ML20059D013
| ML20059D013 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1993 |
| From: | AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OLA-2-I-MFP-130, NUDOCS 9401060324 | |
| Download: ML20059D013 (17) | |
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3 poucowronMawa RaponT affestive Date: 12/31/90 l
V r fember Rev.
2.
(baality Probles Report IEU(if applicable) j Pgt 1.
NCR 8221. /
A0249624
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i 1-Ita=IActivity 52HH13 Failure to Open 6.
Referoace
'93 DCT 28 P5 Z9 5.
Description of nonconfermance I
When transferring 4KV bus H to startup power 52-HH-13 did not open:after.the startup breaker closed.
This is considered a nonconforman I iier','dAPoi5'.M l
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- 12. IICN Eva[uation Attached on the 90CR Taat Contimaation ShNts 3
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Plant Conditions III. Cause of Probles V.
Corrective Actions t
A II. In,scription of Problem IV.
Analy41s of Probles
- 71. Additional Info instion
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- 16. Eatiested
- 15. Responsible 1
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10CFRSO.73
- 17. Potentially 10CFR11
- 18. 10CFRSO.9
- 39. Reference Other I
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- 21. fine Limit
- 22. Method
- 23. Notified By
- 26. Time
- 25. Date R
R anort N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A E
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- 26. Required
- 27. Time Limit
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- 29. Date i
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- IXl N/A N/A N/A E
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9401060324 930821
. tsistritation PDR ADDCK 05000275
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O PDR j
NPC natorials PSRC Secretary 1
Manager. QA Sta tionhiys... ~enstruction Initiator Plant Manager, DCPP TES Appropriate QC 1
00MPAAC Secretary Authorised Inspector, Other j
Engineering if applicable other cMO(Off 03rd 1
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- DC2-91-EM-N095 D6 September. 2 4 ',. 1 9 9 2 i
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MANAGEMENT
SUMMARY
On October 23, 1991, while preparing to enter.Mo'de 1,-the l
Unit 2 4 kV vital bus H aux power. feeder breaker failed to open when the startup power feeder breaker was closed.
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91NCRWM91EMN095.rm Page 1
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- September 24,;1992 NCR DC2-91-EM-N095 t
Failure of Breaker 52HH13f o.Open' I.
Plant Conditions Unit 2 was in Mode:2'(Hot Standby).at'O percent power:
during plant' restart:from the. Unit 2 fourth refueling, outage.
II.
Descriotion of Event A.
Event:
On October 23, 1991,'at 2320 PDT, the' Unit 2 4 kV; vital bus ~H auxiliary feeder breaker 52HH13;(aux
'sreaker) failed to'open when the 4:kV: vital' bus H startup feeder -breaker 52HH14 '(startup breaker) was closed.
In preparation to transition Unit 2 from Mode 2'to Mode 1, the vital' busses were.being' aligned to-the.
230 kV startup1 power system to~allowLthe' auxiliary power system to be cleared-in' preparation-to-parallel the main ~ generator to the' grid.. When the bus H transfer switch was placed'in.the " Transfer--
to Startup" position, the aux' breaker is supposed-to open and the startup W eakerLis supposed to-close.
However, when1the transfer switch;was positioned, the aux' breaker failed to;open.
The startup breaker wasLopened,'and'a'second attempt was.made:to transfer from aux power;to startup power. 'Again, the' aux breaker failed.to open as designed.
The startup feeder 1 breaker,was inspected to verify that it was not damaged,'and:a third attempt-to '
~
transfer from aux power to~startup power with an.
electrician stationed at'the aux breaker. cubicle to' witness =theLattempt was made'...When the transfer switch was actuated,.the startup breaker-closed, and'immediately tripped._Overcurrent alarms on both tha aux breaker and the startup' breaker actuated when the transferiswitch was-actucted.
The~startup feeder breaker tripped open, and the aux feeder breaker! remained closed.
91NCRWM91EMN095.rm Page 2
of 15 i
l DC2-91-EM-N095 D6 September 24,.1992 The electrician observed smoke coming from the aux breaker cubicle.
The cubical was opened, and the electrician observed smoke coming from the aux breaker trip coil.
The DC knife switch for the-breaker control power was opened.
At 2355 PDT, the startup breaker cubical was opened to verify that the startup breaker wasinot damaged.
The startup breaker was inspected and verified operable on October 24, 1991, at 0100 PDT.
At 0119 PDT, Diesel Generator (DG) 2-2 was started and paralleled to bus H.
The' aux breaker was then manually opened.
At 0135 PDT, Bus H was j
paralleled to startup power.
l After the event, the aux breaker was racked out and replaced with a spara breaker..The spare l
breaker was. tested by transferring loads between aux power and startup power several= times.
The aux breaker was then disassembled.
The aux breaker trip coil showed signs of severe overheating.
It was also identified that the trip coil was slightly out of alignment.
The following i
conditions were also noted:
1.
One of the two trip prop' springs was disconnected, 2.
The spring shaft was galled, 3.
A set screw was :. iso missing on the trip latch assembly (This screw is on the trip bar end of the trip coil plunger assembly),
4.
The breaker was misaligned very slightly.
The aux breaker is a GE Magnablast ML 13 i
Air / Magnetic 4 kV 1200 A circuit breaker.
B.
Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event:
1 None.
l l
C.
Dates and Approximate Times for Major Occurrences:
i 1.
October 23, 1991; 2320 PDT: Event / Discovery date - 4 kV aux ~
91NCRWM93DOim.rm Page 3
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l-1 DC2-91-EM-NO95 D6 September 24, 1992 feeder breaker failed to.open.
D.
Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected:
None.
t E.
Method of Discovery:
The event was immediately-apparent to plant operators due to alarms and indicationsfreceived-in the control room.
The following control room' indications were observed during the event.
The first time the transfer switch was placed in the " Transfer to
-Startup" position,-the red-light'for startup:
feeder breaker came on and the red light for aux.
a feeder breaker went out.
When the switch"was; released, the red. light ~for the' aux. feeder:came on and the-red light for startup feeder remained-on.
The transfer switch was then;placed back'in the " Transfer to aux" and the green light came on for the startup feeder.
Both red lights'were on l
for approximately 2 to 3-seconds.
The second time the-transfer switchLwas placed'in i
the " Transfer to S/U." position, indications.
observed were similar to above.-
Both' red lights-were on for approximately 5 seconds..
The third tire the transfer switch was placed in the " Transfer to.S/U." position,. blue lights and overcurrent alarms werefimmediately' observed on both breakers.
The bus remained energized.
Red lights;for both' breakers,were out and a green light on startup. breaker came on.
F.
Operators Actions:-
i None.
G.
Safety System Responses:
None.
91NCRWM91EMN095.MN Paga 4
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k DC2-91-EM-N095 D6 September 24,.1992 l
III.
Cause of the Event A.
Immediate Cause:
l The immediate cause-of the problem was determined to be misalignment of the trip coil.
f B.
Determination of-Cause:
1.
Human Factors:
1 a.
Communications: N/A.
b.
Procedures:.
i Is the procedure used-for the j
maintenance of the breaker adequate?-
MP E-63.1A does.not discuss'a method' for alignment of the breaker trip coil.
However, this event is the only i
occurrence of trip coil misalignment' to date.
l c.
Training:
l Have the electricians been trained-on the installation of'the trip' coil?
-l Training is completed via the 3
maintenance procedures,.which; l
previously did not address this installation.
l d.
Human Factors:
N/A.
l e.
Management System:
N/A.
2.
Equipment / Material:
a.
Material Degradation:
-N/A.
b.
Design:
Is the design of'the. trip coil adequate to assure that it'will trip the breaker?
I 91NCRvm91EMN095.PD4 Page 5
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September 24, 1992 l
When properly aligned with specified free travel, the trip coil will trip the breaker.
.c.
Installation:
Was the trip coil correctly installed during its last maintenance period?
The trip coil was not shimmed correctly during the breaker' overhaul during 2R4.
The misalignment of the trip coil would-not cause the breaker j
to fail to trip when first' cycled.
l The breaker would have to be cycled to i
cause the misalignment which could l
bind the t;-ip coil armature and reduce l
.the free travel distance.
- However, the misalignment would occur within the first few cycles for the breaker.
d.
Manufacturing:
N/A.
l e.
Preventive Maintenance: N/A.
f.
Testing:-
N/A.
g.
End-of-life failn"e:
.N/A.
C.
Root Cause:
The root cause was determined to be inadequate procedural guidance to properly install the-breaker trip coil.
D.
Contributory Cause:
A contributory cause was inadequate communication between the vendor and PG&E'on proper alignment i
techniques for the breaker.
Thorough inspections and testing of the aux breaker.that malfunctioned and similar 4kV 1
breakers were made to determine what contributory causes may exist.
Invastigations identified no significant problems related to this breaker other than the poor alignment of the trip coil.
Testing _
91NCR%7.91EMN095.rm Page 6
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\\c DC2-91-EM-N095 D6 September 24, 1992-has confirmed that insufficient travel of the l
armature could prevent the breaker from tripping.
i It was also determined that'if the trip coil is misaligned the armature can hang up when the coil deenergizes.
This would reduce the. travel of the armature and possibly prevent the breaker from, opening during the next operation.
This failure mode would allow the breaker to' operate during the first operation but the second operation would be impeded due to restriction of the armature travel.
If this condition-exists it would be apparent during the second operation following an overhaul which included the adjustment or replacement of this coil.
Based on this logic it is reasonable j
to assume that any breaker which has operated i
properly three times since being overhauled wil3 l
not fail as a result of a misaligned coil and.that any failure during a later operation would.be purely random and not related to this problem.
This misaligned-coil.was identified and tested during 2R4 which allowed similar breakers in unit 2 which were-overhauled during 2R4 to be inspected
)
and verified as' operable.
A review was made of the operational history of all Unit i vital 4 kV breakers since last overhauled.
The 480V feeder, l
the 4kV start up feeder and the.4kV aux feeder breakers are operated less.than other breakers and were, therefore, investigated.
AE # 02 on A0249974 provides a history of these breakers-since last overhaulc2 and an estimated number of operations which provides sufficient' justification l
that these breakers have been operated sufficiently to eliminate the possibility that an incorrectly installed trip coil exists.
The remaining unit 1 breakers are routinely tested which assures operability. ~ Sufficient. operations have been demonstrated for all breakers not inspected in unit 1 and unit 2 to assure operability.
Breakers were not inspected at power i
due to personnel safety concerns and the certainty that sufficient margin exists in the number of i
operations provided for these breakers to assure l
these breakers will not fail due to a misaligned trip coil.
IV.
Analysis of the Event 91NCR%7.91EMN095.MN Page 7
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i DC2-91-EM-N095 D6 l
September 24,71992
)
A.
Safety Analysis:
l l
The aux breaker provides connection /ssparation
?
function between the plant aux power system and a R
vital bus.
There is one. aux breaker for each i
vital bus.
The aux breaker is. designed to open i
when a manual or automatic transfer to startup i
power occurs, or to isolate a bus in the event of a fault.
If startup power is not available, the e
l breaker'is required to be open to allow 12un diesel j
generator-(DG) to pick up the. load ~of the vital l
bus.
The. aux breaker would.be required to open-in i
the event of a loss of power to the 500 kV power
[
system or a faulted condition in'the 500-kV. power j
system.
If the aux breaker did not open during a' transfer i
to startup power, both the startup and auxiliary j
power systems would be momentarily aligned.
If both the aux and startup power systems were _
[
energized, circulating current between.the busses i
would result in an overcurrent condition.for_the-i breakers, and the startup-breaker would open.
The I
vital' bus associated with the aux breaker would-l still be energized by;the aux power system..The i
aux breaker could be manually opened under1these l
circumstances.
l If the aux power system was not energized.as the i
result of a ground fault, the startup breaker would close, connecting-the 230 kV system and the faulted aux rower system.
The'230 kv system would feed the fault until the startup feeder. breaker I
tripped on overcurrent.
At this time, an l
undervoltage condition would exist on the. vital.
l 5
i bus, and~the DG would be required to pick up the
{
load of the vital bus.
However,1the DG1would be j
unable to pick up the load of the bus because the j
aux breaker must be opened before the DG can be l
loaded onto the vital bus.
Under this worst case j
condition, one plant vital bus and its associated j
equipment would be inoperable.
i Each unit has two DGs with a swing DG between the l
l units.
In the event of a loss of one vital. bus, the other two vital busses would have been-operable.
Each unit can be' shutdown'and 1
91NCRWP\\91DOOS.MN Page 8
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DC2-91-EM-N095fD6 j'
September 24, 1992 3
maintained in a safe condition with two vital 4
4 l
busses per unit available.
4 Since,:aach unit ~can be shutdown and maintained'in-a safe-condition with two vital; busses, and two 1
vital busses.were available, the health and safety?
1 of the public were not affected by this event.
4 l
B.
Rcportability:
1.
Reviewed-under QAP-15.B and.datermined'to-b's non-conforming in accordance'with'Section j
2.l.8.
-i i
i 2.
Reviewed under 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR'50.73 3
per NUREG 1022 and determined-tolnot be i
reportable'in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.
The loss of-one vital bus does notLprevent the j
operators from shutting _downLthe unit or' l
maintaining it in a' safe condition.
t Additionally,~no.date previousito the failure-of the breaker could.be identified as a likely l
, event date.
Thrae oraf thefevent and v
discovery date are coincidentLin accordance j
'with NUREG 1022.- The appropriate actions were j
taken when-the breaker was identified as.
)I 3.
This problem does not require a 10-CFRS21' l
report.
The problem is the result'of maintenance, and not the' design.
The breaker j
functions properly when' maintained. correctly.
i j
4.
This problem does not require reportingLvialan.
]
i INPO Nuclear Network entry.
l' 1
S.
Reviewed under 10 CFR 50.9 and determined to i
be not reportable since'this event 1does not' i
have a significant implication for public health and safety or common' defense and j
security.
1 i
6.
Reviewed under the criteria of AP C-22 l
requiring the issue and. approval offa'JCO and determined that no-JCofis. required.
V.
Corrective Actions' j
l l
91NCRWM91DOO5m Page 9
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DC2-91-EM-N095 D6 September 24, 1992 A.
Immediate Corrective Actions:.
1.
.Mn Operations shift order..was: issued to manually trip the aux feeder breakers if they do not-trip electrically.-
)
2.
Aux breaker 52HH13 was replaced'with a spara j
breaker and verified operable.
i 3.
All recently overhauled Unit 2 Magnablast i
breakers were inspected for proper trip coil alignment.
All the inspected breakers had properly aligned trip coils.
R 4.
Extensive troubleshooting.and' testing'was which verified that a reduced free travel ofc
~
performed on the removed aux feeder. breaker the trip coil armature.would prevent the breaker from' opening and that a misaligned trip' coil could' reduce the free travel. - A thorough inspection.could identify no other-problems with'this breaker.or control circuitry.
B.
Investigative Actions:
1.
Obtain information on the installation-of.the trip coil from the vcr. dor.
RESPONSIBILITY: S' Foat COMPLETE DEPARTMENT:' Electrical Maintenance.(PGMLi l
Tracking AR: A0249974, AE # 01 2.
Determine the number of times the Unit 11480V J
feeder, 4 kVLStartup feeder, and 4 kV' Aux' feeder breakers have been cycled 1since their.
last overhaul.
j RESPONSIBILITY: G. Cecchi.
COMPLETE DEPARTMENT: ' Electrical. Maintenance :. (PGEM)-
Tracking-AR: A0249974, AE"# 02' 3.
Investigate maintenance practices 1for trip; coils in GE Magnablast breakers at other nuclear power plants.
RESPONSIBILITY:'P. Colbert COMPLETE 91MCRW91EMN0ps.rm Page 10 of 15 m..
'DC2-91-EM-N095 D6'
- September ~24,11992' DEPARTMENT: NECS/OPEG (NCFE) j Tracking:AR:.A0249974, AE # 03 4.
. Submit a NOMIS question?toLthe'NOMIS; bulletin board.
RESPONSIBILITY: C.?Pendleton-COMPLETE DEPARTMENT: System' Engineering (PTEB)-
Tracking.AR: A024997.4','AE_#L04 5.
Determine'the recent' operating. history of-breaker 52HH13.
I RESPONSIBILITY:1 G. Cecchi.
. COMPLETE-DEPARTMENT: Electrical Maintenance-(PGEM)!
' Tracking lAR: -A0249974, AE # 06' 6.
Investigate OE status; establish.and justify that an OE11s.not required or. facilitate the-issue of the OE.
RESPONSIBILITY:.J..Nolan.
COMPLETE-DEPARTMENT: Regulatory Compliance 1(PTRC);
Tracking AR:'A0249974,:AE.# 07 7.
Provide an enhanced rooticause: analysis.-
COMPLETE' RESPONSIBILITY:'G.:Cecchi DEPARTMENT:' Electrical / Maintenance-(PGEM).
Tracking AR: A0249974,.AE # 08-l i
C.
Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:
1.
MP E-63.1C, " Overhaul of 4'and.12:kV.
Magnablast Circuit; Breakers," ;willibe revised-to provide more specificiguidance'on'the-installation of.the breaker trip coil. :NP E-63.1A, " Maintenance of 4 kV;Magna-Blast Circuit Breakers":willEalso be revised to include-the same information.
Ensure compatibility betweeniMPLE-63.1C-and'E-63.1A1 and vendor' recommendations'.
4 RESPONSIBILITY:
S.
Foat COMPLETE-DEPARTMENT:' Electrical: Maintenance (PGMB)'
Tracking'AR: A0249974,"AE'#'05 Outage Related?,No 91NCRWM91Pm095m Page 11 of. 15
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DC2-91-EM-NO95 D6 September. 24,-1992 JCO Related?
No NRC Commitment? No CMD Commitment? Yes D.
Prudent Actions (not required for NCR closure):
None.
VI.
Additional Information
[
A.
Failed Components:
i None.
I B.
Previous Similar Events:
?
NCR DC2-87-EM-N043 RHR' Pump 2-2:
The root cause of NCR DC2-87-EM-N043 was misalignment of the breaker release solenoid.. The misalignment-prevented the coil trip springs from charging.
C.
Operating Experience Review:.
1.
NPRDS:
Not applicable.
2.
NRC Information Notices,' Bulletins,-Generic Letters:
A search of the OEA database was performed to identify any past concerns with GE circuit l
breakers.
The search did not identify any past problems with misalignment of. trip'ccils.
j t
3.
A search of the OEA database was performed to identify any past' concerns with;GE cikcuiti breakers.
The search did not identify any past problems with misalignment of trip coils..
]a D.
Trend Code:-
I
.EM (Electrical Maintenance) - A (personnel' error),
1 91NCRWP\\91Beens Page 12 of-15
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.DC2-91-EM-N095:D6 l
September 24,11992 B2 (procedure deficiency; procedure. incomplete).
E.
Corrective ActionLTracking:.
1.
The tracking action request 11s A0249974.
F.
Footnotes'and Special Comments:
None.
G.
References:
- 1.. Initiating Action Request A0249624.
2.
Shift Foreman's Logs dated 10/23/91 3.
-NCR~DC2-87-EM-N043 H.
TRG Meeting _ Minutes:.
1.-
On October 30,11991,._the1TRG convened and-considered the following:
a '.
The TRG discussed 1the: investigation?
performed ~during the disassembly of the
. breaker..The TRG also discussed;the operationLof the trip ~ coil:of.the' breaker..
b.
The TRG assigned.several investigative.
actions.
c.
The TRG determined'theiroot;cause and the immediate.cause.
d.
The TRG discussed the reportability of the event.
The TRG will reconvene on 11/13 to discuss a.
'the results of the investigative actions.
2.
On November'13, 1991, the-TRG reconvened an'd considered the following:'
a.
The TRG discussed the'results of the investigative actions.. The feeder breakers on busses FLand G-have experienced several.hundred cycles prior 91NCRW91EMNOD$.FTN
_Page 13 of 15
l DC2-91-EM-N095 D6 September 24,'1992 to the last overhaul. -Further investigation is needed to. determine ~tho' history of'the bus H breakers'.
b.
The TRG identified NCR DC2-87-EM-N047 as a potentially similar NCR.
This NCR dealt with' binding'of1the closing coil.
.c.
The TRG discussed the responses to the J
NOMIS. question and the. contacts;with other nuclear power plants.
Neither action;has produced any useful information yet.
d.
The TRG will reconvene on December 4, 1991, to discuss the results of the investigative actions.
3.
On February 21, 1992,1the TRG: reconvened'in room 3021of the administration building at 1:00 pm PST to' discuss 1the results of.
investigative actions taken to date.-
i r
Additional discussion took place-regardingL what indicators provide confidence that a reassembled breaker will continue'to function t
acceptably;following^the first fewfoperational cycles.
.The more successful cycles thei breaker experiences'the greater confidence level it provides.
Electrical Maintenance to provide al root cause.
u analysis.-
l The estimated closure date of this NCR is May j
l 29, 1992.
j 4.
On September 24, 1992, the TRG' reconvened-in room'4241of the administration building at 1:00 pm'PDT to review'the: revised ~ safety.
evaluation for this NCR priortto resubmittal to the'PSRC.
~The TRG~ members.present concurred'with the: revised content of the,
safetyfevaluation andLresigned the NCR._ This NCR will be representedJto'the PSRC at the
- )
earliest' opportunity for' approval.and closure.
I.
Remarks:
i 9mCRWM91DeOS rm.
Page-14 of 15 j
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DC2-91-EM-N095 D6'-
. September.24, 1992
-l I
None.
J.
Attachment (s):
Root ~Cause Analysis
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03:46 mensay. OcteRet 5. 1993 1 l
l WifK uuMSER 2 l
' PERF08MANCE STATI$f!CS 1R5 WEf elf ACTIVITY COUNf 3 265[P92 THROUGH 020CT92 attwurICAL DEPARimint BY 70RinAn GROUP A GROUP B GROUP G G800P E GWUP F GROUP C GROUP O GROUP H l
TA MET TARGli TARGIT TARGET TARGET NOT $CHO IMERGluf COMPLETE l
WRK WAK WRK WRK WAK IUT WAK SIFORE PORG CouPLift 0(PRIM RESCH[0 ELL (0 ComPL[f(
ConPLEft TARG[T l
PEMOMP l112 l 32 295l 0 l 46 415l 32 295l 12 l 8 l 4
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l PGNONW l 44 l 17 395l 0 l 11 25s[ 15 34sl 2 l 13 l 2 l
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PEM0M1 l 95 l 40 425l 0 l 15 losl 39 415l 13 l 15 l 1
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l PGMOM3 l107 l 46 43sl 0 l 20 265l 29 275[ 4 l 23 l 1 l
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PEmon$
l 16 l
6 385l 0 l 3 195l 7 445l 4 l 1 l 0
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PGm0M8 j150 l 60 405l 0 l 23 155l $9 395l 6 l 18 l 1 l
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PEMOM9 '
l 87 l !$ 295) 0 l 9 105l 53 615l 10 l 0 l-0 l
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