ML20059L183
| ML20059L183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1994 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059L176 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9402030259 | |
| Download: ML20059L183 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES i
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20E0001
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION -
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.128TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-75 PUBLIC SERVICE ELEC7F i GAS COMPANY PHILADELPHIA E
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' 9ANY DELMARVA POWER
. t COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY L MPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-311
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated August 30, 1993, the Public Service Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would replace the main feedwater control (BF-19s) and main feedwater control bypass (BF-40s) valves with the main feedwater stop check (BF-22s) valves for the containment isolation function in the Table 3.6-1 of the TS.
2.0 BACKGROUM During the initial licensing of Salem, Unit 2, the licensee identified the stop check valves in the main feedwater system for containment isolation purposes. However, in January 1981, the staff issued Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement 5 (NUREG-0517) that identified a concern with the use of the stop check valves.
The main feedwater stop check valves at Salem had local-manual operators.
In the event of an accident, environmental and/or radiological conditions could preclude operator access to the local-manual valve operator.
If the valves could not be accessed to positively close the valves, the stop check valves then functioned as a simple check valve.
General Design Criterion 57 (GDC 57) requires closed systems that penetrate the containment to have at least one containment isolation valve which shall be either automatic, or locked closed, or capable of remote manual operation.
GDC 57 further states that a simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve. Therefore, the design did not meet GDC 57. _The licensee, by letter dated August 18, 1981, proposed to install motor operators on the stop check valves with remote-manual operation from the control room or new air / electric valves in the main feedwater system as the means to meet GDC 57.
By letter dated September 30, 1981, the staff accepted the licensee's proposal. Motor operators were installed on all main feedwater stop check 9402030259 940121 ADOCK0500g1 DR 11
valves at both Salem units. However, the technical specifications were not changed to show the stop check valves as the containment isolation valves for the main feedwater system.
When the issue was raised in the 1990 time period, the licensee re-evaluated the suitability of the stop check valves for containment isolation and concluded that the remote-manual closure feature utilized non-safety related controls in the main control room. Design modifications were made to the control circuits to upgrade them to safety related.
3.0 EVALUATION The containment isolation function, as contained in Table 3.6-1 of the TS, is currently provided by the main feedwater flow control valves and main feedwater flow control bypass valves. These valves automatically close on actuation of the Reactor Trip System (safety injection or reactor trip coincident with low T
) and/or Engineered Safety Features Actuation System.
The proposal to chang,e,the containment isolation function to the main feedwater stop check valves will provide the same function without reliance on an actuation signal.
Positive closure is assured during all accident scenarios through the remote-manual controls in the main control room.
In a telephone conversation with the licensee's staff on November 10, 1993, it was determined that valves 21 - 24 BF-22 were included in the Inservice Test Program and were also included in the motor operated valve program as requested by Generic Letter 89-10.
By including the valves in these programs, there is reasonable assurance that the valves will be adequately maintained.
i Therefore, the staff concludes that the stop check valves, 21 - 24 BF-22, meet the requirements of GDC 57 and finds the proposed changes acceptable.
Two editorial changes are included: The first adds the word " supply" to the functional description of valve 22CA360 and the second changes "I CV 68 or 1 CV 69" to "2 CV 68 or 2 CV 69" in the note marked "##" on Page 3/4 6-19.
The first change is consistent with the functional description of valve 21CA360 and the second change corrects typographical errors.
The staff finds these changes acceptable.
In the note marked "+" on revised Page 3/4 6-19, in the marked up TS pages, the last sentence read " Valves open on Phase B isolation." The original TS had " Valve opens on Phase B isolation." The licensee requested that the original wording be maintained. The staff find this acceptable.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
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5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a i
facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public coment on such finding (58 FR 50974). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Comission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be' inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
J. Stone Date: January 21, 1994