ML20058F497

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 56 to License DPR-72
ML20058F497
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/16/1982
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20058F494 List:
References
TAC-48471, NUDOCS 8207300534
Download: ML20058F497 (2)


Text

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UNITED STATES E'

,<'h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E

WASHINGTON. D C. 20555 s

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AT1ENDf1ENT NO. 56 TO FACILITY OPERATIllG LICENSE NO. DPR-72 FLORIDA POWEP. CORPORATION, ET AL CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-302 Entroduction In a May 28, 1982 letter, Florida Power Corporation (the licensee) requested a Technical Specification (TS) change to allow operation up

~ to 97.3% of full power (2475 MWt) with the Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors (RCPPMs) out of service. The RCPPMs provide a fast (0.620 ms) reactor trip signal on loss of power to the reactor coolant pumps.

This system was added to CR-3 as part of a previous power level upgrade (2452 MWt to 2544 MWt). Since then, plant operations have been interrupted a number of times due to spurious operation of the RCPPMs.

Therefore, the licensee proposed to operate CR-3 at 90.4% without the RCPPMs until they could establish the cause of the RCPPM trips and implement a fix. We approved operation at this level. The licensee now proposes to increase the reactor power level from 90.4% to 97.3% with the RCPPMs out of service.

The licensee's letter includes proposed TS changes addressing operation at reduced power without the RCPPMs for both three pump and four pump opera tion.

Discussion The licensee has submitted a summary of the results of analysis of the four pump loss of coolant flow and three pump loss of coolant flow (for three pump operation) without taking credit for the RCPPMs. The analysis relied on the Flux / Flow Trip, and shows that the minimum Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) during a loss of coolant flow would be 1.30.

Evaluation The analysis of the four pump loss of flow was done with the same codes, methods and correlation as previously used in CR-3 licensing analyses.

The analysis results indicate that the minimum DNBR would be 1.30 which is the DNBR limit. The analysis therefore demonstrates acceptable results.

Previous analyses for the four pump loss of flow indicated a minimum DNBR of 1.43 when the event was initiated from 2300 MWt (90.4% power).

We have independently determined that the reduction in minimum DNBR from 1.43 to 1.30 is consistent with an increase from 90.4% power to 97.3% power.

8207300534 820716 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P

PDR

2 Several questions remain unresolved relative to the three pump loss of coolant flow analysis. The licensee's April 9,1982 letter on this subject states that steady state thermal-hydraulic analyses indicated that a loss of coolant flow during three pump operation from 1725 MWt (75% of 2300 MWt) would satisfy the DNBR criteria. In the absence of an analysis of the three pump loss of coolant flow transient at 1725 MWt, we rejected the licensee's April 9,1982, proposed TS change.

The licensee's May 28, 1982 submittal indicates that the analysis of the three pump loss of coolant flow provides the basis for operation only up to 1400 MWt.

In subsequent discussions, the licensee indicated that uncertainties in the Reactor Protection System (RPS) setpoints for three pump operation caused the three pump loss of coolant flow to be more severe than expected. At present, the licensee has not provided sufficient infonnation on the RPS setpoint uncertainties and the influence of these uncertainties on the three pump loss of coolant flow for us to approve the requested TS change to allow operation up to 1400 MWt for three pump operation with the RCPPMs out of service.

Environmental Consideration We have detennined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Da ted : July 16,1982 The following NRC personnel have contributed to this Safety Evaluation:

G. Holahan and S. Miner.