ML20059A472
| ML20059A472 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1993 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059A461 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9312300211 | |
| Download: ML20059A472 (20) | |
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Attachment I to JPN-93-082
- PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES TO REFLECT A FULL AREA FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM IN THE EAST AND WEST CABLE TUNNELS (JPTS-92-019)
New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 9312300211 DR 931222 #
ADOCK 05000333 4 ,
PDR g, _
JAFNPP 3.12 and 4.12 BASES The Fire Protection System specifications provide pre-established protected areas, spray or sprinklers are inoperable continuous minimum levels of operability to assure adequate fire protection fire detection and backup fire protection equipment is available during any operating condition including a design basis accident or in the area where the water spray and/or sprinkler protection safe shutdown earthquake, was lost.
A. The high pressure water fire protection system is supplied by Table 4.12.1 specifies tests and inspections to detect nozzle redundant vertical turbine pumps, one diesel driven and one blockage or breakage, to verify header integrity, and to ensure electric motor driven, each design rated 2500 gpm at 125 psig valve operability. Surveillance for flow alarm check valves in discharge pressure. Both pumps take suction from the plant wet pipe sprinkler systems is performed by providing sufficient intake cooling water structures from Lake Ontario. The high flow through the valve to activate the alarm. Full cycling is pressure water fire protection header is normally maintained at not required since the flow alarm check valves are not greater than 115 psig by a pressure maintenance subsystem. designed to latch open.
If pressure decreases, the fire pumps are automatically started by their initiation logic to maintain the fire protection system C. The carbon dioxide systems provide total flood protection for header pressure. Each pump, together with its manual and eight different safety related areas of the plant from either a 3 automatic initiation logic combined makes up a redundant high ton or 10 ton storage unit as indicated in Table 3.12.2. Both pressure water fire pump. CO, storage units are equipped with mechanical refrigeration units to maintain the storage tank content at O'F with a A third fire pump, diesel-driven, has been installed and is set to resultant pressure of 300 psig. Automatic smoke and heat automatically actuate upon decreasing pressure after the detectors are provided in the CO, protected areas and initiation actuation of the first two fire pumps. No credit is taken for is automatic and/or manual as indicated in Table 3.12.2. For this pump in any analyses and the requirements of Technical any area in which the CO, protection is made or found to be Specifications 3.12 and 4.12 do not apply. inoperable, continuous fire detection is available and one or more large wheeled CO2 fire extinguisher is also available for Pressure Maintenance subsystem checks, valve position each area in which protection was lost.
checks, system flushes and comprehensive pump and system flow and/or performance tests including logic and starting Weekly checks of storage tank pressure and level verify proper subsystem tests provide for the early detection and correction operation of the tank refrigeration units and availability of of component failures thus ensuring high levels of operability. sufficient volume of CO, to extinguish a fire in any of the protected areas.
B. Safety related equipment areas protected by water spray or sprinklers are listed in _ Table 3.12.1. Whenever any of the Amendment No. 3',2,176,100, 244h
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JAFNPP -
TABLE 3.12.1
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WATER SPRAY / SPRINKLER PROTECTED AREAS AREA FIRE DETECTION TYPE PROTECTION (3) TYPE INITIATION
- 1) West Cable Tunnel lonization Device Fusible Link Sprinklers / Automatic Frangible Element Nozzles
- 2) East Cable Tunnel Ionization Device Fusible Link Sprinklers / Automatic Frangible Element Nozzles
- 3) Recir.:ulation MG Room Electric Heat Activated Device Fusible Link Sprinklers Automatic / Manual
- 4) Emet gency Diesels (1) Electric Heat Activated Device Fusible Unk Sprinklers Automatic / Manual
- 5) HPCI Electric Heat Activated Device Water Spray Manual
- 6) RCIC Electric Heat Activated Device Water Spray Manual
- 7) Standby Gas Treatment Trains (2) Electric Heat Activated Device Water Spray Manual
- 8) West Diesel Fire Pump Room lonization Device Fusible Link Sprinklers Automatic l
- 9) Battery Room Corridor Ionization Device Fusible Link Sprinklers Automatic l Notes for Table 3.12.1
- 1. Each of two (2) Emergency Diesel Generator Systems is a separate protected area, each system contains two (2) separate rooms.
- 2. Each of two (2) Standby Gas Treatment trains is a separate area.
- 3. All areas are also protected by fire hoses and portable dry chemical and/or CO2 fire extinguishers.
Amendment No. 31,'42,1867 244j
JAFNPP .
TABLE 4.12.1 .
WATER SPRAY / SPRINKLER SYSTEM TESTS CYCLING SPRAY NOZZLE HEADER INTEGRITY NOZZLE AIR AREA EACH VALVE INSPECTION INSPECTION FLOW TEST
- 1) West Cable Tunnel Once/6 Months'" N/A Once/1.5 Years N/A l
- 2) East Cable Tunnel Once/6 Months"' N/A Once/1.5 Years N/A l
- 3) Recirculation MG Room Once/6 Months N/A Once/1.5 Years N/A
- 4) Emergency Diesel Rooms Once/6 Months N/A Once/1.5 Years N/A
- 5) HPCI Once/6 Months Once/1.5 Years Once/1.5 Years Once/3 Years
- 6) RCIC Once/6 Months Once/1.5 Years Once/1.5 Years Once/3 Years
- 7) Standby Gas Treatment Trains Once/6 Months Once/1.5 Years Once/1.5 Years Once/3 Years
- 8) West Diesel Fire Pump Room None N/A Once/1.5 Years N/A l
- 9) Battery Room Corridor Once/6 Months"' N/A Once/1.5 Years N/A l Notes for Table 4.12.1
- 1. These are wet pipe systems which contain flow alarm check valves. The surveillance for flow alarm check valves is performed by providing sufficient flow through the valve to activate the alarm. Full valve cycling is not required.
Amendment No. 31,#42,'867 244q
Attachment il to JPN-93-082 i
SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES TO REFLECT A FULL AREA FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM IN THE EAST AND WEST CABLE TUNNELS (JPTS-92-01_9_)
- l. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES This application for an amendment to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications adds Operability and Surveillance Requirements to Tables 3.12.1 and '
4.12.1 and clarifies the associated Bases to reflect the installation of a full area fire suppression system in the east and west cable tunnels. The application also changes other parts of Tables 3.12.1 and 4.12.1 to be consistent with the proposed changes.
The changes to the Technical Specifications are addressed below.
Minor changes in format, such as type font, margins or hyphenation, are not described in this submittal. These changes are typographical in nature and do not affect the content of the Technical Specifications.
Dae 244h. Bases 3.12 and 4.12. Section B Replace the second paragraph with " Table 4.12.1 specifies tests and inspections to '
detect nozzle blockage or breakage, to verify header integrity, and to ensure valve operability. Surveillance for flow alarm check valves in wet pipe sprinkler systems is performed by providing sufficient flow through the valve to activate the alarm. Full cycling is not required since the flow alarm check valves are not designed to latch open."
Dae 244i. Bases 3.12 and 4.12. Section E At the end of the first paragraph, add " Wet pipe flow alarms are not depended upon for fire detection. Fire detection surveillance testing is therefore not required for wet pipe flow alarms by the Technical Specification."
Paae 244i. Table 3.12.1 Replace the contents of item 1 with the following information:
Area: West Cable Tunnel Fire Detection: lonization Device ,
Type Protection: Fusible Unk Sprinklers / Frangible Element Nozzles Type initiation: Automatic Replace the contents of item 2 with the following information:
Area: East Cable Tunnel i Fire Detection: lonization Device Type Protection: Fusible Link Sprinklers / Frangible Element Nozzles Type initiation: Automatic 9
Attachment 11 to JPN-93-082
. SAFETY EVALUATION Page 2 of 9 Replace the contents of item 8 with the following information:
Area: West Diesel Fire Pump Room Fire Detection: lonization Device Type Protection: Fusible Link Sprinklers Type Initiation: Automatic Replace the contents of item 9 with the following information:
Area: Battery Room Corridor ;
Fire Detection: lonization Device Type Protection: Fusible Link Sprinklers Type Initiation: Automatic Pace 2440. Table 4.12.1 Replace the contents of item 1 with the following information:
Area: West Cable Tunnel Cycling Each Valve: Once/6 Months"'
Spray Nozzle inspection: N/A Header Integrity inspection: Once/1.5 Years Nozzle Air Flow Test: N/A Replace the contents of item 2 with the following information:
Area: East Cable Tunnel Cycling Each Valve: Once/6 Months"'
Spray Nozzle inspection: N/A Header Integrity inspection: Once/1.5 Years Nozzle Air Flow Test: N/A Replace the contents of item 9 with the following information: ;
Area: Battery Room Corridor Cycling Each Valve: Once/6 Months"'
Spray Nozzle Inspection: N/A tieader Integrity inspection: Once/1.5 Years Nozzle Air Flow Test: N/A Revise note 1 by deleting " Wet pipe sprinkler system" and adding "These are wet pipe systems which contain flow alarm check valves. The surveillance for flow alarm check valves is performed by providing sufficient flow through the valve to activate the alarm. Full valve cycling is not required."
For item 8, delete the footnote identifier "(1)".
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Attachment il to JPM-93-082
- . SAFETY EVALUATION
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. t II. PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES ,
I The purpose of the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications is to add LCOs (Limiting Condition for Operation) and Surveillance Requirements to Tables 3.12.1 ;
and 4.12.1 and clarify the associated Bases to reflect the installation of a new full e area fire suppression system to the east and west cable tunnels. The proposed .
changes also correct other portions of Tables 3.12.1 and 4.12.1 for consistency with changes made to reflect the east and west cable tunnel modifications.
The fire suppression systems in the east and west cable tunnels were declared administratively inoperable on January 15,1992. The Authority reported this in Licensing Event Report 92-004-00 (Reference 1). A review of the hydraulic design calculations indicated that the sprinkler system did not provide coverage to some cable trays and the sprinkler head orientation did not provide full coverage of the cable trays where it was installed. The Authority has been granted an exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections lil G.2 and Ill.G.3 (Reference 2) for completion of this modification.
The modification replaces the existing cable tray deluge system, associated flow l control valves, heat detectors, conduits, cables and manual pull ooxes with one l automatic wet pipe system per tunnel. Three zones of smoke detection per tunnel will remain. Each wet pipe system will be connected to a fire suppression header through a six inch line with an outside stem and yoke (OS&Y) valve for isolation. The ,
new system uses a flow alarm check valve to indicate system actuation. Fire will be indicated by alarms from the smoke detectors. 4 I
Ill. SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications have no adverse safety implications. The new east and west cable tunnel suppression systems improve the ability of the plant's fire protection system to suppress fires. The design and installation of the new system is in accordance with fire protection program requirements. The proposed Surveillance Requirements clarify the Technical Specifications and increases the number of components subject to Surveillance Requirements. The Technical Specifications remain consistent with the guidance provided in the Standard Technica' Specifications (Reference 3) or current plant requirements. The changes do not alter the conclusions of the FitzPatrick accident analyses as documented in the FSAR or the NRC staff's SER.
t Safety Benefit The new wet pipe design is an improvement over the old system design. There is an ,
increase in the suppression capability for the cable trays by the addition of directional l frangible element nozzles. The new system is more reliable because there are no ;
valves that must receive an actuation signal to operate to provide flow. The system is automatically actuated when local heat levels reach a predetermined level. Only i the flow alarm check valve is required to actuate. The OS&Y valve, used to isolate
- the system from the header,is normally open. Fusible link sprink.lers and frangible i
Attachment 11 to JPN-93-082 ;
SAFETY EVALUATION Page 4 of 9 i
element nozzles provide a sectionalized fire suppression capability and reduce the potential for flooding in the tunnels, i
Design, Analysis and Installation The new fire suppression system was designed, analyzed, and installed in accordance with the FitzPatrick Fire Protection Program requirements. Specific design, and analysis and installation information related to the conclusions in the modification safety evaluations include the follewing:
- 1. Seismic failure of the new fire suppression system which could affect safety related equipment is prevented by design (Reference 4).
- 2. Adequate drainage is provided by existing drain lines and a drain line to be added to the east cable tunnel to accommodate worst case flow in either the east or west cable tunnel (References 5 and 6). Cable immersion poses no safety concern (References 4 and 7),
- 3. Water damage due to events such as inadvertent actuation, seismically induced pipe cracks or moderate energy pipe cracks will not affect the ability of the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown from the control room (References 4, 5, 6, and 7).
- 4. The fire detection system is designed, installed and tested in accordance with NFPA 72-1990 (Reference 8). The system will provide suppression spray coverage for the plant to meet design requirements of NFPA 13-1991 and 15-1990 (References 9 and 10).
Limiting Conditions for Operation The Limiting Condition for Operation for water spray and sprinkler systems, Specification 3.12.B and smoke and heat detectors, Specification 3.12.E, apply to the systems in the areas listed on Table 3.12.1. The systems in the east and west cable tunnels are currently listed in Table 3.12.1 and subject to the Limiting Conditions for Operation in Specifications 3.12.B and 3.12.E. The operating restrictions and reporting requirements are not altered by this proposed revision.
The new system will be a wet pipe system like those in the west diesel fire pump room and the battery room corridor. The system will have a flow alarm to meet the requirements of NFPA 13-1991.
lonizing devices, but not flow alarms, will be added to the fire detection column of Table 3.12.1 Only the ionization devices are required for detection. NFPA 13-1991 and NFPA 72E-1990 (References 9 and 11 respectively) do not require flow alarms to '
be used for fire detection. Flow alarms are provided to indicate system flow which can come from fire or inadvertent operation. For consistency, the sprinkler flow alarms listed on Table 3.12.1 under fire detection for the west diesel fire pump room and the battery room corridor are being removed. Also, ionization devices are being added to Table 3.12.1 to reflect the presence of fire detectors in the west diesel fire
4 Attachment il to JPN-93-082 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 5 of 9 pump room. These fire detectors were not added to the Technical Specifications when they were installed.
Deleting flow alarms does not reduce the ability of the plant to detect fires since detection is the purpose of the ionization devices in the east and west cable tunnels, the west diesel fire pump room and the battery room corridor. The addition of the ionization devices to the fire detection column on Table 3.12.1 for the west diesel fire pump room reflects their installation to meet NFPA 72E-1990 and provides an equivalent level of protection for fire detection to that installed in r,ther fire areas.
Surveillance Requirements The Surveillance Requirements for water spray and sprinkler systems, Specification 4.12.B, are identified on Table 4.12.1. Surveillance Requirements for smoke and heat detectors, Specification 4.12.E, are identified on Table 3.12.1. The proposed changes affect both tables: (1) flow alarms are removed from the fire detection column of Table 3.12.1: (2) the valves subject to cycling on Table 4.12.1 have been redefined to include flow alarm check valves; and, (3) requirements for spray nozzle inspections and air flow tests have been removed. These Surveillance Requirements are based on current plant practice, Standard Technical Specifications (Reference 3),
and/or NFPA requirements.
- 1. Flow Alarms Flow alarms were not added to the fire detection column in Table 3.12.1 for the east and west cable tunnel modifications and were removed from other wet pipe systems since ionization devices are used to detect fire. This change has no affect on plant safety since Specification 4.12.E has no Surveillance Requirement for flow alarms.
- 2. Valve Cycling The new east and west cable tunnel suppression systems will have two valves in each system. One is the OS&Y manualisolation valve between the header and the manifold. The second is the flow alarm check valve downstream of the isolation valve.
The OS&Y valves are used to isolate the east and west cable tunnel '
suppression system manifold from the distribution system. The OS&Y valves are tested under Specifications 4.12.A.1.c and since they are included in the High Pressure Water Fire Protection System by Specification 3.12.A.1.b ("The high pressure water fire protection system shall be operable ... to the ... first valve ahead of the water flow alarm device on each sprinkler, or spray system riser required to be operable per specification 3.12.B ...*). This is consistent with past practice (References 12 and 13). The proposed change will require annual cycling and monthly position verification consistent with NFPA 25-1992 (Reference 14) and Section 4.7.7.2 of the Standard Technical Specifications.
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l Attachm:nt 11 to JPN-93-082 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 6 of 9 The flow alarm check valves are used to detect flow due to a fire or other cause. The flow alarm check valves are not normally considered testable by cycling because there is no instrumentation to verify full cycle movement and valve design does not require them to latch when fully open. Testing performed to meet NFPA 25-1992 simulates the approximate flow through one nozzle and confirms that this flow is sufficient to actuate the flow alarm.
The proposed change requires testing every 6 months by cycling but clarifies that this does not imply full cycling. The testing frequency is consistent with current Technical Specifications and exceeds the annual testing frequency of Section 4.7.7.2 of the Standard Technical Specification. The frequency is less frequent than the quarterly testing required by NFPA 25-1992.
The Surveillance Requirement for the battery room corridor will be revised for consistency.
The west diesel fire pump room uses a paddle rather than a check valve for flow alarm so no surveillance will be required. ,
- 3. Spray Nozzle inspections and Air Flow Tests These Surveillance Requirements are deleted since the open head sprays are being removed. These inspections and tests were originally performed to '
confirm that the open nozzles of a dry pipe fire suppression system were not obstructed. The new suppression system is a wet pipe system with closed sprinklers. Deleting the spray nozzle inspections and nozzle air flow testing surveillance requirements for the modified east and west cable tunnel suppression systems makes them consistent with NRC accepted established plant practice for similar fire protection systems at FitzPatrick.
- 4. Header integrity inspections The Surveillance Requirement to inspect the header integrity once per 1.5 years is not part of the proposed change because the existing header is retained. The current Surveillance Requirement is longer than NFPA 15-1990 which requires annual inspection but is consistent with NRC guidance provided by Section 3/4.7.7.1 of the Standard Technical Specifications (Reference 3).
Bases Sections B and E in Bases 3.12 and 4.12 discuss the sprinklers and fire detection systems. The proposed revision clarifies that flow alarm check valves are not fully !
cycled to meet the Surveillance Requirements. The proposed change applies to the flow alarm check valve in the east and west cable tunnels and the battery room -
corridor. The West Diesel Fire Pump Room uses a paddle rather than a check va:ve to .
alarm flow and was never subject to the Surveillance Requirement.
Attachmsnt 11 to JPN-93-082 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 7 of 9 IV. EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION r Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed Amendment would ,
not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since it would not: ,
- 1. involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. [
The proposed changes revise the Technical Specifications to incorporate a modification to the James A. FitzPatrick Fire Protection System and to make >
existing Technical Specifications consistent with the specifications proposed for i the modification. The modification will improve the ability of the plant's fire protection system to detect and suppress fires. The modified system has been designed, analyzed and constructed in accordance with fire protection system requirements. These changes to the Technical Specifications assure that the modified system is operable by periodic surveillance and that required actions are taken if it is not available. The surveillance requirements meet or exceed past requirements.
- 2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously "
evaluated.
The only potential for a new or different type of accident arises from different failure mechanisms of the system. An analysis of flooding has demonstrated that there are no associated failures of shutdown equipment. The new system has been designed and constructed so that there is no damage to safety related ;
equipment due to missiles or water spray. The modification to the fire protection ;
system provides additional protection for possible fires in the east and west cable !
tunnels through increased spray coverage. There are no changes to plant operations or operating procedures other than Surveillance Reauirementa. The Surveillance Requirements are consistent with past plant practices and industry codes and standards.
- 3. involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The piping has been designed and constructed to prevent damage to safety related equipment due to missiles or water spray during a seismic event. The modification improves the plant's capability to detect and suppress fires. The potential for flooding or water damage has been evaluated and does not result in failure of shutdown equipment. The LCO and Surveillance Requirements meet or exceed past practice. This change results in no reduction in the margin of safety.
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Attachm:nt 11 to JPN-93-082 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 8 of 9 V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES These proposed changes will not affect the ALARA Program at the FitzPatrick plant, nor will they impact the environment. The Surveillance Requirements will not add inspections to high radiation areas. The construction work will not be in radiation areas. The construction work on the modification will be inside existing structures so . ,
there will be no environmental discharges. When completed, testing of the modification will be in compliance with current practices and will not impact the environment in a manner different than current practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
'Ihe changes, as proposed, do not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. That is, they:
- 1. will not change the probability nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report:
- 2. will not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report: and
- 3. will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.
Since they involve no unreviewed safety question, the changes involve no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.
Vll. REFERENCES
- 1. NYPA letter, R. J. Converse to NRC, dated February 14,1992, (JAFP-92-0154),
LER-92-004 Cable Tunnel Fire Suppression Sprays inoperable Due to inadequate Design and Appendix R Review.
- 2. NRC letter, R.A. Capra to R. E. Beedle, dated September 10,1992, regarding issuance of exemptions from requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R for James A. FitzPatrick.
- 3. NRC NUREG-0123, " Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/5)," Revision 3, dated Fall 1980. ,
- 4. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Safety Evaluation for the Design of l the East / West Cable Tunnel Fire Suppression System (Modification F1-91-109),
JAF-SE-92-94, Rev.1, dated January 6,1993.
- 5. NUTECH ENGINEERS, Pacific Nuclear Company, calculation PNYO12.4200.103,
" Cable Tunnel Drainage,* Rev. 3, March 31,1993, as approved by NYPA.
Attachm:;nt il to JPN-93-082 ;
. SAFETY EVALUATION Page 9 of 9
- 6. Pacific Nuclear letter, J.W. Gill to NYPA, S. Prussman, dated May 14,1993, '
(PNY-012-209) regarding the basis for flooding in the cable tunnel drainage calcuiation.
- 7. NEMA Standards No. WC 8-1976 (Rev 7) and WC 7-1982 (Rev 1).
- 8. National Fire Protection Association Document 72 (NFPA 72), " Standard for the installation. Maintenance, and Use of Protective Signalling Systems," dated 1990.
- 9. National Fire Protection Association Document 13 (NFPA 13), " Installation of Sprinkler Systems," dated 1991.
- 10. National Fire Protection Association Document 15 (NFPA 15), " Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection," dated 1990.
- 11. National Fire Protection Association Document 72E (NFPA 72E), "Autornatic Fire Detection," dated 1990,
- 12. NYPA letter, R. E. Beedle to NRC, dsted September 25,1992, (JPN-92-057),
regarding a proposed change to the Technical Specifications to reflect a modification to the Fire Protection System in the battery room corridor.
- 13. NRC letter, B.C. McCabe, to R. E. Beedle, dated February 19,1993, regarding issuance of Technical Specification Amendment 186 to reflect changes to the Fire Protection System in the Battery Room Corridor.
- 14. National Fire Protection Association Document 25 (NFPA 25), " Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems," dated 1992.
- 15. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.8.2.2 " Fire Detection and Signalling Systems" and Section 9.8.2.3
" Fire Suppression," through Revision 5, dated January 1992.
- 16. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Safety Evaluation Report (SER), dated November 20,1972, and Supplements.
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Attachment til to JPN-93-082: ;
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANG'ES I TO REFLECT A FULL AREA FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM IN THE EAST AND WEST CABLE TUNNELS {
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New York Power Authority
. JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT I Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59
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'? - Attachment lll to JPN-93-082 l PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES 1 TO REFLECT A FULL AREA FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM IN THE EAST AND WEST CABLE TUNNELS -
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' i; New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT f Docket No. 50-333 ;
DPR-59 l
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- JAFNPP 3.12 and 4.12 BASES i- -
The Fire Protection System :p % etions provide pre-established B. Safety related equipment areas protected by water spray or minimum lowels of operetsty to aneure adequete fire protection spnnklers are listed in Table 3.12.1, Whenever any of the during any operating condtion includng a design basis accident or protected areas, spray or sprinklers are inoperable continuous safe shutdown earthquake, fire detection and backup fire protection equipment is avadable in the area where the water spray and/or sprinkler A. The high pressure weter fire protection system is supphed by protection was lost.
mq redundant vertical turbine pumps, one desel driven and one electric motor driven, each design rated 2500 gpm at 125 poigfa,t g 9 hee pPerformance of the tests and inspections listed in Table .
discharge pressure. Both pumps take auction from the plant 4.12.1 will prevent and detect nozzle blockage or breakage intake cooling water structures from Lake Ontario. The high gand verify header integrity to ensure operability.
pressure water fire protection hooder is normally maintained at greater then 115 pois by a pressure maintenance subsystem. If C. The ca bon dioxide systems provede total flood protection for pressure decrosses, the fire pumps are autxMi started by eight different safety related areas of the plant from either a their initiation logic to maintain the fire protection system 3 ton or 10 ton storage unit as indicated in Table 3.12.2.
header pressure. Each pump, together with its manuel and Both CO, storage units are equipped with mecherwcal automatic initiotion logic combined makes up a redundant high refngeration units to maintain the storage tank content at-pressure water fire pump. O'F with a resultant pressure of 300 psig. Automatic smoke and heat detectors are provided in the CO, protected areas A third fire pump, diesel <friven, has been instaned and is set to and initiation is automatic and/or manuel as indicated in automatica#y actuate upon decrossing pressure after the Table 3.12.2. For any area in which the CO, protection is actuation of the first two fire pumpe. No credit is taken for this made or found to be inoperable, continuous fire detection is pump in any analyene and the ::7'xuas of Technical avedeble and one or more large wheeled CO, fire Specifications 3.12 and 4.12 do not apply, extinguisher is also available for each area in which protection was lost.
Pressure Maintenance subsystem checks, valve position checks, '
system flushes and -:1-Ja *2 pump and system flow Weekly checks of storage tank pressure and level verify and/or perfonnance tests includng logic and starting subsystem proper operation of the tank refrigeration units and tests provide for the eerfy detection and correction of eveilability of sufficient' volume of CO, to extinguish a fire in component fatures thus ensuring high levels of operability. any of the protected areas.
. Amendme'nt No. f, If2, If6,190 1
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'JAFNPP ,
. 3.12 and 4.12 BASES (continued) -
Performance of tho periodc testa and inspections listed in Table Testing of smoke and heat. detectors and associated circuitry' -
~4.12.2 are in accordance wth NFPA.12,1973, wiH verify the every 6 months, in~accordance with manufacturers and NFPA integrity of system rentes and detribution headers as wet as detect and remove any accumulation of rust or scale. The use of 72E-1974 recommendations ensures a high level of operatmisty. _ -
" puff test" rather then fuA Sow teels wNl demonstrate proper valve F. The functionalintegrity of the fire barrier penetrati ..
operation wNhod tie attendent potential equipment and personnel horards aseodated wNh fun Row tests. fire will be confined or WM*/ retarded from' spreading to e4acent portion of the facility. This design feature mmimizes the D. poselbitty of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the Manuel hoes stodons provide bedsup tre prder*m throughout factity prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barrier the Plant. Those hoes atellons tiet are in or near areas with penetra6ons are a passive elemer.t in the facchty fire protection' safety reisted equipment are listed in Table 3.12.3. Hoes station program and are subject to periodic inspections.
location and hoes longlh selection provides the capsbuity of reaching any Are in a esfety related area wth the hoes stream. .
The barrier penetrations, including cable penetration barriers, fire :
When any of Wie hoes stations Noted in Table 3.12.3. is inoperable,' provksng adtNelonel hoes longlhe from other doors and dampers are considered functional when the visually ,
observed condition is the same as the as-designed condition. 1 operable hoes stadons amoures maintenance of this capabihty.
- Periodc inspecdon and tests are in accordance with NFPA Code i' guidelines and assures prevention, detection and correction of During periods of time when the barriers are not functional, either,1) a continuous fire welch is required to be maintained in hose, nozzle, valve and/or gasket damage or deterioration to the vicinity of the affected barrier, or 2) the fire detectors on at i
maintain highlevels of operablNty.
least one side of the allected barrier must be veriflod operable ,
E. and a hourty fire watch patrol established until the barrier is Earty Are detecton and Gre Eghung acevity is somential to restored to functionalstatus.
ensuring that any Sre wu reeuft in minimum demeGe to sately 1 reisted equipment. Since endi ares monnored uunres a number V of smoke and/or heat detectore when more than one detector is inoperabie, early are deseoman is assured by a***hing a patromng are watch which dieck the area where the detectors .
areinoperable atleast hourly wsedg* -
Amendment No. ,1 ,176
e *' * '
JAFN99 TABLE 3.12.1 WATER SPRAY / SPRINKLER PROTECTED AREAS AREA FIRE DETECTION TYPE PROTECTIONf 3) TYPE INITIATION
- 1) West Cable Tunnel lonizatiorM Electric Heatf f"5# {' #'
Automati
[ Activated Device 'OONm .Me
- mm uu l4, _
- 2) East Cable Tunnel lonizatioryana usctric Heat [ AutomatigManual/
vice Water Spray b** *" h 3)' Recirculation MG Room Electric Heat Activated Device Fusible Link Sprinklers Automatic / Manual
- 4) Emergency Diesels (1) Electric Heat Activated Device Fusible Link Sprinklers Automatic / Manual
- 5) HPCI Electric Heat Activated Device Water Spray Manual
- 6) RCIC Electric Heat Activated Device Water Spray Manual
- 7) Standby Gas Treatment Trainst2) Electric Heat Activated Device Water Spray Manual
- 8) West Diesel Fire Pump Room 'Qprinkler Flow Alar p ,
Fusible Link Sprinklers Automatic
- 9) Battery Room Corridor lonization)end SprinkleF Fusible Link Sprinklers Automatic i (flow Alarmjpegf,'ce .
Notes for Table 3.12.1
- 1. Each of two (2) Emergency Diesel Generator Systems is a separate protected area, each system contains two (2) separate rooms.
- 2. Each of two (2) Standby Gas Treatment trains is a separate area.
- 3. All areas are also protected by fire hoses and portable dry chemical and/or CO, fire extinguishers.
Amendment No. [,1[.186 244j
JAFNPP .
TABLE 4.12.1 - -
WATER SPRAY /SPfMNKLER SYSTEM TESTS -
CYCLING SPRAY NOZZLE HEADER INTEGRITY NOZZLE AIR AREA EACH VALVE INSPECTION INSPECTION FLOW TEST
- 1) West Cable Tunnel Once/6 Months T nce/1.5 M WA Once/1.5 Years "6e/3 YeaUDN44 b
- 2) East Cable Tunnel Once/6 Months CQnce/1.5 Yea 3)ga Once/1.5 Years M /3 Ye %
- 3) Recirculation MG Room Once/6 Months N/A Once/1.5 Years N/A
- 4) Emergency Diesel Rooms Once/6 Months N/A Once/1.5 Years N/A
- 5) HPCI Once/6 Months Once/1.5 Years Once/1.5 Years Once/3 Years
- 6) RCIC Once/6 Months Once/1.5 Years Once/1.5 Years Once/3 Years.
- 7) Standby Gas Treatment Trains Once/6 Months Once/1.5 Years Once/1.5 Years Once/3 Years
- 8) West Diesel Fire Pump Room N N/A Once/1.5 Years N/A
- 9) ^ Battery Room Corridor M N/A Once/1.5 Years N/A l
l Chs*/C w iS5 Notes for Table 4.12.1
- 1. @et pipe sprinkler systempb Af ee 7 tvM Y.
Amendment No. , , 186 244q
- - , _ . - - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ . - - - - . _ _ - - - - - - e- s e r -, . - - - - - - - - - - -
d F SERT "A" e
Table 4.12.1 specifies tests and inspections to detect nozzle blockage or breakage, to verify header integrity, and to ensure valve operability. Surveillance for flow alarm check valves in wet pipe sprinkler systems is performed by providing sufficient flow through the valve to activate the alarm, Full cycling is not required since the flow alarm check valves are not designed to latch open.
INSERT "B" Wet pipe flow alarms are not depended upon for fire detection. Fire detection surveillance testing is therefore not required for wet pipe flow alarms by the Technical Specification INSERT "C" These are wet pipe systems which contain flow alarm check valves. The surveillance for flow alarm check valves is performed by providing sufficient flow through the valve to activate the alarm. Full valve cycling is not required I
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