thereafter, i

2. Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel and movement (

of heavy loads over irradiated fuel, l

3. Have-estabMshed centainment penetra f

-ident+fied ir. Specification 3.9-4r [tianicsu.e-asJA/56#T 4 ] l

4. An emergency diese! generator shall be OPERABLE and aligned to provide power to the emergency busses within seven days.

5. Within two weeks prior to the planned unavailability of an -

OPERABLE emergency diesel generator, a temporary diesel generator shall be demonstrated available. 1 i

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6. A temporary diesel generator shall be demonstrated available by starting it at least once per 72 nours. t

7. If ACTIONS b) I through b) 6 are not met, restore compliance '

l with the ACTIONS within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or restore an OPERABLE ;

emergency diesel generator within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

c. With No.11 Fuel Oil Storage Tank inoperable, demonstrate the '

OPERABILITY of No 21 Fuel Oil Storage Tank by: 1) performing i l

Surveillance Requirement 4.5.1.1.2.a.2 -(verifying 74,000 gallons) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ; and 2) verifying the flow path from No. 21 Fuel Oil Storage Tank to the diesel generator within I hour.

d. With No. 21 Fuel Oil Storage Tank inoperable, restore No. 21 Fuel Y

Oil Storage Tank to 0PERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads i over irradiated fuel.

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The provisions of ACTION b) are no longer applicable following the installation of two additional emergency diesel generators.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 8-7 Amendment No.M7- !

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3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS r

i 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS l A.C. Distribut;on - Shutdown f

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

3.8.2.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical busses shall be ;

OPERABLE and energized from sources of power other than a diesel generator !

but aligned to an OPERABLE diesel generator: ,

1 -

4160 volt Emergency Bus 1 -

480 volt Emergency Bus 2 -

120 volt A.C. Vital Busses APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. i ACTION:

) a. With less than the above complement of A.C. busses OPERABLE and ,

energized for reasons other than the performance of Surveillance !

j Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.1 on No.12 diesel generator.

l($$ 1. Imediately* suspend all operations involving CORE i ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of '

irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads over irradiated :

fuel, until the minimum required A.C. busses are restored to .

[ OPERABLE and energized status, and q

! 2. Imediately initiate corrective actions to restore the minimum A.C. electrical busses to OPERABLE and energized ;

status, and I

1 j 3. Establish containmeai y-net? 'iun clususe es ideritified in Spec 4ficatica 3.9.4 5 %irH -hows,-

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f Performance of ACTION a. shall not preclude completion of actions to i establish a safe conservative position.

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) CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 8-10 Amendment No r177 i j

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i 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

b. With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE for the performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.1 on No.12 emergency diesel generator:"

1. Verify either two 500 kV offsite power circuits or a 500 kV offsite power circuit and the 69 kV SMECO offsite power circuit are available and capable of being used. This availability shall ba verified prior to removing the OPERABLE emergency diesel generators and once per shift thereafter,

2. Suspend all operations ~ involving CORE ALTERATIONS.~ positive

~

reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel,

3. Jave estebHshed watainment penetntien c!csure_as itfeatified in Specification 3.g.4,-

CZ~ALSE/Pr K3

4. An emergency diesel generator shall be OPERABLE and aligned to provide power to the emergency busses within seven days.

5. Within two weeks prior to the planned unavailability of an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator, a temporary diesel generator shall be demonstrated available.

kW C. A temporary diesel generator shall be demonstrated available by starting it at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

7. If ACTIONS b) I through b) 6 are not met, restore compliance with the ACTIONS within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or restore an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 4.8.2.2 The specified A.C. busses shall be determined OPERABLE and energized from A.C. sources other than the diesel generators at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated power j availability.

i The provisions of ACTION b) tre no longer applicable following the installation of two additional emergency diesel generators. 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 8-11 Amendment No.--1R ;t

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3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTF.MS D.C. Distribution - Shutdown I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.4 As a minimum, the following D.C. electrical equipment and busses ;

shall be energized and OPERABLE: !

2 -

125-volt D.C. busses, and I 2 -

125-volt battery banks, one_ of which may be the Reserve -'

Battery, and one associated charger per bank supplying the ,

above D.C. busses. '

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. i ACTION: With less than the above complement of D.C. equipment and busses OPERABLE:

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a. Imediately* suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, I positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, and movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel until the minimum '

required D.C. equipment and busses are restored to OPERABLE !

jgig;jgp status, and

b. Immediately initiate corrective actions to restore the minimum l D.C. equipment and busses to OPERABLE status, and

c. Establish containment-penetraticr. closure as icentifiec'in f

-SpeeH4 cation-3-9-4 witMrr8 hwrs~ ;

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l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.4.1 The above required 125-volt D.C. busses shall be detemined OPERABLE and energized at least once per 7 days by verifying correct i breaker alignment and indicated power availability.

4.8.2.4.2 The above required 125-volt battery banks and chargers shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillt.nce Requirement 4.8.2.3.2.

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, Performance of ACTION a. shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative position. :

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 8-16 Amendment No. -1W-4 l l

INSERT A All containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or be capable of being closed by an OPERAllLE automatic purge valve. A minimum of one door in each airlock shall be closed and the equipment door shall be closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts.

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3/4.9 REFUELING O KRf] IONS I

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME LIMITlhG CONDITION IOk OPERATION

/00 3.9.3 The reactor shall be subcritical for at least-72--hours. l APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel.

10 0 A_CTION: With the reactor suberitical for less than-7& hours, suspend all l operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. The provisians of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.3 The reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least-72-hours by verification of the date and time of subcriticality prior to mov ment of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. ,

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1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 9-3 Amendment No.-169--

i 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS ;

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ;

3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four i

bolts, !

t c_ A . A minimum of one door in each airlock is closedhf.yweer B] / {

6 4. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment

(

atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or

2. Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic !

containment purge valve.

f APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATION 5; nositive r+ activity denges, a J }

movement of irradiated fuel within the containment, Svement of heavy loads >

-over-4rradiated- fuel stMn-the-containment building. and Electrical-Power / ;

Distribution-System degradation es required by Specificetiens 3.".I.2,

-3424and 3.8.2.4r .

sin @

ACTION:

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a. With the rec,uirements of the above specification not satisfied, i imediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS <and j

--pos444*e-reac+ivity chen;es, movement of irradiated fuel within { !

the containment.-and-movement of heavy leads over irradiated fuel within the containment building.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

The emergency escape hatch temcorary closure device is an acceptable replacement for that airlock door.

Performance of ACTION a. shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

CALVERT CLIFFS - U,1IT 1 3/4 9-4 f

1 Amendment No. ifrP

INSERT 11 ,

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but, both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open if:

1. one personnel airlock door is Ol'ERAllLE, l

2. the plant is in MOI)E 6, I

3. there is 23 feet of water above the fuel, and

4. a designated individual is available immediately outside the personnel airlock to close the door.

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS I fea & ed SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS fI .

4.9.4 Each of the above required containmen penetrations shall be i

detennined to be either in its 4ksed/ isola condition or capable of l i being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months prior to the start of and at lea l ALTERATIONS,--pos4tive r:=tivity cheg# ,jt once per 7 days during COREi mov l f !

the containment; mnvamant af heavy le:dr ever irr:diated fuel witMa-the c4ntair.n at building, or Electrical Pe er Distributier. System deg.edetiew l by: ; ;

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a. g g d a al !

Verifying the penetrations are in their <10:ed/f e:1:ted '

condition, or - - - - --

b. Testing the containment purge valves per the applicable portions t

of Specification 4.6.4.1.2. .

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I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 9-5 l Amendment No.-1159-1

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS i BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION l

The limitations on minimum boron concentration (2300 ppm) ensure that: ;

1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a i uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the i water volumes having direct access to the reactor vessel. The limitation on K,,, of no greater than 0.95 which includes a conservative allowance for uncertainties, is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during ,

refueling operations.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that '

redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core. ;

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME I

i The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short ->

lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment, '

-aprevente6 release of fission product radioactivity to the environment must be rnl**c /l During MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4, this is accomplished by ;

maintaining CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY as described in LCO 3.6.1. [

In other situations, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an -

accident is not present, therefore, less stringent requirements are needed r

to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere. C/W6 AT C 3 !

The containment structure serves to contain fission product radioactivity which may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA), such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained within the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100. Additionally, this structure provides radiation shielding from the fission products which may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueTing station personnel can be promotly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. 49--

, . L INSERT C '

Both cont tinment personnel airlock doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment and during core alterations provided one airlock door is OPERAllLE, the plant is in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel, and a designated individual is continuously available to close the airlock door. This individual must be stationed at the Auxiliary Building side of the outer airlock door. Operability of a containment personnel i airlock door requires that the door is capable of being closed, that the door is unblocked, and no cables or hoses are being run through the airlock. The requirement that the plant by ,

in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel ensures that there is sufficient time to close the personnel airlock following a loss of shutdown cooling before boiling occurs.

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l ATTACHMENT (2) l i

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e UNIT 2 ;

TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION REVISED PAGES l 3/48-6 l

3/48-7 3/4 8-10 i 3/4 8-11 1 i 3/4 8-16 t 1

l 3/49-3 I i

l 3/49-4 !

l 3/49-5 BASES 3/4 9-1 I

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! 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i

3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES Shutdown I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be :

OPERABLE:

a. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE Distribution System, and

b. One diesel generator with:

1. A fuel oil day tank containing a minimum volume of ,

275 gallons of fuel, 2'

2. A comon Fuel Storage System consisting of:

a. No. 21 Fuel Oil Storage Tank containing a minimum volume i

of 74,000 gallons of fuel oil, and 7 !

b. No. 11 Fuel Oil Storage Tank containing a minimum volume i of 32,000 gallons of fuel oil, and

,%l$

A fuel transfer pump.

3.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

a. With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power '

sources OPERABLE for reasons other than the perfonnance of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.1 on No. 12 diesel generator: !

1. Imediately* suspend all operations involving CORE '

ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel, and

2. Imediately initiate corrective actions to restore the l minimum A.C. electrical power sources to OPERABLE status, and

{

3. -fstabHsh-conta4nmentgenetrauun closui c e5H4ent4Med-in

-Spectfreation-3&4-wi-tMn-a hours.

l [ZA2SC/27' 43 l l

Perfonnance of ACTION a. shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 8-6 Amendment No. -H+-

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS _

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) b.

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power 4.8.1.1.2.d.1 on No.12 emerger.cy diesel generator:" sourc 1.

Verify either two 500 kV offsite power circuits or a 500 kV offsite power circuit and the 69 kV 5MECO offsite power circuit are available and capable of being used. This availability shall be verified prior to removing the OPERABLE emergency diesel generators and once per shift thereafter, 2.

Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive of heavy loads over irradiated fuel, reactivity changes, move 3.

Have-estabMshed-containment penetration cWsure as identifJed in Speeff4caticr. 3.9.4r 4.

[~Z A)S eer A J An emergency diesel generator shall be OPERABLE and aligned to provide power to the emergency busses within seven days .

5.

Within two weeks prior to the planned unavailability of an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator, a temporary diesel sta, generator shall be demonstrated available.

6.

A temporary diesel generator shall be demonstrated available by starting it at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

7.

If ACTIONS b) I through b) 6 are not met, restore compliance with the ACTIONS within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or restore an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

c.

OPERABILITY of No. 21 Fuel Oil1) Storage perfonning Tank by:With within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ; and 2) verifying the flow path from N Oil Storage Tank to the diesel generator within I hour.

d.

K Oil Storage Tank to OPERABLE status within 72 all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, over irradiated movement fuel. of irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads installation of two additional emergency diesel generato CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 8-7 Amendment No. 4S4___._

l 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l

3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS A.C. Distribution - Shutdown )

l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l l

3.8.2.2 As a minimum, the follouing A.C. electrical busses shall be OPERABLE and energized from sources of power other than a diesel generator but aligned to an OPERABLE diesel generator:

1 -

4160 volt Emergency Bus 1 -

480 volt Emergency Bus 2 -

120 volt A.C. Vital Busses APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

a. With less than the above complement of A.C. busses OPERABLE and l energized for reasons other than the performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.1 on No.12 diesel generator:

$@ 1. Immediately* suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel, until the minimum required A.C. busses are restored to OPERABLE and energized status, and

2. Imediately initiate corrective actions to restore the minimum A.C. electrical busses to OPERABLE and energized status, and

3. EstabMsh-containment penetration-closure-n_identi4f edJn l

-Specificat4on-3.-9.Lwithin 8 hnurs

/LE [/2 T 4 1 t

Performance of ACTION a. shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

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! CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 8-10 Amendment No. -H4- 4

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1 3/4.8 ELECTP"AL POWER SYSTEMS l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

b. With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE for the performance of Surveillance, Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.1 on No. 12 emergency diesel generator:

1. Verify either two 500 kV offsite power circuits or a 500 kV offsite power circuit and the 69 kV SMECO offsite power circuit are available and capable of being used. This availability shall be verified prior to removing the OPERABLE emergency diesel generators and once per shift thereafter,

2. Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel,

3. ifenstebWheteente4nment-penetratfen-chsure as f Ment &f4eetTr-SpEctfication 3.9.4,- L 4.

(Z/LMRT A3 An emergency diesel generator shall be OPERABLE and aligned to provide power to the emergency busses within seven days.

5. Within two weeks prior to the planned unavailability of an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator, a temporary diesel generator shall ne demonstrated available.

N!$ 6. A temporary diesel generator shall be demonstrated available by starting it at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

7. If ACTIONS b) I through b) 6 are not met, restore compliance with the ACTIONS within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or restore an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.2 The specified A.C. busses shall be determined OPERABLE and energized from A.C. sources other than the diesel generators at least once I per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability.

The provisions of ACTION b) are no longer applicable following the installation of two additional emergency diesel generators.

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 8-11 Amendment No Itt-- 4

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i 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l f 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM f D.C. Distribution - Shutdown LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.8.2.4 As a minimum, the following D.C. electrical equipment and busses I shall be energized and OPERABLE- {

2 -

125-volt D.C. busses, and i 2 -

125-volt battery banks, one of which may be the. Reserve t Batt'ery, and one associated charger per bank supplying the .

above D.C. busses.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. {

ACTION: With less than the above complement of D.C. equipment and busses OPERABLE

a. Imediately* suspend all operations involving.C0RE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel and i l

movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel until the minimum I required D.C. equipment and busses are restored to OPERA 8LE l l g, igg status, and ;

b. Imediately initiate corrective actions to restore the minimum D.C. equipment and busses to OPERABLE status, and {

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c. -Establieb containment penetratier, cicssre as identified % '

SpecM testicn 3.9.4 within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months . l i

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{.T/Ll5E2T~ Al '

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i l

4.8.2.4.1 The above required 125-volt D.C. busses shall be determined \

OPERABLE and energized at least once per 7 days by verifying correct '

breaker alignment and indicated power availability.

4.8.2.4.2 The above required 125-volt battery banks and chargers shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.3.2.

Performance of ACTION a. shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 8-16 Amendment No.454- %

d LNSERT A All containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic purge valve. A minimum

of one door in each airlock shall be closed and the equipment door shall be closed and held J

in place by a minimum of four bolts.

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1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS i

)j 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ICO '

j 3.9.3 The reactor shall be suberitical for at least-72-hours. I i

APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure j vessel.

100

] ACTION: With the reactor subcritical for less thanYF hours, suspend all l j operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure

vessel. The provisions of.. Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

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i i l i i i j SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS !

l.

I 4.9.3 The reactor shall be determined to have been suberitical for at t i least% hours by verification of the date and time of subcriticality prior l ?

I tomovemeptofirradiatedfuelinthereactorpressurevessel. '

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 9-3 Amendment No.449- !

- ._ - -- .- -= . - . ._. . _ _ - _ _ _ _

J 1-4 1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS i ( 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS

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};

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION !

l

3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status: :

1 '

i' a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts, G ). A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed *hCJ^mF F1 4 '

i j, t . Each penetration providing direct access from the containment I !

atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, l

{ or !

j 2. Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve. ,

j APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS, pc:itive rc:ct4vity cher.gc;, and movement of irradiated fuel within the containment,-movement-ef heavy icads- f '

j -ever-teradi-ated-fuel withiTrthe-contahment buildhg, arid Electrical Power '

j

-Distribution-Systeiii degradation-as requirea Dy specificattens-311@ L !

2 jg -3.8.222-and-Lar2-Ar -

ACTION:

a. With the recuirements of the above specification not satisfied, ;

immediately" suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONSA"J i pnsitive-reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel within j

the containmentand mnvamant of heavy lecds cver irradiated fuei- '

! withir. the conte n ment building.

I i b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. '

i 1

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4 The emergency escape hatch temporary closure devi c is an acceptable 2

, replacement for that airlock door.

l Performance of ACTION a. shall not preclude completion of actions to

establish a safe conservative position.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 9-4 Amendment No.149-i

INSERT 11 but, both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open if:

1. one personnel airlock door is OPERAllLE,

2. the plant is in MODE 6,

3. there is 23 feet of water above the fuel, and

4. a designated individual is available immediately outside the personnel airlock to close the door.

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1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

( SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS M7d' 4.9.4 Each of the above required containment genetrations shall be detennined to be either in its dosed /1:olated condition or capable of I t being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS, pnsitive reactivity changed l'# movement of irradiated fuel in the containment, movamant of heavy Ic:d:,wer-4nad44ted fuel within tha ;

containinent buittiinw. ur Etectricai ruwer-Distributien Syste degrarfation u ;

by:

fe

a. Verifying the penetrations are in their -cle:fut(ed d/1:chted I l

l condition, or _.

b. Testing the containment purge valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.4.1.2.

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1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 9-5 Amendment No. M9---

1

__. _ _ ~ . . . . _ . . . . . . _ . _ _ . . . . _ . , - - _ . . . . _ . _ . . . , . . _ _ , _ . . _ _ . . , . . . . _ _ . . . _ . - ,

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 1

BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION '

The limitations on minimum boron concentration (2300 ppm) ensure that:

1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volumes having direct access to the reactor vessel. The limitation on K,y of no greater than 0.95 which includes a conservative allowance for I

uncertainties, is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during

refueling operations.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION _ _ .

The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that i redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the i reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME 1

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions j used in the accident analyses.

M5 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS I

l During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment, a release of fission product radioactivity to the environment must be thMM ?d.

preventet During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by ,

maintaining CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY as described in LC0 3.6.1. In other i

situations, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an l

accident is not present, therefore, less stringent requirements are needed to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere. pA/JE/2 T Cl The containment structure serves to contain fission product radioactivity which may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA), such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained within the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100. Additionally, this structure provides radiation shielding from the fission products which may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

3/4.9.5 CCMMUNICATIONS i

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly infor ned of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. -149-l

I 1

INSERT C ;

Both containment personnel airlock doors may be open during movement ofirradiated fuel j in the containment and during core alterations provided one airlock door is OPERAHLE, the .

plant is in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel, and a designated individual is continuously available to close the airlock door. This individual must be stationed at the Auxiliary Building side of the outer airlock door. Operability of a containment personnel airlock door requires that the door is capable of being closed, that the door is unblocked, and no cables or hoses are being run through the airlock. The requirement that the plant by in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel ensures that there is sufficient time to close the personnel airlock following a loss of shutdown cooling before boiling occurs.

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ATTACHMENT (3) i i

l NUREG-1432 !

l l " STANDARD TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR COMBUSTION ENGINEERING i l PLANTS" !

l REVISED PAGES !

3.9-4 ,

1 BASES 3.9-8 i BASES 3.9-9 i BASES 3.9-10 i r

BASES 3.9.ll ,

BASES 3.9-12 1 :

l BASES 3.9-13 i

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Containment' Penetrations 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

{

3.9.3 Containment Penetrations LC0 3.9.3 Thecontainmentpenetrationsshallbeinthefollowingh l status:

a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by [four]

bolts; C. AI. One door in each air lock closedg. { J N S E /P T A.]

l b. -e. Each penetration providing-direct access from the - - ~

containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, 1

blind flange, or equivalent, or

! 2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment :

l Purge and Exhaust Isolation System. !

l APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS, l During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within l containment. , . .g ACTIONS l

i CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately containment ALTERATIONS.

penetrations not in required status. AND A.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

CEOG STS 3.9-4 Rev. O, 00/2S/02

I i

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i LCO 3.9.3 INSERT A r

but, both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open if:

I 1. one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE, t

2. the plant is in MODE 6,

3. there is 23 feet of water above the fuel, and

4. a designated individual is available immediately outside the personnel airlock

to close the door.

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l Containment Penetrations i B 3.9.3 !

i B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations l

l BASES BACKGROUND During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of ful assemblies within containment with irradiated fuel in containment, a release of fission product radioactivity within the containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LC0 requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LC0 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LCO requirements are referred to as

" containment closure" rather than " containment OPERABILITY."

Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the Appendix J l

leakage criteria and tests are not required.

The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core

'g following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures

! are maintained well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.

Additionally, the containment structure provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving large equipment and components into and out of containment.

During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the equipment hatch must be held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by this LCO be approximately equally spaced.

I The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 operation in accordance with LCO 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is requi red. During periods of shutdown when containment

~

(continued) h CE0G STS B 3.9-8 -Rev. O,00/28/02 i

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!- Containment Penetrations j B 3.9.3 :

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i BASES l

BACKGROUND closure is not required, the door interlock mechanism may be (continued) disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open i for extended periods when frequent containment entry is !

necessary. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of l

~i irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, containment l closure is required; therefore. the door interlock mechanism :

may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always !

j remain cicacd.QNTEP7 8]

I The requirements on containment penetration closure ensure

] that a release of fission product radioactivity within !

I containment will be restri e ro esca ing he !

environment. sure m tH ctions arm su. cientito( i

. e s .ri ct ssicr. product radioactivity relcas frc=

containmeni. due i.o a fuel handMng accident during :

%' .W i i

The Containment Purge and Exhaust System includes two l subsystems. The normal subsysteni includes a 42 inch purge !'

penetration and a 42 inch exhaust penetration. The second ,

subsystem, a minipurge system, includes an 8 inch purge .

penetration and an 8 inch exhaust penetratiun. During l MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the two valves in each of the normal !

i h purge and exhaust penetrations are secured in'the closed position. The two valves in each of the two minipurge l

[

penetrations can be opened intermittently, but are closed ,

automatically by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation !

! System (ESFAS). Neither of the subsystems is subject to a i a Specification in MODE 5. ;

j In MODE 6, large air exchanges are necessary to conduct ;

refueling operations. The nonnal 42 inch purge system is ;

used for this purpose and all valves are closed by the ESFAS i j in accordance with LCO 3.3.2, " Reactor Protective System j (RPS)-Shutdown. " [

~ ~

)

The minipurge system remains operational in MODE 6 and all !

! four valves are also closed by the ESFAS. j t

or j i

i The minipurge system is not used in MODE 6. All four i

[8] inch valves are secured in the closed position. '

The other containment penetrations that provide direct !

access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere !

{

(continued)

! i CEOG STS B 3.9-9 "cv. O, 09/28/92 l

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L

] LASES 3.9.3 INSERT 11 l

closed.

OR operable. Operability of the containment personnel airlock door requires that the door is capable of l

l being closed and that the door is unblocked and no cables or hoses are being run through the airlock.

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- . . - . - - - . - . . - - - - . - - - - - . . = - - --

s i- l i Containment Penetrations i I

B 3.9.3 I i

a l a

BASES h 3

BACKGROUND must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be

1 (continued) achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve, or by a i

manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent.

Equivalent isolation methods must be approved and may 1

include use of a material that can provide a temporary, j atmospheric pressure ventilation barrier for the other

containment penetrations during fuel movements (Ref.1). j 1

4 APPLICABLE During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel SAFETY ANALYSIS assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological l consequences result from a fuel handling accident. The fuel ;

j handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage' f

to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents,

! analyzed in Reference 3, include dropping a single i irradiated fuel assembly and handling tool or a heavy object l onto other irradiated fuel assemblies. The requirements of l

LC0 3.9.6, " Refueling Water Level," and the minimum decay l

' time of [72] hours prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the ;

release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a i

fuel handling accident, results in doses that are well ^

within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. The 1

acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure are M i contained in Standard Review Plan Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1 !

j (Ref. 2), which defines "well within" 10 CFR 100 to be 25% !

> or less of the 10 CFR 100 values. ;

t Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC

) Policy Statement. !

(

! LCO This LCO limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident j in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for r i

fission product radioactivity released within containment.

j The LC0 requires any penetration providing direct access l from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to l be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and l exhaust penetrationsi. For the OPERABLE containment purge !

/L15E/PTC]

! and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures that these f penetrations are isolable by the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System. The OPERABILITY requirements for i

this LCO ensure that the automatic purge and exhaust valve i closure times specified in the FSAR can be achieved and therefore meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis 5

(continued) {

i "-" ^ ^ ^ ' ' ' " ' -

! CEOG STS B 3.9-10

- - = . . .w...

F b

IIASES 3.9.3 INSERT C and the containment personnel airlock. For the containment personnel airlock, this LCO ensures that the airlock can be closed after containment evacuation in the event of a fuel handling accident.

The requirement that the plant be in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel ensures that there ,

is sufficient time to close the personnel airlock following a loss of shutdown cooling before boiling .

t occurs. A designated individual must be located outsHe of the affected area to close the door. The OPERAlllLITY requirements ensure that the airlock door is capable of performing its function.

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. t Containment Penetrations i B 3.9.3 l l

lf BASES i

LC0 to ensure releases through the valves are terminated, such ,

! (continued) that the radiological doses are within the acceptance limit. ;

l l l l

APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel ;

assemblies within containment because this is when there is l a potential for a fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by i LC0 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODES 5 and 6, when CORE !

ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within t containment are not being conducted, the potential for a :

fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under j these conditions no requirements are placed on containment t penetration status. j l

i A.1 and A.2 ACTIONS With the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any }

g containment penetration that provides direct access from the l containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere not in the required status, including the Containment Purge and Exhaust .

Isolation System not capable of automatic actuation when the purge and exhaust valves are open, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the isolation function is not ;

needed. This is accomplished by immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Performance of these actions shall not t preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. l l

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.3.1 i

REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that each of the containment ;

penetrations required to be in its closed position is in i that position. The Surveillance on the open purge and exhaust valves will demonstrate that the valves are not blocked from closing. Also, the Surveillance will i demonstrate that each valve operator has motive power, which will ensure each valve is capable of being closed by an

( (continued)

, CE0G STS B 3.9-11 "a. O,09/20/02 1

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Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 i b

BASES i'

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS OPERABLE automatic containment purge and exhaust isolation signal.

The Surveillance is performed every 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the containment. The Surveillance interval is selected to be commensurate with the normal duration of time to complete fuel handling operations. A surveillance before the start of refueling operations will provide two or three surveillance verifications during the applicable period for this LCO. As such, this Surveillance ensures that a postulated fuel handling accident that releases fission product radioactivity within the containment will not result in a release of fission product radioactivity to the environmentg {ygtygf 7 g]

SR 3.9.3.2 This Surveillance demonstrates that each containment purge g and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position on -

tr 'ual initiation or on an actual or simulated high r ciation signal . The 18 month Frequency maintains consistency with other similar ESFAS instrumentation and In LCO 3.3.4 [(Digital) or valve testing)]

3.3.3 (Analog requirements."

Miscellaneous Actuations," the Contain Purge Isolation Signal System requires a CHANNEL CHECK every 7 days and a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST every 31 days to ensure the channel OPERABILITY during refueling operations. Every 18 months a CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed. The system actuation response time is demonstrated every 18 months, during refueling, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. SR 3.6.3.5 demonstrates that the isolation time of each valve is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program requirements.

These surveillances performed during MODE 6 will ensure that the valves are capable of closing after a postulated fuel handling accident to limit a release of fission product radioactivity from the containment.

(.)

(continued)

CEOG STS B 3.9-12 "re . O, 09/20/92 e -

. _. _ ~ - __

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IIASES 3.93 INSERT D ;

in excess of those recommended by Standard Review Plan Section 15.7.4, Revision 1 (Reference 3). l l

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Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 1

1 h BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. GPU Nuclear Safety Evaluation SE-0002000-001, Rev. O, May 20, 1988.

1

2. FSAR, Section [ ]. i

3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1, July 1981.

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CEOG STS B 3.9-13 -Rcv. O, 09/28/92 J y .

\

,.,e j A'ITACilNTENT (4)

SUMNIARY OF TIIE ANALYSIS OF A FUEL IIANDLING ACCIDENT I The analysis generally followed the guidance of Standard Review Plan 15.7.4, except that more recent guidance was used when available and justifiable.

1. All 176 rods from only one fuel assembly will be damaged in the " base case" fuel handling accident analysis. Administrative controls and fuel handling equipment setpoints ensure than no more than the equivalent of one fuel assembly may be damaged at one time.

2. Damaged rods are assumed to release their gas gap activities. The gas gap activities consist of 10Fc of all iodines except for I-131 which is 127c,107c of noble gases except for Kr-85 which is 30Fe. These release fractions are obtained from Regulatory Guide 1.25 as modified by the NRC Safety Evaluation Report on extended burnup fuel for Calvert Cliffs dated, October 10,1985.

3. Core isotopic inventories and half lives are consistent with TID-14844. This source term is identical to that used in the Calvert Cliffs Maximum Hypothetical Accident analysis.

4. Core power is assumed to be 2754 MWt or 1029c of rated thermal power. Operation at this I 1 power level for an infinite length of time prior to shutdown is assumed.

i

5. The single damaged assembly is assumed to have exper:enced a power level of (2754 MWt/217)

1.65. This 1.65 peaking factor comes fro.n Regulatory Guide 1.25 and is a conservative estimation of the actual power level the highest power assembly might experience. In reality, over the life of a discharged !ssembly, the peaking factor will be much closer to 1.0.

l 1

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ATTACIIMENT (4)

SUMMARY

OF TIIE ANALYSIS OF A FUEL IIANDLING ACCIDENT

6. The iodine gap inventory is composed of 99.75% inorganic species and 0.25% organic species .

ofiodine. This assumption comes from Regulatory Guide 1.25.

7. The accident occurs at 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months after shutdown. This is the minimum time allowed by the 1

proposed Technical Specifications before fuel movement may begin. .

8. Radioactive material that escapes from the refueling pool to the Containment Building is released to the atmosphere exponentially over a two hour time period. The site boundary dose from such a release is calculated for the 0-2 hour time period. This is conservative as no pressurization of containment is expected to drive the radioactive material out of the Containment Building.

9. No credit is taken for atmospheric cleanup systems in containment. This is conservative as the containment recirculation (charcoal) filters would be used to remove iodine. j j

10. Atmospheric dispersion factors assume a ground level release. Factors used are taken from i

the Calvert Cliffs UFSAR and are ccmsistent with those used in the Maximum Hypothetical i 3

Accident analysis. The 0-2 hour site boundary x/O of 1.3E-04 sec/m is taken from UFSAR Section 2.3.6.

11. No credit is taken for deposition of the plume on the ground or decay ofisotopes in transit to the 'ste boundary.

1 1

12. Dose conversion factors are obtained from ICRP 30.

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l A'ITACIINTENT (4)

SUNiNfARY OF TIIE ANALYSIS OF A FUEL IIANDLING ACCIDENT

13. The decontamination factor of noble gases in the pool is taken as 1.0. This assumption is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.25.

e

14. The total effective decontamination factor of iodine is taken as 100. This assumption is conservative and consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.25. !

15. Buildup of daughters is not taken into account as source term nuclides decay. This assumption is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.25. Sufficient conservatism exists in the gas gap fractions assumed to compensate for the small effects of daughter products. ,

16. No credit is taken for decay as the source escapes and travels to the site boundary. No credit is taken for plateout.

17. The breathing rate of 3.47E-04 m 3/sec is taken from Regulatory Guide 1.25.

The total 0-2 hour site boundary thyroid dose associated with a fuel handling accident is:

14.02 Rem inhalation dose + 0.04 Rem immersion dose = 14.06 Rem The total 0-2 hour site boundary whole body dose associated with a fuel handling accident is:

0.421 Rem inhalation dose + 0.036 Rem immersion dose = 0.457 Rem 3

ML20059L401

Text

SUMMARY

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