ML20059L288

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Application for Certification of Advanced BWR Design

ML20059L288
Person / Time
Site:	05000605
Issue date:	09/19/1990
From:	Scaletti D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Marriott P GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
References
NUDOCS 9009260234
Download: ML20059L288 (16)

Text

.

v'

.1

..4 September. 19, 1990:

l

,-. j

]

'n '

i Docket No. STN-50-605 l 1 ..

[ Patrick W.-Marriott, Manager Licensing & consulting Services

=l

]j GE-Nuclear Energy Geraral Electric Company.

175.Cu.tner Avenue ,

San' Jose, . C. 'lifornia 195125 .j

Dear Mr. Marriott:

O  :

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RFGARDING

? ,

THE-GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY APPLICA" ION FOR  !

CERTIFICATION-OF THE ABWR DESIGN t

During the" course of the review of your application for' ,.

certification of your Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Design, we i ,

,I

' ha,e identified a need for additional information.

. Our request for= additional [information, contained in the enclosure,

' addresses the areas of SRP Section 9, covering the em?rgency 3 l

j. i's diesel generat' ors, fire, protection and station. blackout. We l

'equest that you provide your responses to enclosure by p

E

October 31, 1990.- If yet have any concerns regarding' this

• e.

f ^ request,,please call me on (30.) 492-1104.

-w  :

Sincerely, g g ,

.Dino C. Scaletti, Project' Manager ,

Standardization' Project Directorate

, Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, J+ V and Special Projects . .

4 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

. Asl stated ~

ccDw/enclo'sure:

See next page -

~

uiSTRIBUTIQR : ...-

'" i

. [DocketyFileS8 JKudrick CMiller OGC

-CMcCracken

,  :-NRC.PDR . RArchitzel EJordan

PDS Reading. Tchandracekaran- ACRS(10)  ;

DScaletti PShea 4 i

PDS PDS (M

< etti:

09/gq/90 PShe 09/ /90 CMiller p-O3 c 09/j')/90 9009260234 900919 PDR ADOCK 05000605 g PDC

--w-.,y, ,

.m.m_+____m- -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . w ,- - 9..,-

e 'i i U t- t '

Q}+y#"%ib ~ UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

_P j,c /};

l. WASHINGTON D. C. 20556 m a,, 8

. September 19, 1990

+ , ** . . . . . / . '

• p Docket,No. STN 506605 Patrick W. Marriott, Manager Licensing Er Consulting. Services GE Nuclear Energy:

General' Electric Company V .175 Curtner Avenue-l San Jose, California.95125

~

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATYON OF THE ABWR DESIGN During'the course of the-review of your application for-certification.of your Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Design, we, i

have identified a~need for additional information.- Our-request .!

-; j for additiona' information, contained in the enclosure, l addresses-the c:.eas of SRP Section 9, covering the emergency-diesel' generators, fire protection and station blackout. We-1 request that you provide'your responses to enclosure by

October 31, 1990. -If you have any concerns regarding this o

[ request, please call me on (301) 492-1104. ,

L

< Sincerely, y _

r,ino C. Scaletti, Project Manager .  ;

Standardization Project Directorate- l L

Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, l V and Special' Projects oifice of, Nuclear Reactor: Regulation 5

Enclosure:

As stated ~

cc1w/ enclosure: .

l: ,

s 1See next,page L,

! ; +- !y

~ I..g, ,

. - i

.q ' ' i ,

.t v  ;

7 '

Mr.- Patrick W..Marriott Docket No. STN 50-605: '

-3 ~

General Electric Compeny cc: Mr.; Robert Mitchell [

' General Electric Comparty 175,Curtner Avenue. I' San Jose, Celifornia 95114-fir. L.- Gifford,- Program 11anager'

- Reguletory' Programs:

l t GE Nuclear Energy 3 4 12300 Twinbrook Parkway

. Suite 315. J Rockville. . Maryland L20852-

-Director, Criteria &' Standards Division .;

Office of Radt,ation Programs- 1 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency H '401 M Street,'S.W. )

Washington, D.C. 20460, fir. .Da'niel F. Giessing DivisionLof.t4 clear Regulation ,

Jand Safety .

10ffice of Converter Reactor

- Deployment,- NE-12' Office lof Nuclear Energy

- Washington , -D.C. 20545 J

..j; :y I

+t 5

i

'u

. I. a t ( ,

]4 j . 5 t

t 0

l >

\[ '

. :n 4

)j '. s' h ,

> t 5 I

+ =\ !

.i.t :

f.s .

Il!

s 0

{

a Nl >

_.______=----_-___--____----_-__-_-_--_________-_l

4 ,

l;[ .,

U ,

r . . .

3; , ADVANCED BOILING WATER REACTOR' i REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l r

430.2C5 ' Provide system layout diagrams for the diesel generator (9'5.4-

. support systems.- .These diagrams should be of ]

17

'9.5.8) sufficient. detail-so that component location'can be-determined and the-accessibility of equipment-for. test 4 and maintenance can be evaluated. Physical: separation:

between individual subsystems of each: support system )

serving the three diesel. generators should be .  :

+

explicitly stated in the respective SSAR' sections..

l 430.267 'For-each diesel generator support system,-provide-P (9.5.4- - sufficient information/on how each system is protected

~

9. 5. 8)' against the effects of failure of.any high or moderate energy piping located near the system components.. 3 430.268 Provide a failure modes and effects analysis including (9.5.4- . loss'of offsite power situation for the componentsLof 9.5.8)6 each. diesel generator support system. .;

430.269- Provide informat m on location and mounting of. .;

.(9.5.4-: controls and in nentation-foi .)l: the. diesel .

j 9.5.8) generator <suppt ,ystams in so far as they relate to ,

protecting the eiwtem components from adverse: effects ,

due to engine vibration during engine operation ~(see -

NUREG/CR-0660 " Enhancement of on-sits emergency diesel 1 generator reliability," Recommendation C.6,.Page V-18)s- d y

H 430.270 . ABWR SSARETable-3.2-1 FhoWs that some safety-related j' (9.5.4- components of'theidiesel' generator support' systems are l

9.5.8);1ocated outdoors onsite!(see SSAR page 3.2-24.1, l

'1c Items:R3.3, 4 and;5)., Explain how these are~ protected. l against the effects of'SSE, flood and tornado-missile.

!I i f '430.271 The staff agrees with GE that/the keep-warm heaters ~and E . (9. 5. 4-- associated pumps-of the diesel generator lubrication L, 9.5.8) system and the air compressors and' motors ofothe diesel L4 generator starting-air system need not be nuclear ,

safetyEclass. Except1for the above, thicstaff requires-p ^a -that all piping and components of all:the support-of

• systems up to the-engine interface should:bs designed, q R' fabricated and installed in.accordance.with ASME code,. A t

p Section III, Class 3 requirements. The staff' considers.

the engine interface as being the first connection off the engine block -- flanged, welded or screwed.

l clarify'whether the design ofLthe support systems-meets the above' requirement. .If it does not, provide .  ;

justification for the deviations. Also, explain how

-the-safety-related portions of.the support-' systems are

! protected.fror,the effects of failure of i

, non-safety-related: portions of the systems.

L

__.____________m. ____ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ __.____ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _______

p z' -y c iq" .*

g i 4;

• / -

., , e _430.272 Provide'P& ids for'the diesel generatorifuel-oil and

,(9.5.4)j -transferfsystem that include safety classification--

changes andelevelF temperature and pressure sensors-

~

1 among other' things.

430.273- Discuss =the provisions for measuring fue1T oil:

(9.5.4)~ temperature and pressure and maintaining?it within

-recommended' limits.

r[M;m 430.274 Provide information on the following in the system (9.5.4) description:

4

-(a). Type of transfer pump.

-(b)i Design features for protecting diesel generator-

~

< fuel oil fill and vent lines from the: effects;of SSE, flood and: tornado-missile.

(c) Clarification on provision of a stick gauge connection for each tank.

(d) Internal and external' corrosion protection features for exposed'and-buried portions of the-system including the storage tanks (see Regulatory Guide.l.137 " Fuel 011-Systems for Standby = Diesel Generators," Position-C.1.g).

s .(e) Provisions for removal of accumulated water from'-

^

the fuel storage tanks (see NUREG/CR-0660LPage V-16, Recommendation "a").

1 (f) Precautions after fill-up of oil . tank to. minimize potential-causes and v 1 sequences of fires and explosions (see SRP lection=9.5.4, item-III'.7).

430.275 An event may occur-requiring.the replenishment of fuel (9.5.4) oillin the storage tank without interrupting the.

This, in' turn,-may operation of:the. diesel generators.

e result in turbulence of the accumulated sediment:(at' 1 the bottom of the storage tank). . Further, theJduplex

-filters.in'the transfer pumpLdischarge piping lmay not be.-able to handle the above problem.- Therefore,~

describe additional features that will:be providedLfor-preventing turbulence:of accumulated sedimenttduring- , ~

filling of the storage tank',;so'that1 uninterrupted

supply of fuel oil will not be compromised'(see Regulatory Guide 1.137, Position

C.2.g).

, 430.276 Discuss system compliance (including-justification for' y '(9.5.4) noncompliance),'if applicable, with Positions C;1.e,*f'

_g ,

3 and C.2.a, b, d, e, f-and h of Regulatory Guide 1.137

~* -(the1 staff notes that the above guidelines are not' addressed-in"SSAR Section 9.5.4).

MI 430.277 Ident'ify the power source-for the jacket water

-(9.5.5) circulating system.

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ,

r i n

'. ~ _ _

m- - -

n

.:9

)

4

. ri cc . ' 430.278? ' Provide' P& ids for the diesel- generator cooling wate r:  !

(9. 5. 5) . ' system which include safety; classification!chardes. -i 430.279= Provide a-table'of design. flow andLheat removal

- (9. 5. 5) . requirements for the diesel generator cooling water system.- Also,-provide the-design heat removal capacities of all the coolers or. heat exchangers in the; system. SSAR Figure 9.2-le shows intercoolers, lube ,

o11' coolers and filtered l water' coolers;-SSAR Section-

^

9.5.5.2, however, uses different terminology to' ,

identify 1some of the above-(e.g.,-air intercooler ' '

jacket water heat exchanger).. Identify < clearly'all the heat exchangers or coolers in the system-and clarify.

whether.the-combustion air is also' cooled by the -

system. 3

-t 430'.280 Provide-information on the following.. ..

(9.5.5) (a) Type of-jacket water circulating-pumps. l (b) Clarification as to whether.the system' includes a _l motor-driven jacket water keep-warm' pump;= describe  ;

the keep-warm feature of the system. *

(c) Identification ofLall systemRheat~ exchanger 5 ~ tr F coolers where heat is rejected'to the.RBCW jetam l (SSAR Subsection 9.5.5.2 states " jacketed L&reateld r

and a; heat exchanger which is furnished witn PV4" l

whereas SSAR Figure 9.2-le-shows supply:of,RCw.to j' two intercoolers, one lube oil cooler and one J ' filtered water cooler-for each diesel generator).

L (d)' Type of temperature sensors ("Amot" brand ~or equal s j with an-expanding wax type' temperature sensitive E element? ,- see NUREG/CR-0650, Page V-17,

-Recommendation under Item 4)~.

(e) Clarification as:to whether the. system canibe  ;

vented.to assure that all spaces in the closed

• - , loop are-filled.with-water (see SRP Section 9.5.5,y  ;

4 E Item III.2). . .

4 h

(f) Function'of the filtered water cooler shown in ,

SSAR Figure 9.2-le.. .i (g) Provisions for'isolatingsnon-safety-related ,

y portions from safety-related portions of the system. ,

,6 ,

^

g 430.281 SSAR Suksoction 9.5.5.4 givesilittle information f ' ( 9. 5.~ 5 ) - regarding-periodic inspection (e.g.,_ accessibility of h! ,

areas) snd. testing (e.g., structural 1and~ leak tight:

integrity'of the components, active components and

system as a whole). Discuss how;the system complies

, ;fC with GDCs 45 Land 46 regarding' inspection and. testing of t if,' '

the system-(note that layout diagrams alone are not i sufficient'and'that these should be supplemented by

• descriptive information).

L  :

b -

d" 7> "n Y EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERNNRS

^*

> (

!. m j ]1e ,3 L

< 4 b$$\

udi;;5M m,, l 8

\*

if, ; ,f ' . O ,

f t

9- JI

430.~2821-Are the diesel generators capable of operating at  !

(9.5.5) . design loads;without secondary cooling (i.e.,.by the 1RBCW-system)z in excess of time needed to restore RBCW supply tolthe diesel generators cooling water system- 1 F

j following~a loss of offsite power?

430.283 . Demonstrate by analysis that normal system coolant.

i s

(9." 5) leakage-over an7-day period Will-not exceed'the excess Ji~ . amount of coolant contained.in;the system expansion,

' tank and/or cause loss ef positive suction head to  ;

jacket water circulating pumps, t 430.284 Identify the operating procedures to ensure that the c f (9.5.5) diesel generators and the associated cooling water [

, system can perform their design functions-for extended  !

periods when less than full electrical' power ~ generation ~

. is required without degradation of their performance or- l reliability (note that operating procedures identified  ;

in SRPeSection 9.5.5, Item III.7 are acceptable)'.-  ;

t 430.285 ' Discuss the provisions'for controlling the dew point ofL .i (9.5.6) di.esel generator starting air; also, identify the temperature to which the dew point will be controlled.

'.' 430.286 Provide P& ids for the diesel generator starting' air  :

(9.5.6) system that include safety classification changes, pressure gauges, relief _ valves, drain valves and  :

isolation valves among other things. -Provide system: J design requirements such as. compressor capacity, power [

source,'and receiver tank capacity.. Also,1 1dentify the l design features which will maintain the receiver L_ pressure ~within an allowableLrange.

i 430.287.- Include devices to crank the-engine as' recommended by I i

-(9. 5. 6) the engine manufacturer as.one-of.the components'of.;the

• system.1 Also, identify the air start' requirements with regard to:the duration of'the cranking cycle and.numbei of engine revolutions-(see SRPfSection 9.5.6, Mi g acceptance' criterion III'.g).

}

'430.288 Identify system provisions for periodic or automatic l,

(9.5.6) blowdown of7 accumulated' moisture and' foreign material in the' air receivers and other critical points:of the i

W -system. In this context, the staff notes that ,

NUREG/CR-0660;has-identified water in the starting air F

Has the," root.ccuse" for most of the troubles reported; y for the systeu and has, therefore, strongly recommended-g ,, refrigerated' starting air driers with a. minimum' flow' +

l rate of~250 SCFM.between the compressors and the j

. receivers and automatic water' drains (see Page V-4 of 4 I

L the'NUREG). Clarify whether the system design d ncludes the above features for water removal and if not, l provide justification.

EMERGENCY ' DIESEL GENERATORS N ,

L1,;, 1; >- :r

<  : i j

it"? '

c 1 .

1

% .s  ;

,Y dp ,

U.: 1 0 ' jp 430.2894-Discuss-how'the! diesel generator support: systems meet I o

(9.5.6) the NUREG/CR-0660 recommendations 2.a, 2.b,.and.2.d

-(9. 5. 8 ); (Page V-6) and 5 (Page V-18) on concrete floors l

-painting).with regard to protection of these systems e L' from the adverse effects of dust and dirt.-

a , .430.290 -Clarify whether the fill connection for the lube oil x

-(9.5.7)

(5 supply-tank'is located in the locked diesel generator  ;

(A

' room or discuss-the provisions for preventing lube oil- i. .

contamination via the fill pipc. j n

l. 430.291 Provide P& ids for the diesel generator lubrication J (9.5.7) system that include safety classification changes,.

temperature, pressure and level sensors e.mong other i things. Include the pre-lube provisions'in the P& ids.- [

430.292 Provide design cr iteria (pump flows, operating (9.5.7) pressure, temperature mifferentials, cooling. system ll heat removal capab;11 ties, electric heater  !

R I characteristics) - fcr the diesel generator lubrication -

-system.

430.293 Describe how.the diesel generator lubrication system (9.5.7) (1) complies with NURE0/CR-0660, recommendations 1 andt 2 (see Pages V-9 and V-10 of the.NUREG) regarding duration of the pre-lube period and-starting and '

stopping'of:the pre-lioe pump, and (2)-precludes excessive pre-lubrication of the diesel engine ,

turbocharger. In this context, clarify whether the o, keep-warm oil circulating pump can-perform the function-

! of.the pre-lube pump. .Also,. provide information on how a the: pre-lube operation will'be monitored., Note'that. '

the staff; requires the monitoring / alarm circuit for the  :

pre-lube system.to be. safety-related'(ClassLlE) to '

provide' reliable indication of-the system. operation so that'the operator can perform timely;correctiveLaction in case of failure.

430.294 Describe system = protective features-to prevent ,

(9.5.7) unacceptable crank case explosions and toumitigate the i consequences of such'an event.

430.295 Identify all the components-in the flow paths.for the '

'9.5.8) diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust: *,

system .(e.g., air intake silencer, turbocharger, combustion air aftercooler). If the above include flow-control devices (louvers, dampers), can the system function if there is failure of a single active component?

1 I

. EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS

.- :_ _i___________-__________ - --

. . . > s .

1

,;,'.{M j w 9 , ,

~

'430.296T.NUREG/CR-0660 recommends'(Page.V-15,; recommendations i@' .' . ( 9. 5. 8 )l . 1.a'.'andi1.b):that:the piping ~for the diesel. generator-9- roomLvent'ilation. air should-be separaterfrom that used

- 4 for the' combustion. air ~and'that.the suppipJof the .i

~

7

-combustion air should preferably.be through' pipings .

H a directlyffrom'outside the building and at least?20 feet J u from thefground levelTthrough-proper. filters.' ABWR-  ;

[~ SSAR Subsection 9.5.8.2.'1 states'that each: diesel 'j engine takes. combust.4cn' air from its own' diesel ,

3, igenerator-room;which,.in turn,sreceives its air supply- J

, 'from the' room air ventilation. system.. Explain:whycan4 l

,,' advanced design like ABWR does not comply.withithe: j NUREG recommendations in so-far-as they~ relate.to-keepingnthe ventilation'and combustion ~ air supplies g s ' separate.;fAlso,. explain how the air exhaust silencers r  ; mounted at-the roof of the-reactor building are-

? . protected-'from tornado missiles.. Further,: contrary to '

what-has'been. stated,-reactoribuilding arrangement 11 drawings in SSAR Section-1.2 do not'show intake and' F exhaustElocations for the. system; include these

- locationsLin'.the applicable drawings.

430.297 -Discuss:the: ability of-the intake filtersato. provide- .

(9.5.8) sufficient filtered' combustion; air'for the. entire time f

. period.when emergency power is requirad assuming. :i Lmaximum' particulate.concentrationcat the intake. >

.430.298 Provide a' system.P&ID' showing safety classification

.(9. 5. 8) changes for the-diesel generator combustion air! intake- i

- and' exhaust system..  ;

430.2991 Identify the' diesel engine operation procedures /that.-

)

( 9 .' 5 . 8 ) .  : Will minimize or avoid incomplete combustion!(see:

-NUREG/CR-0660, recommendation B. 3.~a, Page' V-11) . .

\ ,

y

:i

,c >

1

,1 t

R i , ,

g/ '

k ,

I

. EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS 1

. t

, i

$ i --

ti'; 4 ,

I

_' a -

.s' 1 ^

.t ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR' ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH ,

4302315 ABWR:SSAR Section.9.5.1 provides fire hazards enalyses:  ;

(9.5.1) '

for fire' areas in the reactor building only.

,, Additionally, the section does not describe the

, -specific reactor shutdown method that will be used for-each of the-fire areas in the reactor building. 1' 1 Provide the following:

VS (A)L ' Fire hazards analysis for-each-fire area outside I the reactor building which is within the scope of j g the standard design (e.g., control building,_

O' turbine building, radwaste_ building, service j building). Note that on receipt of such j

. yn 'information, additional information may be L requested.  !

(B) Description of_ specific reactor shutdown method-for each fire area. - The description should 4';

'~

discuss how the chosen method provides safe shutdown'or dedicated shutdown, whichever-is applicable lor the given area, that is, how the shutdown method meets Positions-C.S.b or C.5.c of-BTP CMEB 9.5-1 " Guidelines forLFire Protection for Nuclear Power' Plants" of'SRP Section 9.5.1 " Fire' Protection' Program." Specifically,cthe response for' each fire area'should include among other a things, an associated circuit analysis (that is, how the commonnbus, common enclosure and spurious '

signal _ concerns including:high/ low pressure .

interface breachesLwill be eliminated), available shutdown equipment' including cables,' required 4

Loperator actions and-the time when these have to m be completed, andLrequired' repairs, if any,,_for i achieving-cold shutdown within-the' allowed time-Additionally,0for the, control room,-the response should identify.the specific design provisions to ensure the capability to transfer controlJof (

needed hot shutdown equipment to a remote shutdown l panel without' recourse to-any5 hot shutdown repair.

(C) Lighting and communications provisions as'they relate to the fire protection program for the ABWR. Your response should' indicate how the ,

program meets the specific: guidelines stated under (

Positions C.5.g(1) through g(4) of BTP CNEB 9.5-1.

Note that cross referencing ABWR SSkR Sections 9.5.2 " Communication ~ Systems" and'f. 5.3 " Lighting and Servicing Power Supply-System" Vill not be an adequate response,;since these sections do not- ,

9 discuss-all the above guidelines.

3

[

t 1

E r ,

\

g. . J,['

>

• 1 i  : : _

-W (D); l Interface requirements for referencing. applicants; I

?for fire areas-not-within the scope _of-the H standard design (e.g., ultimate heat' sink area)'.-

For;such areas, the interface requirements should )

call out for applicable-information requested;1n Items ' (1) ,. (2) , and (3):above. j i

430.316 The. fire hazard analysis provided as' Appendix 9A-listed  !

2

( 9. 5 ~.1) several components within-the. rooms of each fireLarea in the reactor building.. However, specific cables '

j v _(power and instrumentation) were not identified'inithe 1

, equipment listings-(Tables 9A.b-1 and-9A.b.2). The i failure of~these cables will have1to beLincluded in a- I f '

safe D shutdown analysis. Additionally, the equipment. l listed in:these two tables showed that' equipment i

. powered by separate divisions of AC power (Div.11:and;2- l forfexample) are located-in the same. reactor building ,

fire zones. From the information in Appendix 9A,'it-is. H not possible to1 determine 13'the failure of this  ;

equipment'could affect the operability of: required safe shutdown' equipment-in other fire areas. . This equipment

~

should be addressed in the safe shutdown analysis,,

including an associated circuit analysis.-

430.317 Section 9.5.1.2.1~should be expandedLto-include the' (9.5;1). fire protection water supply system.

s .

430.318 - Section 9.5.1.2.2 states.that a manually operated- '

(9.5.1) Ecarbon dioxide (CO' fire suppression system will be

. provided for the d$e)sel generator: rooms,. including the

' day' tank rooms. This does not correspond to the

_ guidance provided in NUREG-0800, CMEB BTP 9.5-1, i, Section C.7.1 which specifies automatsc' fire t a

~

suppression for the amergency: diesel generators. LThis section should be changed to:show'automaticLfire suppression or, expanded to.justifyJhow manual i

suppression provides either equivalent or superior. '

protection.

• D .430.319 Section 9.5.1.2.7 indicates;a 30 second time delay

'(9.5;1) . discharge will be provided for the carbon dioxide fire .,

suppression systems. This featurefis appropriate for -

automatic systems but not for manually operated-systems. This section should be changed to stateethat-  !

a time delay discharge will not be provided for a

,y" manually operated systems, such as those provided~for ~

the emergency diesel generator rooms in case the manual g systems are justified and retained in the ABWR design.

s i

FIRE PROTECTION r i AND STATION BLACFOUT i

4 7-: . .1_.. .a__. , - - . _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . - - - -

o oO <

p > <

w ,e .,

, .se e i 4

• " 1430.320 .Section;9.5.1.2.8,= smoke control, refers to Section 6.4- '!

_m (6.4) and Subsection.9.4.5. .

S N

a (9.4.5)' '

ll ' ' L ( 9. 5.1)L IA. Section'6.4'.~412 states that "In the smoke.. removal-C 59 ', mode,zthe purge flow-through:the control. building- j R

.provides;three airichanges per hour in order to sweep t

y. '

'atmosphericicontaminants out-of thefair." An,airi e change every 20 minutes will-be' effective for smoke  :

control: only for_ the very smallest fires in; very large ,

Volumes. This section shouldxbe, changed ared. expanded:

to describe how smoke will be removed from fire areas- l

.and.to-provide the technical bases, including test. d data, to support. assumptions used in the smoke removal e Lsystems design.

. q --

L B'. Section 9.4.5.x..x states for-the various areas, where; applicable, that " fire protection has;been: .

evaluated.and'is described in Subsection'9'.5.1." .No 4 descriptive material is contained'in these subsections A pertaining to smoke removal capability of the normal HVAC system. , ,

! 130.321. Section 9.5.3.1.1(5) (f)' should be expanded as follows:'

'(9.5.1) -Battery power supplies for lights in harsh (9.5.3) environmr.nts.(including high/ low temperature areas). g shall bc located where the environment will not degrade  ;

' the' ba'cteries, . or the batteries: shall be qualified by .

test for the~ environment." 4 430.322 Section 9A.2.1.1 should be expanded to include NFPA~20, 1 (9.5.1) =" Centrifugal _-Fire Pumps." ]

430.323'. Section- 9A.2.4 (3) implies that walls with fire  !

(9.5.1) fresistance ratings less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> will be allowed,as-fire walls. This is not acceptable. .-Section 9A.2.4(3)'

should be: clarified.to clearly state that all fire-E barriers will have a minimum. fire resistance rating of L ~ 3 ' hours..

430.324 Secti6n .9A.2. 4 (11) states that. redundant safe shutdown  !  !

p

~

(9.5.1). . cables'"are not permitted together in the same cable a

> tray." zActual: separation of' redundant safe shutdown (

cables.should be specified, since literal compliance; 'f with this prohibition against'thencase of a single cable tray'for redundant cables, could~still result-in:

o an; unacceptable' condition.

L<

E '

430.325 Section 9A,3.1(8) states that one of the methods:of (9.5.1) protection for sofsty-rolated equipment and associated .

cabling ~is spatial separation (isolation).- The: staff L. does'.not, recognize as acceptable for use in an advanced reactor design any method of protection which relies  !

j

Q' "

\

LFIRE' PROTECTION I L~ 4 W

'AND STATION BLACKOUT l a .n / l 1

Eh

o i

.r R> {* , l .* !

Q:- - ,

- 9 w , >

}

' onlyfupon spatia 1H separation.

.., - We recognize the need 4 for open communication:between compartments inside -

h m ,

containment:inLorder-'to be ablesto relieve and equalize- ,

4, ,

pressure following a high energy line break.= 1 Therefore,~the use of structural walls inside J

, containment as fire barriers to separate safety-related^ l systems:(cabling -

ments and equipment), even .

l

-though such;wal~ not fully enclose theLequipment; requiring separ< -

, is acceptableJinl intent.. Care mustLbe taken in actual system layout, however,Jto.

g("m assure that-line-of-sight exposure between components requiring-separation does not exist,' and that a m sufficient labyrinth'is provided between:the' separated;

@y  ; components to, assure that fire spread does not' occur.= g

'l M f430.326 .Section'9A.4.1.1.x under~(9) " Consequences-of, Fire" for .

i

_(9.5.1) :several different rooms or areas, states " smoke from a; fire would be removed by the" normal. HVAC system, Jif L it =

s has not-been isolated. If the normal'HVAC system has .

l been isolated, smoke removal is by the..SGTS system."-

~

3' Iniquestion 430.320 above we-pointed out the.

limitations.-of ventilation systems that provided onlyl three air changes per hour to function as.a smoke

' 4' -,

a

, . removal system =during fires. Lother technical considerations aside (such as possibility-of soot -

fouling),'the' capacity of the SGTS is.so small; relative i to the building volumes served that it is clearly:not- j v

capable of performing as.an effective smoke removal' >

system. Please. describe how smoke 1 removal"from-these- 1 0 . areas will be accomplished if the normal-HVAC system is t not available.- ,

<!430.327 LSection 9A.4.1.1~.18 under (2) states noLcore: cooling is

~

(9.5.1) provided in this' room,Jwhile under.(9).GE states-thats "the provisions for core cooling's' stems y < backup are-definedEin-Section 9A.2.5." -Which statement:is ,

correct? '!

g , 430.328 Section 9A.4.1.1.26 under (2)JstatesLyes: ;

l(9.5k1) safety-related, however, under (9) states', "the a ' function is.not safe.y-related and-its loss is

% , -, ~ acceptable'" . Which' statement is' correct?

L's >

430.329- Section.9A,.4.1.1.33, Subsection.(9) " Consequences of d '

9 , 1(9?5.1) Fire" states that " access to"the' operating handles =forf iW the manually. actuated valves in the. adjacent room would- '

L

'be: temporarily reduced." What does this mean and what E . y!

.is thu' postulated effect? Are manual actions in the adjacent room contemplated for safe shutdown?

q 4

V I I

f  ;

L K FIRE PROTECTION AND STATION' BLACKOUT l

?'^

}.

w_, o m

- - n '

((

3;,J4,7 *

g y ,

[ .

"430.330 . Section 9A.'4.1'. 2.10.' Subsections (2) and[(9) are:

(9.5.1): ' mutually-ambiguous. Is the equipment"in=this, area

'~

j safety-related and does it provide. core; cooling?i R .

'430.331 . Sections - 9A. 4.1. 2.18, - 9A . 4.1. 2.19 end 9A'. 4.1'.' 2 ; 2 0 . all' b

(9.5'.1); state in Subsection (2) that equipmentcinteach roomiis safety-related.and provides core--cooling. However, in. '

each.. case, Subsection (9)1 states that, "thefpostulated

-fire' assumes the loss of the-function. The function is ,

notisafety-related and its: temporary loss is

, . acceptable." Since these statements appear to.be.

contradictory, please' clarify._

430.332' Section'9A.4.1.2.25' states in Subsection.(2) that-(9.5.1) equipment in the room is safety-related. -However, .i

' Subsection'(9) states that,~"the function is not safety-related,.therefore the loss of thetfunction11s acceptable." .Which' statement is correct? ,

.430.333 Section 9A.4.1.2.32 has the'same statements as Sectioni

(9.5.1)- H9 A . 4 .1'. 2 . 2 5 (Question 430.332) above and'the same l question applies.

430.334 Section 9A.4.1.4.04 Diesel Generator A Room

- (9.5.1) Section 9A.4.1.4.10 Diesel Generator C Room

a. ?Section'9A.4.1.4.15 Diesel Generator B Room '

A..See comments about CO . Protection provided for Diesel Generator Room in 2Question.430.318 above  :

relative to'the description of the manual total 't

. flooding CO system in Subsections (7).

2 l 4

B.: See Question- 430.326'aboveirelative'to use of normal

-HVAC or SGTS systems for smoke removal..'In addition-to those concerns, we' question the: availability'of:the SGTS to'the' Diesel Generator. Rooms'.'

lt < 4 5

430.335 ~Section 9A.4.1.4.26 states in' Subsection.(9)'thatLthe '

~ (925.1).' safety-related' valves in this area'will fail closed upon loss of actuation' power. How is.this-accomplished?

W .430.336 Section 9A.4.1.5.04 DG Control Panel and Service

'A (9.5.1) Corridor A-(Room 514). Section 9A.4'1.5.08 DG Control

- , 'PanelfCland Service Corridor C (Room 532). Section 1 9A.4.1.5.16 DG Control' Panel B and Service Corridor B.

6 g (Room 522). ,

', Subsectiol. (9) for all three of these rooms strtes that fire could result in temporary loss of accessLtc the B 4, . diesel generator HVAC room and that functional'Sackup FIRE PROTECTION

< AND STATION ~ BLACKOUT ,

s  ! .. __ ,- .2. _ __. . . - _

( .

,I 1,. i ,

l q q7 e 1? "

ps = ' a ,

"( ,is provided-~by:the.A and C diesel generators. Although (this' subsection also states that continuous access:to- -;

a Lthe-HVAC is not required, we question how all three.of_ . j 1these: rooms (each related to a separate diesel generator unit) can cause loss.of access.to the'same .

Train B;l diesel generator HVAC room.

430.337 lSection 9A.4.1.5.23 - Why.is loss of the stack monitors.

- (9.5.1) as stated in Subsection (9). acceptable?

fc '- 430.338 Sections'9A.4.1.6.02 through Section'9A.4.1.6.37 -

0 ( 9. 5.1) ^ Question.No. 41).326 above finds unacceptable reliance. ,

upon the SGTS for-smoke removal when the. normal HVAC o system is not available. Subsection (9) in eachtof 1

, there sections references reliance upon the SBGT which  ;

we'understandito be the same~as the SGT9. Therefore, 1

=

the same concerns noted in Quescion No 430.326 apply

'here also. ,

..)

430.339 .Section-9A.4.1.7,01 states?in SubsectionD(2) that  !

, (9.5.1) systems in'the room are safety-related but11n.

Subsection (9) states that the functions are not safety-related. Which statement is correct?

q 430.340 'Section 9A.4.1.7.12 states in Subsection.(9) that four-(9.5.1) divisions of the stack radiation monitors are located ,

at the basa.of the stack-and could be lost. Why.is it i acceptable to loose all'four of these monitors? R 430.341 Section 9A.5.1 reads as follows: .

l (9.5.1). "9A.5.1 Piping' Penetrations,. Reactor: Building Piping-penetrations through'the.drywell shell1haveLunique

, design considerations. The stress and> containment ,

• requirements;along with the temperature: inputs to the 3 concrete' walls' leave.little_ design latitude.-

E Experience has shown that someLof these: penetrations LJ for high; energy pipingfmay noticontain a 3-hour. ,.

b fire-resistive barrier-such'as have provided:throughout

} the other ABWR buildings.- Penetration details'are not-is available at this stage of.the plant design." "The j b staff understands this-to.mean that GE is proposing [

p

.c <that;we approve in advance. deviations from,the

~

.l requirement to provide 3-hour l fire rated penetration  ;

, seals for'certain as yet unidentified!high-energy ,

piping, fThis is not acceptable. The applicant _shouldL j ,'

u

, state their intention.to provide 3-hour fire rated' h ,;t penetration seals for all high energy piping or,;as a .i Ls minimum, state those-conditions when-such1 seals cannot

?' '

be provided_and-what will be~ installed as'a substitute.

Sufficient technical detail must be provided to allow the staff to approve such deviations in principle.

{ \

FIREEPROTECTION-

AND-STATION BLACKOUT 3 m ,

Yhi , > -

f

, f. .-

p . ,j

^,

bM 430.342: =Section 9A.5.5.lsstates that. conduit fron the separate

(9~.5.1) divisions are; separated;from each:other t9 aset!IEEE

'384; 1The IEEEJ384-separation distances.Are primarily; to prevent ~ electrical signal interference between-or among conductors. They do not necessarily. provide-

' adequate separation to satisfy fire protection needs.

This sthcement should be expanded to assure that fire

= protection' separation requirements are setisfied.

l430.343 Discus. Oonformance with the requirements of 10 CFR-

.(5.4.6) 50.63."Ioss of All Alternating Current Power," as . -

(6.2.4) rela *.ed tc the support systems regarding-(1) sufficient

. (8.3.2)- amoun? of weter (condensate storage system),- .

r (9.2.6) (2) sufficient flow path and delivery system'(reactor (9.3.1)- core isolation cooling system) ,m (3) decay. heat removal

( 9. 4 .1)~ capability (automatic depressurization; system) ,- (4)

-(9.4.5) sufficient valve position indication and: closure (9.5.4-8) capability for containment isolation (containment T- isolatjon system), . (5) sufficient compressed air capacity for station -blackout (SBO). components _ for. core cooling and/or containment isolation (compressed air system), (6) suitable environmental conditions inside control room and,other areas served to protect personnel and SBO equipment including-instrumentation-and controls.(control room area ventilation system and

' engineered safety feature ventilation-system), (7) common' mode failures of sufficient-fuel oil supply,

. transport and storage recharging capability, sufficient cooling and'compressedLair, and adequate lubrication and air intake and exhaust.for the diesel engine 2'

(emergency diesel engine support systems), if used as ,

an alternate AC power source, and (8)-battery _ capacity to assure that core'is. cooled and an appropriate SP containment' integrity:is maintained indeoendent of y, oreferred-and onsite emeraency'AC nower-in the event of a-station blackout for the-specified duration-and recovery therefrom in accordance with the guidance of

• Regulatory Guide 1.155," station blackout, NUMARC 87-00 and NOMARC B7-00 supplementary guidanceLdated U ' December 27, 1989.

4 i x*

i M

a.

-FIRE PROTECTION

-AND' STATION BLACKOUT V +

pp . _ . _ _ . _ . . . . . . . .