ML20059L288

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Application for Certification of Advanced BWR Design

ML20059L288
Person / Time
Site:	05000605
Issue date:	09/19/1990
From:	Scaletti D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Marriott P GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
References
NUDOCS 9009260234
Download: ML20059L288 (16)

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September. 19, 1990:

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Docket No. STN-50-605 l

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Patrick W.-Marriott, Manager

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Licensing & consulting Services j

GE-Nuclear Energy Geraral Electric Company.

175.Cu.tner Avenue

San' Jose,. C. 'lifornia 195125

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Dear Mr. Marriott:

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SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RFGARDING THE-GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY APPLICA" ION FOR CERTIFICATION-OF THE ABWR DESIGN t

During the" course of the review of your application for' certification of your Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Design, we i

' ha,e identified a need for additional information.

Our request

,I for= additional [information, contained in the enclosure,

' addresses the areas of SRP Section 9, covering the em?rgency 3

l i's diesel generat' ors, fire, protection and station. blackout.

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'equest that you provide your responses to enclosure by p

October 31, 1990.-

If yet have any concerns regarding' this E

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^ request,,please call me on (30.) 492-1104.

-w Sincerely, g

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.Dino C.

Scaletti, Project' Manager Standardization' Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, J+

V and Special Projects 4

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

. Asl stated ~

ccDw/enclo'sure:

See next page uiSTRIBUTIQR :...-

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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. September 19, 1990

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• p Docket,No. STN 506605 Patrick W. Marriott, Manager Licensing Er Consulting. Services GE Nuclear Energy:

General' Electric Company V

.175 Curtner Avenue-l San Jose, California.95125

~

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATYON OF THE ABWR DESIGN During'the course of the-review of your application for-certification.of your Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Design, we, i

have identified a~need for additional information.- Our-request j

for additiona' information, contained in the enclosure, l

addresses-the c:.eas of SRP Section 9, covering the emergency-diesel' generators, fire protection and station blackout.

We-1 request that you provide'your responses to enclosure by

October 31, 1990.

-If you have any concerns regarding this o[

request, please call me on (301) 492-1104.

L Sincerely, y

r,ino C.

Scaletti, Project Manager.

Standardization Project Directorate-l L

Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, l

V and Special' Projects oifice of, Nuclear Reactor: Regulation 5

Enclosure:

As stated ~

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cc1w/ enclosure:.

s 1See next,page L,

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7 Mr.- Patrick W..Marriott Docket No. STN 50-605:

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General Electric Compeny cc: Mr.; Robert Mitchell

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' General Electric Comparty 175,Curtner Avenue.

I San Jose, Celifornia 95114-fir. L.- Gifford,- Program 11anager' l

- Reguletory' Programs:

t GE Nuclear Energy 3

12300 Twinbrook Parkway 4

. Suite 315.

J Rockville.. Maryland L20852-

-Director, Criteria &' Standards Division Office of Radt,ation Programs-1 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency H

'401 M Street,'S.W.

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Washington, D.C.

20460, fir..Da'niel F. Giessing DivisionLof.t4 clear Regulation Jand Safety 10ffice of Converter Reactor

- Deployment,- NE-12' Office lof Nuclear Energy

- Washington

-D.C.

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ADVANCED BOILING WATER REACTOR' i

3; REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l

r 430.2C5 ' Provide system layout diagrams for the diesel generator (9'5.4-support systems.-.These diagrams should be of

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17

'9.5.8) sufficient. detail-so that component location'can be-determined and the-accessibility of equipment-for. test and maintenance can be evaluated.

Physical: separation:

4 between individual subsystems of each: support system

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serving the three diesel. generators should be.

explicitly stated in the respective SSAR' sections..

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430.267 'For-each diesel generator support system,-provide-P (9.5.4-

- sufficient information/on how each system is protected

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9. 5. 8)'

against the effects of failure of.any high or moderate energy piping located near the system components..

3 430.268 Provide a failure modes and effects analysis including (9.5.4-

. loss'of offsite power situation for the componentsLof 9.5.8)6 each. diesel generator support system.

430.269-Provide informat m on location and mounting of.

.(9.5.4-:

controls and in nentation-foi.)l: the. diesel j

9.5.8) generator <suppt

,ystams in so far as they relate to protecting the eiwtem components from adverse: effects due to engine vibration during engine operation ~(see NUREG/CR-0660 " Enhancement of on-sits emergency diesel 1

generator reliability," Recommendation C.6,.Page V-18)s-d yH 430.270. ABWR SSARETable-3.2-1 FhoWs that some safety-related j'

(9.5.4-components of'theidiesel' generator support' systems are l

9.5.8);1ocated outdoors onsite!(see SSAR page 3.2-24.1, l

'1c Items:R3.3, 4 and;5)., Explain how these are~ protected.

l against the effects of'SSE, flood and tornado-missile.

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'430.271 The staff agrees with GE that/the keep-warm heaters ~and E

. (9. 5. 4--

associated pumps-of the diesel generator lubrication L,

9.5.8) system and the air compressors and' motors ofothe diesel L4 generator starting-air system need not be nuclear safetyEclass.

Except1for the above, thicstaff requires-p ^a

-that all piping and components of all:the support-systems up to the-engine interface should:bs designed, q

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fabricated and installed in.accordance.with ASME code,.

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Section III, Class 3 requirements.

The staff' considers.

t the engine interface as being the first connection off the engine block -- flanged, welded or screwed.

l clarify'whether the design ofLthe support systems-meets the above' requirement.

.If it does not, provide.

justification for the deviations.

Also, explain how

-the-safety-related portions of.the support-' systems are protected.fror,the effects of failure of i

non-safety-related: portions of the systems.

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_430.272 Provide'P& ids for'the diesel generatorifuel-oil and

,(9.5.4)j

-transferfsystem that include safety classification--

changes andelevelF temperature and pressure sensors-1

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among other' things.

430.273-Discuss =the provisions for measuring fue1T oil:

(9.5.4)~

temperature and pressure and maintaining?it within

-recommended' limits.

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-(a). Type of transfer pump.

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-(b)i Design features for protecting diesel generator-fuel oil fill and vent lines from the: effects;of

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SSE, flood and: tornado-missile.

(c)

Clarification on provision of a stick gauge connection for each tank.

(d)

Internal and external' corrosion protection features for exposed'and-buried portions of the-system including the storage tanks (see Regulatory Guide.l.137 " Fuel 011-Systems for Standby = Diesel Generators," Position-C.1.g).

.(e)

Provisions for removal of accumulated water from'-

s the fuel storage tanks (see NUREG/CR-0660LPage

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V-16, Recommendation "a").

(f)

Precautions after fill-up of oil. tank to. minimize 1

potential-causes and v 1 sequences of fires and explosions (see SRP lection=9.5.4, item-III'.7).

430.275 An event may occur-requiring.the replenishment of fuel (9.5.4) oillin the storage tank without interrupting the.

operation of:the. diesel generators.

This, in' turn,-may result in turbulence of the accumulated sediment:(at' e

1 the bottom of the storage tank).. Further, theJduplex

-filters.in'the transfer pumpLdischarge piping lmay not be.-able to handle the above problem.- Therefore,~

describe additional features that will:be providedLfor-preventing turbulence:of accumulated sedimenttduring-

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filling of the storage tank',;so'that1 uninterrupted supply of fuel oil will not be compromised'(see Regulatory Guide 1.137, Position:C.2.g).

430.276 Discuss system compliance (including-justification for' y

'(9.5.4) noncompliance),'if applicable, with Positions C;1.e,*f' and C.2.a, b, d, e, f-and h of Regulatory Guide 1.137

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-(the1 staff notes that the above guidelines are not'

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• addressed-in"SSAR Section 9.5.4).

MI 430.277 Ident'ify the power source-for the jacket water

-(9.5.5) circulating system. EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS r

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. ' 430.278? ' Provide' P& ids for the diesel-generator cooling wate r:

(9. 5. 5).

' system which include safety; classification!chardes.

-i 430.279= Provide a-table'of design. flow andLheat removal

- (9. 5. 5).

requirements for the diesel generator cooling water system.- Also,-provide the-design heat removal capacities of all the coolers or. heat exchangers in the; system.

SSAR Figure 9.2-le shows intercoolers, lube o11' coolers and filtered l water' coolers;-SSAR Section-

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9.5.5.2, however, uses different terminology to' identify 1some of the above-(e.g.,-air intercooler '

jacket water heat exchanger).. Identify < clearly'all the heat exchangers or coolers in the system-and clarify.

whether.the-combustion air is also' cooled by the system.

3

-t 430'.280 Provide-information on the following..

(9.5.5)

(a)

Type of-jacket water circulating-pumps.

l (b)

Clarification as to whether.the system' includes a motor-driven jacket water keep-warm' pump;= describe the keep-warm feature of the system.

(c)

Identification ofLall systemRheat~ exchanger 5 ~ tr F

coolers where heat is rejected'to the.RBCW jetam l

(SSAR Subsection 9.5.5.2 states " jacketed L&reateld and a; heat exchanger which is furnished witn PV4" r

l whereas SSAR Figure 9.2-le-shows supply:of,RCw.to j'

two intercoolers, one lube oil cooler and one J

' filtered water cooler-for each diesel generator).

L (d)' Type of temperature sensors ("Amot" brand ~or equal s

j with an-expanding wax type' temperature sensitive E

element?,- see NUREG/CR-0650, Page V-17,

-Recommendation under Item 4)~.

(e)

Clarification as:to whether the. system canibe vented.to assure that all spaces in the closed loop are-filled.with-water (see SRP Section 9.5.5,y E

Item III.2).

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(f)

Function'of the filtered water cooler shown in h

SSAR Figure 9.2-le..

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Provisions for'isolatingsnon-safety-related y

portions from safety-related portions of the system.

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430.281 SSAR Suksoction 9.5.5.4 givesilittle information

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' ( 9. 5.~ 5 ) -

regarding-periodic inspection (e.g.,_ accessibility of h!

areas) snd. testing (e.g., structural and~ leak tight:

1 integrity'of the components, active components and

system as a whole).

Discuss how;the system complies

, ;fC with GDCs 45 Land 46 regarding' inspection and. testing of if,'

the system-(note that layout diagrams alone are not i

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• sufficient'and'that these should be supplemented by descriptive information).

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430.~2821-Are the diesel generators capable of operating at 9-(9.5.5)

. design loads;without secondary cooling (i.e.,.by the 1RBCW-system)z in excess of time needed to restore RBCW supply tolthe diesel generators cooling water system-1 F

j following~a loss of offsite power?

430.283. Demonstrate by analysis that normal system coolant.

i (9." 5) leakage-over an7-day period Will-not exceed'the excess s

amount of coolant contained.in;the system expansion, Ji~

' tank and/or cause loss ef positive suction head to jacket water circulating pumps, t

430.284 Identify the operating procedures to ensure that the f

c (9.5.5) diesel generators and the associated cooling water

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, system can perform their design functions-for extended periods when less than full electrical' power ~ generation is required without degradation of their performance or-l

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reliability (note that operating procedures identified in SRPeSection 9.5.5, Item III.7 are acceptable)'.-

t 430.285 ' Discuss the provisions'for controlling the dew point ofL

.i (9.5.6) di.esel generator starting air; also, identify the temperature to which the dew point will be controlled.

430.286 Provide P& ids for the diesel generator starting' air (9.5.6) system that include safety classification changes, pressure gauges, relief _ valves, drain valves and isolation valves among other things.

-Provide system:

J design requirements such as. compressor capacity, power

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source,'and receiver tank capacity.. Also,1 1dentify the l

design features which will maintain the receiver L_

pressure ~within an allowableLrange.

430.287.- Include devices to crank the-engine as' recommended by I

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-(9. 5. 6) the engine manufacturer as.one-of.the components'of.;the i

system.1 Also, identify the air start' requirements with regard to:the duration of'the cranking cycle and.numbei of engine revolutions-(see SRPfSection 9.5.6, Mi g

acceptance' criterion III'.g).

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'430.288 Identify system provisions for periodic or automatic (9.5.6) blowdown of7 accumulated' moisture and' foreign material i

l, in the' air receivers and other critical points:of the W

-system.

In this context, the staff notes that NUREG/CR-0660;has-identified water in the starting air F

Has the," root.ccuse" for most of the troubles reported; for the systeu and has, therefore, strongly recommended-y refrigerated' starting air driers with a. minimum' flow'

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rate of~250 SCFM.between the compressors and the j

receivers and automatic water' drains (see Page V-4 of 4

L the'NUREG).

Clarify whether the system design d ncludes I

the above features for water removal and if not, l

provide justification.

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-(9. 5. 8 );

(Page V-6) and 5 (Page V-18) on concrete floors

-painting).with regard to protection of these systems e

L' from the adverse effects of dust and dirt.-

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.430.290 -Clarify whether the fill connection for the lube oil x

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-(9.5.7) supply-tank'is located in the locked diesel generator

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' room or discuss-the provisions for preventing lube oil-i.

A contamination via the fill pipc.

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430.291 Provide P& ids for the diesel generator lubrication J

(9.5.7) system that include safety classification changes,.

temperature, pressure and level sensors e.mong other i

things.

Include the pre-lube provisions'in the P& ids.-

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430.292 Provide design cr iteria (pump flows, operating (9.5.7) pressure, temperature mifferentials, cooling. system ll heat removal capab;11 ties, electric heater I

R characteristics) - fcr the diesel generator lubrication -

-system.

430.293 Describe how.the diesel generator lubrication system (9.5.7)

(1) complies with NURE0/CR-0660, recommendations 1 andt 2 (see Pages V-9 and V-10 of the.NUREG) regarding duration of the pre-lube period and-starting and stopping'of:the pre-lioe pump, and (2)-precludes excessive pre-lubrication of the diesel engine turbocharger.

In this context, clarify whether the o,

keep-warm oil circulating pump can-perform the function-of.the pre-lube pump.

.Also,. provide information on how a

the: pre-lube operation will'be monitored., Note'that.

the staff; requires the monitoring / alarm circuit for the pre-lube system.to be. safety-related'(ClassLlE) to provide' reliable indication of-the system. operation so that'the operator can perform timely;correctiveLaction in case of failure.

430.294 Describe system = protective features-to prevent (9.5.7) unacceptable crank case explosions and toumitigate the i

consequences of such'an event.

430.295 Identify all the components-in the flow paths.for the

'9.5.8) diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust:

system.(e.g.,

air intake silencer, turbocharger, combustion air aftercooler).

If the above include flow-control devices (louvers, dampers), can the system function if there is failure of a single active component?

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'430.296T.NUREG/CR-0660 recommends'(Page.V-15,; recommendations i@'

. ( 9. 5. 8 )l

. 1.a'.'andi1.b):that:the piping ~for the diesel. generator-9-

roomLvent'ilation. air should-be separaterfrom that used for the' combustion. air ~and'that.the suppipJof the

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-combustion air should preferably.be through' pipings H

7 directlyffrom'outside the building and at least?20 feet J

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from thefground levelTthrough-proper. filters.' ABWR-

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SSAR Subsection 9.5.8.2.'1 states'that each: diesel

'j engine takes. combust.4cn' air from its own' diesel igenerator-room;which,.in turn,sreceives its air supply-J 3,

'from the' room air ventilation. system.. Explain:whycan4 l

advanced design like ABWR does not comply.withithe:

j NUREG recommendations in so-far-as they~ relate.to-keepingnthe ventilation'and combustion ~ air supplies g

' separate.;fAlso,. explain how the air exhaust silencers s

mounted at-the roof of the-reactor building are-r

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protected-'from tornado missiles..

Further,: contrary to what-has'been. stated,-reactoribuilding arrangement 11 drawings in SSAR Section-1.2 do not'show intake and' F

exhaustElocations for the. system; include these

- locationsLin'.the applicable drawings.

430.297 -Discuss:the: ability of-the intake filtersato. provide-(9.5.8) sufficient filtered' combustion; air'for the. entire time f

. period.when emergency power is requirad assuming.

i Lmaximum' particulate.concentrationcat the intake.

.430.298 Provide a' system.P&ID' showing safety classification

.(9. 5. 8) changes for the-diesel generator combustion air! intake-i

- and' exhaust system..

430.2991 Identify the' diesel engine operation procedures /that.-

Will minimize or avoid incomplete combustion!(see:

( 9.' 5. 8 ).

)

-NUREG/CR-0660, recommendation B. 3.~a, Page' V-11)..

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.t ENCLOSURE

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REQUEST FOR' ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH 4302315 ABWR:SSAR Section.9.5.1 provides fire hazards enalyses:

(9.5.1) for fire' areas in the reactor building only.

Additionally, the section does not describe the

-specific reactor shutdown method that will be used for-each of the-fire areas in the reactor building.

1 Provide the following:

1 VS (A)L ' Fire hazards analysis for-each-fire area outside the reactor building which is within the scope of j

g the standard design (e.g.,

control building,_

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turbine building, radwaste_ building, service building).

Note that on receipt of such j

yn

'information, additional information may be L

requested.

(B)

Description of_ specific reactor shutdown method-for each fire area. - The description should

'~

discuss how the chosen method provides safe 4';

shutdown'or dedicated shutdown, whichever-is applicable lor the given area, that is, how the shutdown method meets Positions-C.S.b or C.5.c of-BTP CMEB 9.5-1 " Guidelines forLFire Protection for Nuclear Power' Plants" of'SRP Section 9.5.1 " Fire' Protection' Program."

Specifically,cthe response for' each fire area'should include among other a

things, an associated circuit analysis (that is, how the commonnbus, common enclosure and spurious signal _ concerns including:high/ low pressure interface breachesLwill be eliminated), available shutdown equipment' including cables,' required Loperator actions and-the time when these have to 4

m be completed, andLrequired' repairs, if any,,_for i

achieving-cold shutdown within-the' allowed time-Additionally,0for the, control room,-the response should identify.the specific design provisions to ensure the capability to transfer controlJof

(

needed hot shutdown equipment to a remote shutdown l

panel without' recourse to-any5 hot shutdown repair.

(C)

Lighting and communications provisions as'they relate to the fire protection program for the ABWR.

Your response should' indicate how the program meets the specific: guidelines stated under

(

Positions C.5.g(1) through g(4) of BTP CNEB 9.5-1.

Note that cross referencing ABWR SSkR Sections 9.5.2 " Communication ~ Systems" and'f. 5.3 " Lighting and Servicing Power Supply-System" Vill not be an adequate response,;since these sections do not-9 discuss-all the above guidelines.

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-W (D); l Interface requirements for referencing. applicants;

?for fire areas-not-within the scope _of-the H

standard design (e.g., ultimate heat' sink area)'.-

For;such areas, the interface requirements should

)

call out for applicable-information requested;1n Items ' (1),. (2), and (3):above.

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430.316 The. fire hazard analysis provided as' Appendix 9A-listed

( 9. 5 ~.1) several components within-the. rooms of each fireLarea 2

in the reactor building.. However, specific cables j

_(power and instrumentation) were not identified'inithe v

1 equipment listings-(Tables 9A.b-1 and-9A.b.2).

The failure of~these cables will have1to beLincluded in a-f D

safe shutdown analysis.

Additionally, the equipment.

l listed in:these two tables showed that' equipment i

. powered by separate divisions of AC power (Div.11:and;2-forfexample) are located-in the same. reactor building fire zones.

From the information in Appendix 9A,'it-is.

H not possible to1 determine 13'the failure of this equipment'could affect the operability of: required safe shutdown' equipment-in other fire areas.. This equipment

~

should be addressed in the safe shutdown analysis,,

including an associated circuit analysis.-

430.317 Section 9.5.1.2.1~should be expandedLto-include the' (9.5;1).

fire protection water supply system.

s 430.318 - Section 9.5.1.2.2 states.that a manually operated-Ecarbon dioxide (CO' fire suppression system will be (9.5.1)

. provided for the d$e)sel generator: rooms,. including the

' day' tank rooms.

This does not correspond to the

_ guidance provided in NUREG-0800, CMEB BTP 9.5-1, i,

~

Section C.7.1 which specifies automatsc' fire t

a suppression for the amergency: diesel generators. LThis section should be changed to:show'automaticLfire suppression or, expanded to.justifyJhow manual suppression provides either equivalent or superior.

i protection.

• D

.430.319 Section 9.5.1.2.7 indicates;a 30 second time delay

'(9.5;1)

. discharge will be provided for the carbon dioxide fire suppression systems.

This featurefis appropriate for automatic systems but not for manually operated-systems.

This section should be changed to stateethat-a time delay discharge will not be provided for a

,y manually operated systems, such as those provided~for the emergency diesel generator rooms in case the manual

~

g systems are justified and retained in the ABWR design.

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4 1430.320.Section;9.5.1.2.8,= smoke control, refers to Section 6.4-(6.4) and Subsection.9.4.5.

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N L ( 9. 5.1)L IA. Section'6.4'.~412 states that "In the smoke.. removal-C 59 ',

mode,zthe purge flow-through:the control. building-j R

.provides;three airichanges per hour in order to sweep t

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'atmosphericicontaminants out-of thefair."

An,airi change every 20 minutes will-be' effective for smoke e

control: only for_ the very smallest fires in; very large

Volumes.

This section shouldxbe, changed ared. expanded:

to describe how smoke will be removed from fire areas-l

.and.to-provide the technical bases, including test.

d data, to support. assumptions used in the smoke removal Lsystems design.

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Section 9.4.5.x..x states for-the various areas, where; applicable, that " fire protection has;been:

evaluated.and'is described in Subsection'9'.5.1.".No 4

descriptive material is contained'in these subsections A

pertaining to smoke removal capability of the normal HVAC system.

130.321. Section 9.5.3.1.1(5) (f)' should be expanded as follows:'

'(9.5.1)

-Battery power supplies for lights in harsh (9.5.3) environmr.nts.(including high/ low temperature areas).

g shall bc located where the environment will not degrade

' the' ba'cteries,. or the batteries: shall be qualified by test for the~ environment."

4 430.322 Section 9A.2.1.1 should be expanded to include NFPA~20, 1

(9.5.1)

=" Centrifugal _-Fire Pumps."

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430.323'. Section-9A.2.4 (3) implies that walls with fire (9.5.1) fresistance ratings less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> will be allowed,as-fire walls.

This is not acceptable..-Section 9A.2.4(3)'

should be: clarified.to clearly state that all fire-E barriers will have a minimum. fire resistance rating of L

~ 3 ' hours..

430.324 Secti6n.9A.2. 4 (11) states that. redundant safe shutdown

~

p (9.5.1).

. cables'"are not permitted together in the same cable a

tray." zActual: separation of' redundant safe shutdown

(

cables.should be specified, since literal compliance;

'f with this prohibition against'thencase of a single cable tray'for redundant cables, could~still result-in:

o an; unacceptable' condition.

L<

E 430.325 Section 9A,3.1(8) states that one of the methods:of (9.5.1) protection for sofsty-rolated equipment and associated cabling ~is spatial separation (isolation).- The: staff L.

does'.not, recognize as acceptable for use in an advanced reactor design any method of protection which relies j

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,' onlyfupon spatia 1H separation.

We recognize the need h

for open communication:between compartments inside 4

containment:inLorder-'to be ablesto relieve and equalize-m 4,

pressure following a high energy line break.=

1 Therefore,~the use of structural walls inside J

containment as fire barriers to separate safety-related^

l systems:(cabling ments and equipment), even l

-though such;wal~

not fully enclose theLequipment; requiring separ<

is acceptableJinl intent.. Care mustLbe taken in actual system layout, however,Jto.

g("m assure that-line-of-sight exposure between components requiring-separation does not exist,' and that a sufficient labyrinth'is provided between:the' separated; m

@y

components to, assure that fire spread does not' occur.=

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f430.326.Section'9A.4.1.1.x under~(9) " Consequences-of, Fire" for i

_(9.5.1)

several different rooms or areas, states " smoke from a; fire would be removed by the" normal. HVAC system, Jif L it =

s has not-been isolated.

If the normal'HVAC system has l

been isolated, smoke removal is by the..SGTS system."-

3' Iniquestion 430.320 above we-pointed out the.

~

limitations.-of ventilation systems that provided onlyl three air changes per hour to function as.a smoke 4'

. removal system =during fires. Lother technical a

considerations aside (such as possibility-of soot fouling),'the' capacity of the SGTS is.so small; relative i

to the building volumes served that it is clearly:not-j capable of performing as.an effective smoke removal' v

system.

Please. describe how smoke 1 removal"from-these-1 0

. areas will be accomplished if the normal-HVAC system is t

not available.-

<!430.327 LSection 9A.4.1.1~.18 under (2) states noLcore: cooling is (9.5.1) provided in this' room,Jwhile under.(9).GE states-thats

~

"the provisions for core cooling's' stems < backup are-y definedEin-Section 9A.2.5."

-Which statement:is correct?

g 430.328 Section 9A.4.1.1.26 under (2)JstatesLyes:

l(9.5k1) safety-related, however, under (9) states', "the

' function is.not safe.y-related and-its loss is a

~ acceptable'"

Which' statement is' correct?

L's

430.329-Section.9A,.4.1.1.33, Subsection.(9) " Consequences of d

1(9?5.1)

Fire" states that " access to"the' operating handles =forf 9

iW the manually. actuated valves in the. adjacent room would-L

'be: temporarily reduced."

What does this mean and what

.is thu' postulated effect?

Are manual actions in the q

E. y!

adjacent room contemplated for safe shutdown?

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"430.330. Section 9A.'4.1'. 2.10.' Subsections (2) and[(9) are:

(9.5.1):

' mutually-ambiguous.

Is the equipment"in=this, area

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safety-related and does it provide. core; cooling?i j

'430.331. Sections - 9A. 4.1. 2.18, - 9A. 4.1. 2.19 end 9A'. 4.1'.' 2 ; 2 0. all' R

(9.5'.1);

state in Subsection (2) that equipmentcinteach roomiis b

safety-related.and provides core--cooling.

However, in.

each.. case, Subsection (9)1 states that, "thefpostulated

-fire' assumes the loss of the-function.

The function is notisafety-related and its: temporary loss is

. acceptable."

Since these statements appear to.be.

contradictory, please' clarify._

430.332' Section'9A.4.1.2.25' states in Subsection.(2) that-(9.5.1) equipment in the room is safety-related. -However,

.i

' Subsection'(9) states that,~"the function is not safety-related,.therefore the loss of thetfunction11s acceptable.".Which' statement is correct?

.430.333 Section 9A.4.1.2.32 has the'same statements as Sectioni

(9.5.1)-

H9 A. 4.1'. 2. 2 5 (Question 430.332) above and'the same l

question applies.

430.334 Section 9A.4.1.4.04 Diesel Generator A Room

- (9.5.1)

Section 9A.4.1.4.10 Diesel Generator C Room

?Section'9A.4.1.4.15 Diesel Generator B Room a.

A..See comments about CO. Protection provided for 2

Diesel Generator Room in Question.430.318 above

't relative to'the description of the manual total

. flooding CO system in Subsections (7).

l 2

4 B.: See Question-430.326'aboveirelative'to use of normal

-HVAC or SGTS systems for smoke removal..'In addition-to those concerns, we' question the: availability'of:the SGTS to'the' Diesel Generator. Rooms'.'

lt 5

4 430.335 ~Section 9A.4.1.4.26 states in' Subsection.(9)'thatLthe safety-related' valves in this area'will fail closed

~ (925.1).'

upon loss of actuation' power.

How is.this-accomplished?

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.430.336 Section 9A.4.1.5.04 DG Control Panel and Service

'A (9.5.1)

Corridor A-(Room 514).

Section 9A.4'1.5.08 DG Control

'PanelfCland Service Corridor C (Room 532).

Section 1

9A.4.1.5.16 DG Control' Panel B and Service Corridor B.

6 g

(Room 522).

Subsectiol. (9) for all three of these rooms strtes that fire could result in temporary loss of accessLtc the B 4,

. diesel generator HVAC room and that functional'Sackup FIRE PROTECTION AND STATION ~ BLACKOUT

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,is provided-~by:the.A and C diesel generators.

Although (this' subsection also states that continuous access:to-a Lthe-HVAC is not required, we question how all three.of_

j 1these: rooms (each related to a separate diesel generator unit) can cause loss.of access.to the'same Train B;l diesel generator HVAC room.

430.337 lSection 9A.4.1.5.23 - Why.is loss of the stack monitors.

- (9.5.1) as stated in Subsection (9). acceptable?

fc '-

430.338 Sections'9A.4.1.6.02 through Section'9A.4.1.6.37 -

0

( 9. 5.1) ^

Question.No. 41).326 above finds unacceptable reliance.

upon the SGTS for-smoke removal when the. normal HVAC system is not available.

Subsection (9) in eachtof o

there sections references reliance upon the SBGT which 1

we'understandito be the same~as the SGT9.

Therefore,

=

the same concerns noted in Quescion No 430.326 apply

'here also.

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430.339.Section-9A.4.1.7,01 states?in SubsectionD(2) that (9.5.1) systems in'the room are safety-related but11n.

Subsection (9) states that the functions are not safety-related.

Which statement is correct?

q 430.340 'Section 9A.4.1.7.12 states in Subsection.(9) that four-(9.5.1) divisions of the stack radiation monitors are located at the basa.of the stack-and could be lost.

Why.is it acceptable to loose all'four of these monitors?

R 430.341 Section 9A.5.1 reads as follows:

l (9.5.1).

"9A.5.1 Piping' Penetrations,. Reactor: Building Piping-penetrations through'the.drywell shell1haveLunique design considerations.

The stress and> containment

• requirements;along with the temperature: inputs to the 3

concrete' walls' leave.little_ design latitude.-

E Experience has shown that someLof these: penetrations LJ for high; energy pipingfmay noticontain a 3-hour.

b fire-resistive barrier-such'as have provided:throughout

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the other ABWR buildings.- Penetration details'are not-is available at this stage of.the plant design." "The j

b staff understands this-to.mean that GE is proposing

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<that;we approve in advance. deviations from,the

.l requirement to provide 3-hour l fire rated penetration

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seals for'certain as yet unidentified!high-energy u

piping, fThis is not acceptable.

The applicant _shouldL j,'

state their intention.to provide 3-hour fire rated' h,;t penetration seals for all high energy piping or,;as a

.i Ls minimum, state those-conditions when-such1 seals cannot

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be provided_and-what will be~ installed as'a substitute.

Sufficient technical detail must be provided to allow the staff to approve such deviations in principle.

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bM 430.342: =Section 9A.5.5.lsstates that. conduit fron the separate

(9~.5.1) divisions are; separated;from each:other t9 aset!IEEE

'384; 1The IEEEJ384-separation distances.Are primarily; to prevent ~ electrical signal interference between-or among conductors.

They do not necessarily. provide-adequate separation to satisfy fire protection needs.

This sthcement should be expanded to assure that fire

= protection' separation requirements are setisfied.

l430.343 Discus. Oonformance with the requirements of 10 CFR-

.(5.4.6) 50.63."Ioss of All Alternating Current Power," as.

(6.2.4) rela *.ed tc the support systems regarding-(1) sufficient

. (8.3.2)-

amoun? of weter (condensate storage system),-

(9.2.6)

(2) sufficient flow path and delivery system'(reactor r

(9.3.1)-

core isolation cooling system),m (3) decay. heat removal

( 9. 4.1)~

capability (automatic depressurization; system),- (4)

-(9.4.5) sufficient valve position indication and: closure (9.5.4-8) capability for containment isolation (containment T-isolatjon system),. (5) sufficient compressed air capacity for station -blackout (SBO). components _ for. core cooling and/or containment isolation (compressed air system), (6) suitable environmental conditions inside control room and,other areas served to protect personnel and SBO equipment including-instrumentation-and controls.(control room area ventilation system and engineered safety feature ventilation-system), (7) common' mode failures of sufficient-fuel oil supply,

. transport and storage recharging capability, sufficient cooling and'compressedLair, and adequate lubrication and air intake and exhaust.for the diesel engine 2'

(emergency diesel engine support systems), if used as an alternate AC power source, and (8)-battery _ capacity to assure that core'is. cooled and an appropriate SP containment' integrity:is maintained indeoendent of oreferred-and onsite emeraency'AC nower-in the event of y,

a-station blackout for the-specified duration-and recovery therefrom in accordance with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.155," station blackout, NUMARC 87-00 and NOMARC B7-00 supplementary guidanceLdated U

' December 27, 1989.

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