ML20058P999
| ML20058P999 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1993 |
| From: | Howell A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058P979 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1021 50-298-93-27, NUDOCS 9312280033 | |
| Download: ML20058P999 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000298/1993027
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APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-298/93-27
License: DPR-46
Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District
P.O. Box 499
Columbus, Nebraska
Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station
Inspection At: Brownville, Nebraska
Inspection Conducted: November 29 through December 10, 1993
Inspector: John L. Pellet, Chief, Operations Section
Accompanying Personnel: Don Draper, Examiner, Contractor,
Battelle Pa ific NW Labs
Approved:
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Krthur T.~ H$elT7eputyr Director,
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Division of Reactor Safety
Insoection Sungary
Areas Insoected:
Routine, announced inspection of the qualification of
licensed operators and evaluation of their requalification training program.
The examiners also observed the performance of on-shift operators and plant
conditions incident to the conduct of the examinee evaluations. The examiners
used the guidance provided in NUREG-1021, " Operator Licensing Examiner
Standards," Revision 7, Sections 601 through 605, issued January 1993.
Results:
The Cooper Nuclear Station licensed operator requalification training
program was evaluated as satisfactory in accordance with NUREG-1021
(Section 1.2).
All crews and all but one individual were evaluated as satisfactory by
the NRC and facility evaluators on all portions of the coadministered
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examinations (Section 1.2).
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Licensed operator performance had improved since the last program
evaluation. The improvement in command and control and communications
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was noteworthy (Section 1.6).
Several individual performance errors were attributed directly to a lack
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of effective self-checking by the examinees (Section 1.6).
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Summary of Insoection Findinos:
Inspection Followup Item 298/9116-01 was closed (Section 2.1).
Violations 298/9209-01 and 298/9320-01 were closed (Section 2.2).
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Attachments:
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Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
Attachment 2 - Simulation Facility Report
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DETAILS
1 LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINEE QUALIFICATION EVALUATION (NUREG-1021)
During the inspection, the examiners evaluated the qualifications of
16 licensed operators, comprising three crews, and the licensed operator
requalification training program. Licensed operators were evaluated based on
examination results. The program was evaluated based on observation of the
facility evaluators during the coadministered examinations and by analysis of _
the results. The examiners performed the evaluations in accordance with
10 CFR Part 55 and NUREG-1021, " Operator License Examiner Standards,"
Revision 7, Sections 601 through 605.
Further, the inspection included
evaluation of facility materials, procedures, and simulation capability used
to support development and administration of the examinations. These areas
were evaluated using the guidance provided in the sections of NUREG-1021 cited
above.
Performance results for individual examinees are not included in this report
because inspection reports are placed in the NRC Public Document Room as a
matter of course.
Individual performance results are not subject to public
disclosure.
1.1 Facility Materials Submitted for Examination Develooment
The chief examiner reviewed the licensee's materials provided for development
of the examination, which included station administrative and operating
procedures, question banks, simulator scenarios, lesson plans, and job-
performance measures (JPMs). The procedures and question banks, as well as
the lesson plans, were current and adequate to support the examination
development. The examination material banks met or exceeded the quality and
quantity guidelines in NUREG-1021.
The chief examiner also reviewed draft written examinations and operating
tests proposed by the facility. The draft examinations were used as proposed
with the following minor excepions:
One JPM was replaced to ensure that the two JPM sets proposed for the
walk-through portion of the examinations were of comparable difficulty.
One JPM required the operator to locally vent the scram air header in
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accordance with Emergency Operating Procedure 5.8.3, " Alternate Rod
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Insertion Methods," Revision 2,
Attachment 1.
The local copy of this
procedure had been reduced in size to the extent that it was not
legible. The facility had identified this just prior to the
examinations and revised the JPM to provide a legible copy of the
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procedure required to perform the task.
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One scenario was replaced when it was found to result in inconsistent
simulator performance during validation.
The proposed written examinations required about four hours to complete
during initial validation and were shortened and revalidated to satisfy
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the three' hour limit in the examiner standards.
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The draft examinations adequately met the scope and content guidelines in
NUREG-1021. The changes above were made to enhance the examinations and
constitute a minor fraction of the large amount of material used to construct
the examinations.
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1.2 Operator Performance
The examiners evaluated the performance of a total of 16 licensed operators,
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comprising three crews.
Eleven of these licensed operators were administered
full NRC examinations by co-administering dynamic simulator, written, and
plant walkthrough portions of the examinations. The remaining five licensed
operators were evaluated by NRC only as part of the operating crews during the
dynamic simulator examinations.
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All crews and all but one individual were evaluated as satisfactory by the NRC
and facility evaluators on all portions of the coadministered examinations.
The average grade on the written examination was 88.5 percent. Two examinees
incorrectly performed one of five JPMs. One examinee incorrectly performed
two of five JPMs and consequently failed the walk-through portion of the
examination. All other examinees performed all JPMs acceptably. Crew and
individual simulator performance was satisfactory overall and with respect to
all crew critical tasks. The facility staff identified several areas for
additional training for selected individuals who performed adequately overall
and passed the examination.
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Based on the individual and crew results above, the Cooper Nuclear Station
licensed operator requalification training program was evaluated as
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satisfactory in accordance with NUREG-1021, with the following observations:
Individual and crew performance and teamwork was a strength.
Supervisory command and control and overall communications had improved
significantly from prior requalification examinations. Some
inconsistencies were observed in adhering to facility guidance on
communications and chain of command.
One emergency plan classification was made at the alert level rather
than at the site area emergency level. This was an isolated error since
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all other classifications were correct.
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Overall, diagnosis and interpretation by the crews examined was good.
One crew incorrectly diagnosed that abnormal secondary containment and
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other plant radiation problems were due to direct radiation and normal
leakage. As a result, the crew emergency depressurized before it was
required by the governing procedures.
Plant conditions were trending to
the point where emergency depressurization would have been required
later in the scenario.
Overall, system knowledge and panel awareness were good.
Several minor
system knowledge weaknesses were observed relating to safety systems but
not to the extent of degrading event mitigation or response. These
system weaknesses included:
High pressure core injection startup with a high level trip signal
sealed in.
Reactor core isolation cooling versus high pressure core injection
system trip signals.
Recognition of the symptoms of and applicable operator actions for
runaway acceleration of a reactor feed pump.
Primary containment isolation system group seven actuation logic.
Jet pump surveillance results application to technical
specification limiting conditions for operation.
1.3 Licensee's Reoualification Examination Participants
During these examinations, facility staff from the training and operations
departments participated during the development and validation of the
examinations. As described above, the draft examinations prepared by the
facility members were good and used substantially without revision. The
facility staff also supported the validation of the draft examinations in a
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professional and competent manner.
During the coadministered examinations, these evaluators identified the same
or similar performance observations as the examiners, with occasional
differences in evaluation of these observations. NRC concurred in the overall
pass / fail judgment for all coadministered examinations.- In all cases,
facility evaluators used thorough and effective examination techniques to
administer valid examinations.
During these examinations, facility operations management representatives
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participated in dynamic simulator crew examinations and were involved in
facility evaluation of crews' performance, indicating a close relationship
between the two groups. The facility developed performance enhancement
remediation programs for identified deficiencies, as applicable, even when the
observed performance was acceptable.
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1.4 Examination Team Observations
During the examinations, the examiners observed the performance of onshift
operators and plant conditions incident to the conduct of the examinee
evaluations. The observations below were presented to the facility staff as
they were developed and at the exit meeting.
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Emergency Operating Procedure 5.8.3, " Alternate Rod Insertion Methods,"
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Revision 2, implemented June 3, 1993, required the station operator to
manually operate local valves in accordance with the flow chart provided
as Attachment I to the procedure. The local copies of the procedure
reduced the flow chart to the extent that it was not readable and could
not be used to identify the required manipulations. The facility staff
had identified this problem in November 1993 and was in the process of
revising the procedure to add the required steps as a separate section,
rather than referencing the flow chart. This deficiency could have been
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identified prior to issuance of the revision by an enhanced validation
process.
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The safety relief valve fuses were not clearly labelled. A local
operator would be directed to remove these fuses only for the infrequent
event of a stuck open relief valve that could not be closed from the
control room.
In this situation, the operator would be under
considerable stress to act quickly and accurately. Given these
conditions, the small, low contrast labelling on a row of thirty
identical fuses inside an electrical cabinet could inhibit the
operator's ability to identify and remove the correct two fuses. This
also is indicative of a lack of effective validation of procedures.
The handwheel for valve CRD-A0V-CV33 showed turning the handwheel
clockwise to open.
Procedure 5.8.3, " Alternate Rod Insertion Methods,"
Step 6.4.3.2 states to open the valve by turning counterclockwise.
Plant housekeeping was good.
Conduct of operations in the control room and the rest of the physical
plant was professional and controlled.
Health physics, operations, and security personnel provided excellent
support for the examination process and team.
1.5 Simulation Facility
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During the preparation and conduct of the operating examinations, the
examiners observed no simulation facility infidelity that had an impact on
administration of the examinations. The simulator did suffer a hardware fault
during the second week of the examinations which required minor rescheduling
of part of the written examination.
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1.6 Conclusions
The examiners concluded that the performance of all but one of the 16 licensed
operators examined was acceptable (10 of 11 on full examinations).
Further,
the three crews examined in the simulator were found acceptable. The
examiners also concluded, based on the individual results, the examination
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material submitted, and observations during the coadministered examinations,
that the licensed operator requalification training program was effectively
maintaining proficiency of licensed operators.
The examiners also reviewed the most recent prior requalification examination
report, OL 91-02, dated February 10, 1992, for previous findings. That report
noted some minor weaknesses in command, control, and communications;
examination material; and second JPM performance. During these examinations,
the operators performed better in all of these areas.
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In general, the examiners concluded that:
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Licensed operator performance had improved since the last program
evaluation. The improvement in command and control and communications
was noteworthy.
Several individual performance errors were attributed directly to a lack
of effective self-checking by the examinees.
Two observations indicated that in-plant procedure validation was less
thorough than possible.
Simulator fidelity was acceptable with no discrepancies observed.
The licensed operator requalification program was satisfactory.
2 FOLLOWUP
2.1
Followuo (92701)
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(Closed) Insoection Followuo Item (298/9116-01): Provide Linkaae Frnm the
Licensed Operator Task Elements to the Proaram Trainino and Testina learnino
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Ob.iectives
This item identified a failure of the licensee's program development process
to provide connecting linkage from task elements to program learning
objectives. The licensee's response included the revalidation of the task
lists for licensed positions and a creation of links between task list
knowledge and ability st&tements and program learning objectives. The
inspector reviewed linkage documents and randomly sampled learning objectives
to knowledge and ability links for several classroom learning objectives. The
licensee is currently in the process of using the links created in response to
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this item to revise and enhance training program learning objectives, which is
outside the scope of this followup item.
2.2
Followup Items of Noncompliance (92702)
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(Closed) Violation (298/9209-01): Failure to Provide for Independent
Verification of Main Flow Path Valves in a Surveillance Procedure
This item identified a failure of some of the licensee's surveillance
procedures to require independent verification for valve manipulations in the
flow path of a safety system, when required by the licensee's governing
procedure. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions, which-
included evaluation of safety system surveillance and other procedures for any
similar lack of independent verification when required. The inspector
reviewed this evaluation, which identified several other procedures missing
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independent verification, and the resulting procedure revisions or changes
adding the required independent verifications, all of which had been
completed.
(Closed) Violation (298/9320-01): Failure to Maintain Aporooriate Plant
Procedures
This item identified a failure of the licensee's emergency plan implementing
procedures to provide correct mathematical calculations required to develop
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radioactive release rates.
The inspector reviewed the emergency plan
implementing procedure change that provided the proper mathematical
instructions, as well as revision to the licensee's procedure governing
procedure revisions that added an explicit requirement to review and validate
formulas and equations as part of the revision approval process.
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ATTACHMENT 1
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PERSONS CONTACTED
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1.1 Licensee Personnel
- L. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- R. Brungardt, Operations Manager
- R. Creason, Senior Operations Training Specialist
- M. Dean, Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor
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- J. Dutton, Training Manager
- R. Gardner, Plant Manager
- G. Horn, Vice President, Nuclear
- S. Jobe, Operations Training Programs Supervisor
- E. Mace, Senior Manager of Site Support
- D. Robinson, Quality Assessment Manager
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- G. Smith, Quality Assessment Operations Manager
In addition to the personnel listed above, the examiners contacted other
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personnel during this inspection period.
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- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
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EXIT MEETING
An exit meeting was conducted on December 10, 1993. During this meeting, the
examiners reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The examiners
provided preliminary results of licensed individual and program evaluations.
The licensee did not express a position on the inspection findings documented
in this report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information
provided to, or reviewed by, the examiners.
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ATTACHMENT 2
SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT
Inspection Report:
50-313/93-27
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Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District
Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station
Inspection At:
Brownville, Nebraska
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Operating Tests Administered on: December 1 through December 9, 1993
This form is to be used only to report observations.
These observations
do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further
verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR Part 55.45(b).
These observations do not affect NRC certification or
approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that
may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response
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to these observations.
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, no simulator
infidelities were observed.
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