Text

Forwards D Kwiatkowski Re FEMA Region I Rept for 890816 Full Participation Exercise at Plant
	ML20058K863
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Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/19/1990
From:	Randy Erickson; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Ronald Bellamy; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5

WASmNGTON, D C. 20555

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July 19, 1990 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Ronald R. Bellany, Chict Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Region 1 FROM:

Robert A. Erickson, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

FEMA EXERCISE REPORT FOR THE GINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION Enclosed is a letter from Dennis Kwiatkowski of the Federal Energency Management Agency (FEMA) dated July 5,1990, transmitting the FEMA Region I report for

'the August 16, 1989 full participation exercise at the Ginna Nuclear Power t

Station. The State of New York, and Monroe and Wayne Counties both fully participated in the exercise.

.Three deficiencies were identified during this exercise. All three deficiencies were corrected during a remedial exercise that was conducted on October 18, 1989.. Twenty-one Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCAs) were also identified and will either be demonstrated during the next exercise or addressed through 4

plan changes.

We recommend that you transmit the enclosed FEMA letter and exercise report to '

the licensee with the request that the licensee in coordination with offsite authorities ensure that the areas requiring corrective' action identified by FEMA have been addressed.

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/W'1 Rob rt A. Erickson, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Protection i

and Emurgency Preparedness e

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Fnclosure:

FEMA ltr. dtd. 7/5/90 w/ enclosure DN 3 h lf M

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, Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 l

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JL 5.1990

-1 Mr. Frunk J. Congel Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness 1

office of Nuclear Reactor ation j

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory t h =im Washingtm, DC 20555 Daar Mr. Congel:

I Enclosed is a copy of the exercise report for the August 16, 1989, full-participation exercise of the offsita radiological energency raspmme plans, i

l site-specific to the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Statim. 'Ihe State of New York, Monroe ard Wayne omnties participated fully in the exercise. 'Ibe i

report was preparid by Regim II of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FDR).

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'Ihree deficiencies were identified durirg this exercise at the Joint News Canter. During a remedial exarcise conducted on Oct&ar 18, 1989, all three deficiencies were corrected.. Ihers were also 21 Armas Raqutiring Gudve Action (ARCAs) identified during this exercise. 'Ihese ARCAs will either be hisstrated durirq the next' exercise or addressed thruugh plan danges.

c FDR considers that offsite radiological emergency prepalaisies is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriata paamnius can be taken i

offsite to protect the health ard safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site, in the event of a radiological emergency. 'Iherefore, the approval of the offsite plans for the State of New York, sita-spc lfic to the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station granted urder 44 CFR 350 m 1

June 25, 1986, cant'nues to be in offact.

If you have any quest lens, please feel free to call me on 646-2871.

Sincerely,

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Dennis H. Kwia p Assistant Associate Director office of Natural and Te&nological Hazartis e

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POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT 4

August 16,1989, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of New York State, Wayne County, and Monroe County for the ROBERT E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION June it. 1990 Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 11 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY 10278 4

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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,

1979, the President directed the 'ederal Emergency management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's responsibilities in radlological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) developed by state and local governments.

Determining whether such plans can be implen ented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments, Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities e

in the radiological emergency planning process

- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

- U.S. Depart:nent of Energy (DOE)

- U.S, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

- U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)

- U.S. Department of State (Coordination between NY/ Canada)

Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is abstred by FEMA.

The RERPs for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station (GNPS)' were critiqued and evaluated after formal submission of the plans. A public meeting was held on May 5,1982, to acquaint the public with plan contents, answer questions, and receive suggestions on the plans.

The following exercises have been conducted by FEMA Region 11 to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPS and procedures to protect the public in a radiological emergency involving the nuclear power plant.

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o Issuance of Post Exercise Exercise Exercise Assessment by Number Date FEMA Region II 1

1/21/82 2/12/82 2

6/22/83 10/12/83 3

9/26/85 12/16/85 4

10/27-29/87 10/19/88 (revised 6/89) 8/16/89 5/18/90 The fifth exercise, the subject of this report, was an announced exercise. An evaluation team comprised of personnel from FEMA Region 11. the RAC, and FEMA's contracturs eva'luates the August 16, 1989 exercise.

Twenty-five evaluators were assigned to evaluate the emergency response activities of State and local jurisdictions.

Team leaders coordinated team operations.

Following the exercise, the Federal evaluators met ti compile their evaluations. Evaluators presented observations speelfic to their assignments; the teams of evaluators developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdictions and team leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team members.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluators, with final determinations by the FEMA Region !! RAC Chairman.

Deficiencies evaluated during the exercise must be corrected through a remedial drill.

The remedial drill for the deficiencies observed in this exercise took place 10/18/89. The evaluation of the drill is included in this report. Activities demonstrated during the remedial drill must be extensive enough to.show that the deficiencies have been rectified. FEMA also requests that State and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting the areas requiring corrective action (ARCAs) Identified and discussed in this report. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support,' Washington, D.C., that all inadequacles evaluated during the exercise will be corrected and that such corrections are being incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate.

Approval of the radiological emergency preparedness plans under provisions of 44 CFR 350 for the GNPS was granted on June 25,1986.

1.1 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Twenty-five Federal evaluators evaluated off-site. emergency response functions. These individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given below.

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3 Evalustor Entity Exercise Location (Function (s))

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P. Weberg FEMA RAC Chairman S. Oray FEMA Exercise Manager

8. Nelson ANL" State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)(team leader; communications; operations)

A. Thompson FEMA SEOC (command control) b J. Keller INEL SEOC (dose assessment)

C E. Fox NRC Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

J. O'Sullivan FEMA Joint News Center (JNC)

L. Testa FEMA JNC, Radio Station - WHAM P. Kler ANL Wayne County Emergency Operations Center (WEOC)

(team leader; hearing impaired)

S. Jtmes FEMA WEOC (communications)

R. Walsh FEMA WEOC (operations)

B. Salmonson INEL WEOC (accident assessment)

C. Herzenberg ANL Wayne County (fleid monitoring)

M. Farrell FEMA Wayne County (general population evacuation; traffic / access control) d B. Oalloway ARC Wayne County (mobility impaired congregate care)

F. Wilson ANL Wayna County (reception center; medleal drill)

J. Mitrant ANL Wayne County (Personnel Monitoring Center (PMC])

B. Acerno FEMA Monroe County Emergency Operations Center (MEOC)

(team leader)

A. Teotia ANL MEOC (communications)

B. Knoerzer ANL MEOC (operat!ons)

W. Serrano INEL MEOC (accident assessment)

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t Evaluator Entity Exercise Loestion (Funetton(s))

D. Duncan ANL Monroe County (fleid monitoring)

S. McIntosh FEMA Monroe County (general population evacuations traffic / access control)

E. Post USDA' Monroe County (mobility impaired congregate care)

C. Hunckler ANL Monroe County (PMCs reception center)

'Argonne National Laboratory.

l Didaho National Engineering Laboratory.

' Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

dAmerican Red Cross.

'U.S. Depart' ment of Agriculture.

1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning l

standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Sec.11. For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEMA uses an evaluation method to apply the criteria of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1. FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective actions. Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacles that would cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate proiective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radlological emergency. Because of the potential impact of. deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly i

corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions.

Areas reculring corrective actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacles of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled bler.alal exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety, in addition to these inadequacles, FEMA identifies areas recommended for Improvement, which are problem areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety.

While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.

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t 1.4 EAERCISE OBJECTIVES

'the objectives of New York State and Wayne and Monroe counties in this exercise were to demonstrate the adequacy of the RERPs, the capability to moblUze needed personnel and equipment, and the adequacy of the famillarity with the procedures required to cope with an er ergency at Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation's (hereaf ter referred to as the Utility) ONPS.

The exercise was to involve activation and participation of Utility staff. and response facilities of the GNPS, as well as the emergency organizations and facilities of New York State and Wayne and Monroe counties. Feders] representatives were to act as exercise evaluators. The scope of this exercise, with some exceptions, was to endeavor to demonstrate by actual performance a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time was the exercise to interfere with safe operation of the GNPS.

The State of New York Emergency 3

Management Office and Wayne and Monroe counties agreed to demonstrate the following i

objectives for this exercise. The numbering of these objectives corresponds to the number scheme used for the standardized FEMA objectives.

1.4.1 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

SEOC1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use emergency classification levels (ECLs) through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.

SEOC 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions.

SEOC 3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities.

SEOC 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

SEOC 5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations.

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SEOC 16 Demonstrate the ability to make the deelslon to recommend the use of l'

potassium lodide (KI) to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, l

based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it j

once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases.

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1.4.3 Emergency Operations Feellity (EOF)

EOF 1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activltles corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenarlo. The four ECLs are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.

EOF 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilite, e'id activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions.

EOF 3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities.

EOF 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

EOF 5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations.,

1.4.3 Joint News Center (JNC)

JNC1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs 'through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activltles corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.

JNC 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions.

JNC 5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilltles, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations.

JNC 12 Demonstrate the ability to inttlally alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local official (s).

JNC 13 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and 6.ssemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion af ter the initial alert and notification has occurred.

JNC 14 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner.

JNC 15 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.

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o 1.4.4 Wayne County Emergency Operations Center (WCEOC)

WCEOC1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenarlo. The four ECLs are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.

WCEOC 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions.

WCEOC 3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities.

WCEOC 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with til appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

WCEOC $

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations.

WCEOC 10 Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data.

WCEOC 11 Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action deelslons, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAGs, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors, l

WCEOC 12 Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an Instructional message within 15 minutes of a i

deelslon by appropriate State and/or local official (s).

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WCEOC 13 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.

WCEOC 16 Demonstrate the ability to make the deelslon to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized

persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases.

l WCEOC 18 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ populations (including transit-dependent persons, special-needs populations, handicapped persons, and institutionalized persons).

WCEOC 19 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ.

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WCEOC 20 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

1.4.5 Wayne County Field Activities (WCFA)

WCFA 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with appropriate field locations, organizations, and field personnel.

WCFA 6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker erposure.

WCFA 7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements.

WCFAB Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the measurement of altborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10-7 microcurles per oc in the presence of noble gases.

WCFA 9 Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses.

WCFA 18 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and translent plume EPZ populations (including transit-dependent persons, special-needs populations, handicapped persons, and institutionalized persons).

WCFA 20 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

WCFA 21 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees.

WCFA 22 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, and pe sonnel for congregate care of evacueer..

WCFA 25 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures, and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles, and for waste disposal.

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9 1.4.8 idonroe County Emergency Operations Center (MCEOC) j MCEOC1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.

MCEOC 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for i

both facility-and field-based emergency functions.

MCEOC 3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities.

i MCEOC 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

MCEOC 5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations.

MCEOC 10 Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data.

MCEOC 11 Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAQs, availability of adequate shelter, evacuatten time estimates, and other relevant factors.

I MCEOC 12 Demonstrate the at,tilty to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a deelston by approprlite State and/or local official (s).

MCEOC 13 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.

MCEOC16 Demonstrate the ab!!!ty to make the decision to recommend the use of K!

to emergency workers and institutional! zed persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases.

MCEOC 18 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ populations (including transit-dependent persons, special-needs populations, handicapped persons, and institutionalized persons),

i MCEOC 19 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate j

protective actions for school children (day care) within the plume EPZ.

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10 MCEOC 20 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

1.4.7 Monroe County Fle!d Activities (MCFA)

MCFA 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with appropriate field locations, organizations, and field personnel.

MCFA 6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency o

worker exposure.

MCFA 7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining flead radiation measurements.

O MCFA 8 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10-7 microcurles per cc in the presence of noble gases.

MCFA 9 Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses.

MCFA 18 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ populations (including transit-dependent persons, special-needs populations, handicapped persons, and institutionalized persons).

4 MCFA 20 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

MCFA 21 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees.

MCFA 22 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, and personnel for congregate care of evacuees.

MCFA 25 Demonstrate the adequacy of faellities, equipment, supplies, procedures, and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles, and for waste disposal.

1.4.8 Medical Drill (MD) i MD 23 Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures, ar.a personnel for transporting contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals.

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11 MD 24 Demonstrate the adequacy of the medical fsellity's equipment, procedures, and personnel for handling contaminated, injured, or exposed Individuals.

1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Scenario Overview Initial Conditions 1.

The ONPS is operating at 100% of its rated thermal power and has been operating continuously for 150 days.

2.

The reactor core is in cycle 17, which is near the middle of its life.

The RCS boron concentration is 486 ppm.

3.

The IB RHR pump is out for seal failure maintenance. The seal has been replaced, and the pump is lined up and awaiting testing before being declared operable.

4.

At 0315 hours0.00365 days 0.0875 hours 5.208333e-4 weeks 1.198575e-4 months , the RCS total leak rate increases from 0.25 rnm to 1.5 gym. Containment activity is increasing. Shift personnel are continuing to investigate the cause of the leakage. A containment entry is planned as soon as the paperwork is complete.

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scenario On-Site Sequence of Events Approximate Scenario Time (hours)

Time (hours)

Event Description 0645

-00/16-26 Itlal conditions established.

0700 00/00 Commence annual emergency preparedness exercise.

Containment recirculation fan cooler condensate collectors have required dumping more frequently since 0400 hours0.00463 days 0.111 hours 6.613757e-4 weeks 1.522e-4 months this morning because of an increase in primary leakage due to a cracked weld on the "B" RCP discharge pipe.

0715 00/15 An UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared in i

' accordance with SC-100, "Ginna. Station Event UNUSUAL EVENT Evaluation and Classification," EAL: Reactor Coolant Leakagel Primary System Leakage Greater than 7

Technical Speelfication Limits (i.e.,

greater than 1 gpm unidentified for more than four hours).

0715 00/15 If an UNUSUAL EVENT la not declared in approximately 15 minutes, a contingency message should be given out to declare it.

An orderly plant shutdown should commence because of technical specification limits (i.e., with primary system leakage in excess of 1 gpm unidentified, the leakage rate should be reduced to within limits within four hours or be in hot shutdown within the next six hours and at an RCS temperature less than 350*F within the following six hours).

0800 01/00 Fire Zone $4 (Intermediate build!'ng 253-6 AFWP oil reservoir manual deluge) alarm is received in the I

control room. Tt.e fire brigade is activated.

0810 01/10 The fire brigade arrives at the scene. The fire brigade captain reports to the control room that the turbine driven auxillary feed pump oil reservoir is smoking and that they are fighting the fire.

Note:

Off-site firefighting assistance is not participating. If assistance is requested, controllers will Intercede to prevent off-site fire department I

response.

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Time (hours)

Event Description 4

0815 01/15 An ALERT should be declared in accordance with i

t ALERT SC-100, "Ginna Station Event Evaluation and Classification," EAL: Fire Fire Potentially Affecting Safety Systems as Determined by the Shift Supervisor.

If an ALERT is not declared in approximately.15 minlutes, a contingency message should be given out to delcare it.

0830 01/30 The fire on the turbine driven auxillary feed pump oil reservoir is extinguished.

i The primary system leak rate Increases to 2 gpm.

Plant shutdown continues.

0845 01/45

.T5e TSC should be nearing operational readiness of the emergency response organlaation.

l The TSC should send a repale team out to investigate the fire damage to the turbine driven auxillary feed pump oil reservoir.

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The TSC should send a team out to test the IR RHR pump.

The TSC should be working on the leakage problem in containment.

0900 02/00 Fire Zone Z-22 (Intermediate building 253-6 AFWP area) alarm is received in the control room. The fire belgade is activated again.

0910 02/10 The fire brigade arrives at the fire scene. The fire brigade captain reports to the control room that both motor driven auxillary feedwater pump motors are bkrning intensely. It is unknown at this time what started the fire.

The fire brigade is fighting the motor driven AFWP l

motor fires.

Note: Off-site firefighting assistance is not partici-pating. If assistance is requested, controllers should intercede to prevent off-site fire department response.

JENC should be activated at this time.

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Time (hours)

Event Description 0915 02/15 A SITE EMERGENCY should be declared in accordance SITE with SC-100, "Ginna Station Event Evaluation and j

EMERGENCY Classification,"

EAL:

Fires Fire Causing Loss of Safety System Including Redundant Components as i

Determined by the Shift Supervisor.

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SITE EMERGENCY la not declared in approximately 15 minutes, a contingency message should be given out to declare it.

i 0930 02/30 The fire on both the motor driven auxillary feedwater pump motors is extinguished.

The primary system leak rate increases to 2.5 gym.

I Plant shutdown cont;nues.

0945

'02/45 TSC should send a repair team out to investigate the fire damage on the motor driven auxillary feedwater l

pump motors.

TSC should be considering the problems they will have in the later stages of the plant shutdown because of the loss of all normal auxillary feedwater pumps.

Plant shutdown continues.

i 1000 03/00 The IB RHR pump test is completed satisfactorily, and the pump la returned to operable status.

Plant shytdown continues.

1015 03/15 The primary system leak rate increases to approximately 8 gpm. Containment sump "A" pump is operating more frequently.

The EOF Emergency Response Organization should have reported to EOF by this time.

1031 03/31 The "B" RCP discharge line severes where it connects to the pump. Containment pressure and temperature Increase rapidly.

Safety injection and containment spray are activated automatically. A large amount of the fuel gap activity and fuel pellet activity is released due to fuel rod bursting because of core l

uncovery during the initial reactor coolant system blowdown.

Containment radiation levels begin to increase.

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Time (hours)

Event Description 1031 03/31 All safeguards equipment operates normally except the (Cont'd) two motor driven and the one turbine driven auxillary feedwater pumps. They are out of service because of fires.

1035 03/35 A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared in GENERAL accordance with SC 100, "Ginna Station Event EMERGENCY Evaluation and Classification," EAL: Reactor Coolant-Leakaget LOCA identified Inside Containment and Failed Fuel Indicated by Sampling of RCS or Containment Atmosphere, or EAL:

Containment Systems Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Barriers and Potential Loss of the Third, (1) Fuel Cladding, (2) Reactor Coolant System, and (3) Containment Vessel.

An immediata protective action recommendC..on will be made in accordance with SC-240, " Protective Action Recommendations."

Operations stabilizing the plant using emergency operating procedures.

If a GENERAL EMERGENCY is not declared in approximately 15 minutes, a contingency message should be g!ven out to declare it.

1045 03/45 Operations is still working on stabilizing the plant per emergency operating procedures.

The "B" SI pump trips out on overcurrent because of pump internal problems.

1100 04/00 Operations la still working on stabilizing the plant per emergency operating procedures.

TSC should be sending out a repair team to check out the problem with the "B" SI pump.

1115 04/15 The injection phase of the accident is almost over.

Operations personnel is aligning systems for the recirculation phase of the accident.

1130 04/30 Plant safety systems are realigned and operating in the recirculation mode.

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Time (hours)

Event Descr!pt!on 1145 04/45 The "B" RHR pump seal falls. The auxillary building sump hl-level alarm annunclates in the control room.

Plant vent monitors show rapid increases in radiation levels. A major release to the environment begins.

Release paths from containment through "B" RHR pump f ailed seal out the plant vent.

1200 05/00 The "B" RHR pump trips out on overcurrent because of the failed seal.

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TSC should be concluding that the "B" RHR pump seal 1315 06/15 has failed.

Once the TSC has concluded that the "B" RHR pump seal has failed, they should come up with a method to isolate the pump to stop the leak.

Efforts are undarway to track the plume, terminate the release, and implement and coordinate the PARS.

1815 0615 The release is terminated because of the isolation of the "B" RHR pump.

1J30 06/30 Plume tracking continues. Off-site radiation levels near the Ginna plant have dropped substantially because of the departure of the plume. -

Recovery and reentry discussions commence. These should include preliminary discussions about RG&E recovery and downgrade activities, including preliminary designation of the recovery organization.

The State and Counties may also conduct parallel discussions. Recovery and reentry interface between the EOF and off-site agencies should be demonstrated, as time allows.

1430 07/30 After all exercise objectives have been demonstrated, the exercise is terminated.

E,

4 17 l

1.5.1 State and Local Activities New York Wayme Monroe Activity State County County Notify agencies Actual Actual Actual Call up personnel Actual Actual Actual Activate organisation Actual Actual Actual Maintain security Actual Actual Actual Conduct dose assessment Actual Actual Actual Make PAC recommendations Actual Actual Actual Activate JNC Actual Actual Actual NAa Simulate Simulate Activatesiregs NA Simulate Simulate Broadcast EBS message Dispatch field monitoring teams NA Actual Actual Exchange field survey data Actual Actual Actual Set up' reception center NA Actual Actual Activate congregate care center NA Actual Actual General population bus run NA Actual Actual Traffic / access control points NA Actual Actual Mobility-impaired capability NA Actual Actual Activate emergency worker PMC NA Actual Actual Conduct medical drill NA Actual Actual aNot applicable.

bEmergency Broadcast System.

m.

a 18 1.5.3 Emergency Classifloation and Event Time Line Nurs) l Emergency Declared Classification by Received Received Received Received Received Notification Utility by EOF by SEOC by WEOC by MEOC by JNC

.)

l Notification of 8

0730a Unusual Event 0721 0729 07?9 Alert 0813 0813 0823 0823 0823 Facility 0931 0931 0931 0900 0850 0915 declared operational i

Site Area 0918 0922 0919 0919 0920 0920 Emergency Ceneral Emergency 1048 1048 1054 1054 1054 1105 Release started 1130 1130 1152 1152 1152 1152 i

aHessage received at County Warning Point.

3 t

4 s

1 4

g z.c 1.5.4 Protective Action Thee Line New York Stat. EOC Wayne County EOC Monroe County EOC JHC Stren ESS Recomunendation Decision Decision Decision Activation - - Actlretica Ev:nt Made (hours)

ERFA Made (hours).

EltPA Made (hours)

ERFA Rece!,ed (hours)

'ERFA

'(hours)

(bomes) '

~

Prst eetive 0855 Close 0855 Close 0855 Close

-0907 Close 0907 0918 Kction #1 1.sh e Lake Lake

f. eke Prstective 1019 shelter 1019 Shelter.

1019 Shelter 1020 shelter 1031 1934 setton f2 livestock livestock livestock livestock 3-miles 5-miles 5-mites l

Shelter 1107 1110 l

Pratective 1055 shelter 1055 Shelter 1055 sheltec livestock l

&ction #3 livestock livestock livestock-l W1,W2,W3,H1 W1,W2,W3,M1 WI,W2,W3,M1 W1,W2,W3,M1 Fratective 1115 S:W3 1118 s:W3,W5, 1118 S W3,W5, 1120 5:W3,WS-1130 1133 r.ction #4 E:W1,W2,H1 M2-9 M2-9 M2-9 E:W1,W2,H1 EW1,W2,M1 EW1,W2,M1 b

1240 SW3,W5 1240 5:l#3,W5 1240 5:W3,W5

'1240 5 W3,W5 M2-7 1252 1255 Prstective action f5 E:H2-M9,W7, E:M2-9,W7, E:M2-9,W7, EM2-9,WF, M1 W1,W2 M1,W1,W2 M1,W1,U2 M1,W1,W2 1327 Correction Prstective to f5 Action #6

ERPA = emergency response planning area.

bA Protective Action declelon was made at 1240 to evacuate additional ERFAs M2-H9 and W7 (ERFAs M1, W1 and W2 had already been evacuated). ESS message #5:

issued from the JNC contained conflicting instructions to the public to both eve-vete and shelter in ERFAs M2-M9 and WF.. This inconsistent information was later corrected by E85 message #6 issued at 1327.

E = evacuate

= sheltes' s

c M

l t

-s___.______.....

h 4-

.1 k'

20' 2 EXPRCISE EVALUATION 3.1 Eis TORK RTMU n%1CENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (SEOC)

The SEOC is locatied underground in Building 22 of the state office campus in Abany, New York. The SEOC had six objectives to demonstrate during this exercisel f4ve were fully demonstrated, and one was partially demonstrated. One outstanding ARCA was corrected, and two new ARCAs were determined during the evaluation.

SEOC 1.

The objective to demonstrate the chility to Jonitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropelate implementation of emergency fundtons and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario, was met. The SE7C used the ECLs and was promptly notified of changes in status over the Radiological Emergency Communication System (RECS) by the Utility. The ECLs were prominently displayed

. throughout the SEOC, and staff members were briefed on each change in level.

SEOC2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met.

There was a two-tier call-up system. All off-site agencies were notified at the Alert ECL,' but only the five key agencies were asked to report 13. The other agencies placed personnel on standby. Upon notification of the Site Area Emergency ECL, the personnel on standby were notified, and most were asked to report in. Two agencies were asked to keep their personnel on standby throughout the exercise. Accordingly, representatives of 18 State agencies were present at the SEOC during this exercise.

In addition, the t

American Red Cross (ARC) and the Civil Air Patrol were represented. The written list used for call-ups was. accurate, and the call-ups were made in a timely manner.

SEOC 3.

The objective to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was partially met. The Director of the -State Emergency Management Office was effectively in charge at the SEOC; briefing Staff members periodically. The nine briefings conducted occurred either as circumstances changed or within one hour of the last briefing. Urtefings were announced over the loudspeaker and took place in the operations room. They often involved more than one presenter and were structured to allow questions. A previous ARCA (NY 1) from the GNPS PEA (revised June 1989) was thereby corrected.

Staff members were involved in decision making, as appropriate. The head

~

health department representative was in charge of dose assessment efforts and was consulted at every decision point. A copy of the plan was available for reference.

Orotective action decisions were coordinated effectively with all relevant organizations. Monroe County regularly sent status reports to the SEOC; Wayne County sent none. The Monroe County reports, however, showed when protective actions had been initiated but gave no indication of their completion. A message log was kept of all incoming, outgoing, and Internal messages. Although messages were reproduced and en

> e4 '

e 21 distributed, the process was incomplete.- Some, but not all, Emergency Broadcast System I

(EBS) messages were logged and reproduced.

8EOC 4.

The _ objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all-appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was me t.

The SEOC communications system encompassed the Utility, State agencies, contiguous states and provinces, Amtrak /Conrall, State University of New York, the ARC, Salvation Army, and FEMA.

The RECS line is a dedicated conference telephone line that connects' the Utility, the County EOCs, and the SEOC. Other communication systems consist of numerous commercial telephones, facsimile machines, radios, high-frequency operation secure radio, Rad!o Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES), and National Warning.

System (NAWAS). There were no problems with the operation of any of these systems.

The accident assessment area used commercial telephones and had access to other systems through the communications room had there been any problems. A dedicated facsimile machine was available for receiving incoming data on plant status and county monitoring data. This machine was used to send a New York State meteorological-forecast to the ' ountlest this transmission prevented receipt of incoming data for 30 to c

40 minutes. Other facsimile machines should have been used to send this forecast.

BEOC 5._ The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met. There was adequate space, 'vith sufficient ventilation, lighting, furniture, telephones, supplies, and equipment. The facility had cots, a fully equipped kitchen, a small hospital / emergency 9

room area, lavatories, and emergency generators. Access to the faellity was controlled by security officers, and each person had to wear identification. An agency attendance board, which indicated calling and reporting times, was maintained.

Various maps depicting the plume emergency planning zone (EPZ), evacuation routes, relocation centers, and radiological monitoring points were prominently displayed. Status boards, monitors, and an overhead projector were available and were promptly updated as to ECL status, protective actions, and weather. Keyhole-type overlays were used on two of the maps in the assessment area - one was for the 10-mile EPZ map, and the other for the larger-scale EPZ map. Indicating wind direction on the 10-mile EPZ map was difficult, particularly rrhen the wind was out of the south.

SEOC 16. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of potassium lodide (KI) to emergency workers and institutionalized -

persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to dstribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radioiodine releases, was partially met. Accident o

assessment staff were aware of the potential need for K1 for emergency workers and other personnel whose evacuation would be difficult.

Dose projections ')ased on hypothetical data were performed before any release of activity.

When source terms became evallable, new dose projections were performed.

The SEOC staff and head health department representative were aware of the protective action guideline (PAG) for KI use. When actual field measurements became

~

t.n

,3 g

4 available (at 1322 hours0.0153 days 0.367 hours 0.00219 weeks 5.03021e-4 months , which was almost two hours after the start of the release), the actual field data were compared with the projections, with good agreement. Although L

the release involved a considerable amount of radiolodine, the PAGs would not be reached for adult emergency workers for the time emergency workers could be expected-to be in the plume. Therefore, the decision that K1 need not be used was the correct one.

However, the dose projection methodology used, while apparently a correct methodology, was not in accordance with the une in the plan.

DEFICIENCIES No deflalencies were observed at the SEOC.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION' 1.

==

Description:==

The dose projection methdology demonstrated was not.in accordance with the one in the plan (i!UREG-0654, II,1.8).

Recommendation: The methodology la the plan should be followed, or the plan should be revised to reflect the methodology being used.

2.

==

Description:==

Only some of the EBS messages were distributed throughout the SEOC.

Recommendation:

All-EBS messages should _ be logged and distributed throughout the SEOC.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

==

Description:==

- For a short time, the facsimile machine in the accident assessment area, which was used to receive incoming technical data, was used to send a meteorological forecast. This transmission blocked incoming messages.

Recommendation: Support staff should be trained to use other available facsimile machines to send necessary messages to other facilities,

==

Description:==

The wind direction overlay for the 10-mile EPZ map e

was difficult to use, particularly when the wind was out of the south.

Recommendation: A different method should be used to mount the 10-mile EPZ map and wind direction overlay.

--_- _ --- _ _ L

3 -

23 1.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)

The EOF is located in the basement of Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation's building at 49 East Avenue, Rochester, New York. The EOF had five objectives to.

demonstrate-during this : exercise two were partially met and three were fully demonstrated. There were no outstanding ARCAs, and two new ARCAb were identified.

EOF 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through. appropriate Implementation of emergency functions and activities

(

corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenarlo, was met. The ECLs were used by State and County. representatives in accordance with the REPP. The Utility notified the i

State and Counties in a timely manner of each ECL; EOF staff were also notified.

promptly. The ECLs were prominently displayed, and the recovery manager frequently briefed the EOF staff over the public-address system on the current ECL, plant status, prognosis, and developments. The responsible State and local governments were notified' within 15 minutes af ter declaration of each emergency.

ROF 2.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize,' and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met. The-State and County representatives to the EOF wers notified in a timely manner. The written call list' used to place calls over both standard and cellular telephones was accurate.

All outside representatives had arrived by 0931 hours0.0108 days 0.259 hours 0.00154 weeks 3.542455e-4 months .

Thus, all staff designated in the plan were present.

EOF 3.

The objective to demonstrate De ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was met. The representatives to the EOF were liaison officers receiving their direction and control from their respective EOC. At the EOF, the Utility's ' recovery manager was clearly in control and effectively directed activities.

He provided briefings to EOF staff members, State and County representatives, and to the State and County emergency directors, both periodically and.

at major deelslon points. At these times, the EOF-recommended protective actions would be provided and discussed. Copies of the plan and procedures were available.

There was an Internal message-handling system that was prompt, and a record log was kept of these messages.

EOF 4.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropelate locations, organizations, and field personnel was partially met. Sufficient communications channels were available to allow unimpeded flow of information among all emergency response _ organizations. The following communications equipment was available: commercial telephones, the RECS line, a dedicated telephone system with the State and Counties, radio systems, a facsimile machine, and a computer !!nk. The EOF was in contact with the State and County EOCs and survey teams. All communications equipment functioned properly, generally there were no delays in communications with the State and Counties. However, in one instance there was a delay of some 22 minutes F

9

24 in communicating information to Wayne and Monroe Counties. This occurred when a release from the plant to the atmosphere was started at 1130 hour0.0131 days 0.314 hours 0.00187 weeks 4.29965e-4 months st this informatien was not relayed to the Counties until 1152 hours0.0133 days 0.32 hours 0.0019 weeks 4.38336e-4 months (22 minutes later). The cause for this celay in message transfer from the EOF to the County EOCs is not known.

EOF 5.

i objective; to demonstrate the adequacy of facilltlas, equipment, displays, and other a upport emergency operations was partliEt >$ The EOF contained sufficient space, fu:~.:lture, lighting, and ventilation to support emergency operations. Security was present, both on entering the building and before entering the immediate area of the EOF. Typewriters, photocopters, kitchen facilities, etc., were available for sustained operations. Although the maps and status boards on d splay in the -

EOF were adequate to support the organization's response, reception centers were not prominently displayed, and no status board displayed the protective action recommendations (PARS) being made by the Utility.

DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed at the EOF.

- AREAS REQUfRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Deser.ption: Information on the start of the release from the plant

-(beginning at 1130 hours0.0131 days 0.314 hours 0.00187 weeks 4.29965e-4 months ) was not transmitted to the Counties until 22 minutes later (at 1152 hours0.0133 days 0.32 hours 0.0019 weeks 4.38336e-4 months ) (NUREG-0654, II, F).

Recommendation: The cause of the delay in message transmission should be determined and appropriate actions taken to assure that other delays'in message transmission do not occur.

EOF staff should receive additional training to help ensure that radioactivity release information is promptly relayed to county EOCs.

2. Description The PARS issued by the Utility were not shown on the status boards.

Recommendation: A status board should display the 1.'+"Ity PARS.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

==

Description:==

There was no map showing the locstions of relocation centers.

Recommendation: The locations of the relocation centers should be displayed on one of the many maps that show ERPAs, evacuation routes, etc.

)Q, '.i ; ' ' ;

(

ms M

25

<l 2.8 JOINT NEWS CENTER (JNC) x The JNC located at 89 East Avenue, Rochester, New York, had seven objectives 4

to demonstrate during this exercise; five were met, one was partially met, and one was not met.

Two outstanding ARCAs were corrected, and two new ARCAs and two deficiencies were identitled.

i

[N JNC 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use i

1 ECLs as required by the scenarlo, was met. The JNC was nottfled in a timely manner of 4

changes in ECL. Status boards throughout the JNC were updated promptly. Changes were noted in ECL, time, wind conditions, and p!9nt status. Explanations of each ECL

- were posted in the press briefing room. Status boards displaying the ECLs and other

[.

Information were positioned in the press briefing room, the State public Information l

officer (PIO) room, the Utility room, the Wayne and Monroe County PIO room, and the i

rumor-control room.

r_

JNC2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met. The s

l-JNC was activated at 0815 hours0.00943 days 0.226 hours 0.00135 weeks 3.101075e-4 months . Neither State nor County staff were prepositioned, which corrects a previous ARCA (JNC 1) from the GNPS PEA (revised June 1989). The Monroe County lead PIO, was notified via pager while en route to work. Upon arrival at the JNC the PIO Implemented tha call down procedure, taking approximately 15 minutes y

to complete. The JNC was fully Mfed and operational by 0915 hours0.0106 days 0.254 hours 0.00151 weeks 3.481575e-4 months . Staffing included f

the lead P!O and support staffs of both Monroe and Wayne countles; the lead PIO and l

spokesperson for New York States and the lead PIO, spokesperson, and technical and support staff from the Utility.

s JNC 5.

The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met. The JNC is spacious and well lit, and each entity (both Counties, the State, and the Utility) had sufficient operating room. The room where the EBS messages were broadcast to the Utility is a soundproof room with two connecting doors - one led to the County PIO room and one led to the New York State PIO room. The press briefing room had a large 4

map of the ERPAs and evacuation routes, a large plant schematic, a three-dimensional scale model of the plant, a model of the reactor, ECL status boards, a large clock showing the time of the next press briefing, typewriters, copiers, etc. It did not have a computer or word-processor. The press room had a capacity of 250 people. Access control was set up in the JNC at 0835 hours0.00966 days 0.232 hours 0.00138 weeks 3.177175e-4 months . Telephones were available for the press.

,5 JNC 12.* The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision time by appropriate State and/or local official (s) was met. At 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months , the lead EBS tadio station (WHAM 1180) received a call from the Wayne County lead PIO at the JNC. He gave the verification code, which corrects a previous h

-4

36 ARCA (JNC 2) from the ONPS PEA (revised June 1989). The MCEOC called the radio station at 0910 hours0.0105 days 0.253 hours 0.0015 weeks 3.46255e-4 months to verify that all EBS messages throughuut the exercise were to be simulated. Immediately following this call, the JNC called WHAM and read EBS message

1. At 0914 hours0.0106 days 0.254 hours 0.00151 weeks 3.47777e-4 months , the message was reread, recorded, and played back.

JNC 13. The objective to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion af ter the initial alert and notification has occurred was not met. At 1240 hours0.0144 days 0.344 hours 0.00205 weeks 4.7182e-4 months , the decision was made by the State and Counties to evacuate additional ERPAs M2-M9 and W7 (in addition to EPRAs M1, W1 and W2). The JNC was notified to simulate broadcast of the message (EBS-5) at 1255 hours0.0145 days 0.349 hours 0.00208 weeks 4.775275e-4 months (stren simulated at 1252 hours0.0145 days 0.348 hours 0.00207 weeks 4.76386e-4 months ). EBS message #5 was prepared and included the correct ERPAs and boundaries to be evacuated..However, the end of the message reiterated previous instructions (EBS-4) to shelter ERPAs W3 and W5 and included M2 through M9, which had just been advised to evacuate. This inconsistent and erroneous information would have resulted in confusion to the public. Although this error was discovered by JNC staff and corrected 32 minutes later with EBS message #6, the safety of the public would have been jeopardized because the release occurred at 1130 hours0.0131 days 0.314 hours 0.00187 weeks 4.29965e-4 months , and the confusion arising from the error would have involved an additional dose to the public. Because the EBS message was six pages long, a person tuning in to the station while the message was being broadcast might have heard the instruction to shelter in ERPAs M2 through M9 rather than to evacuate.

Additionally, EBS message #2, which advised farmers to shelter livestock and put them on stored feed within a five-mile radius, neglected to give the boundaries of this five-mile radius.

This error was corrected in EBS message #3, which was broadcasted (simulated) 23 minutes later.

The WCEOC was not informed by the JNC 9 error in EBS message #5. EBS message #6 was broadcast without notifying the WCEoc of its existence and therefore was broadcast without coordination with and the knowledge and approval of the chairman of the County Board of Supervisors. Public information officers should receive additional training to help ensure that every E3S message is broadcast only af ter approval by the chairman of the Wayne County Board of Supervisors ar.d the corresponding Monroe County and New York State decision makers.

The WCEOC was denied a timely opportunity to correct the blunder in EBS message #5 in part because hard copies of EBS messages were not received on the facsimile machine in the public information area of the command and control room until 30 to 90 minutes after broadcast. (A hard copy of EBS #1 was never received.) The chairman of the Board of Supervisors did review hard copies of EBS messages and could have detected errors. A Wayne County P!O at the JNC indicated to a Wayne County Federal evaluator that one reason for the delays was that no procedures existed at the JNC for setting priorities for photocopying (a prerequisite to facsimile transmission) and facsimile transmission of public information items. The PIO also indicated that EBS messages might have had lower priority than shorter Utility press releases because of their greater length. Because of the importance of timely receipt of hard copies of EBS messages at the County and State EOCs to facilitate timely correction of errors, procedures should be developed for the JNC to help ensure that high priority is given to

_a s

p h

i i

, photoeo ying and facetalle transm ss on of EBS messages. This planning lasue must be addressed in the next revision of the JNC REPP to be reviewed by the RAC.

JNC 14. The objective to demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner was partially met.

Monroe and. Wayne counties, in coordination with New York State and the Utility, held five press briefings.

At each briefing, plant status and conditions were discussed by Utility' personnel.. Also,_

reporters were briefed on the deployment of resources by both Counties and New York

^

l State.- At each briefing, there was a question and answer period; if the question could not be answered immediately, a staff person would get the answer and provide it at the next briefing. Each EBS message and press release from the Counties, State, and Utility _

was made available in a timely manner and in a very organized fashion to the press. Five, long tables were set up in the back of the room. One table was for EBS messages, and each organization (i.e., Monroe County, Wayne County, NYS and Utility) had a table for j

their press releases. All copies of messages were available to the press. The Utility lasued nine press releases; Monroe County issued four, Wayne County lasued seven, and New York State issued three. The first New York State press release Indicated that representatives of 19 agencies were present at the SEOC. Actt311y, at the time of its release, only 12 agencies were represented at the SEOC, another five had representat!ves-en route, and two had personnel on standby. Care should be taken to ensure the accuracy of. prescripted releases, as inaccuracles diminish public confidence and can in other Instances be dangerous.

JNC 15. The objective to demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion was met. The rumor control operation was y

well' staffed with representatives from the Utility, Monroe, and Wayne counties. Eight i

telephones were available for calls; the telephone number used to callin for information was given to emergency worker staff only. Twenty-one calls were received: I was authentic and 20 were exercise driven.

All _ calls were answered promptly and efficiently. All press releases and EBS messages were available to rumor-control etaff in a timely manner.

Briefings were given to the rumor-control staff as-the exercise progressed.

DEFICIENCY

1. Descriptions Content of some EBS messages was inaccurate and incomplete EBS message #5 erroneously stated that sheltering should occur in ERPAs in which the public had been advised, in the same message, to evacuate; EBS message #2 did not include

+

descriptions of the boundaries of affected ERPAs (NUREG-0654, E.5).

Recommendation: Content of EBS messages should be reviewed and approveo prior to broadcast. To provide the time for this, the JNC o

should be provided with a word processor, and all prescripted

28 messages and ERPAs should be loaded into the system.

This procedure would reduce the time needed to merge the applicable ERPAs into the appropriate EBS message, thus freeing up time to review, verify, and approve messages before broadcast.

2.

Description:

EBS message #6 (which corrected #5) was broadcast without notifying the WCEOC of its existence and was therefore broadcast without coordination with and the knowledge and approval of the chairman of the County Board of Supervisors (NUREG-0654,

!!, E.6, A.2.a).

Recommendation: PIOS should receive additional training to help ensure that EBS messages are broadcast with coordination among the County and State decision makers.

3. Description EBS Message #5 lasued conflicting recommendations to the public with regard to ERPAs M2-M9, and would have resulted in additional dose for the public in these ERPAs.

Despite a corrected EBS Message #6, lasued 32 minutes later, information issued in EBS Message #5 would have created a significant amount of confusion, and the health and safety of the public would have been jeopardized (NUREG-0654,11. E.5).

Recommendatior'. All information disseminated to the public should be scrutinized (or accuracy and consistency prior to release of the EBS messagt.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.

Description:

Content of New York State press releases was not always accurate. The first press release stated that representatives from 19 agencies were at their desks at the SEOC. In f act, only 12 such agencies were then represented, and 2 of the 19 had not even been called in (NUREG-0654, II, G.3.a).

Recommendation: To ensure accuracy, the New York State lea.d PIO should verify information before it is released, particularly if the release is a prescripted message.

2.

==

Description:==

One reason the WCEOC was denied a timely opportunity to correct erro.a in EBS message #5 was that hard copies of EBS messages were not received via the facsimile machine until 30 to 90 minutes af ter broadcast.

(A hard copy of EBS message #1 was never received.) A Wayne County PIO at the JNC

t 29 y

. indicated that no procedure _ existed for setting priorities for W

photocopying and facsimile transmission of public information

(

Items. Furthermore, EBS messages might have had lower priority than Utility press releases because of their greater length i

(NUREG-0654, II, E.5).

Recommendation: At the JNC, high priority should be given to photocopying and facsimile transmission of EBS messages.

^

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were identified. -

1 3

2.4 WAYNE COUNTY 2.4.1 Wayne County Emergency Operations Center (WCEOC)

The WCEOC was located in an earth-bermed building in the County building complex on State Route 31 in Lyons,. New York. There were 13 objectives for.the.

WCEOC; eight were met, and five were partially met.

WCEOC 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to snomtor, understand, and 1

use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities

' corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario, was partially met. Wayne County was. notified by the. Utility of ECLs vialthe Radiological Emergiitcy Communications System (RECS) telephone. The Notification of Unusual Event ECL was received at the county warning point (sheriff's communication center) at 0729 hours0.00844 days 0.203 hours 0.00121 weeks 2.773845e-4 months . The other ECLs were received via RECS at the WCEOC at 0823 hours0.00953 days 0.229 hours 0.00136 weeks 3.131515e-4 months (Alert), 0919 hours0.0106 days 0.255 hours 0.00152 weeks 3.496795e-4 months (Site Area Emergency), and 1054 hours0.0122 days 0.293 hours 0.00174 weeks 4.01047e-4 months (General Emergency). Advance notice of imminent ECL changes was received directly by the dose assessment group from the EOF.

WCEOC staff were kept Informed of the current ECL through briefings and timely displays on the status. board.

Agency representatives at the WCEOC were responsible for keeping their field workers apprised of the current ECL. The PMC was activated before 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months . However, it received no communication from the County highway department representative at the WCEOC about the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency ECLs.. WCEOC staff should receive additional training to help ensure that field workers receive timely notice of ECLs. ta procedure 1 of the plan is a checklist of activities to implement 1

at each ECL, The d'. rector of the County Office of Emergency Management used this checklist to implement activities appropriate for the ECL.

l Y.

30 WCEOC 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met.

Within a few minutes of receiving Notification of an Unusual Event at 0729 hours0.00844 days 0.203 hours 0.00121 weeks 2.773845e-4 months at the County warning point, two sheriff's communications officers initiated alerting key members of the County's response organization by telephone. They used a current call-out list. By 0750 hours0.00868 days 0.208 hours 0.00124 weeks 2.85375e-4 months , all individuals on the Unusual Event list had been notified. When the Alert ECL was received, the communications officers at the County warning point prc aptly began to alert those on the Alert call-out list.

By 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months , the WCEOC was almost fully staffed, with 48 individuals present.

Among the agencies and functions represented were the County Board of Supervisors, the County Office of Emergency Management, the, County sheriff's office, the County Highway Department, the County Health Department, the County fire coordinator, the Area Office on Aging, the County ambulance coordinator, the County Social Services Department, the County public information officer (PIO), the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES), the Americca Red Cross, the New York State Police, New York State Agriculture and Marketing, USDA Soll Conservation Service, and the. Utility.

WCEOC 3.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was met. The chairman of the County Board of Supervisors was effectively in charge of Wayne County's emergency response, in accordance with the plan. He participated in the coordination of protective action decisions with Monroe County and New York State via the executive hotline and monitored RECS messages received over a small speaker in the command and control room. The other four members of the County Board of Supervisors who were present kept themselves inforined about the ogress of the incident and relieved the chairman when necessary. The director of the County Office of Emergency Management and the radiological officer (RO) were consulted, as appropriate. The wind direction was a constant concern during decision making.

The director of the County Office of Emergency Management and the operations officer gave appropriate briefings, and agency representatives gave periodic updates on their activities. Each agency or function in the WCEOC kept message logs, and messages originating in the operations room were also recorded on message forms. (A composite log for all such messages and RECS messages was kept.) The secretary to the chairman of the County Board of Supervisors kept a log of RECS messages and executive hotline discussion,. Runners facilitated message distribution. Overall, message handling was efficient.

WCEOC 4.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met.

A number of communication capabilities were demonstrated during the exercise. The dedicated RECS line linking the WCEOC with the GNPS and EOF functioned normally, as did the dedicated conferencing executive hotline linking the Wayne County, Monroe County, and New York State EOCs.

The police net radio and the fire net radio provided m

i==

m

31 communications with public safety field workers. RACES provided communications with field monitoring teams. There were enough telephones in the operations room so that agency representatives could communicate with base and field workers and the PIO at the WCEOC could keep an open telephone line with the County's public information staff

. t the JNC.

There were two minor malfunctions with machines.

A photocopier did not operate for a short time, and the facsimile machine used by the public information staff did not receive hard copies from the JNC for a short time early in the exercise. Neither malfunction caused any problems. The photocopier was backed up by two machines, and the facsimile machine was fixed promptly.

The RECS telenhone, located in the dose assessment room, did not ring when calls were received. This did not cause a problem, however, as the indicator light functioned during all incoming calls and the RECS line communicator position was always staffed.

Information about the time of release of radioactivity, which was of great interest and concern to field teams, was slow in being relayed from the EOF to the WCEOC. Information that the release had occurred at 1130 hours0.0131 days 0.314 hours 0.00187 weeks 4.29965e-4 months was not received at the WClasC until 1152 hours0.0133 days 0.32 hours 0.0019 weeks 4.38336e-4 months . EOF staff members should be trained to relay information about radionctivity releases to the WCEOC in a timely manner. (See EOF 4.)

WCEOC 5.

The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of factiities, equipment, displays, and other materiais to support emergency operations was partially met. The WCEOC was located in a earth-bermed Quonset hut approximately 30 years old.

Sufficient telephones, maps, status boards, and rest rooms were present. However, its space was marginal, and the ventilation provided by fat s in the dose assessment room and operations room was inadequate.

(The command snd control room could not be ventilated.) The fan in the dose assessment room was to noisy that it had to be turned off when the RECS telephone was in use. The plan a move the WCEOC to better quarters wit ',n the County building complex has not yet be3n implemented.

The maps showing evacuation routes, siren locattuns, plume EPZ ERPAs, wind direction, reception and congregate care centers, and traffic / access control points were prominently displayed. The wind d)rection display was updated each time the wind shif ted. The status board was usually updated within 10 minutes of changes; however,15 to 20 minutes were occasionally required. Also, as the exercise progressed, the times at which the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency ECLs were declared were incorrectly changed on the status board. The staff members responsible for updating the displays should receive additional training.

Access to the facility was controlled by a sheriff's deputy who asked for identification and maintained record sheets having places for the names and sign-in and sign-out times of all staff and observers entering or leaving the facility.

A previous ARCA (WC 6) from the GNPS PEA (revised June 1989) was not corrected and remains extant.

32 D

?

WCEOC 10. The' objective to demonstrate the abillsy, within the plume exposure pathway,.to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, was met. All dose assessment function positions were double-staffed. The primary dose projection system used was a computerized dose model that was used by both counties, the Utility, and New York State.

The backup dose projection methods demonstrated were manual-calculation and HP 41CV programmable calculator L

calculation. Dose projections were revised as the plant status changed. Fleid monitoring data were used to verify the dose projections and to back-calculate release rate source termt The field team coordinator ably directed the field teams to locations where they

)

could traverse the plume to locate its centerline and define its edges. Within the dose J

_ assessment room, plume plot overlays based on wind speed and stability class were used to~ identify. the plume location.. Overall, the dose assessment staff adequately demonstrated its ability to project dosage to the public via the plume exposure pathway.

A previous ARCA (WC 1) from the GNPS PEA (revised June 1989) was corrected.

WCEOC 11.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to-make appropriate j

protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAGs, availability 1

ll of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors, was met.

Protective action recommendations (PARS) and subsequent protective action deelslons were based on comparisons between projected doses and the appropriate EPA PAGs. The

=

4 County RO evaluated the Utility's PARS before making recommendations to the chairman of _ the County Board of Supervisors for both Counties, as well as the State's

[

dose Assessment Staff. The protective action deelslons were revised as plant conditions i

changed.

Preplanned. precautionary PARS (e.g., evacuation of Lake Ontario) were Implemented followit< he Alert ECL. All relevant facts then available were used in making timely protective action decisions.

A previous ARC A (WC 2) from the GNPS PEA (revised June 1989) was corrected.

L t.-

WCEOC 12. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local official (s) was partially met.

The decision to issue' the first EBS message was made jointly by Monroe and Wayne counties and New York State at 0855 hours0.0099 days 0.238 hours 0.00141 weeks 3.253275e-4 months .

Sirens were activated (simulated) at

- 0907 hours0.0105 days 0.252 hours 0.0015 weeks 3.451135e-4 months , and the instructional message (which involved closing Lake Ontario around h

the GNPS and advising the public to stay tuned for further instructions) was broadcast (simulated) on EBS at 0910 hours0.0105 days 0.253 hours 0.0015 weeks 3.46255e-4 months . The P!O, who was stationed in the command and control room, heard the decision and promptly relayed it via the open telephone line to

(.

her counterpart at the JNC. A runner took the message (to simulate activation of the strens) to the fire coordinator and verification of activation was received at 0908 hours0.0105 days 0.252 hours 0.0015 weeks 3.45494e-4 months .

l b

WCEOC staff simulated implementing a procedure for notifying hearing-tmpaired residents. The Area Council on Aging maintains a computerized list of hearing-tmpaired individuals. This list is updated through the Utility's emergency planning information l

l 4

m. m-m m.

-mm-m

7 i

33

. calendar and the Area Council on Aging's newsletter and responses from other County agencies.' The list, which was inspected by a Federal evaluator during the exercise,

- divides hearing-tmpaired. Individuals into two groups:

(1) those who cannot hear a telephone ring, but can hear voice transmissions through the telephone receiver (members of this group have flashers on their telephones) and (2) those who cannot hear a telephone ring or hear voice transmissions through the telephone receiver.

The above list was brought to the WCEOC by a. representative of the Area Council on Aging and was given to the sheriff's representative at the Alert ECL, The sheriff's office was responsible for notifying those with flashers by telephone. The sherifr's office and the State police shared responsibility for dispatching vehicles to contact hearing-tmpaired persons who cannot use telephones. At 0920 hours0.0106 days 0.256 hours 0.00152 weeks 3.5006e-4 months , the State police representative initiated m message for three vehicles to contat.t certain hearing-Impaired individuals and for the sheriff's office to contact others by te!ephone.

E The ability to implement the above-described procedure for notifying hearing-impaired individuals was demonstrated by those charged with imple,menting the process h

(director of the, County Office of Emergency Man 1gement, the operations officer, and representatives of the sheriff's office, the Area Council on Aging, and the State police).

However, the procedure for notifying hearing-tmpaired individuals was not available to

=

the involved persons in written form during the exerelse and has not been, but should be, incorporated into the plan. This planning issue must be addressed in the next revision of the Wayne' County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan (REPP) to be reviewed by the RAC.

WCEOC 13.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred was partially met.

Monroe County, Wayne County, and New York State coordinated implementation of five protective - action decisions.

Sirens were sounded (simulated) 12 minutes after each dectston, and EBS messages were broadcast (simulated) 15 minutes af ter each deelslon.

The P!O in the control and command room of the WCEOC promptly and accurately relayed the content of -each decision to her counterpart at the JNC where the EBS messages were draf ted.

A mistake occurred in the drafting of EBS message #5 (broadcast at 1255 hours0.0145 days 0.349 hours 0.00208 weeks 4.775275e-4 months ) at the JNC, in that residents of ERPAs M2 through M9 in Monroe County were confusingly told to evacuate but also to shelter in place. This error was discovered at the JNC and corrected in an EBS message that was broadcast at 1327 hours0.0154 days 0.369 hours 0.00219 weeks 5.049235e-4 months .

The WCEOC was not Informed by the JNC of the error in EBS message #5. EBS message #6 m broadcast without notifying the WCEOC of its existence and therefore was broadcast without coordination with and the knowledge and approval of the chairman of the County Board of Supervisors. Public information officers should receive additional training to help mure that every EBS message is broadcast only after approval by the chairman of the Wayne County Board of Supervisors and the corresponding Monroe County and New York State decision makers.

_.,-.-.~_-_s

__---__.-__---.__.---------.O

34 The WCEOC was denied a timely opportunity to correct the blunder in EBS message #5 in part because hard copies of EBS messages were not received on the f acsimile machine in the public information area of the command and control room until 30 to 90 minutes af ter broadcast. (A hard copy of EBS #1 was never received.) The chairman of the Board of Supervisors did review hard copies of EBS messages and could have detected errors. A Wayne County PIO at the JNC indicated to a Wayne County Federal evaluator that one reason for the delays was that no procedures existed at the JNC for setting priorities for photocopying (a prerequisite to facsimile transmission) and facsimile transmission of public information items. The P!O also indicated that EBS messages might have had lower priority than shorter Utility press releases because of their greater length. Because of the importance of timely receipt of hard copies of EBS messages at the County and State EOCs to facilitate timely correction of errors, procedures should be developed for the JNC to help ensure that high priority is given to photocopying and facsimile transmission of EBS messages. This planning issue must be addressed in the next revision of the JNC REPP to be reviewed by the RAC.

The public information staff received copies of most or all emergency message forms generated In the operations room. The information on these forms was typed on

" Wayne County P!O Updates" and transmitted to the JNC via f acsimile machine for possible inclusion in press releases or press briefings. Ten such PIO Updates were prepared.

The ERPAs in the 10-mile EPZ for GNPS have two identifying elementsi a letter (M for Monroe County or W for Wayne County) and a number. To correctly identify an ERPA, both elements must be used. At approximately 1025 hours0.0119 days 0.285 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.900125e-4 months , the chairman of the County Board of Supervisors received a coordination call on the executive hotline from the Monroe County executive that day-care centers in ERPAs M1 and M2 were being evacuated to the Monroe Community College. The chairman then mentioned to the PIO that day-care centers in ERPAs 1 and 2 were being evacuated to the Monroe Community Center. The P!O thought the chairman was referring to ERPAs W1 and W2 and so relayed misinformation to the JNC. The misinformation also was entered on the status board.

No untoward consequences arose from this misunderstanding as no actions were taken because of it; however, care should be taken to always use both elements in referring to ERPAs.

Alternatively, ERPAs could be identified by only one element, perhaps a number.

WCEOC 16. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases, was met. The recommendation to use of K1 comes from the State. The decision to administer K1 is made with the concurrence of the State, the County Executive and local health officials. The Wayne County dose assessor and RO continuously monitored the thyrold dose projections to determine whether KI use by emergency workers was warranted. The thyroid dose projections were based on projected release rates and were confirmed by calculations using field data.

The projected thyroid dose did not warrant the use of K1 by emergency workers;

3 35 therefore a decialon was made not to recommend'Its use. Emergency workers were

)

issued K! as part of their dosimetry kits.

WCEOC 19. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ populations (including transit-dependent persons, special-needs populations, f

handicapped persons, and Institutionalized persons) was partially met. When the WCEOC was notified that the ECL was escaleted to a Site Area Emergency at 0919 hours0.0106 days 0.255 hours 0.00152 weeks 3.496795e-4 months , a free-play message was inserted that instructed the Ontario Volunteer Emergency Squad to be '

notified to send ' an ambulance to the homes of two mobility Impairert Individuals Identified by name, to simulate picking them up, and to have the ambulance driver actually run the _ mobility-impaired evacuation route. This message was routed to the c

County ambulance coordinator.

The Area Council on Aging maintains a computer listing of mobility-impaired Individuals, which is to be brought to the WCEOC during radlological emergencies. At 0919 hours0.0106 days 0.255 hours 0.00152 weeks 3.496795e-4 months , a representative of the Area Council on Aging, in response to the request for such a list, provided the County ambulance coordinator with a list of all mobility-Impaired individuals in the EPZ whose impairment required the use of an ambulance for evacuation.

The County ambulance coordinator hesitated and then referred to a computer listing. At 0932 hours0.0108 days 0.259 hours 0.00154 weeks 3.54626e-4 months , he called the specified ambulance squad and gave the dispatcher the names and addresses of the two mobility-impaired individuals. The coordinator did not know the circumstances -of the patients needs, therefore, he did not discuss the nature of the impairments or=where to 6Tacuate the two individuals with the ambulance

- dispatcher. To help ensure that the ambulance crew has the information necessary to safely transport mobility-impaired evacuees, the dispatcher should be informed about the nature of the impairment. The ambulance should be equipped with the proper equipment

- to _ safeguard the health of the evacuees. Also, the dispatcher should be given the destination.

At 1010 hours0.0117 days 0.281 hours 0.00167 weeks 3.84305e-4 months , the Area Council on Aging representative sent a message to the County ambulance coordinator with information on the impairments of the two 1

Individuals. Both were wheelchair-bound; one had a cardiac condition and arthritis, and the other had multiple sclerosis. A flaw'was then apparent in the free-play message in a

that neither individual required an ambulance for evacuation. The instruction in the i

free-play message to contact an ambulance squad may have confused the County ambulance coordinntor. In ti e absence of that instruction, and once the nature of the impairments had been ascertained, the message should have been directed to the highway department representative who would have obtained a van with a wheelchair lift to evacuate the two Individuals.

Free-play message #2, which was to be inserted at the WCEOC upon notification of the General Emergency ECL, called for the running of general population bus route W-1-1.

The Federal evaduator and the State controller arrived at the Wayne Area Transportation Service bus yard more than 30 minutes before the General Emergency ECL notification was received at the WCEOC. The State controller asked whether the 44e e,-

+

36 route could be run ti t n. The bus dispatcher contacted the county highway department representative, who t ave permission to begin the route before an evacuation protective action decision with eut consulting the director of the County Office of Emergency Management.

The caatext did involve an exucise artificiality however, in an actual radiological energency, such premature requests to run evacuation routes could be expected. The !.lghway department representative should receive further training to help ensure that requests from the field to prematurely run genere' population evacuation bus routes are referred to the director of the County Office of Emergency Management.

WCEOC 19. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necesar/ to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ was me t.

Because the exercise was held in August, the only school-type facilities open were day-care centers.

At 0840 hours0.00972 days 0.233 hours 0.00139 weeks 3.1962e-4 months , shortly af ter the Alert ECL was received at the WCEOC, the County schools coordinator attempted to telephone the three day-care centers in the EPZ to notify them of the incident. Two of the day care centers were so notified; one, Spanky and Our Gang, had lef t an answering machine on. Spanky and Our Gang was called again at 0846 hours0.00979 days 0.235 hours 0.0014 weeks 3.21903e-4 months with the same result. At 0921 ho. 's, the County schools coordinator advised the sheriff's department on the status of the day-care centers; 15 minutes later the sheriff's department responded that the New York State Police had been asked to contact Spanky and Our Gang. At 0953 hours0.011 days 0.265 hours 0.00158 weeks 3.626165e-4 months , the County schools coordinator received a message from the New York State Police that Spanky and Our Gang had been notified. At 0954 hours0.011 days 0.265 hours 0.00158 weeks 3.62997e-4 months , free-play message #3 was inserted at the WCEOC.

It instructed that evacuation of day-care centers in Wayne County be simulated by telephone call to those day-care centers. Transportation was to be provided during general population bus run or staff POU.

The above-described notification activities satisfied the requirements of the free-play message and the objective.

WCEOC 20.

The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuttion traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was met. At 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months , free-play message #1 was inserted at the WCEOC. It instructed that a traffic control point (TCP) be set up at the intersection of Boston Road and County Line Road. The message was promptly routed to the sherif t's representative, who telephoned the sheriff's communications center. The information was correctly relayed.

A sheriff's deputy arrived at the specified location at 0918 hours0.0106 days 0.255 hours 0.00152 weeks 3.49299e-4 months . As part of regular exercise play, seven TCPs were set up - three at 0845 hours0.00978 days 0.235 hours 0.0014 weeks 3.215225e-4 months and four at 1013 hours0.0117 days 0.281 hours 0.00167 weeks 3.854465e-4 months . Terminology was used in Wayne County during the exercise that blurred the distinction between TCPs that control evacuation traffic flow and access control points that control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. Training on terminology should be provided to preserve the distinction.

7.

4'-

C; 37 i

1 DEFICIENCIES

>7 No deficiencies were observed at the WCEOC.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. -

Description:

Although activated before 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months , the PMC did not receive communications from the County Highway Department representative at the WCEOC about the Site Area Emergency and.

General Emergency ECLs (NUREG-0654,11, D.3).

Recommendation: WCEOC staff should receive additional training to help ensure that field workers receive timely notice of ECLs.

2.

==

Description:==

The procedure used during the exercise to notify hearing-tmpaired Individuals was not available in written form during the exercise for those responsible for implementing the procedure and had not yet been incorporated into the plan

-i (NUREG-0654, II, E.6).

Recommendations The procedure used during the August 1989 exercise should be incorporated into the plan and be available in written form for involved WCEOC staff, 3.

==

Description:==

The County ambulance coordinator, in responding to free-play message #4, which called for an ambulance squad to be

~'

contacted to evacuate two named mobility-Impaired Individuals, did not give the dispatcher information about the nature of the impairments or the evacuation destination (NUREG-0654, 11, J.10.d).

Recommendattoru The County ambulance coordinator should I

receive further training to help ensure that the ambulance squad is given the information required to safeguard the, health of evacuees.

I 4.

==

Description:==

The highway department representative at the WCEOC granted a request fcom a State controller in the field to run a general population bus route before an evacuation protective action decision had been made, without consulting the director of

.i the County Office of Emergency Management (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.g).

!=

1 t.

' 4S r

38 Recommendation: ' The highway department representative at the WCEOC - should receive further training to help ensure that premature requests from the field to run general population bus evacuation routes are referred to the director of the County ;

Office of Emergency Management.

5.

==

Description:==

The status board was usually updated,wlthin -

10 minutes of changest however, it occasionally was not updated for 15 to. 20 minutes. Also, the - times at which. the Site-Area -

Emergency and General, Emergency ECLs had been declared, as recorded on the status board, were changed incorrectly as the

, exercise progressed.

Recommendation: Staff members responsible for updating displays should receive additional tralning.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

==

Description:==

The bell on the RECS telephone in the dose assessment room of the WCEOC did not ring when incoming calls were received.

Recommendation: The bell on the RECS telephone should be fixed.

==

Description:==

ERPAs are identified by two elements: a letter (M for Monroe; County or W for Wayne County) and a number.

At approximately 1025 hours0.0119 days 0.285 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.900125e-4 months , the chairman of the County Board of

- Supervisors was notified via the executive hot line by the Monroe 1

County executive that day-care centers in ERPAs M1 and M2 were being evacuated to the Monroe Community College. In describing the conversation to the P!O, the chairman Identified the ERPAs as 1 and 2. The P!O at the EOC thought the chairman was referring to ERPAs W1 and W2 and relayed the misinformation to the JNC. The misinformation was entered on the status board at the Wayne County EOC. There were no untoward consequences from this misunderstanding, as no actions were taken because of it. Press Release #2 lasued correct message.

i Recommendation: WCEOC staff should be trained to specify both the letter M or W and a number are required to identify ERPAs.

Alternatively, the system of identifying ERPAs could be changed so that only one element, perhaps a number, is used.

r g

~.

b Description " Terminology was used during the exercise that blurs the distinction between TCPs that control evacuation traffic flow and access control points that control access' to evacuated and sheltered areas.

Recommendation: _ Training should be provided to assist in tne preservation of the distinction.

Descriptions The MCEOC sent regular status reports to the SEOC the' WCEOC sent none.

Recommendation: The WCEOC should also send status reports.

2.4.2 Field Monitoring Teams Wayne County deployed two field monitoring teams; however, only the red team was evaluated. There were three fle!d monitoring objectives; one was met, and two' were partially met.

WCFA 7.

The = objective to demonstrate the appr.opriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements was partially met. The red field monitoring team was equipped with a new Victoreen model 450 instrument having a thin window,' a removable cover and digital readout. It also had an Eberline E-140 meter with a pancake probe that was used primarily for air monitoring. These instruments were

- within their calibration periods; however, the new Victoreen instrument seemed to read

- about a factor of 10 too high for background readings. Team members seemed somewhat confused as they used the Instruments, especially as regards open-and closed-window readings and measurements inside and outside the vehicle. For example, an "open-window" measurement was made in the vehicle with the thin window of the detector pressed up against n' glass window of the vehicle. This measurement was, in effect, a closed-window measurement. Field monitoring team members should receive additional training in ambient radiation r.nonttoring techniques.

Accompanying ' the red team was a RACES operator, who scomptly relayed Infarmation from team m;mbers to the dose assessment group at the UCEOC by radio.

Team members did not r.tways report thele measurement results to the RACES operator accurately. Open-winGow measurements were reported as closed-window measurements and vice versa.- Also, the heights at which the measurements had been made were sometimes reported incorrectly. Team members should also receive additional training in reporting measurements. The red field monitoring team was provided with a suitable vehicle and was able to reach most monitoring points expeditiously.

A previous ARCA (WC 3) from the GNPS PEA (revised June 1989) was coreected.

40 1

procedures for the measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as l WCFA8.

The objective to demoristrate the appropriate equipment an J

microcuries per oc in the presence of noble gases was met. The red field monitoring -

team demonstrated equipment and procedures for measuring radiolodine concentrations in air. The team used an air pump that operated off its vehicle's battery.' Silver zeollte cartridges w*e stored in the team's kit; however, charcoal cartridges were.used for demonstration purposes. - The red fleid monitoring team followed plan procedures. Two air samples were actually collected, one before the release and the other in the plume.

-l (The collecting of another sample was simulated.) After collecting the air sample in the plume, the field monitoring team drove out of the plume to a background area to count the sample, it is preferable to purge the cartridge before counting in order to remove

.l residual noble gases. The field monitoring team did not do this because the procedures

-do not prescribe this technique. - The procedures should be modified to speelfy that

- cartridges should be purged before counting. This planning lasue must be addressed in the

.l next revision of the Wayne County REPP to be reviewed by the RAC. -

J Counting was performed in a reproducible geometry with a pancake probe. The count rates for the cartridges were promptly transmitted by the RACES operator to the i

~ dose assessment. group at the WCEOC.

The field monitoring team used makeshift j

masking tape labels to record the most necessary information. However, not all relevant l

-Information (e.g., the Identity of the collecting team) was recorded. Preprinted labels l

should be provided to promote uniform and systematic labeling.

A previous ARCA (WC 5) from the GNPS PEA (revised June 1989) was corrected.

l WCFA 9.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of L

' particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses was partially met.

Two air samples were actually taken; the taking of a third was simulated.- Particulates were collected on filter paper, which was separated from the i

radiolodine cartridge.before being counted separately in a holder with reproducible j.

geometry with a pancake probe. Samples were double-bagged and marked. Count rates were promptly reported to the dose assessment group at the WCEOC. The extent of play did not call for transport of the samples to a laboratory for analysis. However, the red field monitoring team was familiar with the. methods discussed in the plan for transferring samples to the New York State Police for transport to a laboratory for analysis.

j Red field monitoring team members took some precautions to avoid contamination in handling samples; however, several small flaws in their techniques could have led to contamination of equipment and supplies or cross-contamination of samples.

For example, tweezers were used to handle the particulate filters being returned to the kit-trunk after use; potentially contaminated instruments and probes in protective coverings were Npiaced in the kits; and vehicle surfaces were not covered with plastic when used for sample handling and counting. Field monitoring team members should receive additional training in preventing contamination of equipment and samples.

A previous ARCA (WC 4) from the GNPS PEA (revised June 1989) was corrected.

4 41-4 n.

_.i l

DEFICIENCIES No' deficiencies were observed in the Wayne County field monitoring activities.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.

Description:

_ Members of the red field monitoring team were e

somewhat confused when using survey instruments, especially as regards open-and closed-window readings and measurements inside

, and ' outside the vehicle.

For example, an "open-window" measurement was made in the vehicle with the thin window of the detector pressed up against a glass window of the vehicle. This measurement was, in effect, a closed-window measurement (NUREG-0654, II, I.8).

Recommendation: Field monitoring team members should receive

' additional training in ambient radiation monitoring techniques.

i

2. Descriptions Members of the red field monitoring team did not always report their measurement'results accurately to the RACES operator, who then relayed them to the dose assessment group at the WCEOC. Opea-window measurements were reported as closed-window measurements and vise versa. Also, the heights at which measurements were taken were 'sometimes incorrectly reported

' (NUREG-0654, II,1.8).

Recommendation: Field monitoring team members should receive additional training in reporting measurements..

3.

Description:

The red field monitoring team took some precautions to avoid contamination in handling samples; however, several small flaws in technique could have led to contamination of equipment and supplies or cross-contamination of samples.

For example, tweezers were used to handle particulate filters being returned to

'the kit trunk after use; potentially contaminated instruments and l

probes in protective coverings were replaced In kits; and vehicle surfaces were not covered with plastic when used in sample handling and counting (NUREG-0654, II, I.8).

Recommendation: Field monitoring team members should receive additional training in preventing contamination of equipment and samples.

b

'?Y,'

~.

J r-4 42 t

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVCMENT k

Description:

The red field monitoring team used masking tape for makeshift labels for the samples. The most necessary information, l-but not all relevant information, was recorded. For example, the identity of the collecting team was not recorded on the labels.

Recommendation: Preprinted labels should be provided to promote uniform and systematic labeling of samples.

2.4.3 Field Activities Wayne County had six objectives associated with field activities; four were met, and two were partially met.

WCFA 4.'

The objective to demonstrate ability to communications with appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. This objective wasE evaluated for communications with the following field locations: the traffic control point at the Intersection of Boston Road and County Line Road; the general population evacuation bus dispatched from the Wayne Area Transportation Service; the emergency worker personnel monitoring center (PMC) at the County highway department facility on State Route 311 the reception center and congregate care center at the-North' Rose-Wolcott High School; and the Red radiological field monitoring team.

The sheriff's deputy who set up the traffic control point communicated with base

via police radio. Reception was clear and without problems. The general population evacuation bus driver communicated with the dispatcher via a two-way bus radio without difficulty. The bus driver received instructions clearly from the dispatcher and radioed back when each stop of the route was reached. The telephones used to link the PMC with the WCEOC functioned without failure during the exercise. RACES was the primary communications link _ between the reception / congregate care: center with commercial.

telephone as. backup. The ' fire control -net was also available. The RACES operator demonstrated the capability of the RACES system through communications 'with the RACES operators at the EOCs and it appeared to be adequate.

Radio communications between the Red field team and the dose assessment group at. the WCEOC or with County fire control dispatcher was conducted by the RACES operator assigned to the field team. The primary radio had a magnetic mount antenna affixed to the vehicle. In addition, the RACES operator had a hand-held radio, and the fire control vehicle had a permanently installed radio. Use of all these radios was demonstrated during the exercise. Reception was generally good. Reception deteriorated to very poor at two locations, but moving the vehicle a short distance improved reception. The primary problem associated with communicating with the dose assessment group was not equipment-related. Rather, the problem was the excessive paperwork required of the field team in the use of multiple forms (e.g., standard form 02). Although in principle this structured organization of infortnistion e*Wd be useful, in practice staff

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p 43 time, sometimes in the plume, and radio time were wasted in repeatedly transmitting unnecessary information such as " month - Augusti year - 1989" while information that did fit the form could be neglected. The procedures for communicating informattor between the field teams and the dose assessment group should be revised to address this problem.

This planning issue must be addre aed in the next revision of the Wayne County Radiological Preparedness Plan to be reviewed by the RAC.

WCFA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionalized persons) was partially met. As was discussed earlier (see WCEOC 11), the general population evacuation bus began running route W-1-1 at 1030, before the free play message was inserted at the WCEOC. The bus driver ran the route correctly. At the last stop, the dispatcher ordered the bus to proceed to the reception center at the Palmyra Macedon High School. The bus driver arrived there at approximately noon. Then the bus driver was ordered to drive to the Wayne Area Transportation System garage decontamination center.

The ambulance crew from the Ontario Voluntary Emergency Squad who responded to free play message #4 were dedicated and well trained. Unfortunately, the only information they were given by the dispatcher was the names and addresses of the mobility impaired evacuees and that " continued electric service" was needed. The ambulance crew was fully aware that they were not given sufficient information. They needed to have information on the precise nature of the impairment so that it would carry appropriate equipment. The phrase " continued electric service" was too vague to be ; alpful.

The ambulance dispatcher should not dispatch an ambulance without

'afficient information and should press the WCEOC for such information. It turned out that there was a flaw in the free play message in that the named evacuees were wheelchair-bound so that a van rather than an ambulance was the appropriate for evacuation. The ambulance crew demonstrated how such an individual would have to be removed from the wheelchair, laid down in the ambulance, and transported.

The staff of the WCEOC uses a computer listing to identify the mobility impaired and their impairments. This listing contains an eight-digit number that contains medical and transportation information. The coding of that eight-digit number is not precise enough for the needs of emergency medical technicians. For example, the

" continued electric service" need referred to the home of the mobility impaired individual not the vehicle used for evacuation. The computer listing should be modified in consultation with the emergency medical technician community to contain information needed for choosing the appropriate vehicle with the appropriate equipment for evacuating mobility impaired Individuals. This planning lasue must be addressed in the next revision of the Wayne County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan to be reviewed by the RAC.

WCFA 20. The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and 1

c 44 sheltered areas was met. In response to a free play message inserted at the WCEOC at 0900 to set up a traffic control point at the intersection of Boston Road and County Line Road, a sheriff's deputy arrived at 0918. The deputy effectively demonstrated his ability to control traffic flow from and control access to the evacuation area. (see WCEOC ARFI)

WCFA 21. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees was met. The reception center at North Rose-Wolcott High School was activated out of sequence at 1800. The staff arrived and completed setting up the facility in about an hour. Three individuals simulating evacuees were processed through tha center. They were monitored upon initial entry. An Individual found to be contaminated was segregated and directed to the decontamination area. All clean or decontaminated evacuees were given reception center referral sheets and routed to the reception center registration area for further processing.

The monitoring and decontam' nation teams demonstrated the skills and knowledge together with the appropriate equipment to effective y monitor or decontaminate evacuees. Training logs at the WCEOC indicated that a sufficient number of County public health employees had recently (June 1989) received training in decontamination and monitoring.

The referral sheets were collected at the registration desk and a reception

. center " registration form" was completed. Evacuees are then routed to congregate care centers. Adequate staffing was available to support extended operations.

WCFA 22. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and personnel for congregate care of evacuees was met. The American Red Cross had a more than adequate staff of trained individuals t perform its congregate care responsibilities. In addition a RACES operator set ut.adio communications and a nurse from the department of mental health was available for nursing and crisis counseling assistance. However, it did not appear that the facility observed at the North Rose-Wolcott High School was adequate to provide congregate care for the stated capacity of 984.

The room that was set up for simulation of nursing, counseling, first aid, registration and sleeping accommodations only had space for fat fewer evacuees. In addition the kitchen facilities were locked and therefore could not be evaluated, and the toilet areas were being used for decontamination. Elther the configuration at the school should be changed to increase its congregate care capacity to 984 or additional congregate care capacity should be provided elsewhere. Planning lasue - Specify change for next revision.

WCFA 25. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal was partially met. The PMC was set up at the County highway department f acility on State Route 31. The facility was activated and fully operational approximately 30 minutes after notification.

Monitoring and decontamination of one vehicle and of two emergency workers were performed. Upon

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45 arrival of the vehicle, the team registered the vehicle and its driver, and monitored the vehicle for radiological contamination. The vehicle was determined to be clean and the driver was instructed to proceed to the clean parking area.

To demonstrate the decontamination procedures, the vehicle was then simulated to be contaminated. The driver was Instructed to drive the vehicle to' the decontamination area where It was washed down, remonitored, and found to be clean. The emergency worker proceeded to the personnel monitoring area, was surveyed, 2nd was found to be clean. To demonstrate personnel decontamination, the emergency worker was simulated to be contaminated on the face, palms of the hands, and feet. Af ter being monitored for a second time, he was directed to the wash area of the personnel decontamination area to wash off the contamination.

The team' demonstrated proper techniques in - ' monitoring and decontaminating both vehicle and emergency worker.

The County highway department faellity is generally adequate for use as a PMC.

However, the personnel monitoring is arranged such that a clean emergency worker must step over the path to the decontamination area, which might be contaminated, to reach-the path used by clean Individuals. Procedures should be developed to help ensure that a clean Individual.does not tread the possibly contaminated path. For example, pads of paper could be placed on a portion of that path when a clean Individual steps over it. This planning issue must.be addressed in the next revision of the Wayne County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan to be reviewed by the RAC.

DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the Wayne County field activities.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.

Description:

The only information given the ambulance crew from the Ontarlo Volunteer Emergency Squad by the dispatcher about the mobility impaired individuals to be picked up was their names and addresses, and that " continued electric service" was needed.

Emergency medical technicians need more information about the nature of the medical problem and about equipment needs (NUREG-0654,11, J.10.d)

Recommendation: Dispatchers of vehicles for evacuation of the mobility impaired should receive additional training to help ensure that a vehicle is not dispatched without ascertaining that sufficient information is obtained about the evacuee's impalement and medical condition.

2.

Description:

The County highway department facility is generally adequate for use as a PMC. However, the personnel monitoring is arranged such that a clean emergency worker must step over the 4

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path to the decontamination area, which might be contaminated, to W

reach the path used by clean individuals.

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i Recommendation: Procedures should be developed to help ensure

0 that a clean Individual does not tread the possibly contaminated path.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 1

No ' areas recommended for improvement were observed in the Wayne County Field Activities.

2.4.4 Emeriency Worker Radiological Exposure Control There was one emergency worker exposure control objective for Wayne County It was partially spet.

FCFA 6. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was partially met. The objective was evaluated on the basis of the dosimetry provided to the following emergency workers in the field and of their knowledge of radiologice.1 exposure controls the ambulance crew dispatched from the Ontario Volunteer Emergency Squad; the Red field monitoring-teams the-bus driver-from the Wsyne Area Transportation Service that ran general evacuation route W-1-11 and the sheriffs deputy that set up a traffic control point at the intersection of Boston Road and County Line Road.

All of there individuals had the dosimetry specified in the plan (a 0-5 R drect reading dosimeter (DRD), a TLD, a supply of KI, and a record card). The team leader for the field' team also had a chirping - battery-operated desmetu and the team had protective' clothing and respirators. The DRDs were initlany zeroed, were read at appropriate intervals, and the readings were duly recorded. The bus driver and sheriff's deputy also radioed their readings to their home bases.

The Red field team was in the plume near the plant and was concerned about the radiolodine content of the plume and whether they should use Kl. The radiolodine content of the plume was low and a decision had been made at the WCEOC not to have emergency workers take KI. ThL information and decision should have been ruyed to the field team but were not.

The ambulance crew did not have a thorough understanding of radiological exposure control. They had protective clothing but did not understand its purpose thinking that they should don the protect!ve clothing when their dosimeters read 2 or 3 R. They should receive additional training r this area.

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47 DEFIC 1 ENC 1ES No deficiencies were observed in emergency worker radiological exposure control in Wayne County.

AkEAS REQLilRENC CORRECT!YE ACTION 1.

Description:

The Red field team was in the plume near the plan

and was concerned about the radiolod!ne content of the plume. The radiolodine content of the plume was low and a decision had been ma6e at the WCEOC not to have emergency workers take K!:

however, this information and deelslon were not relayed to the field team.

Recommendation Field teams should be Informed about the radiolodine content of the plume and of dectslons concerning the use of K!.

2. Descriptions The ambulance crew from the Ontarlo Volunteer Emergency Squad did not have a thorough understanding of radiological exposure control. They had protective clothing but did not understand Its purpose thinking that they should don the protective clothing when their dosimeters read 2 to 3R.

Renommendation:

Ambulance crews should receive additional training in radiological exposure control.

2.5 MONROE COUNTY 3.5.1 Monroe County Emergency Operations Center Monroe County Emergency Operations Center (MCEOC) is located in the Monroe County Health and Social Servlees Building,111 Westf all Road, Rochester, New York.

MCEOC had thirteen objectives to demonstrate during this exercise; twelve were met and one was not met.

MCEOC 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario was met.

The Monroe County Warning Point (MCWP) received notification of the NUE at 0730 hours0.00845 days 0.203 hours 0.00121 weeks 2.77765e-4 months from the GNPS. The MCWP staff knew the names of the MCEOC staff to be w,

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48 notifie/J. Calls were made to thesa /taff members including the Acting Administrator of Emerr,ency Preparedness, in a timely manner. WIien the Alert ECL was received at the MCEOC at 0823 hours0.00953 days 0.229 hours 0.00136 weeks 3.131515e-4 months , the administrator distributed the call-up lists to four of his staff and notification calls were made to the remaining EOC personnel. At the General Emergency ECL at 1048 hours0.0121 days 0.291 hours 0.00173 weeks 3.98764e-4 months , MCEOC staff consulted with the appropriate agency to trigger the general population evacuation bus run.

MCEOC staff hsd an excellent knowledge of the ECLs regarding implementation of emergency activities. Also, the ECLs were prominently displayed throughout the MCEOC, and were changed in a timely manner when the ECL was elevated to the next level.

MCEOC 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobillte and activate personnel for both facility and field-batsed emergency functions was met.

The Acting Administrator of 5:;nergency Preparedness distributed up-to-date call-up lists to his Operations Officer, Radiological Officer, Resources Officer, and Shelter / Evacuation Officer to begin contacting staff by activating thelt pagers. Agency staff were alerted in a timely manner, and the EOC was declared fully operational by 0850 hours0.00984 days 0.236 hours 0.00141 weeks 3.23425e-4 months . Agency staff present at the MCEOC included Webster Police, Resources, Social Services, County Department of Health, County Sheriff, Red Cross, N.Y. State Department of Health, U.S. Department of Agriculture, City Fire Department and County Fire Coordinator, Nuclear Facility Operator (utility), County Department of Transportation, State Police, Emergency Medical Services, Regional Transit System, Operations, and Llft Line Co., County and Ste.te Health Dept., and Webster School District Personnel.

After written checklists were used by the radiological field monitoring teams to verify equipment and supplies, the teams were dispatched to the fiel; at 0935 hours0.0108 days 0.26 hours 0.00155 weeks 3.557675e-4 months .

MCEOC 3.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities at the MCEOC was met.

The Acting Administrator of Emergency Preparedness was effectively in charge of all deelston-making until the County Executive arrived at the MCEOC. Frequent briefings were held to update staff on the emergency situation, and Individual agency staff presented verbal updates on the activities and sta*.'us of their agency. A copy of the plan was available and used for reference. Message logs were kept for allincoming and outgoing messages and were produced and distributed as necessary.

The County Executive welcomed staff input and thoroughly considered all recommendations from the Radiological Officer. He discussed all relevant plant conditions and potential protective action with both the State EOC and the Wayne County EOC before a protective action deelslon was made.

MCEOC 4.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met.

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e 49 Primary and backup communication links with other emergency response locations were effectively used by Monroe County personnel. The dedicated RECS and

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the 38 commercial telephone lines (38) served as primary communication links and were used extensively throughout the exercise. The amergency staff in the main MCEOC i

operations room were provided with communication equipment that enabled both telephone communicationt. and direct radio communications with aff' 4tw *leid teams.

A HAL radio center was in operation at the MCEOC througho 3 the +

toise. it received information from ard transmitted information to redlelot eat fk a monitoring teams and Red Cross teams. lumerous other redundant radio systen k to available at i

the MCEOC. The MCEOC had communication links with more ths;.6 organizations Including State EOC, EOF, Wayne County EOC, JNC, and Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation.

l The communication systems used by the Dose Assessment Team at the MCEOC functioned without any problem..Hard copy of plant status, release information, and weather data were received at the MCEOC via the facsimile machine. The RECS line was used for plant status information and conference calling between the MCEOC, State EOC, Wayne County EOC, and the plant. Commerciallines were used for communication with the EOF and other locations. As discussed above, Radio communications were maintained with the County radiological field monitoring teams.

MCEOC 5. The objective to demonstrate the adeqdacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations was met.

The responding emergency staff was located within a central operations room at the MCEOC. Adjacent to the central operations area are readily accessible rooms used by the Accident Assessment Team, Executive Personnel, Communications, and the PIO.

The facility was excellent and had sufficient space, furniture, lighting, telephones, typewriters, corr puter/ word processors, facsimile-machines, and a copier to support emergencv operations. ' Also available were cots, kitchen supplies, and restrooms to support extended emergency operations at the MCEOC. A backup power source was also available for the MCEOC.

Required maps and displays were all posted in visible locations at the front of the central operations room. Status boards were located near the maps / displays and depleted: the status of major events including emergency classification levels ard protective action decislens; meteorological data; ERPA populations; and other pertinent information. These status boards were updated in a timely manner.

During this exercise, a public address system witn a wireless microphone was used by each agency representative while giving their briefings at the MCEOC. The l

status reports were heard clearly throughout the main operations area.

MCEOC 10. The objective to demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data was met.

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The Monroe County Radiological Officer (CRO) and supporting staff 'vorked well j

as a team. Dose projections were made using the primary computerized system, and the i

back-up hand calculations were demonstrated. Prior to a release, dose projections were l

made assuming a source-term based on the plant's area monitor readings. Upon receiving l

notifleation of the first release at the MCEOC at 1152 hours0.0133 days 0.32 hours 0.0019 weeks 4.38336e-4 months via a RECS message, dose projections were made using reported release rates. Subsequently, when field data became avellable, the calculated dose rate data were adjusted using the field measuremen' data.

1 During the exercise, the plant status information was promptly relayed to MCEOC through RECS messages so that offsite dose projections could be made.

Altogether, 16 RECS messages including plant Information were received at the MCEOC.

Several activities contributed to the Increased efficiency of the Monroe County Radiological Assessment Response Team. First, the projected plume location was plotted. Second, field monitoring teams were properly directed by the MCEOC staff to ensure that the plume was properly defined. Third, all relevant data were considered

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In the determination of dose projections, j

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NCEOC 11. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAGs, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors was met.

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For determination of the appropriate PARS, the dose assessment staff at the MCEOC considered projected doses, utility PARS received through RECS messages, EPA I

I PAGs, and other critical parameters including the estimated duration of release reported by the plant, existing meteorological conditions, affected population, evacuation time estimates, and the dose savings should sheltering be considered. The appropriate PARS were recommended to the County Executive.

I MCEOC 12. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public j

within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an Instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate state and/or local officials was met.

Through discussions with his executive team and counterparts at the State EOC and Wayne County EOC, the Monroe County Executive demonstrated effective decision making and PAR formulation. Once concurrence on PARS was achieved with his staff, the Monroe County Executive immediately informed the State and Wayne County EOCs, along with the Monroe County P!O at the JNC.

The initial alert and notification of the general public within the 10-mile EPZ was demonstrated in a timely and effective manner. Following the decision by the Monroe County Executive to initially activate the alert / notification system at 0855 hours0.0099 days 0.238 hours 0.00141 weeks 3.253275e-4 months , the Communications Officer called the 911 Center at 0905 hours0.0105 days 0.251 hours 0.0015 weeks 3.443525e-4 months and asked them to activato the stren (simulation at 0907) and disseminate the message at 0910 hours0.0105 days 0.253 hours 0.0015 weeks 3.46255e-4 months . He then called the back-up Public Safety Communications Center. After the alert signal (simulation), an EBS instructional message was begun at 0910 hourt

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51 The MCEOC staff also demonstrated the capability to disseminate an alert signal and initiate instructional messages to special populations (hearing-tmpaired) within the 45-minute guideline. After the above deelslon was made by Monroe County Executive at 0855 hours0.0099 days 0.238 hours 0.00141 weeks 3.253275e-4 months to alert and notify the public including special needs population, the MCEOC Shelter / Evacuation staff identified six hearing-tmpaired persons from the list of mobility-impaired persons in the 10-mile EPZ.

Using the TDD Telecommunication Device for the Death at the MCEOC, the six persons were alerted and nottfled of the emergency at the nuclear plant between 0907 and 0940 hours0.0109 days 0.261 hours 0.00155 weeks 3.5767e-4 months . Written procedure for notification of the hearing-tmpaired persons was available and used at the MCEOC. This procedure also included the pre-scripted messages for the use by the MCEOC staff.

The system operator is a trained volunteer from the Rochester School for the death.

The information from MCEOC was included in the EBS messages released from i

the JNC. 81x EBS messages were prepared and simulated as being broadcast (thin the 15 minute guideline. Periodically messages were rebroadcast.

With regard to the alerting of the population beyond 10-miles, a written message from the Monroe County Executive was transmitted via telephone to the Mayor, City of Rochesters Town Supervisors in Monroe Countyi and the Village Mayors in Monroe County. The message provided information on the technical malfunction at the nuclear power plant, and the resulting emergency response of Wayne and Monroe countles. The message added that they should " prepare" their township / village for the possibility for inclusion in these safety measures. The message further stated that, if any protective measures are indicated, residents would be Informed via EBS messages on local AM/FM stations (WHAM 1180, and WKLX 98.9).

MCEOC 13.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the rublic in a f

timely fashion af ter the Initial alert and notification has occurred was met.

In general, public instructions were d sseminated in a timely &nd effective manner throughout the exercise, in coordlnt.tlw with the EBS messages. Geographical areas were referred to as ERPAs, and were dr. scribed in terms of famillar landmarks and j

boundaries in the EBS messages.

Appropriate information was included in most protective actions disseminated to the public.

However, EBS Message #5 lasued conflicting recommendations to the public with regard to ERPAs M2-M9. The beginning of the EBS message read " People who reside in Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) M-2 thru M-9, W-7, are asked to te.mporarily evacuate the area in addition to the already evacuated areas of M-1, W-1 and W-2". However, at the end of the same EBS message it erroneously informed the public residing in ERPAs M2-M9 to shelter.

Specifically it stated "If you live in ERPAs W3, W5, M2 thru M-9, you are advised to temporartle- ;tmain Indoors and close all windows and doors to limit access of outside air." EE ' + 2 sage #6, issued 32 minutes later, corrected this error by removing ERPAs M2-M9 f6 a the sheltering recommendation. However, had this been an actual event, much confusion would have been precipitated, and the health and safety of the public would have been jeopardized.

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MCEOC 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the deelslon to l

recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and institutionallzed persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is j

made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases was met. The procedure specifled in the plan (Part !!!, Procedure K, Attachment 2A,Section V) states that the decision to administer K! Is to be made with the concurrence of the County Executive and State and local health officials.

Upon notification of a plant release, the Monroe County Radiological Offleer (CRO) analyzed the release data. Based on this analysis, it was i

determined that the use of KI was not warranted and should not be recommende9. As such, no K1 administration was recommended for the emergency workers in hionroe l

County. The CRO briefed the MCEOC staff of this (No KI) decision at 1225 hours0.0142 days 0.34 hours 0.00203 weeks 4.661125e-4 months .

MCEOC 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population including handicapped persons was met.

A free. play message (#4) for evacuation of two handicapped persons was J

presented to the Acting Administrator of Emergency Preparedness at 0925 hours0.0107 days 0.257 hours 0.00153 weeks 3.519625e-4 months . After

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analyzing the situation with the staff of Command and Control Section at the MCEOC, the administrator asked the Shelter / Evacuation Officer to take appropriate actions to evacuate the two handleapped persons. The Shelter / Evacuation Officer reviewed the special needs of these two persons from his records. Based on his findings, at 0928 hours0.0107 days 0.258 hours 0.00153 weeks 3.53104e-4 months , the Shelter / Evacuation Officer requested the staff of Liftline Ambulance Company to provide suitable transportation for the evacuation of these handicapped persons. Because one of the persons required a wheel-chair during transportation, Littline Company staff decided to arrange for a bus with a wheel chair-lift. After communications between the EOC and the field staff, a Littline Company bus equipped with a wheel chair was dispatched from the garage at 0952 hours0.011 days 0.264 hours 0.00157 weeks 3.62236e-4 months . The bus arrived at the appropriate destination (Monroe County hospital) at 1115 hours0.0129 days 0.31 hours 0.00184 weeks 4.242575e-4 months .

This timely response was an excellent demonstration of the capabilities to implement appropriate evacuation actions involving mobility-Impaired persons.

Additionally, the list of mobility-Impaired persons was current and accurate.

A free play message (#2) for evacuation of general population (Bus Route #X-1A) was presented to the Acting Administrator of Emergency Preparedness at 1032 hours0.0119 days 0.287 hours 0.00171 weeks 3.92676e-4 months .

After analyzing the situation with the staff of Command and Control Section, the administrator requested the Operations Officer at the MCEOC to take appropriate measures.

The Operations Officer immediately discussed the situation with the Shelter / Evacuation Officer. Upon reviewing the needs of the general population on this route, the Shelter / Evacuation Officer contacted the staff of Regional Transport Service (RTS) at the MCEOC. The RTS staff reviewed the availability of the buses and requested his field staff via radio at 1036 hours0.012 days 0.288 hours 0.00171 weeks 3.94198e-4 months to dispatch a bus to cover Route # X-1A. The bus arrived at the site at 1123 hours0.013 days 0.312 hours 0.00186 weeks 4.273015e-4 months for pick-up of general population. After picking up the people, the bus arrived at Greece Olympia Senior High School Reception Center at 1241 hours0.0144 days 0.345 hours 0.00205 weeks 4.722005e-4 months . This timely response was an excellent demonstration of the capabilities of the MCEOC and field staff to implement the evacuation of general population.

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MCEOC 19. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropr! ate protective actions for school (day care center) children within the plume EPZ was met.

A free play message (#3) for simulated evacuation of the day care centers in Monroe County was presented to the Acting Administrator of Emergency Preparedness at 0915 hours0.0106 days 0.254 hours 0.00151 weeks 3.481575e-4 months .

After analyzing the situation with the staff of Command and Control Section at the MCEOC, the administrator asked the Shelter / Evacuation Officer to take appropriate mcasures to evacuate the day care children. The Shelter / Evacuation Officer Identified the following four open day care centers: Little Windmill Day Nursery (ERPA 1

M-1), Toddler's Workshop Day Care (ERPA M-1), Webster Child Care Center (ERPA M-4),

and Once Upon A Time Day Care Center (ERPA M-4). Upon reviewing the procedures, the Shelter / Evacuation Officer accurately determined that the children in the day care centers wore to be sent to the student center at Monroe Community College, Building 10.

Us!ng the microphone system in the MCEOC, the Shelter / Evacuation 4

Officer requested (at 0926 hours0.0107 days 0.257 hours 0.00153 weeks 3.52343e-4 months ) all pertinent agencies at the MCEOC to take appropriate actions for simulated evacuation of the children in the day care centers. At 0952 hours0.011 days 0.264 hours 0.00157 weeks 3.62236e-4 months , a message was sent by the County DSS to the Shelter / Evacuation Officer informing him that the appropriate staff, were in place and ready to receive children at Monroe Community College. The Shelter / Evacuation Officer then requested irom the administrator for the official approval to evacuate the children. A decision was made at Command and Control of the MCEOC et 1024 hours0.0119 days 0.284 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.89632e-4 months to evacuate the children in the four day care centers.

This emergency response in a timely manner was an adequate demonstration of the capabill*,les of the EOC staff to implement appropriate evacuation l

actions.

MCEOC 20.

The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was met.

A free play message (#1) for establishment of a traffic control point (MTCP-1) at Route 250 and Lake Road was presented to the Acting Administrator of Emergency Preparedness at 0857 hours0.00992 days 0.238 hours 0.00142 weeks 3.260885e-4 months . After analyzing the situation with the staff of Command and Control Section at the MCEOC, the administrator asked the County Sheriff to take appropriate actions to set up the TCP. Acting expeditiously, the Sheriff dispatched a radio message at 0859 hours0.00994 days 0.239 hours 0.00142 weeks 3.268495e-4 months to the field emergency unit (Zone 'A' Commander) to set up the TCP. The assigned traffic controller promptly arrived at the above TCP at 0914 hours0.0106 days 0.254 hours 0.00151 weeks 3.47777e-4 months and promptly set up the TCP within 17 minutes of the message introduction in the MCEOC This is considered to be an excellent demonstration of the capabilities of the MCEOC and field staff.

Additionally, appropriate actions were implemented to control accees to the areas affected by the protective action decisions. Railroad personnel were advised to keep access routes open, and the marine unit was advised to keep the lake cleared.

Several traffic posts were assigned by Webster Police Department, Rochester Police Department, and the State Police.

e 54 AREAS REQ'J1 RING CORRECT!YE ACTIONS No areas reguleing corrective action were observed at the Monroe County EOC.

AREAR RECOMMENDED FOR !MPROVEMENT

==

Description:==

The status reports from the MCEOC Indicated when a protective action had begun, but did not Indicate when it had been completed.

r Recommendation: The status of protective actions should be noted on the status report.

2.5.2 Field Monitoring Teams Of the four objectives being evaluated for the Monroe County radiological monitoring teams thrae were met and one was partially met.

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MCFA 4.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was partially met.

A short-wave radio permanently mounted to an automobile was available for communleations between the radiologient field monitoring teams and the MCEOC Field Team Coordinator. Successful use of a hand-held backup radio was also demonstrated.

The RACES operator did a very effective job of providing communications between the Field Team "A" and the MCEOC. The standard message forms used provide a good way to ensure that the information was transmitted to the EOC and no confusion resulted.

The transmissions were clear and precise.

The meteorological Informatlon was constantly updated, but there was a lack of other supporting Information such as protective actions that were being implemented. In addition, information transmitted to the Field Team "A" appeared to be delayed at i

times. For example, the field team was informed (at 1123 hours0.013 days 0.312 hours 0.00186 weeks 4.273015e-4 months ) of the GE,23 minutes af ter notification to the MCEOC by the utility.

I Improvements of the message form itself would improve the timeliness of information flow. The three standard message forms #1 used to transmit three gamma radiation measurements and locations that defined the plume, took four minutes to complete.

Nonmeteorological information such as protective actions that were betrq implemented, were not transmitted to the field teams.

In addition, Informatl66 transmission to the teams appeared to be delayed at times. For example, the team was notified of the GE some 23 minutes after notification from the utility to the MCEOC.

MCFA 7.

The objective to demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements was met.

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l' 55 The Field Team "A" thoroughly and professionally prepared their equipment for field use. Speelfically, the team checked their dostmeters, Instruments, and supplies in accordance with their procedures. This took approximately one hour. The team then loaded their equipment into the RACES operators vehicle. The Field Team Coordinator briefed his personnel and provided instruction for sampling locations, and the available meteorological data.

The team left at 0945 hours0.0109 days 0.263 hours 0.00156 weeks 3.595725e-4 months , and arrived at Point #1 at 1024 hours0.0119 days 0.284 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.89632e-4 months . Open and closed measurements at speelfic distances were then obtained using plastic covered probes: the measurements were reported.

All subsequent measurements were properly obtained. Only two plume traverses were requested after the release occurred. All procedures and forms used were adequately demonstrated. The team personnel received their refresher training two months ago and very capably -

demonstrated their ability to accomplish their tasks.

Previous ARCAs (MC 1,2 and 3) from the ONPS PEA (revised June 1989) were corrected.

MCFA 8.

The objective to demonstrate the, appropriate equipment and progedures for the meesurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10' microcuries per cc in the presence of noble gas was met.

Upon receiving the instructions from the MCEOC, the RADECO Air Sampler was assembled according to procedure. However, the sampler was assembled (and later disassembled) while the team was within the plume boundary.

This could cause contamination of the supply kit and add unnecessary exposure to the team members. The sampler was attached up to the automobile 12 V batteryl the car was started and the sampler turned on. Based on the initial flow rate, a table was used to select a run-time that would provide a 10 cubic foot sample. The flow rate was again observed about halfway through the sampling period and the length of collection time was adjusted, if necessary. The sampler was then disassembled according to their procedures: glo. es were used to protect the monitor, tweezers were used to handle the filter, and the filter and the cartridge were separately begged and labeled. The Team "A" then lef t the plume.

In an area outside the plume (less ths,n 0.1 mR/hr), the team determined background for the Eberline E140N with probe (40 cpm) and measured the filter and the cartridge.

The team provided a very good demonstration for collecting three samples.

However, prior assembly of the air sampler out of the plume could prevent contamination of the supply kit. Also, the time in the plume could be decreased by disassembling the sampler out of the plume.

The Wh for counting the alt samples Indleates that a charcoal cartridge used for the collection of noble gas should be purged before counting, but there are no instructions for the silverzeollte eartridge.

The plan should be reviewed and the procedure changed if appropriate. This planning issue must be addressed in the next revision of the Monroe County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan (REPP) to be reviewed by the RAC.

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56 A previous ARCA (MC 13) from the GNPS PEA (revised June 1989) was corrected.

MCFA 9.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses was met.

Field Team "A" followed their procedures and collected two 10 cubic-feet air 1

samples. The samples included a particulate filter. The filters were properly labeled, I

counted, recorded, and double bagged for shipment. The data on filters was transmitted to the MCEOC.

Instructions for transfer of the samples at a planned exchange point to a NY State Trooper were received from the Field Team Coordinator at the MCEOC via the RACE 8 operators radio. Speelfloally, the filter was to be taken by the trooper to the Palmyra Airport and then transported to the State Laboratory in Albany, N.Y. by the Civil Air Patrol.(CAP). The exchange was to be simulated. Howeva=, the Monroe County Plan indleates that by prior written agreement, the semples are *.o be taken to the Fitapatrick Nuclear Power Station Laboratory in Fulton, N.Y. But, it is noted that the arrangement made for the State Laboratory in Albany should have provided the sample results within the four hour FEMA guideline period.

This planning issue must be addressed in the next revision of the Monroe County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan (REPP) to be reviewed by the RAC.

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DEFICIENCIES i

No deficiencies were observed at the Monroe County fleid monitoring teams.

1 AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i

1. Description Upon receiving the Instructions from the MCEOC, the RADECO Air Sampler was assembled according. to procedure.

i However, the sampler was assembled in the plume to collect an air sample at the plume center line. After collection, the sampler was disassembled in the plume and the samples bagged and labeled; this could cause contamination of the supply. kit and add unnecessary exposure for team members (NUREG-0654, !!,1.8).

Recommendation: Prior assembly of the air sampler out of the plume could prevent contamination of the supply kit and decrease plume exposure time. Moreover, the time in the plume could be further decreased by disassembling the sampler out of the plume.

i The team should leave the plume in order to count the sample.

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2. Deseription Nonmeteorological information such as protective actions that were being implemented were not transmitted to the field teams. In addition, Information transmission to the field team appeared to be delayed at times. For example, the field team was notified of the GE by MCEOC some 23 minutes after notification i

from the utility (NUREG-0654, !!, F).

Recommendation The MCEOC Field Team Coordinator should be provided with informattor, as soon as it arrives in the EOC and then transmit the information to the field teams in a timely manner.

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AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT i

Deseription: The message form use could be improved since it was necessary to use three standard message forms #1 to transmit three j

gamma radiation measurements and locations that defined the plume. It took four minutes.

Recommendation: A method should be developed to report more than one gamma radiation measurement per transmission.

For example, the messages A-6,A-7 and A-8 could be combined.

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==

Description:==

The field team performed dosimeter, instrument and supply check in accordance with their procedures; however, this process took about one hour.

a Recommendation:

The field team equipment preparation procedures should be revised to facilitate a more rapid mobilization time.

For example, the kit checking could be eliminated by l

providing a security type seal for each box.

2.5.3 Field Activities All six objectives being evaluated for Monroe County field activities were met.

MCFA 4.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. This objective was observed for following field assignments:

General Population Evacuation,

.TCP, Mobility-Impaired Persons Evacuation, Personnel Monitoring Center (PMC), Reception Center (RC), and Congregate Care Center (CCC).

Radio systems were adequately used as the communications links between the several field emergency staff and their reporting authority at the MCEOC or other base. During the evacuation of general population, the bus driver was in communications with the dispatcher at RTS. The County Sheriff communicated with his senior official at

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l 58 the MCEOC while establishing a TCP at the intersection of Route 250 and Lake Road.

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The driver of the bus carrying mobility-impaired persons communicated with his reporting official of the Lift!!ne Company. In all these cases, the radios were able to handle communications flow without any delays.

j Radio and commercial telephone lines were available and used effectively for communications at the PMC. RACES was the primary system for communications with I

the MCEOC.

The PMC also communicated with other facilities including the Fire Department, and Police Department. The radio and telephone were able to handle l

communications flow without any delays.

]

Radio and commercial telephone lines were available and used adequately for communications at the Monroe RC. RACES was the primary system for communications with the MCEOC. The RC also communicated with other organizations including the Fire Department, Police Department, and field monitoring teams.

The radio snd telephone were able to handle communications flow without any delays.

RACES was used adequately as the primary communication system 'oetween CCC and key organizations including the MCEOC, and ARC Headquarters. Several other radio systems were also available and used effectively at the CCC.

The CCC also communicated with the field teams and Monroe County emergency operations center (EOC).

i MCFA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriato protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population including handicapped persons was met.

This objective was observed for evacuation of general population and mobility-impaired persons.

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Upon the request of the Shelter / Evacuation Officer for the general population i

evacuation, the RTS staff at the MCEOC reviewed the availability of the buses and requested his field staff via radio at 1036 hours0.012 days 0.288 hours 0.00171 weeks 3.94198e-4 months to dispatch a bus to cover Route #X-l 1A. The bus arrived at the site at 1123 hours0.013 days 0.312 hours 0.00186 weeks 4.273015e-4 months for pick-up of general population. The p

driver was famillar with the process used to transport evacuees out of the affected area and was acquainted with the designated route and the pickup points. On one occasion, when a road was closed, the driver called the dispatcher and was given instructions to use an alternate road. Once the driver finished the route, he proceeded cppropriately to the RC/CCC.at Greece Olympia Senior High School at 1241 hours0.0144 days 0.345 hours 0.00205 weeks 4.722005e-4 months .

The Shelter / Evacuation Officer requested the staff of the Littline Company at the MCEOC at 0928 hours0.0107 days 0.258 hours 0.00153 weeks 3.53104e-4 months , to provide suitable transportation for the evacuation of the two handicapped persons, one of whom required a wheel-chair. After communications between the MCEOC and the field staff, a Liftline Company bus equipped with wheel chair was dispatched from the garage at 0952 hours0.011 days 0.264 hours 0.00157 weeks 3.62236e-4 months . After pickup of the two persons, the driver then proceeded to the appropriate destination (Monroe County hospital) arriving there at 1115 hours0.0129 days 0.31 hours 0.00184 weeks 4.242575e-4 months . This timely response was an excellent demonstraticn of the capabilities to implement appropriate evacuation actions involvlag mobility-impaired persons.

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59 MCFA St. The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was met.

tJpon the request of the Administrator at the MCEOC, the Sheriff expeditiously dispatched a radio message at 0859 hours0.00994 days 0.239 hours 0.00142 weeks 3.268495e-4 months to the field emergency unit (Zone 'A' Commander) to set up a TCP at Route 250 and Lake Road. The assigned traffic controller promptly arrived at the TCP at 0914 hours0.0106 days 0.254 hours 0.00151 weeks 3.47777e-4 months . The set up of the above TCP within 15 minutes of the call from the Sheriff in the MCEOC was an excellent demonstration of the capabilities of t'.e Sheriff and his field staff. The traffic controller demonstrated a thorough understar.aing of the emergency response procedures.

MCFA 21. The objective to denanstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees was met at the Pittsford-Mendon Senior High School reception center.

The fackllty was adequate for handling recuption, registrattun and radiological monitoring requirements for potentially contamir.ated evacuees and vehicles.

The facility was large enough to accommodate both clean and contaminated vehicles without any cross-contamination problems.

The !! quid waste resulting from vehicle decontamination was collected in a catch basin and ultimately pumped to the sanitary drain lines by the Fire department. All contaminated clothes were baf ged, tagged and taped closed, and stored for final pickup by ONPS employees. A separate area with showers for performing decontamination was provided.

Suffielent staff was available for registration of evacuees. Four ndividuals were available to perform radlological monitoring. The monitoring ar.o relistration staff appeared well trained, and knowledgeable in the proper procedures and ue of radiation survey instruments. All survey instruments were currently calibrated ani operational.

All of the required activities were adequately performed and documeated on the designated forms. The reception center was able to communicate with all necessary locations.

MCFA 22. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and personnel for congregate care of evacuees was met.

Pittsford-Mendon Senior High School was activated as a congregate care center (CCC). The facility was adequate to handle the anticipated number of evacuees (about 1200). The facility had sufficient sleeping accommodations, toilets, and parking area for short-term needs for the evacuees. The CCC had access to adequate food supplies and drinking water for the evacuees.

The Ccunty Department of Social Services (CSS) was responsible for general management at the CCC and the ARC was responsible for operational activities at the CCC. RACES provides communications to the CCC. The Humane Societ'y was available to attend the needs of the pets of the evacuees. The Monroe County emergency medical d

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l team was also on site to provide any ambulance services. The staff were famillar with the procedures and the requirements for equipments and supplies.

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l MCFA 25. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equl; ment,

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supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equiv st i

and vehicles and for waste disposal was met.

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The Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center (PMC) located at the National Guard Armory, Culver Road, Rochester, N.Y. demonstrated that it was able to l

process the number of emergency workers expected. The parking area at the PMC was l

large enough to accommodate both clean and contaminated vehicles.

The facility staff appeared well tralned, and knowledgeable in the proper l

procedures and use of radiation survey Instruments.

All survey Instruments were l

currently calibrated. The direct reading dosimeters (0 to 5 R) were charged, zeroed and L

lasued aloag with a TI.D recording sheet and verbal Instructions.

An ace'eptable monitoring' process for both personnel and vehicles was i

demonstrated.

All of the PMC personnel were aware of the contamination levels l,

requiring decontamination work. The personnel were also well Informed on both liquid and solid waste disposal procedures to be used at the PMC.

The vehicles were decontaminated using appropriate procedures and without any cross-contamination problems. All of the required activities were adequately performed and recorded.

1 DEFICIENCIES j

No deficiencies were observed at the Monroe County field activities.

l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 7

No areas requiring corrective action were observed at the Monroe County field activities.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l

No areas recommended for improvement were observed at the Monroe County field activities, i

2.5.4 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control l

The one objective evaluated for Monroe County emergency worker radiological l

exposure control was partially met.

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MCFA 4. The objective demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was partially met by county emergency workers assigned to field activltles.

All field personnel participating in the exercise were equipped with the required one direct reading dosimeter (0 to 5 R), and a TLD. All.

workers were given instructions on how to read the direct reading dosimeter. The dosimeters were zeroed tiefore use, and an exposure record form / card lasued for recording readings.

These workers were involved with radiological field monitoring, traffic control, general population bus evacuation, mobility impaired evacuation, and reception center.

Emergency workers were familiar with how to read and record dosimeter values. Mcst of the field personnel knew the maximum allowable doses without further authorization and what steps to take in the event of exposure that exceeds those limits.

These workers knew that they were to notify their supervisor at the exposure limit of

~

200 mR,1 R and 3 R1 and to leave the area at 5 R. However, the driver of the vehicle carrymg mobility-impaired persons was not totally familiar with the above exposure limit for the mission, and the procedure of who to contact for authorization to incur exposures in excess of the exposure limit for the mission.

Proper dosimetry equipment and procedures wert, demonstrated for traffic control ttaff, reception center staff, general population bus eveeuation staff, and field monitoring team.

DEYlCIENCIES No deficiencies were observed at the Monroe County emergency worker radiologleal exposure control.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECT!YE ACTIONS 1.

Description:

The driver of the vthicle carrying mobility-impaired persons was not totally familiar with the authorized exposure limit for the mission, and the procedure of who to contact for authorization to incur exposures in excess of the exposure limit for the mission (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a).

Ree9mmendation: Pefore starting the mission, the bus driver should be matructed about the authorized exposure !!mit for the mission ard the procedures of who to contact for authorization to incur exposures in excess of this exposure limit.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROYEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed at the Monroe County emergency worker radiological exposure control.

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,g 2.6 MEDICAL DRILL l

Emergency medical response capabilities for the GNPS were demonstrated on separate occasions.

The ambulance response was tested during the exercise on i

August 16, 1989, originating at the Wayne County reception center at the North Rose-Wolcott High School. The hospital response was demonstrated on August 2,1989 at the Rochester General Hospital. There were two objectives to demonstrate and both were j

met.

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i 2.6.1 Ambulance Portion j

i M D 23. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of veh!cles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured, or exposed Individuals was met.

During the exercise an accident was staged which involved a contaminated injury to a Wayne County resident. The resident was evacuating from Wayne County ERPA-3 and was following PA instr'ictions to proceed to the North Rose-Wolcott Reception Center. As the Individual was leaving her home she tripped and fell on the contaminated o

pavement. The injuries received consisted of a fractured right forearm, contused right elbow, lumbar strain and a minor abrasion to the rl3ht hand. This individual, although injured, decided to continue on to the reception center where 'she could receive definitive guidance and assistance.

She was met just outside the entrance to the reception center by county j

monitoring personnel who monitored her and surveyed her injuries. An ambulance from the Wolcott Area Volunteer Ambulance Corps (WAVAC) was stationed at the reception E

center as part of the response activities. The WAVAC was notified upon activation of the reception center as part of the activation procedures and a EMS vehicle was dispatched for staging at the reception center. The ambulance crew had prepared their vehicle to transport possible radiologically contaminated injured persons.

,t The ambulance crew was alerted by the reception center staff that their assistance was needed and they immediately responded to the injured Individual. One of the crew members donned protective clothing and began to radiologically survey the person with a Ludlum Model 3 meter. Members of the ambulance crew had been issued a TLD, a 0-5 R self reading dostmeter, El and instructions for their use.

Proper survey techniques were used by the ambulance crew and contamination of 2,500 cpm was found on the clothing, hands and elbow of the individual. The patient was triaged, placed on a back board, loaded into the ambulance and prepared for transport to the Rochester General Hospital for further treatment. The hospital had been paaviously l~

notified that an Individual with contaminated injuries was to be transporteu W their l

facility.

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The ambulance crew demonstrated their ability to respond to a radiation medical l

emergency according to procedures in accordance with FEMA Guidance Memorandum L

MS-1.

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o 63 2.8.2 Hospital Portion MD 14.

The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of medical facility's equipment, procedures, and personnel for handling contaminated, injured, or exposed Individuals was met at the Rochester General Hospital.

The hospital portion of the medical drill began at the Rochester General Hospital at 1315 on August 2,1989. A call was received from the plant by the emergency room staff indicating that an injured workman was being transported to the hospital. Hospital security personnel Immediately began setting up a controlled area for the patient transfer to the radiation emergency room. The entry was covered with a yellow plastic sheet.

Prior to the arrival of the ambul6nce the patient's med!' cal condition was transmitted to the hospitals a laceration on the left arm, paralysis of the left side, and

" lightly" contaminated with radioactive material. The ambulance arrived at 1355 with the patient wrapped in a blanket on a stretcher underlain with a yellow plastic sheet.

The patient was being attended by medical and health physics personnel from the plant who were administering oxygen from a portable tank.

The transfer of the patient's care from the ambulance crew to the hospital team occurred smoothly and according to procedures.

The ambulance was met by the emergency room physician and staff who had dressed out in anucontamination clothing.

Additional Information on the patient's condition was obtained during the transfer.

All ambulance personnel and the ambulance were checked for radioactive contamination with a calibrated Ludlum Model 177 Instrument. They were fotind to be clean of radioactivity and subsequently release.

The Rochester General Hospital has a special room that has been equipped by the Rochester Gas and Electric Company for radiation emergencies. In addition, the utility also provides health physics and medical staff assistance. The radiation emergency room -

is equipped with two autopsy like tables which are provided with a drainage system that can be directed into the floor drain, to a special separate floor drain tank, or to portable tanks. Instrumentation in the emergency room included two Ludlum Model 177 with pancake probes and an Eberline SRM 100s all of which were within calibration times labeled on the Instruments. A decontamination kit supplied by the utility was also in the room and was utilized by the staff. Celling mounted surgical lamps and flexible spray faucets were available and demonstrated.

Medical procedures used by the emergency room staff were proper and appropriate to the situation.

The patient was examined, monitored for radioactive contamination, x-rays were taken, blood was sampled and various other processes were used to determine the patients condition. The emergency room team did not take proper measutes to limit the exposure received by personnel and dostmetry when using the portable x-ray machine.

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I 64 Following the treatment of the patient, the emergency room was radiologically surveyed and approved contamination control procedures were observed in cleaning up the room and releasing the staff.

I DEYlCIENCIES No defielencies were observed at the medical drill.

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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring corrective action were observed at the medical drill.

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Previous ARCA cleared 8-2-89.

1 ARBAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l

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Description:==

The emergency room team did not take proper e

measures to limit the exposure received by personnel and dosimetry when using the portable x-ray machine.

Recommendation: Training should be provide to assure that personnel are familiar with the proper operation of x-ray equipment.

1.7 REMEDIAL EXERCISE OCTOJ ER.'s8,1989 A remedial exercise was hela October 18, 1989 to test the capabilities of the State and Counties to correct the deficiencies observed at the JNC regarding draf ting of self-contradictcry EBS messages. This remedial exercise called for evaluation of EBS message content at the JNC and verification Gat the coordinated protective action decisions of Monroe and Wayne Counties were promptly and accurately relayed to the JNC from the county EOCs.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate Information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion af ter the initial alert and notification had occurred was, met.

This corrects the deficiencies at the August 16,1989 full sarticipation exercise.

Four Federal evaluators eve. 4ted this remedial exercise. These Individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise wignments are given below.

Evaluator Entity Exercise Location (Function (s))

P. Weberg FEMA FEMA 11 RAC Chairman, Joint News Center (JNC)

C. CMI FEMA JNC

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o 65 S. Gray FEMA Monroe County Emergency Operations Center P. Kler ANL Wayne County Emergency Operations Center The initial scenarlo condition was the reactor plant is operating at 100% reactor power. At 0500 on October 18,1989, a notification of unusual event ECL was declared because of an unidentified leakage of greater than 1 gym for more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . At that time, the plant prognosis was degrading. School officials delayed opening of schools.

At 1000, an alert ECL was declared because of a plant trip and reactor shutdown, and because the actual safety injection to the reactor vessel was greater than 50 gpm.

At 1045, a site area emergency ECL was declared because a loss of coolant occurred inside the containment and because the safety injection flow was greater than 100 rpm.

At 1125, a general emergency ECL was declared because of the loss of coolant and because contamination of the contalnment atmosphere Indicated that fuel had failed.

After receipt of the alt, site area emergency, and general emergency ECL declarctions via the RECS line, the Directors of Emergency Management of Monroe County and Wayne County, and the representative of the New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission conferred by means of the executive hotline. They formulated information and protective action recommendations for the public, in a timely fashion.

The instruction to be disseminated over the EBS system after the sounding of the strens was in!tlally coordinated between the countles, the State and JNC representatives. The decision times, the stren activations (simulated), the EBS messages, and PARS are listed below.

Decision Stren

EBS_,

PAR or EBS Message Content 1020 1032 1035 Informed the public of the alert ECL and advised staying tuned to the EBS station.

1102 1114 1117 Shelter in place in ERPAs W-1, W-2, M-1, M-2, M-3, M-4.

1145 1157 1200 Evacuate ERPAs W-1, W-2, W-3, M-1, M-2, M-3, M-4 shelter in place in ERPAs W-4, W-5, W-6, W-7, M-5, M-6, M-7, M-8, M-9.

At the county EOCs, the PIOS promptly and accurately conveyed the decisions to their counterparts at the JNC. At the JNC, the staff formulated EBS messages that were consistent with the PARS and simulated giving the copy to the EBS reader at the JNC on or before the times specified in the decisions.

The EBS messages describing protective action re' commendations for the public should be almtlar in content to the ERPA descriptions in the plan. In the future, use

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l 66 natural and/or man-made landmarks to more speelfically delineate geographic areas for which PAR's are intended. The general public residing in the area, need information that describes the affected areas in recognizable and identifiable terms. For example, ERPA W-1, which contains part of. the town of Ontarlo, is bounded on the north by Lake Ontarlo, on the west by the Wayne-Montroe County Line, on the south by Berg Road and Kenyon Road, and on the east by town-line road (Fisher Rd.).

The EBS messages described W-1 as simply the town of Ontarlo north of Berg Road and Kenyon Road.

DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the remedial exercise.

AREAR REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Descriptions In describing the areas affected by a PAR, an EBS message used the same description to identify ERPA's W41 and W-2, M-1 and M-3, and M-2 and M-4.

These areas would have been Indistinguishable to the general and transient population in the affected areas (NUREG-0664, !!, E.7).

. Recommendation:

Descriptions of ERPA's should differ distinguishably, and be consistent in the Plan, the Public Information Brochure, and the EBS messages.

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Description:

The drafting of the EBS messages at the JNC was not coordinated with the State and County representatives, therefore, the EBS message was broadcast without verification of accuracy (NUREG-0654, II, E.7).

Recommendation: Content of EBS messages should be reviewed and approved prior to broadcast. The JNC should coordinate with the State, and the counties before transeitting Instructions to the public.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR 1MPROYEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed in the remedial exercise.

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SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREA 8 REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Cection 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficiencies and areas requiring corrective action noted during the June 7-8,1989 exercise.

Tables 3.1 through 3.10 summarizes recommendation to correct those deficiencies and areas requiring corrective action identified in previous exercises which remain unresolved or have been rectifled during the exercise.

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TARIJE 3.1 ROBERT E. CIWmA IEUCtf.AR FOMER STATION -

StBOIARY OF BEFICIENCIES OR AREAS ESqWIRIIBC CDRRECT1WE ACTION AMCNST 16, 1989 IIt:W ToltE STATE EUC Fage 1 of 1 De'iciency/ Area 8equiring IIUltEC-06}4 FEMA b

No.

Corrective Action Reference Objective 8/16/89 Frevices Esercises Present Status a

1.

The dose projection methodology

8 11 I

I demonstrated was not in accordaa.ce with t k.s one in the plan.

The eethodology in the plan should be followed, or the plan showid be revised to reflect r

the ne'.hodology being used.

2.

Becaisse the connand and control A.I.b.

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C section is separ ate from the A.2.s operations eaction, the entire EOC st.ft was not briefed frequent 1y.

Considerations should be given to installation g

of a centrat public address system throughout the State EOC that should be used frequently by a key individual to brief staff on the emergency situation.

" Objective number is from CM EI-3 (dated February 26, 1988) as it relates to AaCAs.

bC2 Corrective Action Completed.

It Corrective Action incomplete.

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TAetE 3.2 ROSERT E. Cf 8MIA tsUClEAR F0W2 STAYlON -

StaseARY OF DEFICIDICIES DE AREAS REgillRluC CORRECTIVE ACTIORI AUCUST 16, 1999 ONM TUItE STATE EUC Page 1 of 4 Deficiency / Area Requiring 18UREC-0654 FEMA b

Iso.

Corrective Action Reference Objective

8/16/89 Frevious Esercises Present Status 1.

The DOT truck and driver use,' for I.8 27 I

I transporting samples were not J.11 monitored prior to leaving the laboratory af ter the samples had been unloaded to ensure that radiological contamination was not present.

Procedores should be implemented whereby the unloaded vehicles used to transport the 9 apples and the driver ' are monitored befo,re leaving the laboratory.

2.

The sampliam team which una 1.3, 4

Y required to travel the farthest F

{

from the I.ake District EOC lost radio contact and had to connunicate with the EOC wie telephone.

Ilone of the sampling teams vers equipped with or knew the I.ab e District EOC telephone numbes*.

Sampline teams should

have, e, - be providee while in etdio co. tact, with celephone numbers to call facilities they are required.o communicate with.

3.

The I.DEOC staf f were not able to J.1 29 I

I provide informat.on to one of the teams concerning the locations of dairy farms, even though this information was available at the EOC.

Additional training should be provided to 1.DEOC staff to assure that existing information can be readily referenced and made available to field teams.

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P TARIK 1.2 DOGEltT E. CluuA spUCIEAR POWER STATION -

SWOMRT OF DEFICINICIES OR AREAS RequitlNC GIERECTIVE ACTION AUCUST 16, 1989 NOf TtMtK STATE FUC Page 2 of 4

.a-Deficiency / Area Requiring IfUREC-0654 FDIA a

b 16 o.

Corrective Action Reference Objective 8/16/09 Freviome Esercises Present Statas j

l 4

The I.DEOC had newly updated log I.8 7

1 I

forms, while the field. team equipment kits had at least two versions of outdated log forms (i.e.,

different forms among teams).

This inconsistency caused some initia't confusion in data transmiscion.

In some cases, survey routes had to be retraced and measured again to acquire' consistent measurement data.

The same form should be used by the field team controller and all samplina teams.

3.

The sampling teams were not 1.8 4,7 x

4 provided with the telephone F

P numbers needed to contact the EOC in cases of radio failure. These teIephone nea6 era shoold be provided in the kits issued to the sampling teams.

6.

The letsel s used for identifying I.8 7

I I

milk samples f rom various dairies will need more is. formation to make the ' sample data es.ful to the decision makers at the State

~

EOC.

All agriculture and market personnel should have the same training with respect to j

information requirements on milk sample labels (i.e.,

feeding history of

cattle, time of milking, and any dilution by uncontaminated milk).

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s s-F YAntE 1.2 moentT E. ClunA NUCLFAR p0MER STATIcet -

SupetARY OF DEFICIBBCIES OR ASEA 5 REQtflelWC UlstECTIVE ACTies AUCtf5T 16, 1989 18W TUlti 3 TATE a)C Fase 3 of 4 Deficiency / Area Requiring IBUltEC-0634 FDtA b

po.

Corrective Action Reference Objective

8/16/89 Freefous Esercises Present States F.

Sampling team radiological 1.8 7

I I

technicians were not familiar with the significance (or lack of significance) of the direct field measurements.

All measurements at background levels were assumed to mean that no contamination e

cuisted, which may or may not have been the case.

This assumption resulted in a

relamation in the see of protective clothing, gloves.

It is possible to have radiciodine contanination that is indistinguishable free the

-4 natural variation in background levels using the am/hr range field survey meter used by the team.

Radiation technician tese members should be property equipped and trained to take background readings using the nicro-R survey meter.

8.

Some team members did not 1.8 7

I I-demonstrate good ability to 3

prevent cross-contamination of esoples.

They did not properly double-bag samples nor use water to clean saepting utensils after collecting each sample.

Additional training should be provided te sample team members to reduce the potential for cross-conteeination.

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TAntE 3.3 h080tf E. CIWuA IIUCIEAR peter STATION -

StacMar OF OFJICIDICIES OR AREAS REQUIRlWC 03SEECTIVE ACTION AUCUST 16 1999 3

WESTuta DISTRICT Page 1 of 1 b

Deficiency / Area Requiring IfUREC-0654 FDtA b

38 0.

Corrective Action Beference Objective' 8/16/89 Previous Esercises Present Status C

I The radio system at the Western F.1 4

1 I

District

EOC, which caused problems during the 1983 and subsequent esercises was partially updated.

However, it is still unreliable and suffered intermittent failures during the esercise that caused einer problems.

The cause of intermittent problems with the radio ' system at the Western District EOC should be investigated and remedied.

2.

There are an inadequate number of F.!

4 I

I telephone lines and telephone a

equipment available at the td WDEOC.

AdditionsI telephone lines and equipment should be secured for the WDEOC.

Objective number la free CM EX-3 (dated February 26, 1988) as it selstes to ARCAs.

b: Corrective Action Completed C

la Corrective Action incomplete.

cRewrite of ARCA 7 free CWPS PEA dated 12/16/83, page 78.

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". Aa:E 3.4 -

nonIF E. CIIntA NUCIEAlt N STATION -

SWielART OF DEFICIENCIES OR AREA 5 ret lUIRIWC GIMECTIVE ACTION AeCUST 16, 1989 IAs IE pt3TRICT Page 1 of 1 Deficiency / Area Requiring IsUltEL-0654 FEMA 18 o.

Corrective Action Refe+ence Objective

8/16/09 Freviene Esercises Present Status' 4

1.

There are en inadequate num6er of V.1 4

I I

commercist telephone lines at the LDEOC.

Additiona1 teiephone lines should be installed for mee by the emergency staf f.

t

0bjective number is from Qt EX-3 (dated February 26, 1988) as it relates to f1CAs.

b Corrective Action Completed C

I: Corrective Action Incomplete.

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-TABIE 3.5 It0#Dtf E. CittelA IIUCIEAlt POW.It STATluff -

StBetARY OF DEFICIE38CIES Olt AREAS REQUIRIIOC Q)tRECTIVE ACTIOtt AUCUST 16, 1989 DentCIrssCY OPENAT108t3 FACll.lTY Page 1 of 1 Defiriency/ Area Requiring IfUREC-0654

. FEMA-b afo.

Corrective Attion Reference Objective"' 8/16/89 Previous Esercises Present Status s

1 Information on the start of the F

4 K

- I release from the plant (beginnis.g at 1130 hours0.0131 days 0.314 hours 0.00187 weeks 4.29965e-4 months ) was not ' ' trans-mit ted ' to the Counties sent il 22 minutes later (at 1152 hours0.0133 days 0.32 hours 0.0019 weeks 4.38336e-4 months ).

The cause of the delay in message transmission should be determined and appropriate actions taken to assure that other delays in message transmission do-not occur.

2.

The PANS issued by the Utility.

5 1

I were not shown on the status boards.

A status board simuld

-J display the Utility PARS.

m a0bjective number is f rom CM EX-3 (dated February 26, 1988) as it relates to ARCAs.

b Corrective Action Completed j

C i

1 Corrective Action Incomplete.

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M TABLE 3.6 90BERT E. CIIRIA strffM FOMER staff 0N StpetAST OF DEFICIENCIES OR AREAS tequit!NC CDERECTIVE ACff0N AUCUST 16, 1999' J0lMT MEWS CENTER i

Page 1 of 3

-i v i Deficiency / Area Rettuiring

-WUREC-0654' FEMA b

1 N(.

Corrective Action Reference Objective

8/16/89 Previous Esercises Present Status 4

C 1.

Deficiency

Content of some EDS

' E.5

.- 13 I

C messages was' inaccurate and incompletet EBS message 65 erroneously stated that sheltering should occur in " ERPAs in. which the public had been-advised, in the some message, to evacuate; EBS message #2 did not include descriptions of the boundaries of affected ERFAs.

Content of E85 messages should be revieued and approved prior to broadcast.

To provide the time for this, the JWC should be provided with a word processor, and all prescripted messages and ERPAs should be loaded into the

~ 4 system.

This procedure would m

reduce the time seeded to merge.

the applicable ERFAs into the appropriate' ESS ' message, thus freeing up time to - review,

verify, and approve messages before broadcast.

C 2.

Deficiency

EDS message f6 A.2.a 13, 3 I

C (uhich corrected

5) was broadcast without notifying the WCEOC of its existence and was therefore broadcast without coordination with and' the knowledge and approval of the chairman of the County Board of Supervisors. PIOS should receive additional training to help ensure that EBS messages are broadcast with coordination among the County and ftste decision makers.

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' AOSERT E. CitRIA Nurt ras ytisfER STATION -

StRetARY OF DEFICIENCIEli OR AREAS 39QUIRIIIC CORRECTIVE ACTION AUCUST 16, 1989 JOINT IIENS CENTER Page 2 of 3 Deficiency / Area Esquiring UUREC-0654 FEMA-b No.

Corrective Action Reference Objective 8/16/89 Frevious Exercises Present Status s

C*

3.

Deficiency:-

EBS Message #5 E.5 13 I

issued confileting recommenda-tions to the public with regard to ERPAs M2-F:9, and would have resulted in additional dose for the public in these ERPAs.

Despite a corrected E85 Message

6, issued 32 minates

later, information issued in EBS Message

5 would have created a signifi-cant amount of confusion, and the health and safety of the public would have been jeopardized. All information disseminated to the

.public should be scrutinised for accuracy and consistency prior to

' q release of the EBS message.

4 4.

Content of New York State news C.3.s.

14 I

I releases was not always accurate. The first news release stated that representatives froic 19 agencies were at their desks at the SEOC.

In fact, only 12 such agencies were then represented, and 2 of the '19 had not even been ca11a.4 in.

To ensure accuracy, the New York State lead FIO should verify information before it is released, particularly.if the release is a prescripted message.

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- ROSotT E. CINHA Nt9CIEAR POWot STATION -

Stse6AltY OF DEFfCIENCIES OR AREAS REqtitRINC CORRECTIVE ACTION ANCUST 16, 1989-

Jof NT IIEWS CENTML

+

Page 3 of 3 Deficiency / Area Sequiring.

NUREC-0654 FEMA b

Wo.

Corrective Action Reference Objective" 8/16/89 Previous Esercises Present Status 5.

' one reason the WCEoc was denied a E.5 4, 5 I

I timely opportunity to correct errors in EBS message #5 was that hard copies of. E85 messages were not received via the-facsimile machine entil ' 30 to 90 minutes

~

after broadcast. -(A hard copy of E85 message

1 was never

^

received.) A Wayne County FIO at the JNC indicated that

-no procedure existed for-setting priorities for photocopying and facsimile transmission of public Information items. ' Furthermore, e-EBS messages might'have had lower priority than Utility press releases because of their greater y

length.

At the

JNC, high op priority should be given to photocopying and facsimile tranteission of E85 messages.

6.

Several State P!O. staf f - were E.2 2

I C

prepositioned from. ' Albany to Rochester which expedited activation of the JNC within approximately 45.

minutes.

Freemercise agreements should be~

adhered to for demonstrating the activation of State P!O personnel assigned to the JNC.

7-The designated PIO. should C.4.b 13 Y

C actually complete the authentica-tion and verification process with the ESS radio station (s).

Addi:lonal training is required for P!0s in the procedures for interacting with E85 station (s).

0bjective number is from CM EX-3 (dated February 26. 1988) as it relates to ARCAs.

b Correct ive Action Completed.

Ct 1-It Corrective Action Incomplete.

~

Deficiency evaluated at 8/16/89 exercise and corrected hy demonstration during the 10/18/89 Remedial Drill.

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,e' TASt.E 3.7

- =

BOSERT E. CIWA ISUCLEAR FOWER STATIbst -

SIRGIARY OF DEFICIENCIES OR AREAS REEPJIRINC GIRRECTIVE ACTION OCTOBER 18, 1989 JOftrT NEWS CENTER

//,.,,

Fase I of 1 Deficiency / Area Requiring; NUREC-0654 FEMA --

b No.

Corrective Action Refetence objectives.8/16/89 Frevious Esercisee ~Present Status 1.

In describing the areas affected E.7 4,5-1 I

by a PAR an EBS sessage used the description to identify EEPA*a W-1 and W-2, N-1 and N-3, and N-2 j

and M-4.

These areas would have been indistinguishable to the general and transient population in the' af fected areas.

Descrip-tions of ERFA's should coincide :

in the Plan, the Public Brochure, and the ESS messages.

2.

The draf ting of the EBS messages E.7 4,5 -

X I

at the JNC was not coordinated with-the State and '. count y representatives, therefore, the 4

E85 eassage was broadcast without verification of accuracy.

Content of EBS messages should be reviewed and approved prior - to broadcast.

The JNC should coordinate with the State, and the counties before transeitting Instructions to the public.

a0bjective number la from CM EK-3 (dated February 26, 1988) as it relates to 4ECAs.

b Corrective Action Completed.

Cs Is Corrective Action incomplete.

cDeficiency evaluated at 8/16/89 esercise and corrected by demonstration during the 10/18/89 Remedial Drill.

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' TAatE 3.8 -

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' totERT E. CIIRBA WCl2AR POWER STATICII

' StNetART OF DEFICIEIICIES OR AREAS REqtil2IIIC CORRECTIVE ACTION AtICt:ST 16, 1989 n,

~WAfteE MUIITY Page 1 of 8 Deficiency / Area Pequiring

~ NUREC-0654 rr.MA b

Wo.

Corrective Action Reference Objective" 8/16/89' Previous Exercises Present States

}

k l

1.

Although activated before D. 3 '

4. ' l 1

1 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months , the PHC did not' receive comununications f rom, the County ifighuey Department representative at the WCEOC about the Site Area Emergency and Ceneral Emergency ECf.s.

WCEOC staff should receive additional training to help ensure that field workers receive timely notice of ECLs.

2.

The. procedure used during the E.b 15 X

1 esercise to notify hearing-impaired individuals was. not

[

available in written form during the exercise for those responsible for implementing the m

procedure and had. not yet been o

incorporated into the plan. 'The I

procedure used during the August 1989 caercise should 2be.

incorporated into the plan and be available in written form for invol.ved WCEOC staff.

t l

J.10.d..

18 I

I.

l 3.

The Coun'.y ambulance coordinator, l

in responding. to free play message f4, which called for an ambulance squad to be contacted to evacuate two named mobili y-impaired individuals, did. net

-give the dispatcher information.

about the nature of the j

impairments or.

the evacuation l

destination.

The County i

ambulance coordinator should I

receive further training to help I

ensure that the ambulance squad i

is given the information required

(

to safeguard the health of-evacuees.

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TA8fE 3.8 ROBERT tl.' CINNA NUCLEAR POWER STAT!0lf -

- SIDefART OF DEFICIENCtKS OR ASEAS REQUIRlWC CORRECTIVE ACTION

.. ~

J-AUCUST 16, 1989' WAYNE COUNTY Page 2 of 8' t,

f' Deficiency /Aree llequiring If0 REC-0654 FEMA --

h Wo.

Corrective Action Referee.ce

.0b}ective' 8/16/89 Previons Esercises Present Status I

1

^

department J.80.g 3, 18' I

I l

4.

The highuay representative at the UCEOC granted a request from -a State

^

controller in the field to run a general population bus route

~ evacuation ' protective i

before an action decision 'had been made, L

without consulting the director l

of the County Office of Emergency i

Management.

'The highway department representative at the WCEOC should receive further l

training to. help ensure that l

premature requests from the field to run general population bus evacuation routes are referred to the director of the County Office of Ear.rgency Management.

m 5.

The status board was usually

.5 I

I upd at ed within IO minutes of che engeo g however, it occasionally vae not updateJ for 15 to 20 minutes.

Also, the times at which the Site Area Emergency and Ceieral Emergency ECLs had been declared, as recorded ont the status

board, were changed incorrectly as the-esercise progressed.

Staff members responsible for updating displays should receive additional training.

4 i

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N' TABLE 3.8 30 SERT E. CIONfA NUCLEAR 70MER STATION ~

SUtstARY OF DEFICIENCIES OR naEAS REQtif tlNC QMtRECTIVE ACTION AUCUST 16. 1989 WAYNE COUNTY Page 3 of 8 Deficiency / Area Requiring IfUltEC-0654 FDtA b

Wo.

Corrective Action Reference. Oh}ective" 8/16/81 Previous Esercises Present Status l

6.

Members

'of the. red field I.8 7

I

-I monitoring. team.were somewhat

_ confused when using survey instruments, especially

- as regards open-and closed-window

~

readings ' and measurements inside and outside' the vehicle.

For

example, an "open-vindow" j,

measurement was made in the j

vehicle with the thin vindow of p

the detector pressed up against a

glass vindow of the vehicle.

This measurement was, in ef fect, a

closed-windov

' measurement.

Field monitoring ~

additional

-team members should receive training in ambient radiation znitoring techniques.

so 7.

Members of the red field I.8.

7, 14 X

i monitoring team did not always report their measurement results accurately to the RACES operator, who then relayed them to the dose assessment group. at the WCE0C.

Open-window measurements. were reported as r9ased-window measurements and vise versa.

Also, the heights at which measurements were taken were sometimes incorrectly reported.

Field monitoring team members should receive additional training' in reporting measurements.

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. TABLE 3.8 ROBERT E. CINNA HUCI. EAR POWER STAT 10ef -

'StsetARY OF DEFICIENCIES OR AREAS REQUIRIHC CDRRECTfvE ACTION AUCtf5T I6,'1999 WAYuK CouwTY x

5 Page 4 of 8 Deficiency / Area Requiring NUREC-0654

_ FEMA b

No.

Corrective Action Reference.

Objective 8/16/89 Frevious Esercises Present Status s

86 The. red field monitoring team 1.8 7

X f

took some precautions to avoid contamination in handling samples; however, several-small flaws in technique could have led tn contamination of eouipment" and supplies or cross-contamination of samples.

For

esemple, tweezers were used to handte particulate filters being returned to the kit trunk after uses potentially contaminated instruments and probes in protective-coverings were replaced in kits; and vehicle surfaces were not covered with plastic when used in sample handling and counting.

Field co monitoring team members should W

receive additional training in preventing contamination of e.guigment and samples.

9.

The only information given the J.10.d 4

X I

ambulance crew from the Ontario Volunteer Emergency Squad by the dispatcher about the ' mobility impaired individuals to be picked up was their names and addresses, and that - " continued-electric service" was needed. Emergency i.

medical technicians need more information about the nature of L

the medical problem and about f

equipment needs.

Dispatchers of vehicles for evacuation of the l

mobility impaired should receive ensure that a vehicle is ~ help additional training to not dispatched without ascertaining that sufficient information is obtained about the evacuee's impairment and medical condition.

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'TAat2 3.8 annenT E. CINNA NtfCtX.AR PONER STATION -

a' S

^StmetARY OF BEFICIENCIES OR AREAS ENQWIRINC mRRECTtWE ACTION :

AucuST 16,'1989 T,7.

WAYNE (XItNITY 1

Page 5 of 8 Deficiency / Area Requiring NtNtEC-0654 FEMA -

No.

Corrective Action Reference On.jactive' 8/16/89 Previous Esercises Present Statu."

~

10.

It did not appear that the J.10.h 5

2 I

facility observed at the North Rose-Wolcott High School was adequate to provide -congregate care for the stated capacity of i

984. The room that was set up for

~

simulation of - nursing, counsel-ing, first' aid, registration and sleeping accosumodations had only space. for far fever evacuees. In addition, the kitchen facilities were locked and therefore could not be evaluated, and the toilet areas were being used for decontamination.

Either the configuration at the North Rose-Wolcott High School should be changed to increase its congregate care capacity t.o 984 w.

or additional congregate care capacity should be provided etsewhere.

I1.

The County highway department

.J.10.h 5

I

.I facility is generally adequate for use as a PMC.

However, the personnel monitoring is arranged -

such that a clean. emergency worker must step over the path to

(

the decontamination area. -which might be contaminated, to reach the path-used by clean individuals.

Procedures should be developed to help ensure that a clean individual does not tread the possibly contaminated path.

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'. TCCt E $.8 SOSEltT E. C!lEGA NUC1. EAR POWER STATION -

5tsetARY OF DEFirIEIICIES OR AaEA5 RFJQUIRINC CORRECTIVE ACTION At9CUST 16, 1989 WAvsW. (xpuerry Page 6 of 8 Deficiency / Area Requiring NUREC-0654 FEMA' h

No.

Corrective Action

Reference Objective

8/16/89 Previous tuercises. Present Status 12.

The Red field team was in the 16 I

I plume near the plant and was concerned about the radiciodine content of the plume.

The i

radiciodine content of the plume

~

was low and a decision ' had been made at the WCEOC not tohave emergency uorkers take-K!;

houever, this information and decision were not relayed to the field team.

Field teams should' be informed about the radiciodine content of the plume and of decisions concerning the use of KI.

13.

The dose assessment staff made 1.10 10 1

C changes in the computer program J.10.m EID in used to make dose projections.

These changes resulted in inaccurate thyroid dose prolec-tions.

Changer to the computer program should be verified and checked for accuracy prior to use for projecting doses.

14.

The Wayne County RO did not 1.10.

10. 11 1

C question the technical reasons

'J.10.m for the 25-mile shelter PAR (17 miles in Wayne County) strongly enough.

Trainics 'should be provided to the R0 to assure that att data, either the County's or the utility's, are used to defend or refute PARS.

15.

One team performed only closed-f.8 9-X C

window readings, even though both open-and closed-window readings.

were required to properly charac-terize the plume location. Field monitoring team members should be trained to take both open- ~ and closed-window instrument readings.

'S

W.'-

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I TARIA 3.8

~

ROSERT E. CIIRIA HUCIEAR p0MER STATI0el -

StNetART OF DEFICIEBICIES OR AREAS REQUIRIIIC (XBRRECTIVE ACTICII AUCUST 16, 1989 WAYNtt 00tA7 Page 7 of 8 Deficiency / Area Requiring:

.WlfREC-0654

' FF)tA a

b No.

Corrective Action Reference Objective 8/16/89 Previous Esercises Present Status 16.

Several problems were identified 1.8 7

I C

related to contamination control in the field.

- One of ' the teams did not use protective coverings" for the survey instrument probes.

- The ' equipment kits were opened in the plume, which could lead to contamination of equipment and

~ possible cross-contamination of samples.

-A pa'il that was set on the ground to support. the air-sampling equipment was put back into the vehicle without CD :

checking it for contamination.

e Field monitoring. team members

. j-should be trained in proper procedures for contamination control.

17.

Radiological monitoring team 1.9 8

1 C

members used an inappropriate procedure for air sample surveys.

The charcoal / silver zeolite cartridges and the particulate filters.

were i

esonitored simultaneously rather

.l then separately.

The. field j

monitoring teams should be 7

trained in proper survey techniques for the analysis of air samples.

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. ROSERT E. CIIAIA IIIICIEAR POWER STATION -

'SEDetARY 06' DEFICIEIICIES OR arf.AS REqti!RIIIC CORRECTIVE ACTION AUCUST 16, 1989 WAYIIE COUISTT Page 8 of 8 t

Deficiency / Area Requiring WtJnEC-0654 FDtA b

No.

Corrective Action Beference Objective" 8/16/89' Previous Exercises Present Status

+

C' 18.

The EOC operations and dose H.3 5

I I

+2 assessment areas continue to have a limited working space and poor ventilation.

.Protonged use of thia facility would reduce the efficiency of emergency response personnel.. The Wayne County EOC facility should be retocated to a '

new facility or the esisting-facility should be substantially-upgraded.

A a0bjective number is from CH EX-3 (dated February 26, 1988) as it relates to ARCAs.

b: Corrective Action Completed.

C 1

Corrective Action incomplete.

CD Consolidation of ARCA and 34 from CNPS PEA dated 12/16/85, pages 82 and 86.

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' TABLE 3.9 90 SERT E. CIINIA NUCIAAR F0WER STATION -

SIAetARY OF DEFICIENCIES OR AREAS REQtilRIWC CORRECTIVE ACTION AUCtlST 16, 1949 M0entolt CouuTY Page 1 of 3 Deficiency / Area Requiring NUSEC-0654 FEMA b_

No.

Corrective Action Reference - Chjective' 8/16/89 Previous Esercises Present Status 1.

Upon receiving the instructions 1.8 9

I I

fron the. MCEOC, the RADECO Air Sampler was assembled ' according to. procedure.

Houever, the sampler was assembled - in the plume to collect an air sample at the plume center line.

After collection, the sampler was disassembled in the plume and the samples begged and 1;beleds - this could cause contamination of the supply kit and add unnecessary esposure for tese members. Prior assembly of the air sampler out of the. plume could prevent contamination of the supply kit -

and decrease plume-esposure time.

Moreover, the time in the plume could b= further decreased by disassembling the sampler out of the plume.. The team should leave the plume in order to count

^

the sample.

2.

Bonneteorological information F

4 I

I

^

such as protective actions that vere being leptemented were not-transmitted to the flete teams.

In addition, information trans-mission to the field team appeared to be delayed at times.

For esemple, the -field team was notified of the CE by MCEOC some '38 minutes after notification from 'the utility.

The MCE0C Field Team Coordinator should be provided with informa-tion as soon as it arrives in the EOC and then t ranset t the information to the field teams in-a timely menner.

u.

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. e TABLE 3.9-ROBERT E. CIIN8A NtN1 EAR POWER STATIDsl - 1 SE20tARY OF DEFICIENCIES OR AREAS REQUIRileG ColtRECT1TE ACTIOW -

At9CtfST 16,.1989 se0sIROE COUNTY Page 2 of 3 18 0.

Corrective Action NUREC-0654 FEMA Deficiency / Area Requiring-b Reference Ob}ective' _ S/16/89 - Previous Esercises Present' Status 3.

The driver of the vehicle K.3.a 6

I I

carrying-mobility-impaired persons was not totally familiar with the authorized exposure limit for the mission, and the procedure of who to contact for authorization to incur exposures in excess of the exposure timit for the mission. Before starting the mission, tha bus driver should be instreated about the authorized expo *.sre limit for the mission - '.;.e procedures of who

contact for authorization to incur esposures in escess of the this esposure timit.

4.

The radiological monitoring teses I.8 7

I

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were not adequately briefed on current plant conditions, meteorological data, or control procedures by the field team dispatcher before being developed into the field.

Field teams should receive detailed briefings before being disptached.

i bi a

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TAtlE 3.9 w

AOBERT E. CIIntA NtfCf2AR FeldER STATICII -

StNetART OF Dt[FICIEDICIES OR ARF.AS RflQt!!EllIC ColtRECTIVE ACTICIf 1

AtlCUST 16, 1989 WAYIItt CDUIITY Page 3 of_3 Deficiency / Area Sequiring 88UltEC-0654 FDfA h

18 o.

Corrective Action

~ Reference Objective" 8/16/89 Previous Exercises Present Status 5.

One Monroe County iletd team I.8

.7 X

C i '

reported the. volume of air e

d sampled as 10 liters ' instead of prescribed in 10 cubic feet as the field team procedures. ' Field team personnet should be trained to report att sampling units in the proper units as prescribed in the field team procedures.

6.

Members of Team A exhibited poor f.8 7

X Ci s

understanding of the strategy for sampling white minimizing their exposore.

The team f ailed - to relocate outside the plume while conducting a radio check and a 15-minute team conference. Also, to team A took an inappropriate amount of time to cat 1 in sample o-results, sometimes as long as cne hour.

Additional training should be provided to team members on approved field techniques, with particular emphasis

.on radiological safety.

7.

The procedures used to measure

!.9 8

1 C

radiciodine concentration deposited in the filter media were not consistent or reproducible.

Appropriate equipment and procedures should be provided to assure controlled and reproducible measurement of alsborne radiciodine concentra-tinns.

Field monitoring. teams should be trained on an ongoing basis in the measurement of radiciodine samples.

a0bjective number is from CM EX-3 (dated February 26, 1988) as it relates to ARCAs.

b: Corrective Action Completed.

C I: Corrective Action Incomplete.

8/16/89 exercise and corrected by demonstration during the 10/l8/89 stenedial prill.

" Deficiency evaluated at

I l

l TABLE 3.16

~

ROBERT E. CIInsA IIUC1. EAR F0WER STATION -

StpetARY OF isEFICl>31CIES OR ASEAS Rt3Filtl9sC CDREFCTIVE ACTIOef AUCIfST 16, 1999 ROCHESTER CENERAL tIO4FITAL Page 1 of I

'eficisscy/ Area Requiring asUREC-0654 FEMA b

Wo.

Corr-ctive Action Reference Objective

8/16/09 Previous Esercises Present Status C

1.

Hospital staff used a blanket t.. !

24 X

C under the contaminated patient which could contaminate the high i

patient's back and a

pressure hose which could spread 3

contamination.

Hospital staff should be given initial training in decontamination procedures.

2.

Emergency room staff did ner E.3.b 6

I C'

check their self-readia dosimeters betore entering the emergency roomt initial readings were not recorded.

Two of these dosimeters actually read 200 mR.

Emergency room staff should be given training in the use of personal dosimetry.

e a

" Objective number is from CM EI-3 (dated February 26, 1988) as it relates to ARCAs.

b Corrective Action Completed.

C 1

Corrective Action incomplete.

"Itochester Ceneral Hospital did not participate in the 8/16/89 esercise.

ARCAs cleared 8/2/89.

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.E 92

-J 4 REMOVAL OF COMPLETED ARCAs PROM PREVIOUS PEA The following list summarizes those ARCAs identitled in the Robert E. Glnna Nuclear Power Ststfon PEA dated October 19,1988 (Revised June 1989) which have been corrected and verified in previous exercises and are being removed from the tables provided in Section 3: '

3 Table 4.1.0 New York State:

2-6

~

Table 4.1.1 Ingestion Exercise 10 New York States Table 4.2.0 Western Districts -

3 Table 4.4.0 Emergency Operation 1 Facility:

Table 4.5.0 Joint News Center:

3&4 Table 4.6.0 Wayne County:

7 - 23 Table 4.7.0 Monroe County:

4 - 12, 14, 15 & 16-The only ARCAs which appear in Section 3 are those previous ARCAs which

- remain incompleto, have been completed as a result of the August 16,1989 exercise, or are the new ARCAs identitled during the August 16,1989 exercise.

i e

v 9

. 1.

5

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r4*N DRAFT-POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT 4

August 16,1989, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of New York State, Wayne County, and Monroe County for the ROBERT E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION June 11, 1990 s

Federal Emergency Management Agency Regior 11 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y.10278 t

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I CONTENTS P A RTICIP ATIO N O F GOVE R N M E NTS........................................

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A B B R EVI ATIO N S.......................................................... vil 4,

SUMMARY

lx 1 I NT R O D U CTI O N........................................................

1

-j 1.1 Exe rc ise Bac kgro und.................................................

1 l.

1. 2 F ede ral E val ua t o rs..................................................

2 L

1.3 Evalua t ion C ri t eria..........................................~........

-4 J

1. 4 Ex erc ise Obj ec t ives.................................................

5 1.4.1 State Emergency Operations Center.............................

5 1.4.2 Emergency Operations Facility..................................

6

'1.4.3 Joint Ne ws C e nt er............................................

6 u

l' 1.4.4 Wayne County Emergency Operations Center.....................

7 1.4.5 Wayne County Field Ac ilvities..................................

8.

1.4.6 Monroe County Emergency Operations Center.....................

9 I

l 1.4.7 Monroe County Field Activities................................. 10

1. 4. 8 M edical Drill................................................. 10 1.5 Exercise Scenario................................................... 11 1.5.1 Sce nario Overvie w............................................ 11 1.5.2 Sta te and Local Ac tivities...................................... 17 1.5.3 Emergency Classification and Event Time Line.................... 18 1

1.5.4 Protective Action Time Line.................................... 19 4

2 EX E R C IS E EVA LU ATIO N................................................ 2 0 l-

'l 2.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center.......................... 20 2.2 ' Emergency Operations Facility........................................ 73 l

2.3 Join t Ne ws C e n t er.................................................. ' 2 5 l

2. 4 W ayn e. C o un t y...................................................... 29 2.4.1 Wayne County Emergency Operations Center..................... 29 2.4.2: Field Monitoring Teams........................................ 39 2.4.3 F ield A c t i v i t i e s............................................... 42

. 2.4.4.. Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................. 46 2.5 M o nroe Co un ty..................................................... 4 7 2.5.1 Monroe County Emergency Operations Center..................... 47

'2.5.2 Field Monitoring Tea ms......................................... 54' 2.5.3 Field A c t i vi t ies............................................... 57

.2.5.4 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................. 60

2. 6 ' M edic al Drill....................................................... 62 2.6.1 A m bulance Po r tion............................................ 62 2.6.2 Hospi tal P o rt i on.............................................. 63 2.7 Remedial Exercise - October 1 8, 19 8 9.................................. 64 3

SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING C O R R E CTI V E A CTI O N.................................................. 67 4 REMOVAL OF COMPLETED ARC As FROM PREVIOUS PEA.................. 92 Lll n-.

~

e TABLES 3.1 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station -- Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action August 16, 1989 -

N e w Y o rk Sta t e....................................................... 68 3.2 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action August.16,1989 -Ingestion Ex e rc ise N e w Y ork St a t e............................................... 69 3.3 Robert E. Ginna ' clear Power Station - Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Reqp.ng Corrective Action August 16, 1989 - Western District..............................................................

73 3.4 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action August 16,1989 - Lake District..............................................................

74 3.5 Robert.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action August 16, 1989 - Emergency Ope ra tio n F ac ili ty..................................................... 75 3.6 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station -- Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action August 16,1989 - Joint NewsCenter.........................................................

76 3.7 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Summary of Deficiencies or Areas Reqdring Corrective Action October 18,1989 - Joint NewsCenter.........................................................

79 3.8 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action August 16,1989 - Wayne County..............................................................

80 3.9 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station -- Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action August 16, 1989 - Monroe County..............................................................

88 3.10 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action August 16, 1989 - Rochester G e n e ral H osp i t al...................................................... 91 iv

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PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENTS

~

PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS -

t The State of New York l

State Emergeeny Management Department "of Laboe i

e Office l

Department of Education -

e Departr.ient of Health Division of Military and Naval Divislot of State Police Affairs Department of Agriculture and Department of Transportation Markets Department of State Department of Environmental e

Energy Office Conservation -

Public Service Commission Department of Parks and Recreation Roches ter Gas & Electric Department of Mental Health Corporation e

Civil Air Patrol e

Department of Corrections e

Office of Mental Retardation New York Thruway Authority Developmental Disability American hed Cross-Salvation Army Lake District Office of Geneeal Services State University of New York Office of Fire Prevention and Control Western District Monroe County County Executive / Administration Rochester Chapter of the Americant e

Department of Public Safety Red Cross e

Office of Emergency Preparedness

- - Regional Transit Service and Lif t e

Auxillary Police Units Line Department of Public Health Humane Society of Rocheme and Division of Public Safety Commun-

. Monroe County leations Radio Amateur Civil Emergency e

Department of Social Services Service / Amateur Radio Emergency Office of the Sheriff Road Service Pat *ol and Marine Unit -

Water Authority e

Fire Coordinator City of Rochester - Fire, Police, e

EMS Coordinator o

Office of Emergency Communications, Department of Public Works Water Bureau-(Transportation, Traffic, and Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation Pure Waters)

Rochester Telephone Corporation Department of Communications and New York State Departm:nt of Special Events Transportation Webster Police e'

New York State Police Webster Central School District New York State Department of Health L

1

i i

I Agricultural Stabilization and

Pittsford Central School District Conservntion Service Pittsford Volunteer Fire Pittsford Volunteer Ambulance Department U.S. Department of Agriculture Wayne County Office of Aging Board of Supervisfors Wayne Area Transportation Services Office of Emergency Management Wayne Central School District Sheriff's Department Palmyra-Macedon Central School Fire Coordinator District Highway Department Williamson Central School District Ambulance Coordinator Union Hill Fire Department Social Services Ontario Fire Department American Red Cross East Williamson Fire Department Department of Health Walsworth Town Highway Schools Coordinator Utility County Extension Association County PIO New York State Police

RACES New York State Agriculture and

+

Marketing USDA Soll Conservation Service NONPARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS Ontario County Province of Ontario, Canada vi

j

~

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ABBREVIATIONS ANL Argonne National Laboratory ARC American Red Cross ARCA.

Area (s) Requiring Corrective Action ARFI Area (s) Recommended for Improvement '

BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOH Department of Health (New York State)

DO!

U.S. Department of the Interior DOT U.S. Department of Transportation DRD Direct-Reading Dostmeter EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECL Emergency Classification Level EMS Emergency Medical Service EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERPA Emergency Response Planning Area FAA Federal Aviation Administration FDA-U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GNPS -

Ginna Nuclear Power Station HHS-U.S. Department of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory JNC.

Joint News Center KI Potassium lodide MD Medical Drill MCFA Monroe County Field Activities MCOEC Monroe County Emergency Operation Center NAWAS National Warning System NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUE Notification of' Unusual Event NYSPIN New York State Police Information Network PA Protective Action

' PAG Protective Action Guideline PAR Protective Action Recommeadation PEA Post-Exercise Assessment PIO Public Information Officer PMC Personnel Monitoring Center RAC Regional Assistance Committee

~

RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RECS Radiological Emergency Communications System REPP ltadiological Emergency Preparedness Plan vil

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ABBREVIATIONS (Cont'd).

RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan-RO Radiological Officer SEMO State Emergency Management Office SEOC State Emergency Operations Center (Albany)

TCP

~ Traffic' Control Point TLD Thermoluminescent Dostmeter TSC Technical Support Center USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture USN U.S. Navy

' WATS Wayne Area Transportation Service WCFA Wayne County Field Activities WCEOC ' Wayne County Emergency Operations Center O

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s

SUMMARY

s i

On August 16,1989^' a team of 25 Federal evaluators evaluated an exercise of' the radiological emergency response plan and the level of State and County preparedness for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station located in Ontarlo, New York. The exercise was announced and took place from approximately 0700 to 1500 hours0.0174 days 0.417 hours 0.00248 weeks 5.7075e-4 months . - Following the

.I exercise, an evaluation was made by the Federal evaluator team, and a preliminary briefing for exercise participants was held at the Newark-Sheraton inn in Newark, New

. York, on

" gust 18,1989, at 0930 hours0.0108 days 0.258 hours 0.00154 weeks 3.53865e-4 months . A media briefing was held at 1400 hours0.0162 days 0.389 hours 0.00231 weeks 5.327e-4 months on

{

August 18, 1989, at the Joint News Center in Rochester, New York. Subsequent to those j

- preliminary briefings, detailed evaluations were-prepared and are included in this

.i report. - The hospital response was demonstrated on August 2,1989 at the Rochester General Hospital.

During a full-participation exercise, the Federal Emergency Management Agency requires that most components of the state and local emergency response organizations participate. Federa1 evaluators evaluated the following operations:

l J.

' State Emergency Operations Center in Albany Off-Site Emergency Operations Facility' i

e Joint News Center i

Wayne County Emergency Operations Center Monroe County Emergency Operations Center Stren activation (simulated) and Emergency Broadcast System l

messages (actual and simulated)

Evacuation of the general population i

L

- Radiological field monitoring e

Impediments to evacuation

(.

q Traffic and access cont.ol Personnel Monitoring Center l

Reception Center and Congregate Care Center Medical drill EK w-_____-_-________--_-____.--__-____,

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ML20058K863

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